Not For Official Publication

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THORNE, Judge.

Heather Cloward appeals from her conviction on one count of aggravated exploitation of prostitution, a second degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1306 (2008). Cloward argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that she encouraged, induced, or otherwise purposely caused sixteen-year-old C.W. to become or remain a prostitute or that Cloward had the requisite degree of awareness that C.W. was under the age of eighteen. We affirm.

"A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he [or she] . . . encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become or remain a prostitute . . . ." Id. § 76-10-1305(1)(b). Exploitation of prostitution is aggravated to a second degree felony if "the person procured, transported, or persuaded . . . is under eighteen years of age." Id. § 76-10-1306(1)(b). "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Burkinshaw, 2010 UT App 245, ¶ 10, 239 P.3d 1052 (internal quotation marks omitted). We determine that the evidence in support of Cloward's conviction is more than ample.

As to the district court's conclusion that Cloward encouraged, induced, or otherwise purposely caused C.W. to become or remain a prostitute, C.W. testified that Cloward "talked about, like, the basics of what escorting was. Like [Cloward] talked about how there was a fee—a service fee that you go and collect and that you give a percentage to her . . . ." In addition, C.W. testified that Cloward told her that she could earn tips for "whatever you feel comfortable with . . . . [Y]ou could do anything you wanted, oral sex, you could do sex." C.W. also testified that Cloward told her to always take condoms with her "[j]ust in case you were going to have sex" and instructed her to use the condoms if she engaged in sex acts. Cloward herself acknowledged that massages provided by escorts could possibly result in a "happy ending," i.e., an orgasm, and that she never instructed her escorts not to provide such a service. Taken together, these statements more than adequately support the district court's conclusion that Cloward had, at the very least, encouraged C.W. to engage in prostitution.

The evidence also adequately supports the district court's conclusion that Cloward knew that C.W. was underage.1 C.W. acknowledged that she lied to Cloward about her age, and Cloward presented evidence of a Utah driver license purporting to show that C.W. was twenty-three years old at the time she was hired. However, C.W. testified that it was Cloward who had provided the driver license to her so that she could get into a bar, raising the inference that Cloward knew that the driver license was a fake.2 Even if C.W. did provide the license to Cloward as proof of age, the district court observed that the stark disparity between the date of birth and the picture on the license strongly suggested that the license was not valid.3 The district court stated that the photograph on the license depicted

Taken together, the trial testimony, the obvious questions as to the validity of the driver license, and the district court's own observations of C.W.'s apparent age at trial all serve to convince us that the district court's conclusion that Cloward knew that C.W. was under eighteen years of age was not "against the clear weight of the evidence." See Burkinshaw, 2010 UT App 245, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The clear weight of the evidence supports the district court's conclusions that Cloward encouraged, induced, or otherwise purposely caused C.W. to become or remain a prostitute and that she knew that C.W. was underage. Accordingly, we affirm Cloward's conviction.

WE CONCUR: Carolyn B. McHugh, Associate Presiding Judge, and Gregory K. Orme, Judge.