VOROS, Judge:
¶ 1 The judgment on appeal was entered in 2004 and unconditionally affirmed in 2006. In 2013, the district court undertook, appellants contend, to alter the terms of that judgment. The principal question on appeal is whether the district court had jurisdiction to do so. We conclude that it did not and accordingly vacate the post-judgment rulings of the district court.
¶ 2 In 1989, Ali Ghaffarian and his wife Nasrin Faezi (Defendants) established Access Auto as a wholesale vehicle business. In 1991, Defendants decided to rent a large lot (the Property) on State Street in Salt Lake City to expand their wholesale business into a retail business selling used vehicles. To "share some expenses" and "help[ ] each other," Defendants approached a friend, Hassan Mardanlou, about cosigning a lease on the Property. Mardanlou owned a wholesale vehicle business called M & M Motors. Defendants and Mardanlou cosigned a lease, which included renewal and future-purchase provisions. The parties shared the Property, but they maintained "two different dealership[s]."
¶ 3 In 1992, M & M Motors ran out of money to maintain inventory for its wholesale business. Defendants began paying Mardanlou as a salaried employee for Access Auto, and Mardanlou worked there as a car salesman and lot manager. In 1994, Defendants unilaterally exercised the option to purchase the Property. Mardanlou did not contribute to the down payment, nor did he make any mortgage payments on the Property. In 1997, Mardanlou terminated his employment with Access Auto.
¶ 4 The following year, Mardanlou sued Defendants, claiming partnership status in Access Auto and seeking money damages. In the 2002 trial, the district court concluded that Defendants and Mardanlou had indeed entered into an oral partnership agreement. It awarded Mardanlou "one-half the value of the [Property]," plus interest, "less any remaining outstanding mortgage related to the purchase" of the Property. In 2003, the district court entered a judgment requiring Defendants "to transfer to [Mardanlou] by deed one-half of the real [P]roperty known as Access Auto." It further noted that any "reallocation of debt or mortgage on said [P]roperty [would be] subject to further hearing."
¶ 5 On September 13, 2004, the district court entered an amended judgment (the 2004 Amended Judgment) concerning rents and offsets. The district court awarded Mardanlou rents from the date of dissolution of the partnership in 1997 through the date of the 2004 Amended Judgment. Defendants timely appealed.
¶ 6 On appeal before this court, Defendants challenged the district court's ruling
¶ 7 In 2008, after the appeal, Defendants transferred to Mardanlou by quitclaim deed "a one-half interest as tenant in common" in the Property. Defendants also paid Mardanlou net rents plus interest for rents accrued through the date of entry of the 2004 Amended Judgment.
¶ 8 In 2011, the district court ruled that the Property was still "partnership property," and that Defendants had "failed to present any case law, rule or statute that would alter the status of the Property as being held as a tenant in partnership."
¶ 9 In 2012, the district court ordered Defendants to prepare a claim of credits for the amounts he paid in maintenance and improvements, insurance, and taxes on the Property through the present. In this April 24, 2012 Ruling (the 2012 Ruling), the district court indicated that these credits would be set off against the rents plus interest that had accrued from the date of entry of the 2004 Amended Judgment through the present. Defendants remonstrated that the 2004 Amended Judgment required them to pay rents only until the date of the Amended Judgment, September 13, 2004. In response, the district court reconsidered and "clarifie[d]" the text of the 2004 Amended Judgment. In the Ruling, the court explained that the requirement that Defendants pay Mardanlou rents from November 7, 1997, "until the date hereof" did not mean until the date of the 2004 Amended Judgment. Instead, the court defined the period for which Defendants owed rents to Mardanlou as "beginning from November 7, 1997, until the completion of winding-up, settling of accounts, and distribution of assets." Based on this "clarifi[cation]," the district court entered a final order in March (the 2013 Order). That order awarded Mardanlou an additional $299,527.09 in rents accruing from the date of the 2004 Amended Judgment until the date of the 2013 Order. Defendants appeal.
¶ 10 Defendants ask this court to vacate the 2013 Order. They offer three grounds for doing so.
¶ 11 First, Defendants contend that the district court lost jurisdiction over the case after it entered the 2004 Amended Judgment and this court affirmed that judgment on appeal in Mardanlou I, 2006 UT App 165, 135 P.3d 904.
¶ 12 Second, Defendants contend that even if the district court retained jurisdiction to award post-judgment rents, res judicata barred such an award.
¶ 13 Finally, Defendants contend that even if the district court had jurisdiction to award post-judgment rents and was free to do so under res judicata principles, the award of rents accruing after the 2008 conveyance of a tenancy in common in the Property constituted error. The award constituted error, Defendants argue, because tenants in common have no obligation to pay rents to one another under the circumstances presented here.
¶ 14 Because we agree with Defendants on their first contention, we need not address their second and third contentions.
¶ 15 Defendants contend that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case after entering the 2004 Amended Judgment and after that judgment was unconditionally
¶ 16 "[I]t is settled law that a [district] court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment." Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 12, 24 P.3d 958 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, ¶¶ 55-56, 990 P.2d 945 (noting that district courts may ordinarily change the terms of a judgment before entering final judgment). However, "[a]s a general rule, unless control over [the judgment] has been retained in some proper manner, ... no final judgment can be amended after the term at which it was rendered or after it otherwise becomes a final judgment." Frost v. District Court of First Judicial Dist., 96 Utah. 106, 83 P.2d 737, 740 (1938) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, any "variances or conflicts" over the language of the judgment "must be pointed out, and (by proper proceedings) remedied, while the [district] court still has jurisdiction of the cause."
¶ 17 "Generally, when a party files a timely notice of appeal, the court that issued the judgment loses jurisdiction over the matters on appeal." Myers v. Utah Transit Auth., 2014 UT App 294, ¶ 15, 341 P.3d 935 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ¶ 45, 993 P.2d 191 ("`This court has long followed the general rule that the [district] court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is under advisement on appeal.' (quoting White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990))).
¶ 18 Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, "a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding on successive stages of the same litigation." IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 26, 196 P.3d 588. And "a district court's power to reconsider decided issues is limited when the case has been appealed and remanded." Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 352. "This aspect of law of the case doctrine is frequently referred to as the mandate rule." Id. "`The mandate rule, unlike the law of the case before a remand, binds both the district court and the parties to honor the mandate of the appellate court.'" Id. (quoting IHC Health Servs., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 28, 196 P.3d 588). "Thus, the decisions of an appellate
¶ 19 Utah law distinguishes between enforcing a judgment and amending or altering a judgment. District courts possess jurisdiction to enforce a final judgment. See Cheves, 1999 UT 86, ¶ 52, 993 P.2d 191 (observing that an "initial action resulting in a final judgment and the subsequent action seeking enforcement of that judgment are separate proceedings, each resulting in separate judgments"). But as we have discussed, once final, "a judgment[ ] is no longer open to any amendment, revision, modification, or correction which involves the exercise of the judgment or discretion of the court on the merits or matters of substance." Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah.2d 314, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 20 Here, whether the district court properly exercised jurisdiction depends on whether the 2013 Order permissibly enforced, or impermissibly altered, the 2004 Amended Judgment.
¶ 21 The 2004 Amended Judgment awarded Mardanlou rents from the date of dissolution of the partnership in 1997 through the date of the 2004 Amended Judgment:
(Emphasis added.) Defendants appealed.
¶ 22 In Mardanlou I, we affirmed the district court's award of "one-half the annual rental value of the [P]roperty until the date judgment was entered." 2006 UT App 165, ¶ 23, 135 P.3d 904, overruled on other grounds by Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C., 2008 UT 28, 183 P.3d 248. We referred to the "[district] court's award of rental value from 1997 to judgment," id. ¶ 23, and affirmed that Mardanlou's right to receive rents ran from the partnership dissolution in 1997 to "the date of final judgment," as expressed in the 2004 Amended Judgment, id. ¶ 7. The district court's 2004 Amended Judgment fully and finally disposed of the rents issue. We affirmed that judgment unconditionally, and we remitted the case without remanding for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 25. Accordingly, the 2004 Amended Judgment was final, and the district court lacked jurisdiction to award further relief.
¶ 23 We now turn to the district court's 2013 Order to determine whether it permissibly enforced or impermissibly altered the terms of the 2004 Amended Judgment.
¶ 24 The 2013 Order relied upon the 2012 Ruling, which purported to clarify, and thus merely enforce, the 2004 Amended Judgment by interpreting the language to mean that rents were ongoing and due to Mardanlou until the date Defendants had paid all rents:
(Emphasis added.) The district court then interpreted the language to mean that rents were ongoing and due to Mardanlou until the date Defendants had paid all rents. The 2013 Order thus required Defendants to pay rents to Mardanlou beyond the September 13, 2004 date of the 2004 Amended Judgment
¶ 25 This reading of the 2004 Amended Judgment in effect amended it by awarding relief not awarded in 2004 Amended Judgment itself. The 2004 Amended Judgment states that Defendants must pay "one-half the court-determined $83,500 annual rental value of the Property, pro-rated each month for the period November 7, 1997, until the date hereof" (Emphasis added.) The clear meaning of "hereof" refers to the 2004 Amended Judgment, dated September 13, 2004. Thus, the district court granted rents through September 13, 2004. In Mardanlou I, we read the 2004 Amended Judgment in this manner and affirmed it without alteration. 2006 UT App 165, ¶¶ 7, 23-24, 135 P.3d 904.
¶ 26 Therefore, the 2013 Order attempting to award post-September 2004 rents did not enforce, but rather altered, the 2004 Amended Judgment. Because the 2004 Amended Judgment was a final judgment affirmed on appeal, the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter it. See Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 352; Frost v. District Court of First Judicial Dist., 96 Utah. 106, 83 P.2d 737, 740 (1938). "A judgment or order entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void and does not affect the rights of any party." State v. Vaughn, 2011 UT App 411, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 202. Accordingly, the 2013 Order is void, and we vacate that order.
¶ 27 Mardanlou contends that the law-of-the-case doctrine bars Defendants' appeal. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, "a decision made on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation." IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 26, 196 P.3d 588 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine "allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the same case once the court has ruled on them." Id. "[T]he law of the case doctrine acts much like the doctrine of res judicata—furthering the goals of judicial economy and finality—but within a single case." Id.
¶ 28 Prior to an appeal, "reconsideration of an issue before a final judgment is within the sound discretion of the district court." Id. ¶ 27. But when a party appeals a final judgment, the mandate rule "dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in a case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings of that case." Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995). "The lower court must not depart from the mandate, and any change with respect to the legal issues governed by the mandate must be made by the appellate court that established it or by a court to which it, in turn, owes obedience." Id. at 1038. "Thus, the decisions of an appellate court become the law of the case and cannot be reconsidered on remand." Mid-America Pipeline Co., 2009 UT 43, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 352.
¶ 29 Mardanlou relies on the 2004 Amended Judgment as affirmed on appeal as the law of the case, arguing that "[t]he mandate rule binds the [district] court and this appellate court to prior appellate rulings [in the same case] should the case return on appeal." We agree. But this argument cuts against Mardanlou. As we have explained, the 2004 Amended Judgment awarded pre-judgment rents only, and our opinion in Mardanlou I affirmed an award of "one-half the annual rental value of the [P]roperty until the date judgment was entered." 2006 UT App 165, ¶ 23, 135 P.3d 904, overruled on other grounds by Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C., 2008 UT 28, 183 P.3d 248. As we explained above, the district court lacked jurisdiction to expand the relief granted in the 2004 Amended Judgment to award a portion of post as well as pre-judgment rents. The law of the case therefore favors Defendants, not Mardanlou.
¶ 30 Finally, Defendants ask that we "vacate the [district] court's ruling declaring the
¶ 31 A lot happened between 2004 and 2014. The district court entered a final judgment, the 2004 Amended Judgment. This judgment ordered Defendants to "transfer by deed" to Mardanlou "an undivided one-half interest" in the Property; ordered Mardanlou to reimburse Defendants in the amount of one-half of the $663,414.90 that Defendants had paid for the Property; and ordered Defendants to pay Mardanlou one-half of all rents received through the date of entry of judgment. Finally, it ordered "that any and all remaining claims in this action are dismissed with prejudice."
¶ 32 We affirmed the 2004 Amended Judgment in Mardanlou I. See 2006 UT App 165, ¶ 23, 135 P.3d 904. In 2008 Defendants transferred by deed to Mardanlou "a one-half interest as tenant in common" in the Property. In addition, Defendants paid rents due through the date of the 2004 Amended Judgment, including post-judgment interest.
¶ 33 But in a series of orders culminating in the 2012 Ruling, the district court ruled that the parties' partnership had not been wound up or terminated, ordered the parties to wind up the partnership, declared the parties tenants in partnership, and awarded Mardanlou a share of rents paid after entry of the 2004 Amended Judgment.
¶ 34 As explained above, once the district court entered the 2004 Amended Judgment and this court unconditionally affirmed it, the district court lost jurisdiction to act other than to enforce that judgment. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, ¶ 52, 993 P.2d 191. By 2012, the 2004 Amended Judgment had been satisfied and thus required no enforcement. The 2004 Amended Judgment ordered Defendants to "transfer by deed" to Mardanlou "an undivided one-half interest" in the Property. After the judgment was affirmed on appeal, Defendants did transfer by deed to Mardanlou an undivided one-half interest in the Property. In addition, Defendants paid to Mardanlou a share of pre-judgment rents together with pre- and post-judgment interest. The 2004 Amended Judgment required nothing more of Defendants and in fact dismissed any and all remaining claims with prejudice.
¶ 35 But the 2012 Ruling purported to grant further relief. It adjudicated the status of the parties in 2012 with respect to the former partnership, it ordered the parties to wind up the partnership, and it required Defendants to pay Mardanlou a portion of post-judgment rents. The 2004 Amended Judgment awarded none of this relief. The district court thus lacked jurisdiction to grant this relief in 2012, and its ruling purporting to do so is void. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's 2012 Ruling.
¶ 36 The April 24, 2012 Ruling and the March 20, 2013 Order are hereby vacated.