R. KIMBALL MOSIER, Judge.
The matter before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Motion) filed by Defendants, David Bevan (Bevan) and Benedict Bichler (Bichler) (jointly Defendants), and the Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Cross-Motion) filed by the Chapter 7
The Trustee commenced this adversary proceeding seeking recovery of payments he alleges were fraudulent transfers from the Debtor to the Defendants. "Core" matter jurisdiction rests in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(H) and 1334.
Prior to May 2004, Defendants owned 100% of the outstanding stock of Delta Equipment Industrial Systems, Inc. d/b/a DEI Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation (DEI-UT). Through a series of transactions (collectively referred to as the Purchase Agreement), Defendants sold 44.843% of their shares of DEI-UT to Environmental Services Group (ESG) for the purchase price of $4,000,000 and DEI-UT redeemed 43.946% of Defendants' shares of DEI-UT for $3,920,000 (the Redemption Amount). The Redemption Amount was to be paid on closing by DEI-UT in cash, by certified check or by wire transfer of immediately available funds to the account or accounts designated by the [Defendants]." At the time of closing, the Defendants delivered the redeemed shares to DEI-UT.
As part of the Purchase Agreement, ESG made a secured loan to DEI-UT in the amount of $7,520,000, which included the $3,200,000 Redemption Amount. ESG wired the $7,520,000 from its account at Union Bank of California, N.A., (Union Bank) to a trust account of the Debtors' attorneys, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker (RQN), at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.(Wells Fargo). Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement and Bichler's instructions, the sum of $2,088,576 from the $3,920,000 Redemption Amount was wired from the Wells Fargo account to Bichler's account at Barnes Bank. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement and instructions from Bevans, the sum of $1,831,124 from the Redemption Amount was dispersed by a check drawn on RQN's Wells Fargo account, payable to Bevan. Union Bank, Wells Fargo Bank and Barnes Bank are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Banks."
As a final stage of the Purchase Agreement, DEI-UT merged into D.E.I. Systems, Inc., (DEI). On September 7, 2007, DEI filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. On April 15, 2008, it converted its case to one under chapter 7 and the Trustee was appointed. On February 25, 2009, the Trustee commenced this adversary proceeding on theories of fraudulent transfer against Bevan and Bichler to recover the funds paid to them by DEI-UT. The $2,088,576 and $1,831,124 payments of the Redemption Amount paid to the Defendants, are hereinafter referred to as the "Payments."
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The sole legal issue before the Court in this matter is whether § 546(e)
The Defendants argue that the Payments were accomplished by wire transfers and drafts and are therefore transfers made by or to (or for the benefit of) a financial institution and may not be avoided by the Trustee. Stated another way, because the parties to the Purchase Agreement used the banking industry to effect the Payments, the Payments cannot be avoided. A statute ought to be construed so that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant and to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.
When interpreting statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and only seek extrinsic guidance if the statute is ambiguous or if its application as written produces an absurd result.
Because the interpretation proposed by the Defendants produces an absurd result and because courts have disagreed on the applicability of § 546(e),
This Congressional intent does not require a reading of § 546(e) that would provide protection to transactions that do not require the involvement of financial institutions. Such a reading would be much too broad to fulfill the expressed Congressional intent as explained in Kaiser I and Kaiser II. With an equally plausible and more appropriate reading of the statute available—as explained below—the Court determines that § 546(e) is not intended to provide an expansive safety net that protects transactions simply because a bank honors a customer's instruction to pay.
The Payments are not protected by § 546(e) because the Payments were not transfers made by or to or for the benefit of a financial institution. The case law relied upon by the Defendants is distinguishable. Applicable case law, and in particular controlling case law, interpreting § 546(e) have focused on the definitions of settlement payments or securities contracts and not on whether the transfer was made by or to (or for the benefit of) a financial institution.
An analysis of the Purchase Agreement clearly reveals that the Payments were made by the Debtor to the Defendants for the benefit of the Defendants. Defendants' characterize the Payments as a flow of cash paid by the Banks to the Defendants. Defendants maintain that "the transfers made at the closing of the [Purchase Agreement] were `settlement payments' that were first transferred `to' three `financial institutions' (i.e. Union Bank, Wells Fargo, and Barnes Bank, and then transferred `by' these three financial institutions to the Defendants." The Defendants' "view of things might be arguable if a bank account consisted of money belonging to the depositor and held by the bank. In fact, however, it consists of nothing more or less than a promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor.
Even if the Payments are viewed as a flow of cash, they were not payments or transfers made by or to or for the benefit of a financial institution. The 10th Circuit has adopted what is commonly referred to as the "conduit" theory and has held that banks are not initial transferees in transactions where they are simply honoring their contracts with their customers.
Wells Fargo was not a transferee under the Purchase Agreement because it did not acquire any beneficial interest as a result of the Purchase Agreement. Wells Fargo undertook its contractual obligations with RQN prior to the closing of the Purchase Agreement. Its contractual commitment did not change as a result of the Purchase Agreement or the Payments. The Defendant's banks were not transferees because they received no beneficial interest in any property as a result of the Purchase Agreement or the Payments. None of the Banks took, or parted with, a beneficial interest in the Payments from the Debtor to the Defendants nor in the stock transferred from the Defendants to the Debtor. There was no "transfer" under § 546(e) by or to or for the benefit of a financial institution so no protection is available to any of the parties to the Purchase Agreement under § 546(e).
The roles the Banks played in this case are clearly different than the significant role played by the banks in cases where courts have held that § 546(e) is applicable. In Contemporary Industries,
In addition, and on alternative grounds, the Payments are not protected by the first safe harbor because they were not settlement payments of the type "commonly used in the securities trade." "Settlement payment" is broadly defined as "a preliminary settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the securities trade."
But even if the Payments were settlement payments, they are not settlement payments of the type "commonly used in the securities trade," so they are not settlement payments for purposes of § 546(e). The phrase "commonly used in the securities trade" must modify all of the listed settlement payments to avoid having a circular definition that defines a settlement payment as a settlement payment.
Even if § 546(e) does apply to private securities transactions, the transaction must still reflect "indicia of [settlement payments] `commonly used in the securities trade'" to be protected.
The Payments do not demonstrate any indicia of settlement payments "commonly used in the securities trade." In Norstan, two stockholders owned 100% of the company and sold their shares for over $55,000,000.
The Court also concludes that the second safe harbor provision of § 546(e) is inapplicable to the Payment. The parties do not dispute that the Purchase Agreement is a securities contract. Assuming, for purposes of this analysis, the Payments were transfers made by or to (or for the benefit of ) the Banks, the transfers were not made "in connection with" a securities contract. To avoid the absurd result that all that is required to invoke the protection of § 546(e) is to write a check to effect a transfer made in connection with a securities contract, the phrase "in connection with" requires that the transfer to be causally connected to the securities contract.
At most, the Payments would be transfers effected "through" the Banks. Because the Purchase Agreement was not dependent on a bank's involvement and any transfer was effected with only minimal bank involvement, the transfers effected by the banks were not the type contemplated by the statute. To read § 546(e) as protecting a transfer, simply because it is effected by check or wire transfer, but not protecting a cash transfer for the same transaction is absurd.
In this case the Payments effected by the Banks were simply transfers made to honor a preexisting contract between the Banks and their account holders. Without requiring a greater "connection" than the oblivious facilitation of a transfer by a bank, virtually all securities transactions would be protected under § 546(e). If Congress had intended to protect virtually all securities transactions, it could have easily done so and there would be no need for the extensive Congressional language in § 546(e).
A transfer "in connection with" a securities contract requires more than mere facilitation of the transfer by a bank to trigger protection under § 546(e). The minimal role played by the Banks in this case stand in contrast to the more significant roles played by banks as intermediary entities in some of the decisions that have addressed § 546(e).
The Payments were not transfers made "by or to (or for the benefit of) a financial institution," were not settlement payments "commonly used in the securities trade" and were not transfers made "in connection with" a securities contract. To extend § 546(e) protection to the Payments would be absurd and not in furtherance of Congressional intent.
§ 546(e).