MEMORANDUM DECISION
R. KIMBALL MOSIER, Bankruptcy Judge.
The Court has two matters before it. The first is a motion filed by Jaimie Baker dba Baker Recovery Services (BRS), an assignee of a judgment obtained against Defendant John Stone, to substitute as the plaintiff in the above-captioned adversary proceeding. The second is a motion filed by Gil A. Miller, the Chapter 11 Trustee (Trustee) of the Debtors' substantively consolidated bankruptcy cases and the Plaintiff in the above-captioned adversary proceeding. The latter motion seeks to approve a settlement of the adversary proceeding with Mr. Stone.
After considering the filings relevant to these two motions, after considering the oral arguments of the parties, and after conducting an independent review of applicable law, the Court issues the following Memorandum Decision. This Memorandum Decision constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), made applicable to this proceeding through Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 9014(c) and 7052.1
I. JURISDICTION
The Court's jurisdiction over this case and adversary proceeding is properly invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and § 157(b)(1). These matters are core proceedings within the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) & (H), and the Court may enter a final order. Venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1409.
II. BACKGROUND
The Trustee commenced this adversary proceeding on January 5, 2011, seeking to avoid and recover alleged pre-petition fraudulent transfers made to Mr. Stone in the total amount of $106,426.27. The Trustee obtained a default judgment in that amount against the Defendant and subsequently assigned the judgment to BRS in October 2015. The assignment agreement specifically provided:
For cash consideration to be received from the Buyer upon execution of this Agreement (the "Purchase Price")[,] the Trustee hereby sells, transfers, assigns or otherwise conveys all title, rights, ownership and interests in the aforementioned Judgments to Baker Recovery Services ("Buyer").
The Trustee assigns and authorizes Buyer to recover, compromise, settle (in full or in part) and/or enforce the Judgments at its sole discretion. In so doing, the Buyer has all rights of the Trustee and may notify the Judgment Debtors that satisfaction of the Judgments must be made through Buyer.
. . . .
The sale and assignment of the Judgments to the Buyer is "As Is Where Is" with no representations and warranties of any kind, other than that the Trustee is the holder of the Judgments and has the authority to transfer the Judgments as provided for herein.2
On February 8, 2016 the Defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which BRS opposed. After receiving briefing and conducting two hearings on the motion, the Court granted the motion and set aside the default judgment.3 On August 8, 2016 BRS filed an amended complaint against Mr. Stone. Although the amended complaint omitted three claims for relief that the Trustee had asserted in the original complaint—including two claims under 11 U.S.C. § 5484—the two documents were substantially similar, with the amended complaint repeating much of the language and structure of its predecessor. One significant change, however, was that Mr. Baker substituted "BRS" for "the Trustee" at many points in the amended complaint, such that BRS appeared to be the plaintiff in the adversary proceeding.5 Mr. Baker made clear in the amended complaint that he believed that BRS became "the real party in interest with standing to prosecute this action" through the assignment agreement it executed with the Trustee.6 Mr. Stone filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing, among other things, that BRS "was merely an assignee" of the judgment against him and lacked standing to bring this lawsuit.7
The Court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss on October 25, 2016, where Mr. Stone raised the issue that BRS had not taken the procedural steps necessary to formally substitute for the Trustee as the plaintiff in the adversary proceeding. In response, BRS filed a motion to substitute as the plaintiff pursuant to Rule 25. BRS argued that substitution was proper because it became the "real party in interest in this litigation" through the assignment agreement.8 Mr. Stone filed an objection to the motion wherein he raised the argument that BRS could not pursue the Trustee's fraudulent transfer claim.9
While Mr. Stone's motion to dismiss was pending, the Trustee filed a motion to approve a settlement of the adversary proceeding with Mr. Stone. The Trustee believed that he had the ability to settle with Mr. Stone because "the claims alleged in the Adversary Proceeding reverted back to the Trustee and the Debtors' estate" when the Court set aside the default judgment.10 The Trustee acknowledged that Mr. Baker "believes he is the owner of the claims asserted in the Adversary Proceeding"11 and that "there is a dispute as to whether the Trustee or Baker holds the claims asserted in the Adversary Proceeding."12 BRS filed an objection to the settlement, arguing that the Trustee lacked standing to settle the claims because he sold them to BRS through the assignment agreement.
III. DISCUSSION
The issue at the crux of the parties' dispute is who holds the claims asserted in this adversary proceeding. Answering this question would determine which party controls how to prosecute those claims and, consequently, whether Mr. Stone would face a settlement agreement from the Trustee or an amended complaint from BRS. This inquiry would involve asking what the Trustee intended to assign to BRS: Was it the judgment alone or were the underlying claims included? But the Court does not need to answer that question because even if the Trustee intended to assign the underlying claims, he was legally precluded from doing so.
The underlying claims in this case consist of nine claims which, with one exception, seek to avoid and recover alleged pre-petition fraudulent transfers made to Mr. Stone.13 Courts are split on the issue of whether trustees can assign their rights and powers to avoid and recover fraudulent transfers,14 but the majority of courts have held that such rights are not assignable.15 It is true that parties are not absolutely barred from maintaining a lawsuit under the avoidance provisions of chapter 5 of title 11. Courts have allowed parties to exercise a trustee's avoidance powers in certain limited circumstances, such as pursuant to a chapter 11 plan under § 1123(b)(3)(B),16 or when a creditor is granted derivative standing to pursue avoidance actions that a trustee or debtor in possession has refused to prosecute.17 But these circumstances are not present in this case and are distinguishable from an outright sale of avoidance claims.18
The principal reason why courts generally limit avoidance powers to trustees appears to be the statutory language of the Code.19 Sections such as 544, 547, and 548 confer those powers on trustees, omitting any mention of designees or assigns.20 Policy considerations also counsel against the assignment of avoidance powers. In cases where the assignee is a creditor, "[i]t is feared that by allowing one creditor to buy a claim from the trustee and pursue that claim on his own behalf, that creditor may be allowed to recover more of the estate's assets than would otherwise rightfully be due to that creditor."21 In addition, courts also express a concern that permitting parties other than trustees to pursue avoidance actions could expose the legal system to a multiplicity of lawsuits filed by many different individual plaintiffs.22 This outcome would likely increase the burden on the federal courts and run counter to the policy that favors "the orderly administration of the bankruptcy estate" through the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee.23
For these reasons, the Court holds that even if the Trustee had intended to transfer the underlying claims to BRS through the assignment agreement, he could not have done so. At most, the Trustee assigned the judgment to BRS. Once that judgment was set aside, BRS lacked standing to prosecute any of the underlying claims.24 Consequently, BRS cannot substitute for the Trustee as the plaintiff in the adversary proceeding. By contrast, the Trustee still holds those claims and has standing to prosecute them, which includes the authority to settle them.
In reviewing a proposed settlement, a "court need only determine that the settlement does not fall below the lowest point in the range of reasonableness."25 That assessment includes consideration of the four Kopexa factors: "[1] the probable success of the underlying litigation on the merits, [2] the possible difficulty in collection of a judgment, [3] the complexity and expense of the litigation, and [4] the interests of creditors in deference to their reasonable views."26 The Trustee's proposed settlement of the adversary proceeding with Mr. Stone contemplates a mutual release of claims and a $2,500 one-time payment from Mr. Stone to the Trustee. After considering the Trustee's motion to approve the settlement agreement and its analysis of the Kopexa factors as applied to the settlement agreement, the Court concludes that the settlement is fair, equitable, and in the best interests of the estate.
IV. CONCLUSION
BRS lacks standing to assert the underlying claims in this adversary proceeding, and its motion to substitute as the plaintiff will be denied. The Trustee has standing to assert those claims, however, and its motion to approve a settlement agreement with Mr. Stone will be granted. Separate orders will be issued in accordance with this Memorandum Decision.
This order is SIGNED.
