PAUL M. WARNER, Magistrate Judge.
District Judge Dale A. Kimball referred this case to Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
As an initial matter, the court notes that Defendant is appearing pro se. As such, the court will "construe his pleadings liberally and hold the pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996). That said, "pro se status does not relieve [a party] of the obligation to comply with procedural rules." Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002).
The United States brought this action pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401 and 7403 to reduce to judgment the outstanding federal tax liabilities assessed against Defendant and to foreclose federal tax liens against real property located at 990 N. 100 E., American Fork, Utah (the "Property").
Defendant has engaged in outlandish, if not out-and-out fraudulent, efforts to muddy and confuse title to the Property by purporting to transfer his interest to his alter ego styled as the "Office of First Presiding Overseer for the Popular Assembly of Shared Enlightenment Ministry, Vernon D. Fraughton, First Presiding Overseer" (the "Office of Overseer"). In its rulings on prior motions, the court had little trouble seeing through Defendant's bumbling machinations
On March 9, 2015, Defendant filed what appears to be a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
On March 11, 2015, the United States filed a motion for summary judgment against Defendant, including multiple declarations and exhibits.
Defendant failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment.
On May 1, 2015, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
As noted above, the court construes pro se pleadings liberally and holds pro se defendants to a less stringent pleading standard. That said, the court has exhibited exceptional patience and liberality towards Defendant. Despite what Defendant believes, he is not exempt from the procedures of this court or well-established principles of law, and the orders of this court.
Out of magnanimity, the court will construe the untitled document filed by Defendant on March 9, 2015 in the light most favorable to Defendant and treat it as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject jurisdiction.
Defendant's previous challenges to the jurisdiction of this court were addressed and denied.
Accordingly, it is recommended that Defendant's March 9, 2015 motion be
Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings. Again, the court applies great liberality in interpreting Defendant's purported motion.
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move for judgment on the pleadings, provided it is "early enough not to delay trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The court applies the same standard to a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting courts "use the same standard when evaluating 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions."). For such motions, a court must "accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in a light most favorable to plaintiff." David v. City & County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1351 (10th Cir. 2002).
The court must also "determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed." Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, . . . that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In determining facial plausibility, courts "disregard conclusory statements," Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012), and need not accept as true legal conclusions, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
As discussed in greater detail below and in the court's prior rulings in this case, the United States' complaint clearly meets the applicable pleading standard and alleges facts sufficient to support all of the necessary elements establishing entitlement to relief. Accordingly, Defendant's Rule 12(c) motion is devoid of merit and frivolous. Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings be
The United States moves for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1991); Nelson v. Geringer, 295 F.3d 1082, 1086 (10th Cir. 2002).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Viktus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir. 1993); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that there are genuine issues for trial. Viktus, 11 F.3d at 1539; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991). An issue of material fact is genuine where a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the party opposing summary judgment. Seymour v. Shawver & Sons, Inc., 111 F.3d 794, 797 (10th Cir. 1997). To constitute a genuine factual dispute, there must be more than a scintilla of evidence that is significantly probative in establishing the fact. Viktus, 11 F.3d at 1539.
In applying the summary judgment standard, the court construes the factual record and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 1996); Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs., 27 F.3d 1499, 1503 (10th Cir. 1994); Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Rule 56(e) provides that if a party "fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)," the court may, inter alia, "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; [or] grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials— including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it."
Local Rule 56-1(c)(3) states that properly stated material facts of record "set forth with particularity in the movant's statement of material facts will be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party." DUCivR 56-1(c)(3). "Failure to respond timely to a motion for summary judgment may result in the court's granting the motion without further notice." DUCivR 56-1(g).
The United States filed its motion for summary judgment on March 11, 2015.
The undisputed material facts in the United States' motion appear supported by the evidence submitted in conjunction with the motion and establish that the United States is entitled to summary judgment against Defendant. Defendant has and has had extensive unpaid tax liabilities arising from his failure to file tax returns or pay income taxes.
Based on the moving papers, the court recommends that the United States' motion for summary judgment be
As set forth above,
Copies of this Report and Recommendation are being sent to all parties, who are hereby notified of their right to object. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The parties must file any objection to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of it. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to object may constitute waiver of objections upon subsequent review.