PAUL M. WARNER, Magistrate Judge.
District Judge Jill N. Parrish referred this matter to Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendants Houweling's Nurseries Oxnard, Inc., Houweling Utah Property, Inc., HNL Holdings Ltd., Houweling Utah Holdings, Inc., and HNL Utah Holding Ltd. (collectively, "Houweling") are a tomato growing operation with locations in Utah, California, and British Columbia.
In 2011 and 2012, Robertson approached Houweling about opening a growing operation in Mona, Utah.
Eventually, the relationship turned sour. In 2014, Houweling sent a letter to Robertson terminating their business relationship.
The deadline to file amended pleadings in this case occurred on February 16, 2015,
Robertson represents that he received new evidence supporting additional counterclaims in January and June of 2016.
Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court "should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." Whether to provide a party leave to amend its pleadings "is within the discretion of the trial court." Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations and citation omitted). The court may deny leave to amend only where there is a "`showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment.'" Bylin v. Billings, 568 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir.1993)).
In the court's view, whether Robertson should be permitted to add additional counterclaims depends on whether Robertson was justified in waiting to seek permission from the court to amend his counterclaims. Robertson contends that he was unable to file the appropriate motion because the substance of his new counterclaims was discovered in January and June of 2016.
Rule 15(a)(2) is not an unworkable straightjacket requiring a motion to amend to be filed within a specified period of time. However, "untimeliness alone" is sufficient to deny leave to amend where the moving party has "no adequate explanation for the delay." Frank v. U.S. W., Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365-66 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing cases). For example, Rule 15(a)(2) is not a mechanism for a party to "make the complaint a moving target," to "salvage a lost case by untimely suggestion of new theories of recovery," to present theories in "seriatim," or to knowingly raise an issue on the eve of trial. See Minter, 451 F.3d at 1206 (quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, a party who unjustifiably delays acts "contrary to the spirit of the rule and runs the risk of the court denying permission because of the passage of time." Id. at 1205 (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, "courts may deny leave for untimeliness or undue delay without a showing of prejudice to the opposing party." Deghand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 904 F.Supp. 1218, 1221 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing cases).
In the context of undue delay, Rule 15(a)(2) requires the court to focus primarily on three factors. First, the court must examine the length of delay—"[t]he longer delay, the more likely the motion to amend should be denied." Minter, 451 F.3d at 1205 (quotations and citations omitted). Second, the court must evaluate the "reasons for the delay" and deny leave to amend when the moving party has not offered an adequate explanation for their neglect. Id. Finally, a motion for leave to amend should be denied where the moving party "knows or should have known of the facts upon which the proposed amendment is based" and fails to include them in the original filing. Frank, 3 F.3d at 1366 (quotations and citations omitted).
For example, in Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2015), the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. Id. at 1248. The Tenth Circuit found that the plaintiffs "offer[ed] no explanation" as to why they waited over four months after new factual allegations came to light to request leave to amend. Id. Similarly, in Bird v. W. Valley City, No. 2:12-CV-903-PMW, 2014 WL 3547829 (D. Utah July 17, 2014), this court denied a plaintiff's motion to amend where the plaintiff waited nearly seven months after the expiration of the fact discovery deadline to seek permission to amend her complaint. Id. at *2. The court found that the plaintiff "failed to provide an adequate explanation for the delay in bringing her motion to amend her complaint." Id. Furthermore, the court recognized that the factual underpinnings to the plaintiff's proposed amendments were available to the plaintiff when her original complaint was filed. Id.
Like Birch and Bird, Robertson offers no explanation for why he waited several months to seek leave of the court to amend his counterclaims. Moreover, the majority of the facts relied on in Robertson's proposed amended counterclaims were available to Robertson at the initiation of this lawsuit.
The deadline to file amended pleadings in this case occurred nearly two years ago.
Furthermore, the greater part of the facts Robertson relies on to assert new counterclaims were known or should have been known to Robertson well before August 2016. Indeed, after reviewing Robertson's proposed amended counterclaims, the court notes that Robertson relies little on the information discovered in January and June.
Based on the foregoing, Robertson's Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaim
IT IS SO ORDERED.