TED STEWART, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants City of Orem, Orem City Police Department, Officer Thomas Wallace, Officer William Crook, Officer Orlando Ruiz, Officer Art Lopez and Officer Todd Ferre (collectively, "Defendants"). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the Motion.
Conrad and Heidy Truman were at home together on September 30, 2012. No one else was in the home. At some point that evening, the couple began to quarrel and Heidy went into the bathroom and locked the door. Mr. Truman then picked the lock and followed her into the bathroom, but left after Heidy asked him to. Later, Mr. Truman was in the kitchen alone when he thought he heard the bathroom door open. A moment later he heard a "pop" sound. Heidy Truman was located toward the back of the house, near the bathroom doorway. She fell forward toward Mr. Truman onto the dining room floor. Rushing to help her, he quickly realized she was bleeding profusely from the side of her head and was struggling to breathe. He attempted CPR and then called 911.
When police arrived at the scene, they found Mr. Truman covered in blood, intoxicated, and in shock. He had to be removed from Heidy Truman's body and threatened to kill the police officers if they did not save her life. Heidy was taken to the hospital, where she later died of her wounds.
After a months-long investigation, police ultimately arrested Mr. Truman and charged him with his wife's murder. Mr. Truman was tried and convicted of murder and obstruction of justice. After trial, Mr. Truman, though new counsel, filed a number of motions with the state court. As a result of one of these motions, Mr. Truman was granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and was eventually acquitted.
Mr. Truman brings the present § 1983 action against the police officers and prosecutors involved in his criminal prosecution, as well as Orem City, the Orem City Police Department, and the Utah County Attorney's Office ("UCAO"). Defendants Utah County Deputy Prosecutor Craig Johnson and the UCAO have been dismissed from the case. The remaining Defendants now seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's remaining causes of action.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Plaintiff alleges that Orem City police officers William Crook, Orlando Ruiz, Art Lopez, and Todd Ferre illegally detained and questioned him on the night of Heidy's death and into the next day. Plaintiff also alleges that he was not properly Mirandized and that he was held without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
In moving for summary judgment, Defendants argue that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Both parties agree that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is a matter of state law, and that the term is four years under the applicable Utah law. However, the parties disagree about when the claim accrues.
Defendants argue that the claim accrues after the action occurs. Therefore, because the alleged bad actions took place on September 30, 2012, and October 1, 2012, the statute of limitations began to run immediately and expired on October 1, 2016.
Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled because his claim involves not only allegations of unlawful detention and interrogation, but also use of the acquired statements in his prosecution. Plaintiff therefore argues that the claim accrued on July 19, 2013, when charges were brought against him that relied on his illegally obtained statements.
In Wallace v. Kato,
The plaintiff in that case argued that his release from custody must be the date of accrual, because the "unlawful arrest led to the coerced confession, which was introduced at his trial, producing his conviction and incarceration."
In this case, the basis of Plaintiff's claim was known on October 1, 2012, when he was detained and questioned. Plaintiff may not pursue other harms under the same cause of action, even those that follow as natural consequences of the original harm. Therefore, the date of accrual is October 1, 2012, and the statute of limitations expired on October 1, 2016. Because Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 12, 2017, it is outside the statute of limitations and the Court will grant summary judgment on his first cause of action.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's second through eighth causes of action are barred by issue preclusion. These six separate causes of action include a wide array of allegations, including lack of probable cause for warrants and subpoenas (second cause of action), unlawful arrest (third cause of action), unlawful pretrial detention (fourth cause of action), malicious prosecution (fifth cause of action), manufacturing and fabricating evidence (sixth cause of action), lack of probable cause in criminal information (seventh cause of action), and unfairness of criminal trial (eighth cause of action).
In Allen v. McCurry,
Under Utah law, "[i]ssue preclusion applies only when the following four elements are met":
In opposing summary judgment based on issue preclusion, Plaintiff asserts that 1) the state court's probable cause finding is not binding, 2) probable cause is properly a question for a jury, 3) he was refused an evidentiary hearing, and 4) the probable cause finding was "based solely upon the tainted information provided by Defendants."
Regarding Plaintiff's first argument, as discussed above, a state court's finding of probable cause finding may have preclusive effect in a § 1983 action. Regarding Plaintiff's second argument, Plaintiff does not identify, and the Court is unaware of, any case law that requires a probable cause finding to be made by a jury in order for it to have preclusive effect. Plaintiff's third and fourth arguments are addressed in greater detail below.
Plaintiff asserts in his Amended Complaint that his "requests to quash the previous bindover or for a new preliminary hearing were opposed, almost summarily denied, and the state court relied upon the tainted evidence and the tainted probable cause findings made previously at the preliminary hearing."
However, a review of the record does not suggest any reason for the Court to doubt the thoroughness or fairness of the state court's decisions. The state court issued a number of decisions in January 2017 relevant to the issues before the Court. In its Order on Defendant's Combined Motion for Bill of Particulars; Bar to Prosecution; and New Preliminary Hearing, the state court found that probable cause remained, even taking into account the various arguments made by Mr. Truman.
The state court also made specific findings related to the existence of probable cause in the warrant and supporting affidavits, which Mr. Truman argued were filled with inaccuracies and omitted critical information. The court stated:
The court pointed to "additional unchallenged information in the warrants to support probable cause."
With respect to the administrative subpoenas challenged by Mr. Truman, the state court found that they were supported by good cause and were reasonably related to the investigation.
Finally, in its Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Outrageous Government Conduct, the state court made a number of relevant findings. First, as to the incorrect measurements, the court found they were due to ineptitude and carelessness.
Plaintiff asserts that the state court's finding of probable cause was "based solely upon the tainted information provided by Defendants."
Plaintiff's second cause of action asserts a lack of probable cause for warrants and investigative subpoenas. His third cause of action alleges an unlawful arrest. As set forth above, the state court considered and rejected these very arguments. Therefore, Plaintiff is precluded from relitigating them. Even if the Court were to reopen the probable cause inquiry, based on the evidence Plaintiff has presented, no reasonable jury could conclude that the warrants in this case, including the arrest warrant, were not supported by probable cause.
To prove that each warrant lacked probable cause, Plaintiff would need to show that after setting aside all false information, and including all omitted exculpatory evidence, each warrant lacked probable cause.
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action alleges that he was unlawfully detained because of a lack of probable cause. Again, the state court decided this issue and Plaintiff is precluded from litigating it. Even if the Court were to reopen the probable cause inquiry, based on the evidence Plaintiff has presented, no reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff's pretrial detention was not based on probable cause.
Plaintiff's fifth cause of action is a claim of malicious prosecution. Under Utah tort law, "lack of probable cause is an essential element of the tort of malicious prosecution."
In Plaintiff's sixth cause of action, he brings a claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments alleging that Defendants manufactured and/or fabricated inculpatory evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence. In Pierce v. Gilchrist, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the closest common law analogy to a § 1983 complaint alleging fabrication of inculpatory evidence and disregard of exculpatory evidence is malicious prosecution.
In his seventh cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that his criminal information was not based on probable cause. Based on issue preclusion, the Court declines to allow Plaintiff to relitigate the state court's findings of probable cause. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment as to the seventh cause of action. Even if the Court were to reopen the probable cause inquiry, Plaintiff has not presented adequate evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that his criminal information was not based on probable cause.
In his eighth cause of action, Plaintiff brings a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment alleging fundamental unfairness of his criminal trial. Plaintiff recounts essentially the same facts as the fifth cause of action for malicious prosecution but brings the claim under only the Fourteenth. However, as the Tenth Circuit reasoned in Pierce v. Gilchrist, analogizing such § 1983 claims to malicious prosecution is equally valid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
To the extent that Plaintiff's eighth cause of action is not barred for the reasons stated, it fails on the merits. The Tenth Circuit "recognize[s] a § 1983 claim for a violation of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights in the narrowest of circumstances."
In his ninth cause of action, Plaintiff brings a claim against Orem City and the Orem City Police Department for unlawful policy, practice, and custom. Defendants move for summary judgment on this cause of action and Plaintiff offers no response. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment.
Also before the Court is Defendants' Expert Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert Robert Prevot. Because nothing in Mr. Prevot's report alters the Court's conclusions, the Court need not decide this Motion. However, the Court is in agreement with many of the arguments raised by Defendants with respect to Mr. Prevot's opinions.
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 81) is GRANTED.