HOWARD C. NIELSON, JR., District Judge.
This case is presently set for trial on January 24, 2020. Standby counsel for Defendant has filed a motion for a continuance, purportedly on behalf of Defendant. The court makes the following findings:
2. On November 17, 2016, Defendant made his initial appearance in this court on the indictment returned in this matter. See Dkt. No. 18.
3. On July 12, 2017, a jury found Defendant guilty of Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment. Dkt. No. 130.
4. On September 4, 2019, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the jury verdict and ordered this court to conduct further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See United States v. Hansen, 929 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2019).
5. On October 17, 2019, Defendant informed the court, through his appointed counsel, that he wished to exercise his constitutional right to conduct his defense pro se.
6. On October 18, 2019, Defendant requested, through his appointed counsel, a continuance of "not less than ninety days." Dkt. No. 205 at 1. This court granted that request, and trial is set for January 24, 2020.
7. On October 29, 2019, this court held a Faretta hearing and granted Defendant's request to conduct his defense pro se. Mr. McCaughey, who had been Defendant's courtappointed counsel, was designated as standby counsel.
8. This is the second request to continue trial since the Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded the 2017 conviction.
9. The motion for a continuance has two significant defects.
10. Given these defects, the court denies standby counsel's motion to continue without prejudice. Defendant may file a motion that provides additional explanation for why a continuance is necessary. In the alternative, Defendant may direct standby counsel to prepare and file such a motion on his behalf, so long as Defendant clearly indicates to the court that the motion has been prepared and filed at his request and that he adopts the motion.
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motion to continue without prejudice.
(Emphasis added). But the very next sentence of section 3161(e)—which the United States surprisingly omits—states that "[t]he periods of delay enumerated in section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this section." Section 3161(e) thus does not appear to bar Defendant from seeking, or the court from granting, a continuance pursuant to section 3161(h)(7)(A) et seq.