OPINION BY Justice CLEO E. POWELL.

In this appeal from a judgment in a wrongful death action, we consider whether the circuit court erred in holding that the exclusivity provision of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act") bars a non-dependent individual who is not eligible to collect benefits under the Act from bringing an action in tort. We further consider whether the circuit court erred in holding that this provision of the Act bars an action in tort against the supplier of a product used in the construction process.

BACKGROUND

Scott Alexander Giordano ("Scott") and Martha R. Giordano ("Martha") were married in 1999. In December of 2007, the parties separated and Martha moved out of the marital home. Scott and Martha continued to live separately until August 2, 2008, when the marital home was sold. At that time, Scott moved in with Martha. However, Scott and Martha continued to maintain separate bank accounts and did not co-mingle funds or incur any joint debt.

On August 8, 2008, Scott was hired as an insulator for McBar Industries, Inc. ("McBar").1 At the time, McBar was the general contractor on a construction project in Chester, Virginia that involved the erection of a multi-story, mixed-use building. The construction project required the use of several subcontractors and vendors. McBar subcontracted with E.C. Couch Builder, Inc. ("Couch") to construct and frame the building and A. Bertozzi, Inc. ("Bertozzi") to hang drywall. Bertozzi, in turn, hired Virginia Builder's Supply, Inc. ("Builder's Supply") to deliver the drywall.

On September 10, 2008, Scott was working on the first floor of the building while Builder's Supply delivered approximately two tons of drywall and related supplies to the second floor of the building. The placement of these materials caused the structure to fail; the first floor walls collapsed, bringing down the second floor and roof. The collapse killed Scott.

On October 9, 2008, Martha filed a claim for benefits with the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission (the "Commission") stemming from Scott's death. After hearing the evidence, a deputy commissioner determined that Scott's estate was entitled to funeral expenses as required under Code § 65.2-512(B). The deputy commissioner further determined that Martha was not a dependent of Scott and, therefore, was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits.

On March 23, 2010, Martha, as personal representative of her husband's estate, filed a wrongful death claim in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond against McBar, Couch, Bertozzi, and others. On June 30, 2010, Martha amended her complaint to include Builder's Supply as a defendant. The defendants filed pleas in bar, arguing that Code § 65.2-307(A),2 the exclusivity provision of the Act, barred Martha's action. The circuit court determined that, because the Commission had jurisdiction over the present matter, the exclusivity provision applied. Accordingly, the circuit court sustained the pleas in bar.3

Martha appeals.

ANALYSIS

Martha argues that the circuit court erred in sustaining the pleas in bar because she was not a member of the class to whom the Act applies. Specifically, Martha contends that because she is not a dependent of Scott she is not eligible for compensation under the Act. Therefore, neither the Act nor the exclusivity provision apply to her.

"The right to compensation under the work[ers'] compensation law is granted by statute, and in giving the right the legislature had full power to prescribe the time and manner of its exercise." Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 407, 83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1954). The plain language of the Act establishes that the General Assembly clearly limited the applicability of the Act to injuries or death by accident "arising out of and in the course of" an individual's employment. Code § 65.2-300. "When an employee sustains such an injury, the Act provides the sole and exclusive remedy available against the employer." Butler v. Southern States Coop., Inc., 270 Va. 459, 465, 620 S.E.2d 768, 772 (2005). Thus, contrary to Martha's argument, the applicability of the Act does not turn on the compensability of the claim. Rather, the compensability of the claim turns, in part, on the Act's applicability.

Put simply, when the injury falls within the purview of Code § 65.2-300, the exclusivity provision applies. See Butler, 270 Va. at 466, 620 S.E.2d at 773 ("The exclusivity provision of Code § 65.2-307 applies only to an injury both `arising out of' and `in the course of' an individual's employment"). However, when the injury does not arise out of or occur in the course of the employment, the exclusivity provision does not apply. See, e.g., Griffith v. Raven Red Ash Coal Co., 179 Va. 790, 798, 20 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1942).

We have explained that "[a] particular claim may be non-compensable [under the Act] for one of two reasons: (1) it does not fall within the purview of the Act, or (2) while within the purview of the Act, certain defenses preclude recovery." Adams v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 261 Va. 594, 598, 544 S.E.2d 354, 356 (2001).

Id. at 599, 544 S.E.2d at 356.

We further note that a number of jurisdictions have addressed similar situations and have come to the same conclusion.4 The Supreme Court of Indiana's analysis in McDonald v. Miner, 218 Ind. 373, 32 N.E.2d 885 (1941), is particularly persuasive.5 In McDonald, the decedent received fatal injuries as the result of an accident that arose out of and occurred in the course of her employment. Id. at 885. Her husband, who was not dependent upon the decedent for support, was awarded funeral expenses6 by the Industrial Board of Indiana. Id. He subsequently filed a wrongful death action against the decedent's employer. Id. The trial court dismissed the action, finding that the Industrial Board of Indiana had exclusive jurisdiction. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the decision, explaining:

Id. at 886-87 (citing Chamberlain v. Florida Power Corp., 144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486 (1940)).

In the present case, it is undisputed that Scott was an employee of McBar and that his death was caused by an accident that occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment with McBar. Clearly, the Act applies and the defense asserted by McBar before the Commission, that Martha was not a dependent, merely rendered the claim non-compensable. As the Act applies, so must the exclusivity provision. Butler, 270 Va. at 466, 620 S.E.2d at 773.

Martha next argues that she is not an employee as defined under Code § 65.2-101 because she is not eligible to receive compensation. As the Act only applies to employees and employers, Martha contends that neither the Act nor the exclusivity provision apply to her action as Scott's personal representative. Again, we must disagree.

The Act provides a number of definitions for the term "employee." See Code § 65.2-101. The definition of employee upon which Martha relies is: "The legal representative, dependents and any other persons to whom compensation may be payable when any person covered as an employee under this title shall be deceased." Id. Martha's argument focuses on the fact that she is not Scott's legal representative and, having been deemed a non-dependent, she is neither a dependent nor an "other person[] to whom compensation may be payable." As such, she asserts that she cannot be considered to be an employee who has accepted the provision of the Act under Code § 65.2-307(A).

However, the definition of employee relied upon by Martha specifically includes the phrase: "when any person covered as an employee under this title shall be deceased." By including this language, the General Assembly has clearly demonstrated its intent to look first to the status of the deceased employee when determining the applicability of the Act. Thus, in the context of Code § 65.2-307(A), the "employee" in the present case was Scott.7

Moreover, Martha's reliance on this definition of employee is irrelevant to the issue in this case. While the Act binds employers and employees, it also defines the categories of persons, in addition to the employee, who are bound by the agreement between employer and employee. Even if Martha is not considered an employee under the Act, the language of Code § 65.2-307(A) is clear and unambiguous that Scott, as an employee of McBar, accepted the rights and remedies of the Act as his exclusive remedy. Martha brought a wrongful death action as Scott's personal representative. The plain language of Code § 65.2-307(A) specifically precludes "all other rights and remedies" available to the personal representative of an employee who has accepted the provisions of the Act. Thus, under the plain language of Code § 65.2-307(A), Martha's wrongful death action is necessarily barred because she brought the action as Scott's personal representative.8 Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in sustaining the pleas in bar as to McBar, Couch and Bertozzi.

With regard to Builder's Supply, however, Martha presents an additional argument: that the circuit court erred in holding that Builder's Supply was not a "stranger" to the "trade, occupation, or business" of the general contractor (i.e. McBar). According to Martha, even if the exclusivity provision applies to McBar, Couch and Bertozzi, it cannot apply to Builder's Supply as Builder's Supply merely delivered the drywall and, therefore, was not actually part of the construction process. We agree.

We have recognized that "[t]he exclusivity provision does not apply ... to a common law action for an employee's injury or death against an `other party.'" Stone v. Door-Man Mfg. Co., 260 Va. 406, 412, 537 S.E.2d 305, 307-08 (2000) (citing Code § 65.2-309).

Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 102, 38 S.E.2d 73, 75-76 (1946).

Builder's Supply argues that this case is similar to Bosher v. Jamerson, 207 Va. 539, 151 S.E.2d 375 (1966). We disagree. In Bosher, the defendant was hired to deliver sand to a construction site and spread the sand to a specific depth. Id. at 541, 151 S.E.2d at 376. The sand served as the base for a concrete floor. Id. The defendant furnished its delivery person with a "dump truck equipped with chains on its tailgate that could regulate the spreading of sand." Id. We determined that, under those facts, it was clear that the defendant was performing the trade, business or occupation of the construction company, and therefore was not an "other party." Id. at 543, 151 S.E.2d at 377.

The distinguishing factor between Bosher and the present case is that in Bosher the defendant was obligated to do more than just deliver sand; he was obligated to spread the sand in a specific manner using specialized equipment which constituted a step in the construction process. Id. at 542-43, 151 S.E.2d at 377-78. In the present case, Builder's Supply was merely obligated to deliver drywall and place it in specific locations which did not constitute a step in the construction process. See Burroughs v. Walmont, Inc., 210 Va. 98, 168 S.E.2d 107 (1969).

In Burroughs, the plaintiff was hired to deliver sheetrock and stack it in different rooms at a construction site. Id. at 99, 168 S.E.2d at 108. As he was doing so, he was injured when he fell down an open stairwell. Id. We determined that the plaintiff was an "other party" to the trade, business or occupation of the construction company, explaining:

Id. at 99-100, 168 S.E.2d at 108.

In the present case, the general manager of Builder's Supply acknowledged that it merely supplied the drywall and placed it in locations specified by either McBar or Bertozzi. As we stated in Burroughs, "the stacking of sheetrock in the several rooms constituted the final act of delivery, not an act of construction." Id. at 100, 168 S.E.2d at 108. Such actions do not transcend delivery and, therefore, Builder's Supply was not engaged in the trade, business or occupation of McBar. Id. Thus, we hold that Builder's Supply was a stranger to the business and the exclusivity provision of the Act does not apply to it. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in sustaining the plea in bar with regard to Builder's Supply.

CONCLUSION

The exclusivity provision of the Act bars Martha's wrongful death action against McBar, Couch and Bertozzi because Scott's death was caused by an accident that occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment with McBar. The bar does not apply to Builder's Supply, however, as mere delivery of drywall is not within the trade, business or occupation of McBar. Therefore, Martha can maintain her wrongful death action against Builder's Supply. Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the circuit court sustaining the pleas in bar filed by McBar, Couch and Bertozzi, reverse its decision sustaining the plea in bar filed by Builder's Supply, and remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.