REBECCA BEACH SMITH, District Judge.
On February 16, 2010, the plaintiff, Project Vote/Voting For America, Inc. ("Project Vote"), filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ("Complaint") against the defendants, Elisa Long ("Long") and Nancy Rodrigues ("Rodrigues"). On March 26, 2010, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("Motion"), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). On April 9, 2010, the plaintiff responded ("Response"), and the defendants replied ("Reply") on April 15, 2010. The Motion is now ripe for review.
Project Vote is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization existing under the laws of Louisiana and having its principal office in the District of Columbia. (Compl. ¶ 4); see 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). It endeavors to increase voter registration and participation among low-income, minority, and younger voters, while "working to enforce and expand public policies and procedures that encourage full participation in elections." (Compl. ¶ 4.) Defendant Elisa Long is the General Registrar of Norfolk, Virginia, and is responsible for
Through its ongoing voter protection efforts in Virginia, Project Vote learned that several students at Norfolk State University, a historically African-American public university located in Norfolk, Virginia, had their voter registration applications rejected by Long's office prior to the November 2008, primary and general elections. (Id. ¶ 14.) Suspicious that these students' applications were incorrectly rejected by the Norfolk General Registrar and that eligible voters may have been prevented or discouraged from voting in the 2008 general election, Advancement Project, a national civil and voting rights organization with which Project Vote works, wrote an email request to Long on May 11, 2009, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i) (hereinafter referred to as the "Public Disclosure Provision"),
(Compl. ¶ 15.) On May 13, 2009, Long responded to the email stating that she would not permit inspection or copying of these records (collectively referred to as the "Requested Records"),
On May 15, 2009, representatives from Advancement Project and Project Vote traveled to Long's Norfolk office, again seeking access to the Requested Records, and were again denied such access. (Id. ¶ 19.) On June 22, 2009, Advancement Project and Project Vote wrote to Rodrigues, purportedly pursuant to NVRA § 11(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b), advising her that they believed Long's denial was in violation of the Public Disclosure Provision of the NVRA. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Advancement Project and Project Vote requested that Rodrigues
(Id.) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the plaintiff has filed the instant Complaint, alleging that the actions of the defendants are in violation of the NVRA's Public Disclosure Provision. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the NVRA and the Public Disclosure Provision require that the Requested Records be available to the public for inspection because they are records "`concerning the implementation of programs or activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.'" (Id. ¶ 29 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)).) Additionally, to the extent that the Virginia statute limits the availability of the Requested Records to the public for inspection and photocopying, it is superseded by the NVRA, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Therefore, the plaintiff asks the court to 1) declare that the defendants are in violation of the NVRA; 2) declare that the NVRA preempts the Virginia statute, and any other Virginia law or regulation stating the same (hereinafter referred to as the "preemption claim"); 3) permanently enjoin the defendants' denial of access to the Requested Records; and 4) award Project Vote the costs incurred in pursuing this action, as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(c).
The defendants contend that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Project Vote's claim that potentially qualified Norfolk State University students were denied voter registration does not amount to an "injury-in-fact," which could support standing. (See Mem. in Supp. Of Motion at 7-9.) Instead, the defendants contend that such a claim only shows that Project Vote's "ideals and social policy interests" have been harmed, which are insufficient grounds for standing. (Id.) However, for the reasons detailed below, the court
"Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which ensures that a suit is a case or controversy appropriate for the exercise of the courts' judicial powers under the Constitution of the United States." Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 466 (4th Cir. 2001). A defendant may question a plaintiffs standing by either asserting that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to show it has standing or, that factual allegations cited by the plaintiff in support of standing are untrue. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir.1982). In the former case, the court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party. In the latter case, the court may go beyond the allegations of the complaint and make factual findings as to whether the plaintiff has standing. Id. Nevertheless, the burden is on a plaintiff invoking federal subject-matter jurisdiction to allege, and ultimately prove, standing, namely that 1) the plaintiff suffered an actual or threatened injury, 2) there is a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and 3) the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. See, e.g., Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir.2006).
With regard to the injury prong, "[t]he actual or threatened injury required [for standing] may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Accordingly, an organizational plaintiff, just like an individual plaintiff, may bring suit based on injuries suffered by the organization itself, in order "to vindicate whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy." Id.
The defendants' standing argument both mischaracterizes the nature of the injury which the plaintiff claims and misapprehends the burden which the plaintiff must meet to sufficiently allege such an injury at this stage of the litigation. Contrary to the defendants' characterization of plaintiff's claimed injury, Project Vote does not claim that it was harmed by the rejection of potentially qualified voter-applicants. Instead, the plaintiff claims that the defendants' refusal to allow access to the Requested Records, to which Project Vote was purportedly entitled under the NVRA, was a direct informational injury to Project Vote.
For a plaintiff to sufficiently allege an informational injury, it must first allege that the statute confers upon it an individual right to information, and then that the defendant caused a concrete injury to the plaintiff in violation of that right. See Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156, 159 (4th Cir.2006) (recognizing that standing based on an informational injury requires a twofold inquiry into 1) the status of the claimed right, i.e., whether the plaintiff has any right to information, and 2) the concreteness of the alleged injury). For example, in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989), the plaintiff sought records from the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary ("ABA Committee"), pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"), 5 U.S.C.App. § 1 et seq. The Supreme Court held that FACA created a public right to information by requiring advisory committees to the executive branch of the federal government to make available to the public its minutes and records, with some exceptions. 491 U.S. at 446-47, 109 S.Ct. 2558. Moreover, because the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
The Court reaffirmed the holding of Public Citizen in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998). In this latter case, the FEC determined that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee ("APAC") was not a "political committee" as defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq., and, thus, was not required to make public disclosures regarding its membership, contributions, and expenditures as FECA required of "political committees." Again, the Court acknowledged that FECA, like the statute at issue in Public Citizen, created a public right to information. 524 U.S. at 14-15, 118 S.Ct. 1777. Moreover, the Court again rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs failed to allege an "injury in fact," and held that "[t]he `injury in fact' that [the plaintiffs] have suffered consists of their inability to obtain information ... that, on [their] view of the law, the statute requires that AIPAC make public." Id. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777. The Court reiterated that in Public Citizen it previously held that "when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute," the plaintiff does suffer an injury in fact. 524 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (emphasis added);
In this case at bar, as in Public Citizen and Akins, the NVRA provides a public right to information.
In Pitt County, the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of the county's claim on the ground that it lacked standing because the district court ultimately concluded that the statute on which the county relied did not afford the county relief. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that the fact that the "district court ultimately disagreed with the County regarding the [construction of the statute] does not mean that the County failed to allege an injury in fact. To hold otherwise would reduce all merits inquiries in cases of this type into standing inquiries." Id. In this case, Project Vote need not prove, for standing purposes, that it has a right to the Requested Records, because this determination depends upon the court's ultimate construction of the statute at issue. See id. at 312 (recognizing that a plaintiff "`need not prove the merits of [its] case in order to demonstrate that it ha[s] Article III Standing.'" (quoting Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489, 493 (D.C.Cir.2005))); see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (holding that whether a plaintiff has alleged an injury-in-fact depends upon whether the plaintiff is unable to obtain information which, in the plaintiff's view of the law, creates the right to access that information). Accordingly, the court
The defendants claim that Project Vote is not entitled to the Requested Records and, thus, Project Vote has not stated a plausible claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. For the reasons detailed below, the court
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court accepts the facts alleged in the Complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 143 (4th Cir.1990). However, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Accordingly, the plaintiff must allege facts that show more than a "sheer possibility" or "mere[] consist[ency]" with unlawful conduct, but must instead show that the plaintiff is
To resolve whether plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must decide whether the Requested Records, namely voter registration applications, are "records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1). Accordingly, the court must first determine what constitutes a program or activity conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters. The court then applies that standard to determine whether voter registration records, specifically voter registration applications, concern the implementation of such a program or activity.
In construing a statute, the court applies the plain meaning of the statutory language, unless there is a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, or "when a literal application would frustrate the statute's purpose or lead to an absurd result." Nat'l Coal. for Students with Disabilities Educ. & Legal Def. Fund v. Allen, 152 F.3d 283, 288 (4th Cir.1998). Where the statutory language has a plain meaning, the court's inquiry is complete and it will enforce the statute as written. Stephens ex rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 137, 140 (4th Cir.2009). A statute's plain meaning is defined by the statutory language's common and ordinary meaning, absent an indication from Congress that the language should have a different meaning, id. at 137, and by both the specific context in which the language is used and in the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997).
The defendants insist that the Public Disclosure Provision only "mandates public access to records that prove the states are properly maintaining lists of registered voters," and, thus, does not "cover the registration applications of people who never enter these lists." (See Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 11, 13.) In other words, they contend that, under a plain meaning analysis, only programs and activities which facilitate the proper removal of already-registered voters from the voter rolls, or which allow updating the information of already-registered voters on the voter rolls, or both, are contemplated by the Public Disclosure Provision as programs and activities that ensure the "accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters." (Id.) Thus, only records related to those procedures, which would clearly not include voter registration applications, must be disclosed for public inspection. The court cannot agree with the defendants' construction of the Public Disclosure Provision, as it contradicts the statute's plain meaning.
At a threshold level, the court must determine whether voter registration applications
The process by which the Commonwealth determines whether a person is eligible to vote certainly falls within the purview of the federal statute, as such a process, by its very nature, is designed to ensure that the Commonwealth's lists are current and accurate. The process of evaluating voter registration applications, which determines whether a person belongs on the voter rolls, is a central part of "ensuring the accuracy and currency of the official lists of eligible voters." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1).
Additionally, the exceptions to the Public Disclosure Provision provide evidence that it contemplates and covers voter registration
The court also finds that, with respect to records which "concern" the "implementation" of voter registration procedures, a common and ordinary understanding of those terms encompasses voter registration applications. The term "concern" means "to relate or refer to," to "be about," or "to have an influence on." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 470 (2002).
As stated above, voter registration procedures are the procedures by which the Commonwealth evaluates whether persons belong on the lists of eligible voters, thus ensuring the accuracy of those lists. A completed voter registration application is the means by which an individual provides the information necessary for the Commonwealth to determine his eligibility to vote. It is clear, then, that voter registration applications, perhaps more than other records, are relevant to carrying out voter registration procedures.
In sum, the court finds that the common and ordinary meaning of the terms of the Public Disclosure Provision encompass voter registration applications, as these records concern "the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1).
To determine the plain meaning of statutory language, the court also looks to the specific context in which the language is used and to the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 337, 117 S.Ct. 843. A contextual analysis of the Public Disclosure Provision supports the conclusion that the statute refers to voter registration procedures, and, thus, voter registration records, which obviously include voter registration applications.
In terms of the specific context, the defendants, despite acknowledging that the statute is concerned with states' voter registration procedures, contend that the Public Disclosure Provision "arises in the
Another example is subsection 1973gg-6(a)(1), which requires that states "ensure that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election," if the voter registration application is properly and timely submitted. Id. § 1973gg-6(a)(1). This mandate demonstrates that whether a list of eligible voters is current and accurate directly implicates the propriety, or lack thereof, of voter registration procedures implemented by the state. Voter registration applications, therefore, directly concern the implementation of that mandate and related voter registration procedures. Moreover, the fact that there are subsections within 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6 dealing specifically and exclusively with voter removal procedures shows that where Congress wanted to draw specific attention to programs and activities designed to make lists of eligible voters accurate and current through voter removal procedures, it specifically did so. See id. § 1973gg-6(a)(4) (requiring that states "conduct a general program ... to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters ..."); id. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A) (specifically referring to programs designed to "systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters"). Subsection 1973gg-6(i) is not one of those subsections where Congress paid exclusive attention to voter removal procedures.
With respect to the broader context of the statute, it is entitled "National Voter Registration." Id. § 1973gg et seq. Moreover, each of the substantive provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg, including subsection 6, discuss methods to promote increased voter registration, with some subsections providing added emphasis on voter registration programs to be conducted by the state. See, e.g., id. § 1973gg-4(b) (requiring mail voter registration forms be available for distribution through governmental and private entities, "with particular emphasis on making them available for organized voter registration programs"). Additionally, like subsection gg-6(i), many subsections include provisions which direct states not only to update voter information, but also to put programs in place to increase voter registration efforts. See, e.g., id. §§ 1973gg-3 (a)(1)-(2) and (d); id. § 1973gg-4(a)(1)-(3). There is ample support throughout the NVRA, therefore, for the conclusion that the Public Disclosure Provision is meant to cover records concerning the implementation of voter registration procedures, which by necessity include voter registration applications.
Under a plain meaning analysis, the court will not apply a statute's plain meaning when it would frustrate the statute's purpose or lead to an absurd result. Such
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b) (emphasis added). Reading these purposes together, it is evident that the last identified purpose of the statute is dependent upon, and is the culmination of, the fulfillment of the other purposes of the statute. Those other purposes clearly point toward increasing voter registration and ensuring that the right to vote is not disrupted by illegal and improper impediments to registering to vote or to casting a vote. Accordingly, where those purposes are met, voter rolls may be deemed accurate and current. Undoubtedly, the goals of voter registration procedures are synonymous with the purposes of the statute. The court's conclusion regarding the Public Disclosure Provision's plain meaning is certainly congruent to the statute's purposes.
However, the defendants contend that making voter registration applications available to the public would discourage voter participation because it would involve a release of an applicant's personal and confidential information. Specifically, the defendants contend that disclosure of the applicant's social security number ("SSN"), the applicant's felony record, and whether the applicant has been declared mentally incompetent will keep persons from registering to vote, which is in direct conflict with the statute's purpose. The court disagrees. As a general matter, the statute identifies the information which Congress specifically wished to keep confidential, and sections of the statute require that the state inform applicants that such information will be kept confidential and used for limited purposes. See id. § 1973gg-3(D)(ii) and (iii) (requiring that voter registration application forms contain a statement that informs the voter that his declination to register and the agency through which he or she was registered will remain confidential and will be used only for voter registration purposes); id. § 1973gg-5(a)(7) (same); id. § 1973gg-6(a)(6) (same).
Similarly, the statute explicitly requires that other information related to voter registration, which to some persons may be considered sensitive, be disclosed to the public. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(2) (subjecting to disclosure lists including the "names and addresses" of persons to whom notices are sent regarding their removal from the voter rolls). There is no indication in the statute that entire voter registration applications should be kept confidential. Therefore, insofar as it appears, to some degree at least, Congress has already considered the effect on the statute's purposes of disclosing certain information to the public, as it relates to voter registration records, and keeping other information confidential, the court is not inclined to engage in an act of conjecture by concluding that the public disclosure of other information relating to voter registration would necessarily upset the purposes of the statute.
While Greidinger did not directly involve the NVRA, the court finds the Fourth Circuit's rationale regarding disclosure of a voter's SSN applicable to this case, and concludes that it would likely undermine the purposes of the statute for the NVRA to require that voters disclose their SSNs to the public.
The court concludes that 1) voter registration procedures are programs and activities which are "conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters;" and, 2) voter registration applications are records "concerning the implementation" of voter registration procedures. Having discerned the statute's plain meaning, the court need not consider the statute's legislative history. See Willenbring v. United States, 559 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir.2009) (holding that once the court discerns a statute's plain meaning, "this first canon is also the last [and] judicial inquiry is complete").
The court
The court
I. Factual Background ..................................................... 698
II. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) ................ 701A. General Standard of Review ......................................... 701B. Standing Analysis .................................................. 702III. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ............... 704A. General Standard of Review ......................................... 704B. Plain Meaning Analysis ............................................. 7051. Common and Ordinary Meaning ..................................... 7052. Contextual Meaning .............................................. 7083. Statutory Purpose ............................................... 7094. Summary ......................................................... 712IV. Conclusion ............................................................ 712
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(i)(1) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1354 n. 10. Moreover, the court never suggested that Virginia must keep voter registration records confidential. Instead, the court suggested that Virginia eliminate the requirement that an applicant disclose his SSN or eliminate the use of SSN's on publicly available voter registration records. Id. at 1355. Notably, the district court's consent decree in Greidinger, following the Fourth Circuit's opinion, mandated that Virginia no longer make an applicant's SSN available for public disclosure, but it did not address whether voter applications themselves were subject to disclosure under the NVRA. See Greidinger v. Davis, No. 3:91CV00476 (E.D.Va. Aug. 30, 1993). This court sees no substantial burden if SSNs were either removed from the voter registration applications, or redacted from any voter registration applications made publicly available.
