HENRY E. HUDSON, District Judge.
Jason Trisler, a former Virginia prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The following claims remain:
The VDOC is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Accordingly, Trisler's § 1983 claims against the VDOC, set forth in Claims 1 and 2, will be dismissed with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (permitting the courts to dismiss legally frivolous claims). Additionally, Trisler's release from confinement moots his demands for declaratory and injunctive relief. Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) ("[A]s a general rule, a prisoner's transfer or release from a particular prison moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to his incarceration there." (citing Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991); Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1048 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986))). Accordingly, Trisler's demands for declaratory and injunctive relief will be dismissed as moot.
The matter is before the Court on the Correctional Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 38.) The Correctional Defendants provided Trisler with the appropriate Roseboro
Summary judgment must be rendered "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the responsibility to inform the court of the basis for the motion, and to identify the parts of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the motion is properly supported, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by citing affidavits or `"depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and 56(e) (1986)).
In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court "must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1992)(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). However, a mere scintilla of evidence will not preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (citing Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 (1872)). "[T]here is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party . .. upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.'" Id. (quoting Munson, 81 U.S. at 448).
In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, the Correctional Defendants submitted the affidavits of Defendants Mahon and Schilling. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Attachs. 1-2 ("Mahon Aff." (ECF No. 39-1)) ("Schilling Aff." (ECF No. 39-2)).) Trisler's failure to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment permits the Court to rely solely on the submissions of the Correctional Defendants in deciding the Motion for Summary Judgment. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) ("`Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.'" (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 &n.7 (5th Cir. 1992))).
Between 2007 and 2009, Trisler was incarcerated in Haynesville.
As part of the VDOC policies regarding medical care, the VDOC employs a Utilization Manager.
(Id. (punctuation corrected).)
"Haynesville has medical staff and facilities to provide diagnostic treatment and consultant services for all offenders. Department operating procedures and policies have been promulgated to implement these services." (Mahon Aff. ¶ 15.) On March 22, 2007, Trisler first reported to the Haynesville medical department with complaints of abdominal pain. (Compl. ¶ 19.) On June 2, 2008, Dr. Ajumobi informed Trisler that "he would file a QMC Consultation Request to seek approval for the surgical repair of [Trisler's] hernia." (Id. ¶ 38.) Dr. Ajumobi, "did not file the QMC Consultation Request needed for approval of the [surgery]." (Id. ¶ 65.) Sometime thereafter, Dr. Ajumobi stopped working at Haynesville. (Id. ¶ 41.)
On December 12, 2008, upon learning that no QMC Consultation Request had been filed, Dr. Johnson filed a request seeking approval for Trisler's surgery. (Id. ¶ 68.) On December 15, 2008, Trisler received emergency surgery for his hernia, which had become strangulated. (Id. ¶¶ 50-57.) On that same day, "the QMC request filed by Dr. Johnson [was denied], stating as the reason for the denial that `VADOC policy is to observe reducible and ventral and inguinal hernias rather than operate on them.'" (Id. ¶ 69.)
Defendant Mahon subsequently acknowledged Dr. Ajumobi's oversight. (Id. ¶ 68.)
(Id.)
In order to survive summary judgment, Trisler must demonstrate that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001). A medical need is "serious" if it "`has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.'" Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 846 (7th Cir. 1999)).
The subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a particular defendant acted with deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). "Deliberate indifference is a very high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it." Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Farmer teaches "that general knowledge of facts creating a substantial risk of harm is not enough. The prison official must also draw the inference between those general facts and the specific risk of harm confronting the inmate." Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1997)). Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment, the deliberate indifference standard requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that "the official in question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm" and "that his actions were `inappropriate in light of that risk.'" Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004)(quoting Rich, 129 F.3d at 340 n.2).
In evaluating a prisoner's complaint regarding medical care, the Court is mindful that "society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care" or to the medical treatment of their choosing. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04). In this regard, the right to medical treatment is limited to that treatment which is medically necessary and not to "that which may be considered merely desirable." Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, absent exceptional circumstances, an inmate's disagreement with medical personnel with respect to a course of treatment is insufficient to state a cognizable constitutional claim, much less to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970)).
Defendants Mahon and Schilling acknowledge that the VDOC has a policy "to deny purely elective medical procedures." (Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 8 (citing Schilling Aff. ¶ 9)). Whether an individual requires surgery for a hernia is a matter of medical judgment. See Webb v. Hamidullah, 281 F. App'x 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2008) (dismissing on summary judgment inmate's claim that physician acted with deliberate indifference by classifying inmate's need for hernia surgery as elective). Defendants Mahon and Schilling assert that they are not medical doctors and rely upon medical professionals to diagnose offenders and provide the proper treatment. See Iko, 535 F.3d at 242 (holding that once an inmate has been placed into the care of appropriate medical personnel, `"a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands'" (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004))).
Trisler faces a fairly onerous task in demonstrating deliberate indifference in the present circumstances because reliance upon the expertise of prison doctors in treating inmates is generally appropriate for supervisory officials such as Schilling and Mahon. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854-55; Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2002). To overcome such reliance, the inmate must introduce evidence demonstrating that the supervisory official knew that the care provided by medical personnel was so obviously incompetent that it posed a substantial risk of harm to the inmate's health. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854-55. Trisler has not done so. Trisler fails to direct the Court to evidence that suggests either Mahon or Schilling knew Trisler required surgery and acted with deliberate indifference to that need or any pain that Trisler may have suffered.
Trisler also fails to demonstrate that Defendants Johnson and Jabe bear any responsibility for the allegedly inadequate medical care. "Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must [demonstrate] that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); see Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting that the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to § 1983 actions). Trisler fails to direct the Court to any admissible evidence which demonstrates Defendant Johnson and Jabe personally denied him appropriate medical care or engaged in conduct that would constitute deliberate indifference. Accordingly, Claims 1(a) and (b) will be dismissed with prejudice.
In Claim 2, Trisler contends that the Correctional Defendants acted with deliberate indifference by contracting with PHS to provide medical care to inmates at Haynesville because they knew that PHS had "a custom, practice, and reputation of employing unqualified and unlicensed persons to provide health care to offenders." (Compl. ¶ 42.) PHS, however, had no involvement in the provision of medical care to inmates at Haynesville during the relevant time period. (Schilling Aff. ^ 7); Trisler v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., No. 3:11CV343-HEH, 2013 WL 870102, at *2-3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2013). Moreover, the evidence reflects that, "[t]he VDOC does not allow unlicensed physicians to work in its facilities and treat offenders." (Schilling Aff. ¶ 7.) Accordingly, Claim 2 lacks factual merit and will be dismissed with prejudice.
Generally, supplementary state law claims should be dismissed if the federal claims are dismissed before trial. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In light of the preliminary dismissal of Trisler's federal claims, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to retain Trisler's state law claims. See Jenkins v. Weatherholtz, 909 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, Claim 3 will be dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, Claims 4(a)-(e) against the Correctional Defendants and the VDOC will be dismissed without prejudice.
The Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 38)will be granted. The action will be dismissed.
An appropriate Final Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Large portions of Trisler's Complaint run afoul of the above-referenced principles for proper summary judgment evidence. For example, Trisler fails to demonstrate he "is competent to testify," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4), about Defendants Mahon's and Schilling's knowledge. (Compl. ¶ 84 ("Mahon at all times knew that the surgery needed to repair Trisler's hernia was being delayed or denied for financial reasons...."; Id. ¶ 86 ("Schillings [sic] knew at all times that Trisler was being denied needed surgery for the hernia for financial reasons only.").) Nevertheless, no need exists to catalog the entirety of inadmissible evidence previously submitted by Trisler because he fails to direct the Court to any evidence, such as his Complaint, that he wishes the Court to consider in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (explaining that "[t]he court need consider only the cited materials" in deciding a motion for summary judgment).
