ANTHONY J. TRENGA, District Judge.
On June 7, 2012, Plaintiff Winfred Muchira (Plaintiff or "Muchira"), a then 35 year old citizen of Kenya, signed a contract in Saudi Arabia to work as a housemaid in the United States for the Defendants Halah Al-Rawaf and her three children, Defendants Ibraheem, Fahad, and Luluh Al-Rashoudi ("Defendants" or the "Saudi family"). On July 28, 2012, Plaintiff arrived in the United States with the Defendants and was admitted under a tourist visa valid for a period of six months, which was later extended to May, 2013. On March 29, 2013, while Defendants were out of town, Plaintiff, in the presence of law enforcement, left Defendants' residence where she was living and working and terminated further employment with the Defendants.
On June 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595, which provides a civil remedy for violations of Title 18 of the United States Code, Chapter 77. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the following violations of Chapter 77: (1) involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (First Claim for Relief); (2) trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude or forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (Second Claim for Relief); (3) forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (Third Claim for Relief); (4) involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (Fourth Claim for Relief); (5) unlawful conduct with respect to documents in furtherance of trafficking, peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude or forced labor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592 (Fifth Claim for relief); and (6) benefitting financially from trafficking in persons in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1593A and 1595 (Sixth Claim for Relief). Plaintiff also alleges civil conspiracy (Seventh Claim for Relief); unjust enrichment (Eighth Claim for Relief); false imprisonment (Ninth Claim for Relief); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Tenth Claim for Relief); violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (Eleventh Claim for Relief); and punitive damages (Twelfth Claim for Relief).
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 125] ("the Motion"), which seeks summary judgment on all claims except her FLSA claim against Defendant Al-Rawaf in her Eleventh Claim for Relief.
Plaintiff came from a poor family in Kenya, one of eight children, with an eighth grade education. She had been providing hotel cleaning services in Kenya for some time when at age 32 she learned from her sister and her pastor that there was an opportunity for her to work as a housemaid in Saudi Arabia for the Saudi family. She expressed interest and after receiving information about her from her pastor, the Saudi family made an offer to employ her as a housemaid and a cook, which she accepted while in Kenya. See Pl.'s Ex. 1 at ¶ 19. Plaintiff flew to Saudi Arabia on December 28, 2010 at Defendants' expense and worked for the Saudi family, primarily as a housemaid. She remained in Saudi Arabia, working in Defendants' household, until May 2012, when she returned to Kenya at Defendants' expense to visit her sick mother. Thereafter, Plaintiff spent three weeks in Kenya and then returned to Saudi Arabia in order to accompany the Saudi family to the United States.
On June 7, 2012, before leaving for the United States, Plaintiff signed a contract with Defendant Al-Rawaf to work as a housemaid in the United States.
Plaintiff has described various reasons for her decision to accompany Defendants to the United States, including that she thought "the [Saudi] family would have to treat me better in the United States" and "like a person," she would work less hours because Defendants' entire family would not be there, and she regarded the United States as a "good country and a country where everyone has rights." Overall, she thought "God had answered my prayers because finally I would be able to earn money to send to my family." Pl.'s Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 40-41; see also Def. Ex. I.
Plaintiff arrived in the United States with the Saudi family on July 28, 2012. Plaintiff and Defendants Al-Rawaf and Ibraheem Al-Rashoudi were admitted under six-month tourist visas; Defendants Fahad and Luluh Al-Rashoudi were admitted under student visas. Under the terms of her tourist visa, Plaintiff was not permitted to engage in any employment other than for the Saudi family.
Once in the United States, the Saudi family initially provided Plaintiff with a onebedroom, one-bath apartment. She had possession of the key to that apartment and she lived there alone, while the Saudi family was residing in another apartment in the same building. Beginning late October 2012, the Saudi family moved with the Plaintiff into a substantial detached home in Vienna, Virginia, which the Defendants rented for $6,750 per month. At that residence, Plaintiff was provided her own bedroom on the basement level that included a bathroom and a walk-in closet, with access to a small kitchen, a media room, and a back yard. The Saudi family also provided to her with meals and her maid's uniform and paid for a cellphone, which the Plaintiff kept in her possession.
Plaintiff worked for the Saudi family in the United States for approximately eight months. Her duties included assisting Defendant Al-Rawaf prepare meals, washing the dishes, vacuuming the rooms in the home, making the beds in four bedrooms and doing the laundry and ironing. On certain days, Plaintiff would take out the trash, and on other days, she would accompany a Saudi family member to the grocery store and help bring the grocery bags into the house. She would move furniture on occasion and wash windows approximately twice a month. She would also accompany the Saudi family on various family outings, including to Kings Dominion amusement park, New York City, dinners, trips to ice skating rinks, parks and shopping malls. During at least some of these outings, she was required to provide child care and other services for the Saudi family. See Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 126:1-127:22.
Plaintiff has not given a clear account of when her work day began and ended. Plaintiff testified at one point in her deposition that she worked continuously, up to 15 hours per day, or more, without rest, seven days a week. But she elsewhere testified that she had no set schedule, she would sleep until 6:30 AM to 7:30 AM, shower and dress and then begin her duties. See Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 706:16-18; 707:4-5; 708:19-709:14. She also testified that she would usually be alone with Al-Rawaf during the day while the adult children attended school. Some days she would be constantly busy, while on others there would be breaks in her work, such as when she would sit with Defendant Al-Rawaf while Al-Rawaf drank her tea. She had a daily lunch break and there were also times during the days when she would not be actively working at all and would be able to rest or engage in non-work activities. See id. at 39:2-7; 77:20-78:1. For example, as reflected on her Facebook page, she talked on her cell phone and posted and received messages on her Facebook page throughout the day. Overall, her testimony, construed as a whole and most favorably to Plaintiff, establishes that she worked long hours and was subject to Defendants' demands that she perform various duties throughout the day until Defendants went to sleep, usually around 11:00 PM to Midnight.
Throughout her employment in the United States, Plaintiff was in regular telephone contact with friends and family, both in the United States and Kenya, including her mother, sisters, both male and female friends, a former boyfriend, her current boyfriend, and a pastor in Boston. She also posted regularly on Facebook where she recounted her daily activities and experiences.
The record does not reflect definitively how much money Plaintiff received for her services. Plaintiff testified that she was paid $400 per month.
In December 2012, Defendant Al-Rawaf decided to extend her stay in the United States. For that purpose, she arranged to have her and Plaintiff's tourist visas extended for six months until May 2013. Although Plaintiff did not explicitly consent to extending her contract in the United States, she did not object to the extension when she learned of it no later than January, 2014.
On March 13, 2015, with the encouragement of her friend living in Alabama, to whom she had been complaining about her employment, Plaintiff called the Hotline for the Polaris Project, a service provider partner for the Northern Virginia Human Trafficking Task Force. In that call, and in calls on March 18, 2013 and March 20, 2013, Plaintiff, though not claiming that she had been physically abused or mistreated, complained about her working conditions and low pay and asked for assistance in obtaining a different job. She reported that she was scheduled to leave with the Defendants in May and that she did not want to leave with them.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Evans v. Techs. Apps. & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958-59 (4th Cir.1996). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine dispute exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The facts shall be viewed, and all reasonable inferences drawn, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir.2007). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 248. Whether a fact is considered "material" is determined by the substantive law, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id.
Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence concerning Plaintiff's claims under the TVPA, which fall into two categories: (1) Plaintiff's claims that she was "held to" involuntary servitude in violation Section 1584
Plaintiff's First and Fourth Claims for Relief allege a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584, which imposes liability on anyone who "knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude. . . any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held." Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, which imposes liability on anyone who "knowingly . . . obtains the labor or services of a person" by means of (1) "force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person;" (2) "serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another;" (3) "the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process;" or (4) "any scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint." Plaintiff proffers essentially the same evidence in support of both claims.
There is no evidence sufficient to establish that Defendants coerced, threatened or forced her to accompany them to the United States against her will, either before or after she learned of the actual payment she would receive in the United States. Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 360:8-11(being brought by Saudi family to the United States was "not against my will."). Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that she was forced into "involuntary service" with the Defendants because it was her only "real choice," given her lack of other employment opportunities in Saudi Arabia and Kenya, see Doc. No. 134 at p. 11 and 14, and the pressure she felt from her pastor in Kenya who had assisted her in obtaining employment with Defendants. But there is no evidence that Defendants were responsible for Plaintiff's lack of other more attractive employment opportunities in Saudi Arabia or Kenya or her sense of obligation or coercion because of her pastor's involvement. In short, there is no evidence sufficient to establish that she had been sold into slavery or "held to" involuntary servitude in Saudi Arabia by the defendants when she was brought to the United States or that her agreement to work for Defendants in the United States as a housemaid was "involuntary" for the purposes of the TVPA.
The evidence is likewise insufficient as a matter of law to establish that once in the United States she was held to involuntary servitude through Defendants' threats of serious harm. Plaintiff concedes that she was not physically mistreated, harmed or explicitly threatened in any way, either before or after arriving in the United States. See Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 139:6-21. She also does not claim that she was physically restrained or imprisoned or lacked the physical ability or means to leave Defendants' home at any time. Rather, she claims that she was held in "a psychological prison that Defendants created in Saudi Arabia and transported over to the United States." Doc. No. 134 at p. 2 (emphasis in original). In that regard, she claims that "she was conditioned by Defendants to follow `the rules in the house as a housemaid' in America, just as she was required to follow them in Saudi Arabia," requiring her to "accept illegally low wages, routinely work 15-hour days, allow Defendants to take and possess her passport, and never leave the house alone." Id. at p. 2. These rules, according to Plaintiff and her experts, led to a sense of isolation, vulnerability and dependency that prevented her from exercising free will; and she was therefore subjected to a condition of "involuntary servitude."
As reflected in the statutory elements of Plaintiff's claims, the central issue does not concern the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment, as such, but rather the volitional nature of that employment. No matter how unpleasant the work, or the conditions under which services are provided, the critical inquiry for the purposes of the TVPA is whether a person provides those services free from a defendant's physical or psychological coercion that as a practical matter eliminates the ability to exercise free will or choice. See United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 566 (4th Cir. 1981), where the Fourth Circuit, in accordance with the "generally accepted definition of `slavery' under § 1583," defined a slave as ". . . a person who is wholly subject to the will of another, one who has no freedom of action and whose person and services are wholly under the control of another, and who is in a state of compulsory service to another." That is not to say that the nature of the services provided or the conditions under which they are provided are irrelevant to the inquiry whether a person provides services "voluntarily" or "involuntarily." Reasonable inferences with respect to those issues can sometimes be drawn from both the nature of the services and the conditions under which they are provided. But here, the evidence concerning the nature of her duties or the circumstances under which she was required to perform them does not allow any reasonable inference that she was held to involuntary servitude. Plaintiff does not claim any lack of physical comforts in her accommodations at Defendants' residence. The chores she was required to perform were those generally associated with those of a housemaid; and without minimizing the physical or emotional demands of her work or the long hours she was on duty, she has not described either work or work conditions reflective of "slavery" or "involuntary servitude."
In short, Plaintiff has not described with any specificity or objective evidence the "serious harm"
There is also no evidence that before Plaintiff left on March 29, 2013, she ever requested that her employment be terminated or otherwise attempted to leave Defendants' employment. The only evidence that Plaintiff ever attempted to end the parties' employment relationship is that at some point after learning that the Saudi family would be returning to Saudi Arabia in May, 2013, and her employment in the United States would end, Plaintiff told Defendant Al-Rawaf that she did not want to return to Saudi Arabia with them and in response to that position, Defendant Al-Rawaf purchased an airplane ticket for the Plaintiff to travel directly to Kenya on the same day Defendants would leave for Saudi Arabia.
Plaintiff also claims that she suffered non-physical emotional abuse that forced her to remain in Defendants' employment when she would have otherwise left. But, there is insufficient evidence to support Plaintiffs conclusory characterizations of her treatment. The conduct she points to as the source of her emotional abuse (occasional shouts and verbal reprimands by some of the defendants and claimed refusals to take her to church or the hospital) is, by her own descriptions, insufficient as a matter of law for a jury to find that Defendants eliminated her practical ability to extricate herself from her employment relationship. See e.g., Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 94:9-95:3 (Plaintiff describes an incident when one of the defendants scolded her for talking too much on her cell phone while she was working and Plaintiff shouted back at her.); id at 92:11-93:21(Plaintiff appears to testify that she was given medication rather than being taken to the hospital); id. at 67:4-68:9, 71:4-8 (Plaintiff testifies that Defendants never actually prohibited her from attending church, but rather found excuses not to transport her to and from church, even though one of the Defendants had assisted Plaintiff in locating churches in the neighborhood.). Rather, her testimony establishes that she thought she was free to terminate her employment relationship once her contract period ended in May, 2013, she never attempted to terminate it or was prevented from terminating it before that contract expired and, as events demonstrated, she had the practical ability to terminate that relationship even earlier, once she had made the decision to do so.
The Court accepts, as Plaintiff claims, that she feared that she would face certain consequences or hardships upon leaving Defendants' employment and home, including arrest. But Plaintiff had no legal right to work other than for the Defendants; and there is no evidence sufficient to establish that any felt sense of imprisonment was attributable to any threats of serious harm by the Defendants (including any threats of arrest), as opposed to her correctly understanding that under the terms upon which she was granted permission to live in the United States, she did not have the ability simply to leave Defendants' employment and legally work elsewhere. While the "house rules" may have made her life more onerous and less pleasant than it otherwise might have been, the evidence is insufficient to establish that those "house rules" ever prevented Plaintiff from doing what she ultimately did do terminate her employment and not return to Kenya, then scheduled for less than a month away, almost immediately after she decided upon that course in order to pursue whatever opportunities she had in the United States. See Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 483:7-485:8 ("I learn that in America there is opportunities like one . . . chance to go back to school and continue with my education, which I believe when I go to Kenya, at my age I'm not able to go to a certain level of education. . .").
Finally, Plaintiff claims that she was forced to remain in Defendants' employment through an "abuse of law or legal process" in violation of Section 1589(a)(3) when they instructed Plaintiff to lie to American embassy officials in order to obtain a visa and violated federal labor laws. But the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish any conduct that meets the definition of "abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process" set forth in Section 1589(c)(1).
Based on the record, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law for a fact finder to conclude that she remained in Defendants' employment because of threats of serious harm that deprived her of her ability to exercise free will and terminate her relationship with Defendants. The evidence is therefore insufficient as a matter of law to establish that Defendants held Plaintiff in "involuntary servitude" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (First and Fourth Claim for Relief) or that the Saudi family obtained her labor by means of any of the conduct prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (Third Claim for Relief).
Plaintiff claims that Defendants (1) recruited, transported and harbored her in order to obtain her forced, coerced and involuntary labor in violation of Section 1590 (Second Claim for Relief); (2) knowingly destroyed, concealed, removed, confiscated or possessed plaintiff's passport and immigration documents in the course of violating Section 1589 and Section 1590 (Fifth Claim for Relief); and (3) knowingly benefitted financially from participating in a venture that violated Sections 1581(a), 1592 or 1595(a) (Sixth Claim for Relief). Having concluded that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support Plaintiff's claims that Defendants violated Sections 1584 or 1589, or any other predicate offense under the TVPA, Plaintiff's remaining claims under the TVPA must necessarily be dismissed.
Plaintiff's Seventh Claim for Relief alleges that Defendants conspired "to accomplish human trafficking, peonage, and unjust enrichment or to benefit financially from [Plaintiff's services through these unlawful means." Having concluded that Plaintiff's TVPA claims should be dismissed as a matter of law, Plaintiffs civil conspiracy claim predicated on the TVPA violations is, therefore, also dismissed. However, for the reasons explained below as to the unjust enrichment claim (Eighth Claim for Relief), the Court denies the Motion as to Plaintiff s claim that Defendants conspired to unjust enrich themselves through Plaintiffs employment.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants were unjustly enriched as a result of her services. Defendants challenge the legal sufficiency of that claim on the grounds that this equitable remedy is not available where, as here, there is in fact an express contract in place between the parties. See WRH Mortgage, Inc. v. S.A.S. Associates, 214 F.3d 528, 534 (4th Cir. 2000) (Where a contract governs the relationship of the parties, the equitable remedy of restitution grounded in quasi-contract or unjust enrichment does not lie."); Trident Products and Services, LLC, v. Canadian Soiless Wholesale, Ltd, 859 F.Supp.2d 771, 781 (E.D.Va. 2012) ("Virginia law is clear that a plaintiff cannot raise an unjust enrichment claim where an express contract governs the alleged wrongdoing.). Plaintiff contends that the admitted existence of an express contract notwithstanding, the enforceability of those contracts is at issue and must be resolved in order to adjudicate her unjust enrichment claim. Given the unresolved legal and factual issues pertaining to Plaintiffs FLSA claim (Eleventh Claim for Relief), and without ruling on the merits of Plaintiff's contentions concerning the relationship between her FSLA and unjust enrichment claims, the Court denies the Motion.
Relying on the same evidence proffered in support of her TVPA claims, Plaintiff claims that Defendants falsely imprisoned her. As discussed above, Plaintiff concedes that she was never physically restrained or imprisoned or threatened with physical restraint. The record also establishes that there were occasions when she was outside of the Defendants' home unaccompanied by Defendants and she in fact left Defendants' home on March 29, 2013. See, e.g. Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 123:12-124:21; 127:9-128:8; see also W.T. Grant Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S.E. 860 (Va. 1928) ("False imprisonment is defined as the direct restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification."). Plaintiff claims that the evidence is sufficient under Virginia law to establish false imprisonment because she felt threatened with restraint if she attempted to leave. See Doe v. Siddig, 810 F.Supp.2d 127, 137 (D.D.C. 2011) ("Under Virginia law . . . it is sufficient that the defendant used "force, words, or acts" of which the plaintiff was "afraid to ignore or to which [she] reasonably believe[d] [she] must submit.") (citing Zahand v. United Airlines Inc., 1994 WL 1031381, at *3 (Va.Cir.Ct.1994)). See also Swisher et al., Virginia Practice § 2:11 (under Virginia law, false imprisonment not limited to restraint by "stone walls and iron bars"). As discussed above, there is no evidence that Defendants ever threatened Plaintiff with "force, words, or acts" that would cause her to reasonably believe that she would be physically restrained if she attempted to leave. The evidence is therefore insufficient as a matter of law for a reasonable jury to find that Defendants falsely imprisoned the Plaintiff.
Defendants challenge Plaintiff's IIED claim on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to establish that Defendants engaged in conduct that was "outrageous and intolerable" and that Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress because of Defendants' conduct.
The tort of IIED is not favored in Virginia. Almy v. Grisham, 639 S.E.2d 182, 187 (Va. 2007). In order to qualify as actionable conduct for the purposes of an IIED claim, the conduct must be "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 162 (Va. 1991). Based on the record, as discussed above, the evidence is insufficient to meet that very high threshold, as that threshold has been described by the Virginia Supreme Court. Plaintiff was not physically abused or restrained or threatened with physical harm or restraint, or otherwise threatened with any other serious harm, and the long hours and other conditions of employment she describes do not rise to the required level of intolerable conduct for the purposes of an IIED claim. See Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 523 S.E.2d 826 (Va. 2000) (evidence of "outrageous conduct" sufficient if defendant, operator of a psychiatric facility, failed to notify a patient that the person who sexually assaulted her while a patient was known to be HIV positive).
As to Plaintiffs claim that she suffered a sufficiently high level of emotional distress as a result of Defendants' conduct, "liability arises only when the emotional distress is extreme, and only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it." Russo, supra, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991). See also Harris v. Kreutzer, 271 Va. 188, 205, 624 S.E.2d 24, 34 (2006) (facts insufficient to support severity element where plaintiffs symptoms "include[d] nightmares, difficulty sleeping, extreme loss of self-esteem and depression, requiring additional psychological treatment and counseling. . . mortification, humiliation, shame, disgrace, and injury to reputation."); CI Almy, supra, 639 S.E.2d at 188 (IIED claim adequate where plaintiff's alleged emotional distress "rendered her functionally incapable of carrying out any of her work or family responsibilities.").
In addition to Plaintiff's descriptions of her treatment and her mental state, as discussed above, the record contains two mental health evaluations and a stipulation concerning her lack of impairment to work after leaving Defendants' residence. Plaintiffs forensic psychiatric expert, Dr. Eric Goldsmith, diagnosed Plaintiff with a "major depressive disorder" in the "mild to moderate range," with its "symptoms resolv[ing] fairly quickly after the stressor seemed to resolve." See Goldsmith Dep. Tr. at 48:14-49:13, 173:17-174:12. Victoria Hougham, a Licensed Independent Clinical Social Worker, determined that Plaintiff "met the criteria for a diagnosis of Acute Stress Disorder with Panic Attacks . . . that lasted the duration of her employment and up to around three months after she left Al-Rawafs home." see Pl.'s Ex. 12 at ¶ 7 ("Psychological Evaluation of Winfred Muchira" dated April 23, 2014).
Based on the entire record viewed most favorably to the Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law for a reasonable juror to conclude that Defendants engaged in the conduct or that Plaintiff suffered the level of emotional distress necessary to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court therefore grants the Motion as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Defendants Ibraheem, Fahad, and Luluh Al-Rashoudi claim that they are not "employers" under the FLSA and that claim must therefore be dismissed as to them.
"The definition of `employer' under the FLSA is not limited by the common law concept of `employer,' and is to be given an expansive interpretation in order to effectuate the FLSA's broad remedial purposes. [] Under this broad definition, an individual may be the employee of more than one employer at a given time. [] And under the statute, `all joint employers are responsible, both individually and jointly, for compliance with all of the applicable provisions of the' FLSA." Jackson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, No. CN JFM 08-3103, 2009 WL 2060073, at *3 (D. Md. July 14, 2009) (internal citations omitted). "Rather than rely on any technical test, the Supreme Court has held that under the FLSA, courts should apply an "economic reality" test to determine whether an employment relationship exists. [] While no one factor or set of factors is decisive, the following four factors have been utilized by courts conducting such an analysis: (1) the authority to hire and fire employees; (2) the authority to supervise and control employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) the authority to determine the rate and method of payment; and (4) maintenance of employment records." Id. (citing Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985)).
Defendants argue that it is undisputed that Plaintiff was under contract with Defendant Al-Rawaf only. Pl.'s Ex. 5. Plaintiff counters that her FLSA claim is properly made against all of the defendants because the other three Defendants can also be considered her statutory employers, her testimony regarding who was her "boss" notwithstanding. See Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 89:16-19, 392:20-21; 425:16-17; 505:9-10,
Defendants stipulated that Ibraheem Al-Rashoudi arranged to find a house maid for the family, that Plaintiff was referred and the "family hired [her] for this purpose." Def. Ex. F. at 11 (emphasis added).
The parties' Employment Contract dated June7, 2012 provides that Plaintiff was to serve as a housemaid to "[Defendant Al-Rawaf] and her family members who will assign [Plaintiff] duties related to the job of [housemaid]." Def. Ex. L, Article (1) Job Classification. Defendants have also stipulated that before coming to the United States, "members of the Saudi Family discussed [Plaintiff s] anticipated working conditions in the United States with [Plaintiff]" and that "[m]embers of the Saudi Family assured [Plaintiff] that she could attend church in the United States." Def. Ex. F at ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff essentially testified that each of Defendants supervised and corrected her work See Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 89:9-90:10 ("every single one of the defendants shouted at [her]" when she would make a mistake).
Defendants stipulated that "Plaintiff received her salary in cash from Defendant Al-Rawaf, while Defendant Fahad witnessed Plaintiff sign on a signing sheet that she received that salary." Pl.'s Ex. 15 at ¶ 10. Plaintiff further testified that it was Defendant Ibraheem Al-Rashoudi who communicated to Plaintiff that her salary in the United States would be reduced from $1,600 per month to $400 per month. See Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 168:17-169:10.
Defendants stipulated that they "did not maintain a record of hours [Plaintiff] worked." Def. Ex. F at ¶ 26. However, to the extent that there were documents relating to her employment, including her employment contract, Plaintiff testified that "the family always bring papers to me and . . . tell me to sign," Pl.'s Dep. Tr. at 48:7-9.
Based on these stipulations and testimony, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact to be resolved as to whether the Defendants, in addition to Defendant Al-Rawaf, may be deemed an "employer" under the FLSA; and the Court denies the motion on that basis. See also Schultz v. Capital Intl Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (where facts fit into one of the examples of joint employment listed in the regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)
Based on the Court's rulings, Plaintiff's only remaining claims are for civil conspiracy (as it relates to the unjust enrichment claim) (Seventh Claim for Relief), unjust enrichment (Eighth Claim for Relief), and a violation of the FLSA claim (Eleventh Claim for relief). Punitive damages based on a civil conspiracy appear to be recoverable under Virginia law, at most, only insofar as punitive damages are recoverable for the underlying substantive offense. See Dunlap v. Cottman Transmission Systems, LLC, 754 S.E.2d 313, 317-318 (Va. 2014) (citing with approval cases that hold that a civil conspiracy is not actionable in itself; it is "merely a method of establishing joint liability for the underlying tort."). Assuming, without deciding, that that there is a cognizable cause of action under Virginia law for a civil conspiracy to engage in unjust enrichment, the underlying substantive offense, unjust enrichment, is a quasi-contractual equitable claim that provides only for the recovery of the value of the plaintiff's services (quantum meruit). See Rinehart v. Pirkey, 101 S.E. 353, 354 (Va. 1919) (recognizing unjust enrichment as quasi-contract claim). Punitive damages are therefore not recoverable as a matter of law as to either the civil conspiracy claim or the unjust enrichment claim. See Shaw v. Titan Corp., 498 S.E.2d 696, 701 (Va. 1998) ("When a plaintiff pleads and proves an intentional tort under the common law of Virginia, the trier of fact may award punitive damages."); see also Saleh v. Univ. of Virginia, No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-460 R, 1999 WL 34798179, at *6 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 1999) affd sub nom. Saleh v. Upadhyay, 11 F. App'x 241 (4th Cir. 2001) ("At law, there is no independent, free-standing claim for punitive damages. Rather, punitive damages are an element of damages available if certain claims are proved."). Likewise, punitive damages may not be recovered for a violation of the FLSA. See Lanza v. Sugarland Run Homeowners Assoc. Inc., 97 F.Supp.2d 737, 742 (E.D.Va. 2000) ("where, as here, the statute [§ 216(b) of the FLSA] makes no explicit mention of punitive damages and the remedial scheme makes clear that the right afforded to aggrieved employees is compensatory in nature, courts may not engraft punitive damages onto the statute."). Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages must therefore be dismissed.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to partial judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh (except as to conspiracy pertaining to unjust enrichment), Ninth, Tenth, and Twelfth Claims for Relief. The Motion, however, is denied as to Plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment (Eighth Claim for Relief), civil conspiracy to obtain unjust enrichment (Seventh Claim for Relief), and violations of the FLSA (Eleventh Claim for Relief).
An appropriate Order will issue.
At her deposition, Plaintiff confirmed that she had made certain of the statements attributed to her in the Hotline memoranda while she disputed, or qualified, other statements. Some statements, she both confirmed and denied making at different points in her deposition. In reaching its decision, the Court has not accepted as true any statements attributed to Plaintiff whose accuracy she disputed at any point in her deposition.
(1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; or
(2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee; or
(3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer.
29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b).
