TOMMY E. MILLER, Magistrate Judge.
Presently before the Court is the determination of the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to which S&N Locating Services, LLC, and S&N Communications, Inc. ("S&N") collectively are entitled as a result of the undersigned granting S&N's Request for Sanctions (ECF No. 232). This request stems from attorneys' fees and costs incurred by S&N to brief and attend hearings on two motions to compel. The undersigned has entered an Order granting S&N's request for fees. ECF No. 254. For the reasons outlined below, the Court
On October 3, 2014, the Court held a hearing and granted Defendants' Motion to Compel ("First Motion to Compel"). ECF No. 138. Daniel O'Connor, Esq., represented Defendants at the hearing. CertusView was ordered to turn over two Market Intelligence Reports that were clawed back during the deposition of Curtis Chambers on the basis of attorney-client privilege, and S&N was granted the opportunity to conduct a continuation of the deposition of Curtis Chambers.
On November 19, 2014, the undersigned held a hearing and granted S&N's Emergency Motion to Compel ("Second Motion to Compel", ECF No. 199). Order, ECF No. 220. Daniel O'Connor, Esq., and Weldon Rankin, Esq., represented Defendants at the hearing. Defendants were seeking the production of documents that Plaintiff argued were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Plaintiff asserted that the attorney-client privilege was not waived by disclosure to third parties because the third parties were the functional equivalent of CertusView employees. The Court made the following findings: (1) Plaintiff failed to make the specific demonstration required to show that the documents at issue were privileged according to the criteria set forth in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 272 (E.D. Va. 2004); and, (2) even if the documents had been privileged, the third parties were not the functional equivalent of CertusView employees. In the Order granting the Second Motion to Compel, the undersigned indicated that S&N "may file a request for monetary sanctions." ECF No. 220.
On December 5, 2014, S&N filed a Request for Monetary Sanctions focusing on the amount of sanctions requested. ECF No. 232. Plaintiff responded on December 29, 2014, arguing, in part, that sanctions should not be awarded. ECF No. 240. On January 30, 2015, the undersigned entered an Order granting S&N's request for fees and costs to be awarded as a sanction, and established a briefing schedule to address the amount of fees and costs requested. ECF No. 254.
CertusView filed objections to the undersigned's Orders entered November 20, 2014 and January 30, 2015, and the objections were overruled by United States District Judge Mark A. Davis. ECF No. 296. CertusView then filed a response to S&N's request for sanctions asserting that the fees and costs requested by S&N were unreasonable. ECF No. 307. CertusView further asserted that the request should be reduced by $18,458.55, the amount of fees and costs CertusView is now seeking as a result of Magistrate Judge Lawrence A. Leonard's granting CertusView's request for costs and fees after ruling in their favor on a motion to compel in April 2014. ECF No. 116.
S&N has replied to the response (ECF No. 314), and the issue of the amount of fees and costs is ripe for determination.
Review of the reasonableness of S&N's request for attorneys' fees begins with a determination of the "lodestar figure," which is calculated "by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate." Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Grissom v. Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2008)). To determine a "reasonable" number of hours and rate, the Court is guided by the following factors:
Robinson, 560 F.3d at 243-44 (quoting Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n. 28 (4th Cir. 1978)). Because this matter involves a discovery motion rather than a determination of fees due following the completion of trial, the Court finds that the fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, and eleventh factors are not particularly applicable, leaving the Court to address the first, second, third, fifth, ninth and twelfth factors. See Lismont v. Alexander Binzel Corp., 47 F.Supp.3d 443, 450 (E.D. Va. 2014). In addition to these factors, "the court must exclude any hours that are `excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,' as such hours are not reasonably expended on the litigation." Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 887 F.Supp.2d 704, 709 (E.D. Va. 2012) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).
S&N requests an award of $98,582 in attorneys' fees
As to the first factor, the Court
S&N seeks attorneys' fees for the time and labor expended drafting two motions to compel. ECF No. 318 at 2. According to the chart submitted in support of the fee request, three of S&N's attorneys spent a total of 58.3 hours researching and drafting the First Motion to Compel. ECF 235-1 at 2-3. Ms. Choi recorded 10.5 hours ($4,063.50) preparing the First Motion to Compel, Mr. Rankin recorded 41.8 hours ($23,512.50), and Mr. O'Connor recorded 6 hours ($4,050). ECF No. 235-1 at 2-3. The records show that three of S&N's attorneys spent a total of 71.6 hours researching and drafting the Second Motion to Compel. ECF 235-1 at 4-6. Ms. Hausler recorded 44.5 hours ($17,221.50) researching and drafting the Second Motion to Compel, Mr. Rankin recorded 17.4 hours ($9,787.50), and Mr. O'Connor recorded 9.7 hours ($6,547.50). ECF No. 235-1 at 4-6. Accordingly, attorneys' fees recorded for the time spent researching and drafting both motions to compel total 129.9 hours and $65,182.50. ECF 235-1 at 2-6.
S&N argues that a reasonable amount of time was billed, given the time and labor necessary to draft four briefs. ECF No. 235 at 10. S&N asserts that each brief required legal research and analysis, as well as an in depth review of deposition and hearing transcripts, prior pleadings, and evidence on file with the Court. ECF No. 235 at 10-11. S&N also emphasizes that the Second Motion to Compel required lengthy review of privilege logs, which contained over 600 documents. ECF No. 235 at 11. S&N contends that CertusView's discovery misconduct contributed to the amount of time counsel spent preparing the motions to compel. ECF No. 318 at 3. S&N argues that the extent of CertusView's "efforts to keep non-privileged documents from being produced" forced S&N to spend more time examining the record "with a particularly discerning eye as the truth trickled out." ECF No. 318 at 3.
CertusView claims that the time S&N spent drafting the two motions to compel exceeded the complexity of the issues. ECF No. 310-1 at 3. According to CertusView, the issues involved "a few fairly straightforward questions of attorney-client privilege," rather than complex questions of patent law requiring a large amount of time. ECF No. 310-1 at 4. CertusView contends that S&N's decision to spend a great amount of time on the motions to compel was a "tactical decision." ECF No. 310-1 at 4. CertusView further argues that the involvement of highly experienced patent attorneys should have reduced the time necessary to draft the motions to compel. ECF No. 310-1 at 3. With respect to the specific review of privilege logs, documents, and deposition transcripts made in connection to the motions to compel, CertusView argues that S&N should not recover fees for work that should be done as a matter of course during litigation. ECF No. 310-1 at 6-7 (citing Intelligent Verification Sys., LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:12-cv-525, 2014 WL 6685440, at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 25, 2014)). Accordingly, CertusView asks that S&N's recovery be reduced by $5,181.30 for the time S&N spent reviewing CertusView's privilege logs, documents, and deposition transcripts. ECF No. 310-1 at 5-7. Lastly, CertusView asks for a separate reduction of $2,355.70, which represents the airfare and hotel expenses for travel to the deposition of Mr. Chambers. ECF No. 310-1 at 6.
The party requesting fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of what it seeks to recover. Plyer v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990); Cook v. Andrews, 7 F.Supp.2d 733, 736 (E.D. Va. 1998). The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the amount of a reasonable fee under the circumstances. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. Based on the issue being contested, the Court
However, the Court
CertusView contends that, given the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised, senior partners performed a disproportionate amount of the work that should instead have been completed by more junior associates. ECF No. 310-1 at 4. The Court rejects this argument. As S&N remarks, senior attorney Mr. Rankin was in the best position to prepare the motions to compel, given his familiarity with the facts. ECF No. 218 at 5. As S&N notes, there are situations where a senior attorney's greater understanding of the facts associated with a dispute justifies more involvement in the interests of efficiency. ECF No. 318 at 4 (citing Lismont, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 456). Here, Mr. Rankin understood the details of the dispute more fully, in part because he conducted the initial deposition of Mr. Chambers. ECF No. 318 at 5. Furthermore, in Lismont, the court upheld the reasonableness of an award where 72 out of the 89.5 hours were billed by three senior partners. Lismont, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 455. Compared to Lismont, where the partners billed 80% of the total hours, senior partners in the present case billed a lower amount at 70% of the total hours. ECF No. 235 at 2-6. Therefore, the Court
CertusView argues that S&N's award should be reduced based upon improper overstaffing, in light of the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered. ECF No. 310-1 at 7. CertusView specifically argues that S&N overstaffed the hearing on S&N's Second Motion to Compel (attended by both Mr. O'Connor and Mr. Rankin)
CertusView argues that two senior partners, Mr. O'Connor and Mr. Rankin, should not have both attended the hearing on S&N's Second Motion to Compel. ECF No. 310-1 at 7. Because Mr. O'Connor argued the motion at the hearing, CertusView asserts that Mr. Rankin's presence was unnecessary. EFC No. 310-1 at 7. CertusView notes that, at the same hearing, CertusView sent only one partner, Mr. Moore, and one associate, Ms. Rubin. ECF No. 310-1 at 7. Accordingly, CertusView asks that S&N's award be reduced by $9,477.57, which represents Mr. Rankin's preparation for the hearing (14.7 hours of work totaling $8,268.75) and his travel expenses (airfare and hotel costs for attendance at the hearing totaling $1,208.82).
S&N argues that the attendance of both partners was necessary for the hearing. ECF No. 318 at 10. While acknowledging that Mr. O'Connor alone presented oral arguments at the hearing, S&N argues that Mr. Rankin's presence provided necessary factual expertise based on Mr. Rankin's "initial deposition of Mr. Chambers and the briefing underlying both motions," his extensive work drafting the second motion to compel, and the oral argument outlines that he prepared for the hearing. ECF No. 318 at 10. Accordingly, S&N argues that Mr. Rankin's presence at the second motion to compel hearing was "not duplicative to Mr. O'Connor but complementary." ECF No. 318 at 10. Additionally, S&N contends that the seriousness of the second hearing required the presence of two senior attorneys, both who possessed the kind of extensive knowledge of the case required to answer questions arising at the hearing. ECF No. 318 at 11.
S&N asserts that multiple attorneys often properly attend hearings as "common practice." ECF No. 318 at 10 (citing MiTile, Ltd. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-451, 2013 WL 5525685, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2013)). While MiTile does provide some support for that assertion, the case specifically addresses the work of joint associates and partners, stating that "it is reasonable and customary for both associates and partners to work on the same motion and their time expended is not duplicative, but appropriate." MiTile, Ltd., 2013 WL 5525685, at *2. In this case, however, Mr. O'Connor and Mr. Rankin, two senior partners billing $675 and $562.5 per hour respectively, attended the hearing for the Second Motion to Compel. ECF No. 235-1 at 5-6. In light of the skills required to properly perform this legal service for S&N, the Court
CertusView also argues that S&N overstaffed the deposition by sending both Ms. Choi and Mr. O'Connor to Mr. Chambers' deposition. ECF No. 310-1 at 7. Arguing that Ms. Choi's attendance was unnecessary, CertusView asks that S&N's award be reduced by $1,165.98, the amount associated with Ms. Choi's travel to Mr. Chambers' deposition. ECF No. 310-1 at 7. S&N contends that Ms. Choi's attendance was necessary, as "more junior attorneys [play] critical roles including drafting scripts, formulating follow-up questions, and locating documents for the generally more-senior deposing attorney." ECF No. 318 at 11. However, the Court
S&N's attorneys who participated in the preparation of the two motions to compel include Mr. Rankin (Partner with 12 years of experience), Mr. O'Connor (Partner with 40 years of experience), Ms. Hausler (Associate with 4 years of experience), and Ms. Choi (Associate with 3 years of experience). ECF No. 235-5 at 4. All attorneys are partners and associates of the firm Baker & McKenzie LLP. ECF No. 235-5 at 3. The Curriculum Vitaes ("CV") of Mr. O'Connor and Mr. Rankin show expertise in patent litigation. ECF No. 235-5 at 4. Ms. Choi's CV lists experience in networks, software, communication systems, semiconductors, optics, medical devices, and display technology. ECF No. 235-5 at 4. Ms. Hausler's CV shows experience in complex litigation. ECF No. 235-5 at 4. CertusView does not dispute the experience, reputation, and abilities of these attorneys. Based on the work they performed and their resumes and credentials, the Court
Concerning the fifth factor, S&N proffered the following billing rates for its four attorneys who worked on the two motions to compel: Mr. Rankin—$562.50 per hour; Mr. O'Connor—$675 per hour; Ms. Hausler—$387 per hour; Ms. Choi—$387 per hour. ECF No. 235-1 at 2-6. In determining whether S&N's requests are reasonable, the Court first considers the Declaration of Craig L. Mytelka, an attorney who is not counsel in this case. ECF No. 235-5 at 2-9. The Fourth Circuit has determined that, "[i]n addition to the attorney's own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce satisfactory specific evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which he seeks an award." Plyler, 902 F.2d at 277 (citations omitted). In his declaration, Mr. Mytelka states that the specific rates charged by the attorneys of Baker & McKenzie are reasonable in light of the attorneys' years of experience for "complex, high-stakes civil litigation in federal court." ECF No. 235-5 at 5. Mr. Mytelka further notes that similar rates have been approved in the Norfolk Division of the Eastern District of Virginia. See Swimways Corp. v. Tofasco of America, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-481, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122865, at *3 (E.D. Va. Sep. 3, 2009) (approving and applying a rate of $675 per hour for partner time and $435 per hour for associate time). CertusView does not dispute the reasonableness of S&N's billing rates. ECF No. 310-1 at 12. In fact, it appears as though counsel for CertusView charged CertusView higher rates than those charged to S&N. ECF No. 310-1 at 12. Considering the Declaration of Independent Counsel Craig L. Mytelka and CertusView's lack of objection to the billing structure, the Court
With respect to the twelfth factor, CertusView argues that S&N's fee request surpasses fee awards made in similar cases. CertusView cites six Fourth Circuit cases where the court awarded fees in the $5,000 to $30,000 range pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5). ECF No. 310-1 (citing Flame S.A. v. Indus. Carriers, No. 2:13-cv-658, 2014 WL 7185199 (E.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2014) (awarding $8,400 and $19,797 pursuant to Rule 37 on two separate occasions); Lismont v. Alexander Binzel Corp., 47 F.Supp.3d 443 (E.D. Va. 2014) (awarding $33,873 in fees and costs for multiple motions to compel); Papanicolas v. Project Execution & Control Consulting, LLC, No. CBD-12-1579, 2014 WL 5297646 (D. Md. Oct. 10, 2014) (awarding $8,337.22 in fees and costs on a motion to compel); Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Cathcart, No. 2:07-02992-DCN, 2015 WL 436217 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2013) (awarding $11,360 in fees for a discovery request); Hairston v. Prince George's County, No. PJM-09-3431, 2011 WL 6000757 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2011) (awarding $5,756.01 in fees to compel production of spoliated materials); Mills v. E. Gulf Coal Preparation Co., LLC, No. 5:08-0260, 2010 WL 1050359 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 18, 2010) (awarding $6,120 in fees for briefing and arguing a motion to compel)). The cases listed by CertusView do not grant awards similar to the $98,582 in attorneys' fees and $5,578.41 in costs that S&N seeks here. ECF No. 235 at 2.
S&N alleges that the cases cited by CertusView do not involve the same level of complexity as does the present case. ECF No. 318 at 16. In support of their request for a larger award, S&N cites Swimways, a case in which the court awarded $61,169.69 in attorneys' fees and costs associated with a single motion to compel. Swimways Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122865, at *3. While acknowledging that Swimways involved a preliminary injunction violation not at issue in the present case, S&N asserts that attorneys' fees were awarded in Swimways for a motion to compel discovery because "the discovery of the violation of the preliminary injunction was a direct result of the motion to compel." ECF No. 218 at 14-15. Additionally, S&N argues that the present case compares to cases where discovery misconduct has increased the complexity of the case. ECF No. 318 at 16. S&N compares the present case to Flame, a case involving discovery misconduct, where the court awarded attorneys' fees for 52.7 hours of work. ECF No. 318 at 15-16 (citing Flame S.A., 2014 WL 7185199, at *14). S&N further compares the discovery misconduct at issue to Lismont, a case in which the court found an award for 89.5 hours reasonable based on the preparation of a "motion for entry and a reply in support of the motion; two supplemental briefs; a declaration and reply; and a motion for attorneys fees." ECF No. 318 at 16 (citing Lismont, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 450). However, as noted above, the court in Flame awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $8,400 in connection to a motion to compel and $19,797 in connection to a motion for sanctions. Flame S.A., 2014 WL 7185199, at *15. In Lismont, the court awarded $33,469 in attorneys' fees and $404.01 in Westlaw research fees. Lismont, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 459. Ultimately, S&N bears the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the amount of a reasonable fee in the circumstances. See Henley, 461 U.S. at 433. Both awards in Flame and Lismont were considerably lower than the amount S&N requests, despite what S&N refers to as similar discovery misconduct between the two cases. ECF No. 318 at 16. Accordingly, an analysis of total fee awards in similar cases does not clearly support S&N's request for $98,582 in attorneys' fees and $5,578.41 in costs. ECF No. 235 at 2. After subtracting the Court's aforementioned reductions from S&N's requested amount, S&N's awards stands at $60,925.61. The Court
Along with CertusView's more general allegation that S&N's award request exceeds total awards issued in similar cases, CertusView specifically disputes S&N's request for first class airfare reimbursement and $3 gift shop purchase. CertusView asserts that expenses related to S&N's first class airfare should not be awarded. ECF No. 310-1 at 8. CertusView asks that S&N's request be reduced by $253.55, which represents 25% of the $1,014.20 plane ticket that included a first class seat. ECF No. 310-1 at 8. In response, S&N notes that the costs associated with Mr. Rankin's first class airfare ticket were not the product of frivolity, but rather the fact that a first class ticket was available for a direct flight as opposed to a main cabin ticket also available that "would have required a connecting flight through Charlotte and approximately five hours of travel time." ECF No. 318 at 13. The court has noted that "[a]bsent some unusual circumstances . . . it is not reasonable to shift to the opposing party the costs of first class air travel, luxury cars, or even unreasonably high charges for less luxurious models." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d 753, 762 (S.D. Ind. 2003). While acknowledging S&N's argument that Eli Lilly does not state that first class airfare can never be awarded, the Court
CertusView further argues that it would not be appropriate to award S&N the $3 counsel spent on gift shop purchases during travel. ECF No. 310-1 at 8. S&N refrains from contesting the $3 charge. ECF No. 318 at 14. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that S&N's award will be reduced by the $3 spent at the gift shop.
Lastly, CertusView argues that any award granted to S&N should be reduced by $18,458.55 based upon the court's prior ruling on CertusView's motion to compel interrogatory responses. ECF No. 310-1 at 9. S&N contends that CertusView's inaction for 10 months should prohibit them from now requesting an award. ECF No. 318 at 17. Despite CertusView's failure to take speedy action to collect fees, the Court
Defendant S&N's Request for Monetary Sanctions, ECF No. 232, is
The Clerk shall mail a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.