MEMORANDUM OPINION

T.S. ELLIS, III, District Judge.

The threshold issue in this Fair Credit Reporting Act Case ("FCRA") is whether Defendant Upstart Network, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 & 4, should be granted. Defendant was the loan servicer for an $18,000 loan from Cross River Bank that Plaintiff Mahan Hosseini obtained in July 2014. Plaintiff, who succeeded in having the loan discharged in bankruptcy in 2016, has sued defendant for violating FCRA by failing to report the discharge. Defendant asserts that, in the course of applying for the loan, plaintiff agreed to an arbitration clause and later reaffirmed that agreement in the Promissory Note that he signed. For his part, plaintiff claims that he did not read the Upstart Borrower Platform Agreement (the "Platform Agreement") and does not recall even looking at it. For the reasons that follow, the record reflects that plaintiff accepted the arbitration clause in the Platform Agreement and hence the motion to compel arbitration must be granted.

I.

The following facts are appropriately derived from the parties' affidavits, declarations, and exhibits as well as the facts alleged in the Complaint.

II.

The FAA reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Green Tree Fin. Corp. — Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000). Specifically, Congress enacted the FAA "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit has observed that "[w]hen parties have entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate their disputes and the dispute at issue falls within the scope of that agreement, the FAA requires federal courts to stay judicial proceedings ... and compel arbitration in accordance with the agreement's terms." Murray v. UFCW Int'l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 2002).

In determining whether the FAA requires a court to compel arbitration and stay ongoing judicial proceedings, a court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90. To begin with, it is necessary to "ask whether the parties agreed to submit their claims to arbitration." Id. If so, it is then necessary to determine "whether Congress has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Id. (internal citations omitted). Assuming Congress has not evinced such an intention, a court must compel arbitration and stay judicial proceedings, provided that it determines that "the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, the parties only dispute whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.2 Accordingly, defendant bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a binding agreement to arbitrate. See Minnieland Private Day Sch., Inc. v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co., Inc., 867 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2017); Bigger v. Facebook, Inc., 2020 WL 401804, at *4 (7th Cir. 2020). If defendant makes such a showing, plaintiff "must come forward with sufficient facts to place the entitlement to arbitration in dispute." Lovelady v. Five Star Quality Care-Va, LLC, No.4:18-cv-18, 2018 WL 3580768, at *7 (E.D. Va. July 25, 2018).

A.

Defendant asserts that the Platform Agreement was presented to plaintiff as part of a "clickwrap" agreement and that, as such, the Platform Agreement, including the arbitration clause, is enforceable. A clickwrap agreement is a dialogue box that appears on a webpage and requires that a user agree to certain terms before allowing the user to continue to use the website.3 Most courts have concluded that clickwrap agreements are valid, enforceable contracts.4 Modified or hybrid clickwrap agreements, where the user must affirmatively manifest assent to agreements that are provided via hyperlink, are also routinely found to be valid, enforceable contracts.5 Here, the Platform Agreement is a hybrid clickwrap agreement to which plaintiff manifested his assent. Accordingly, the Platform Agreement, including the arbitration clause, is enforceable and defendant's motion to compel arbitration must be granted.

Defendant has submitted three declarations and several exhibits which defendant argues establish that plaintiff affirmatively agreed to the Platform Agreement and the arbitration clause contained within it. Anna Counselman, the Head of Operations and co-founder of defendant, averred in her affidavit that, at the time plaintiff applied for a loan in July 2014, the Upstart Platform "required him to accept" the Platform Agreement and other agreements "by affirmatively checking an `I Agree' box or clicking an `I Agree' button on the form." Counselman Aff. ¶ 9. Counselman also stated that "the prospective borrower cannot complete the loan application or use the Upstart Platform" without agreeing to the terms of the Platform Agreement and other agreements. Id. ¶ 10. Counselman reviewed defendant's records and determined that plaintiff created his account and agreed to the Platform Agreement at 11:19 a.m. PST on July 10, 2014. Id. ¶ 11. The information included in Counselman's affidavit is echoed by the declaration of defendant's Head of Information Technology, Saikat Maiti. See Maiti Decl. ¶¶ 6-11. In a second declaration, Maiti provides a screenshot of the page depicting the "I Agree" box that appeared in July 2014 (through 2015) when a user applied for a loan and had to agree to the terms of the Platform Agreement. Maiti Second Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, Exh. 1. The specific text of the "I Agree" box states: "By clicking agree, I confirm I have read, understood, and agree to the terms and conditions of the Promissory Note, the Upstart Platform Agreement, Credit Score Disclosure, and the Cross River Bank Privacy Disclosure." Id. ¶ 8. Furthermore, Maiti states that the "I Agree" box provided a link to the Platform Agreement. Id. ¶ 11.

Defendant's evidence establishes that the Platform Agreement is a valid hybrid clickwrap agreement, which required that plaintiff affirmatively consent to the terms of hyperlinked agreements, including the Platform Agreement's arbitration clause, before proceeding to use the Upstart Platform. Maiti's second declaration establishes that plaintiff was presented with the "I Agree" box informing him that "[b]y clicking agree, I confirm I have read, understood, and agree to the terms and conditions of ... the Upstart Platform Agreement ..." Maiti Second Decl. ¶ 8. Clicking "I Agree" is a valid means of expressing assent to a contract. See Mikhak v. Univ. of Phoenix, No. C16-00901 CRB, 2016 WL 3401763, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2016). Moreover, courts have found almost identical hybrid clickwrap agreements to be enforceable. In Fteja v. Facebook Inc., 841 F.Supp.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), the court found that a contract was formed where the plaintiff "was informed of the consequences of his assenting click" and the plaintiff there, as here, was shown immediately below the hyperlinks to the documents to click to understand those consequences. Id. at 840. In Fteja, the court noted that a hybrid clickwrap agreement was no different from a cruise ticket or sign where a user would be required to turn the document over to learn of all of the terms of the contract. See id. at 839. Other courts have similarly found valid contracts formed where a user clicks "I Agree" and is provided with the hyperlinked terms of the contract.6 Because plaintiff clicked "I Agree" in order to use the Upstart Platform, including the arbitration clause, and obtain a loan, he has affirmatively agreed to the Platform Agreement and hence there is a valid agreement to arbitrate.

Plaintiff seeks to undercut this showing of his assent by claiming that he did not intend to enter into an arbitration agreement with defendant and by pointing to the current version of defendant's website. These arguments are meritless. Plaintiff denies his agreement to arbitrate. but that assertion is meaningless and unpersuasive given that plaintiff admits that, when presented with electronic agreements like the modified clickwrap agreement here, he "never review[s] the details in such boxes or click on the hyperlinks." Hosseini Decl. ¶ 9. Courts uniformly hold that "failure to read an enforceable contract, as with any binding contract, will not excuse compliance with its terms." Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.Supp.2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007).7 Plaintiff further complains that the current version of the website, which states "Agree and See Your Rate," does not adequately convey that a user is agreeing to the Platform Agreement. Hosseini Decl. ¶ 13. The current version of defendant's website is not relevant to the issues presented in this case, namely whether plaintiff agreed to the Platform Agreement in July 2014.

Plaintiff also argues that the record lacks sufficient indicia of authenticity and credibility of the Platform Agreement. This argument also fails. Plaintiff argues that the evidence of agreement is unenforceable because he did not physically sign the agreement.8 As courts have sensibly recognized, "[w]hile new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract." One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d 258, 268 (5th Cir. 2011). Thus, manifesting agreement by clicking "I agree," as the caselaw discussed supra holds, is sufficient. Moreover, the FAA does not require arbitration agreements to be signed. Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002); Valero Refining, Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1987) ("It is established that a party may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate even in the absence of his signature."). Thus, clicking an "Agree" button is sufficient to manifest plaintiff's agreement without the inclusion of an electronic signature or other identifying information from plaintiff on the agreement.9 Furthermore, district courts have recognized that "[a] contract is no less a contract simply because it is entered into via a computer." A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F.Supp.2d 473, 480 (E.D. Va. 2008). Here, the record establishes that plaintiff manifested his assent to the Platform Agreement by clicking "I Agree" and thereby entered into a valid contract containing an arbitration clause.

Moreover, courts have rejected similar arguments regarding lack of credible evidence of agreement. Indeed, this case is similar to Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., 256 F. App'x 515 (3d Cir. 2007). In Schwartz, a subscription agreement, like the Platform Agreement, contained an arbitration clause and plaintiff denied the existence of an agreement. The Third Circuit was unimpressed and, relying on the defendant's evidence "of its consistent practice regarding delivery of subscription agreements and of the conduct of the parties," found that there was prima facie evidence of an agreement and that plaintiff offered no evidence to the contrary. Id. at 518. Thus, the Third Circuit held that there was a valid subscription agreement that contained an arbitration clause. Other courts have likewise rejected attempts to dispute agreement.10 In Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F.Supp.2d 756 (N.D. Tex. 2006), the district court found that, as is the case here, there was unchallenged evidence that, "[w]ithout accepting the terms of the license, installation is not possible." Id. Similarly, in Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No.07-cv-1963, 2009 WL 586513 (D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009), the district court rejected the plaintiff's "clever theory for how he might have subverted the online agreement," and held that this theory was not persuasive, because "[t]he website requires assent to the terms" and there was "no evidence that suggests the website operates any differently." Id. at *3. Here, the evidence of agreement is even stronger than that presented in other cases. Defendant has provided undisputed testimony indicating not only that it was impossible to proceed to obtain a loan without agreeing to the Platform Agreement, but the exact time when such agreement took place.

Plaintiff's other authenticity arguments are similarly meritless. Plaintiff suggests that defendant has made alterations to the Platform Agreement demonstrating that it was not in force in 2014, when plaintiff used defendant's website. Namely, plaintiff points to: (i) an address; (ii) a copyright from 2012-2019; and (iii) a reference to Exhibit A. None of the points raised by plaintiff demonstrate that the Platform Agreement attached as an exhibit was not in effect in 2014. To begin with, Counselman, who founded defendant and was involved with defendant in 2014, avers that the Platform Agreement was the agreement used in 2014. See Counselman Aff. ¶¶ 11-12. Similarly, Maiti, the head of information technology at defendant, attests that the Platform Agreement was in place in 2014. See Maiti Decl. ¶ 11. Furthermore, as defendant sensibly explains, the reference to the San Carlos, California address and the 2012-2019 copyright were affixed upon retrieval of the document from online storage for use in this litigation. See Reply at 11. The reference to Exhibit A at the end of the Platform Agreement is explained within the agreement itself: "The loan will be evidenced by a promissory note you make to CRB substantially in the form provided in Exhibit A to this Agreement below." Exh. A, ¶ 4. Thus, plaintiff's suggestions of fraud are unsupported and unpersuasive. Moreover, authenticity is not a high barrier to overcome. See Rule 901(a) (a proponent of evidence must produce sufficient evidence that "the item is what it purports to be"). Here, there are multiple declarations attesting to the authenticity of the Platform Agreement attached as Exhibit A. See Melo v. Zumper, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-621, 2020 WL 465033, at *7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2020). Plaintiff offers no evidence to show that the Platform Agreement attached as Exhibit A was not in the one in place in 2014 and was not agreed to by plaintiff.11

In sum, defendant has come forward with evidence establishing the existence of an agreement to arbitrate that plaintiff has failed to rebut. See Green v. Kline Chevrolet Sales Corp., No., 2019 WL 3728266, at *3 (E.D.Va. Aug. 7, 2019) (citing Chorley Enters., Inc. v. Dickey's Barbeque Rests., Inc., 807 F.3d 553, 564 (4th Cir. 2015)). The parties agreed to the Platform Agreement in July 2014, and the disputes raised in the Complaint fall within the arbitration clause. Accordingly, plaintiff is bound by the arbitration clause and the motion to compel arbitration must be granted.

B.

Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff did not agree to the Platform Agreement itself, which would be impossible given the design of defendant's website, plaintiff does not dispute that he agreed to the Promissory Note in order to obtain the Loan. The Promissory Note, Exhibit B to the motion, incorporates the Platform Agreement, including the arbitration clause, as part of the Promissory Note. See Exh. B, ¶ 16. Plaintiff does not deny that he signed the Promissory Note or that it contains this provision,12 but argues that, because the Promissory Note is between plaintiff and a third-party, the incorporation clause in paragraph 16 does not bind plaintiff to arbitrate with defendant pursuant to the Platform Agreement. Plaintiff is incorrect.

Plaintiff cites no case for the proposition that incorporating the Platform Agreement into the Promissory Note does not require plaintiff to arbitrate with defendant. Courts have held that that non-parties to a contract may compel or be compelled to arbitrate in similar circumstances.13 Courts have also recognized that the reach of the arbitration clause is not limited when it is incorporated into another contract.14 Here, the Promissory Note explicitly incorporated the Platform Agreement, which includes plaintiff's agreement to arbitrate disputes with defendant, as part of the "Entire Agreement" into which plaintiff entered. Exh. B, ¶ 16. Because the Platform Agreement is incorporated into the Promissory Note and because the Platform Agreement was intended to permit defendant to arbitrate disputes with plaintiff, defendant may enforce the arbitration clause, regardless of whether plaintiff separately agreed to the Platform Agreement, which he did. Accordingly, pursuant to the Promissory Note, plaintiff manifested agreement to arbitrate disputes like the Complaint with defendant and the motion to compel arbitration must be granted.

III.

For the reasons set forth above, defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings must be granted.

An appropriate order will issue separately.

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record.