Robert G. Mayer, United States Bankruptcy Judge
The question presented in this case is the relative priority of various unsecured claims, in particular, whether the claims of creditors who loaned money to the debtor in reliance on security agreements that were ineffective to grant liens on real property have priority over the unsecured claims of a creditor who was not an owner of the debtor but who controlled the debtor and knew that the security agreements were ineffective to grant liens on the debtor's real property.
Starlight Group, LLC, the debtor, bought residential real estate at short sales and resold it from January 2009 until November 2011 when it filed bankruptcy.
Holmes approached Spencer C. Brand, a trusted friend and mentor. He proposed that Brand — and at Brand's suggestion, Starlight, Brand's single-member limited liability company — purchase the distressed properties at the below-market price with
Starlight's first purchase was funded solely by Holmes who borrowed $110,000 on his life insurance policy and lent it to Starlight. 1 Tr. 47-48. After the first few transactions proved very successful, Holmes approached W. Michael Dorula and negotiated a loan from him to Starlight. 1 Tr. 68. Dorula became an intermediary for his friends who also lent money to Starlight. At Starlight's height, it had more than $2.3 million in outstanding loans to the Dorula lenders and $800,000 to Holmes.
Holmes' key accounting idea was that at the end of each transaction — the purchase and then the sale of the distressed property — the lenders' money would be restored to Starlight's bank account and the profits would be split. 1 Tr. 61-62. Between the real estate owned and the money in the bank, the lenders would be assured of repayment of their loans. 7 Tr. 22-23.
Homes testified that "Starlight was not a money-making entity. Starlight was a bookkeeping entity." 1 Tr. 61. Starlight received the net proceeds from each sale and made disbursements — principally monthly interest payments to the lenders and the profits to Holmes and Brand as computed by Holmes. Brand acted on behalf of Starlight in this regard. In addition, once Holmes established the relationship with Dorula, Brand was responsible for lender relations and dealt directly with Dorula who acted on behalf of his friends. 6 Tr. 75; 1 Tr. 61.
The venture ended shortly after Brand admitted to Holmes that he had unsuccessfully invested idle funds in the stock market and had lost more than $400,000. 4 Tr. 92. Holmes later learned that Brand had been paying himself more than the profits Holmes had determined were due to him. This amount, charged to Brand as compensation on Starlight's books, amounted to several hundred thousand dollars. 3 Tr. 153-155.
When informed of the situation, Holmes and the Dorula lenders agreed to place the proceeds from the sales of the remaining properties owned by Starlight in escrow. 3 Tr. 52. The escrow agent was initially Northern Virginia Title & Escrow. Id.; 5 Tr. 236-239. Although the settlement company was owned by Scott Flanders, Don Olinger, a Dorula lender, was the individual who had authority to disburse money from it. The funds were moved to American Title & Escrow because of concern over the close relationship between Holmes and Flanders. 5 Tr. 59. Olinger distributed the money in the escrow account to the Dorula lenders, to the exclusion of Holmes. Holmes filed suit against Starlight to stop the distributions to the Dorula lenders and Starlight filed a chapter 7 petition. 3 Tr. 59.
There was extensive oral testimony and numerous exhibits at the seven-day trial of this matter. The transcript is 1,788 pages long.
After having heard the testimony of Holmes, Brand and the other witnesses, examined the exhibits, and considered the access of both Holmes and Brand to information, their respective biases, their roles in the business venture, their stakes in the litigation and its outcome,
Dorula's credibility was also considered. He lent his money to Starlight and filed a proof of claim for $174,128. He was the liaison between Brand and the other lenders who were his friends. They collectively filed proofs of claims for $1,994,984. They were paid, generally, 14% per annum on their loans. Starlight paid Dorula, generally without the knowledge of his friends, an additional 5% override on their loans. 7 Tr. 204-205. The cost to Starlight was a total of 19% per annum.
Dorula was the spokesman for the lenders when Starlight collapsed and negotiated the establishment of the escrow account from which payments were made to Dorula and his friends within 90 days before Starlight filed bankruptcy. 5 Tr. 90-91. The chapter 7 trustee filed preference suits against Dorula and Robert Meletti, one of Dorula's friends and a fellow lender, and threatened preference suits against the rest. Docket Entry 88, ¶ 5-6. Prior to the trial in these matters, the Dorula lenders and the trustee reached a settlement. Id. It allowed the Dorula lenders to retain the money they were paid and established a basis for distributing the remaining funds the trustee recovered. Brooks, another creditor, objected to the proposed settlement because it could give the Dorula lenders a more favorable distribution than he would get, depending on the outcome of the objections to Holmes' and his claims. The proposed settlement was not prosecuted during the trial of these matters but has since been approved. In general, Dorula was a creditable witness, but he — for himself and his friends — had a clear interest
Holmes was licensed as a realtor in 1986. 1 Tr. 28. He testified that he was the third highest selling Century 21 agent in the country in 1999, 2000, and 2001. 1 Tr. 29. He met Brand about 1997, and they became close friends. Brand became his mentor and they spoke many times during the week.
Brand's first purchase was a property at Trinity Square. 3 Tr. 54-55. In light of their close relationship, Brand offered to give Holmes a one-half interest in it. The purpose was to show Holmes how to be
A digression about Starlight's first venture into real estate investment is helpful in understanding Holmes' relationship with Brand. It is not particularly helpful as it relates to the transactions involved in this case, but is relevant as to Holmes' knowledge of Starlight's prior transactions and his relationship with Brand. Prior to Starlight's venture into short sales, Starlight had purchased 12 properties in the booming real estate market intending to hold them for appreciation. The parties referred to this phase of Starlight's business as Starlight I and the short-sale period involved in this case as Starlight II. They are one in the same entity. Holmes was Starlight's real estate agent on a number of the Starlight I purchases. 2 Tr. 173. Holmes sold several of Starlight I's 12 properties as short sales as Starlight's real estate agent after the real estate market crashed. Holmes testified that he thought that Starlight had no liabilities when he agreed to use it for the short-sale business because Brand told him that Starlight was a dormant entity with no assets or liabilities. 1 Tr. 54. Had he known that Starlight had liabilities, he testified, he would never have agreed to use it. Ex. 2 at 262. Brand testified that Holmes knew of the existing debt because of his involvement in the sale of Starlight's properties at short sales. 3 Tr. 142.
Starlight's existing debt, that is, when Holmes began using Starlight as his short sale purchaser, had little impact on the operation of the Holmes Model. The banks that loaned money for the purchase of the 12 properties made loans to Brand individually and not to Starlight.
There were four elements to the Holmes Model: Holmes' expertise in pricing real estate; Holmes acting as the real estate agent in the transactions; Holmes' use of a third party to conceal his participation in the real estate transactions; and financing.
Both Holmes and Brand testified that one of the primary reasons that Holmes was so successful as a real estate agent was his ability to accurately price real estate. As Holmes testified, "I study pricing on a daily basis. And that's a big majority of my day. I think I'm better at pricing real estate than anybody. I think that my success in real estate is because of being able to price real estate." 1 Tr. 43.
Holmes noticed a difference in pricing between a conventional real estate sale and a distressed sale (either a foreclosure or a short sale). A foreclosure or short sale sold for considerably less. Holmes testified that there were several reasons for this. When the bank sold a property at foreclosure, it generally was the purchaser and incurred expenses in acquiring, holding and selling the property. Among the expenses, Holmes testified, was an asset manager who generally received a 10-12% commission on the sale. 1 Tr. 45. There was a stigma to a distressed sale that negatively affected its price. 1 Tr. 47. Finally, the bank often would have to repair the property to bring it to a condition to sell. 1 Tr. 45. Due to these factors, mortgage lenders were willing to agree to a short sale to third parties for less than the price the property could reasonably be expected to receive at a traditional sale by the owner.
Holmes believed he could make money by purchasing distressed properties at short sales. His pricing expertise allowed him to accurately calculate the resale price, determine the potential profit in a transaction in light of a mortgage lender's agreed price and close on the deals with a reasonable amount of profit in them. With his real estate license, he would not have to pay a real estate agent a commission on the purchase or the sale of the distressed property.
Holmes' involvement as Starlight's real estate agent was very important to Holmes. Dorula and Brand characterized Holmes as earning three commissions on each property, two when it was purchased by Starlight and one when it was sold. When the property was purchased, Holmes acted as the buyer's and the seller's agent, which Dorula and Brand counted as two commissions because a real estate commission is traditionally split between the seller's agent who lists the property for sale and the buyer's agent who brings the buyer to the table. When the property was sold by Starlight, Holmes was again Starlight's agent, but not generally the buyer's agent. Holmes generally sought to dismiss this characterization and noted that other agents who were generally part of the "Holmes Team" acted as listing agents and selling agents as well. 3 Tr. 11. The evidence shows that Holmes controlled the transactions,
Holmes did not want to trade in his own name.
Holmes presented his plan to Brand who agreed to participate, but suggested that they use Starlight as the purchaser rather than himself. Holmes agreed. 1 Tr. 48-51; 53-54. They agreed to split the profits with respect to each property when it was sold. Holmes testified that the split was 90%/10% with the lion's share to himself. 1 Tr. 53. The profits were calculated after payment of real estate commissions to Holmes and his team members.
Holmes financed Starlight's first transactions. He borrowed $110,000 from his life insurance policy and loaned it to Starlight at a 12% interest rate.
He was limited by two factors. First, it is most likely that Holmes could not qualify for mortgage loans himself. 1 Tr. 42.
He turned to Michael Dorula whom he knew from previous real estate transactions they had worked on together. 5 Tr. 43-51. He contacted Dorula to see if he was interested in loaning money to purchase the distressed properties. He was. After Holmes and Dorula reached an agreement on the 14% interest rate and Dorula's 5% finder's fee, Holmes — for the
The initial loans from Dorula and his friends were loans that Starlight could repay at any time without penalty. In August of 2009, Holmes directed Brand to repay Aunon's and Townsend's loans. This angered Dorula and his lenders because, as he explained, he felt that Starlight "was taking advantage of my friends." They had to go through the effort and expense of liquidating other investments in order to fund their loans to Starlight, who used it for a very short period of time and paid very little interest on the loan. 5 Tr. 54. Dorula expressed his displeasure in an email to Brand that he copied to Holmes. 5 Tr. 55. As a result, Dorula and his lenders decided that any additional loans would have to be for a one-year term with a penalty for early payment equal to the interest due over the remaining portion of the one-year term. Id.
Holmes guaranteed the initial loans, but not the new one-year loans with the prepayment penalties. He was evasive in explaining why he guaranteed the initial loans. He testified when examined on Moak's note:
2 Tr. 109-111.
Dorula testified that Holmes had guaranteed all the loans up to the prepayment incident and that it was Holmes' decision not to guarantee the loans made after the prepayment incident. He testified:
5 Tr. 58.
After the August 2009 prepayment incident and the revision in the terms of the notes, Holmes did not guarantee the loans. Dorula, in turn, sought collateral for the loans in lieu of Holmes' guarantee. He negotiated with Brand who was now handling Starlight's lender relationships. Starlight granted a lien on "each and every account receivable, all [Starlight's] real estate holdings and chattel paper of every nature and type, wherever located." Ex. 100. Thereafter, all the Dorula lenders' notes were secured. Holmes' notes were never secured. Needless to say, although the documents asserted that the lenders were granted a lien on Starlight's real estate holdings, the UCC security interest did not create a lien on Starlight's real estate. That could only be accomplished by a deed of trust. The UCC liens were not perfected.
Holmes and Brand agreed on the structure of business, which they referred to as the "Holmes Model." It involved two transactions for each property. In the first transaction, Starlight purchased a property at a short sale. Holmes looked for suitable properties to purchase and negotiated the sales price with the banks as either the realtor for the homeowner as the seller or for Starlight as the purchaser.
In the second transaction, Starlight sold the same property traditionally. Holmes acted as Starlight's real estate agent. He negotiated the sales contract without Brand's involvement or immediate knowledge and signed Brand's name to the sales contract on behalf of Starlight. Brand himself signed the settlement statements. 2 Tr. 74.
After the property was sold, Holmes sent Brand an email advising him of the amount of the profits and instructing him how to disburse the profits.
There was a lot of testimony about the split of Starlight's profits between Holmes
For the first two years, Starlight put the lenders' money to good use. The gross income for Starlight was $11,232,895 for 2009; $8,847,891 for 2010; and $7,489,313 for 2011. 4 Tr. 161; Ex. 98 (Statement of Affairs, Question 1). It completed 34 transactions using the Holmes Model in 2009 for a profit of $1,354,713.00. All of the transactions were profitable. In 2010, Starlight completed another 34 transactions for a profit of $1,573,015.00. Only one transaction resulted in a loss. In 2011, Starlight completed 16 transactions for a profit of $257,383.00. Four transactions had a profit between $40,000 and $100,000, seven had a profit of less than $15,000.00, and five had losses between $1,500 and about $36,000.
By 2011, Starlight's profits had fallen to less than half of what they had been in 2009 and 2010. Holmes and Brand identified several reasons for this, although they dispute the exact reasons and the allocation of blame. One was a change in the banks' rules on short sales. Originally, the banks had few restrictions on how long a purchaser had to hold a property before he sold it. As time passed and the banks gained more experience in short sales, they began to require properties be held for longer periods of time before the purchaser could sell the property. 4 Tr. 40, 161. This adversely affected Starlight because the longer holding period increased its interest costs on each particular property and reduced the turnover of its inventory resulting in less effective use of the lenders' money.
Another cause of Starlight's demise was the uninvested cash on deposit in the bank. Holmes recognized this problem at the beginning when he first sought to repay the Dorula lenders when he did not need their money for a particular transaction. He was seeking to treat them as a line of credit and to pay interest only on the outstanding balance. The Dorula lenders objected and Starlight was required to borrow for one-year terms or pay a prepayment penalty. This resulted in idle funds sitting in Starlight's checking account. Starlight was paying 19% interest on the idle funds.
Brand was also concerned about the high rate of interest, and, without Holmes' knowledge, sought to put the idle funds to good use outside of the Holmes Model. He loaned Michael Blank money to purchase
Another area that contributed to Starlight's demise was Brand's and Holmes' dispute over their respective split of the profits. Holmes contended he was entitled to 90% of the profits. Brand contended that it was 50%. Holmes instructed Brand to disburse his profits, 90% of the total profit, on each deal to Holmes at the end of each transaction. Brand did so. When questioned about why he continued to disburse more to Holmes than he thought Holmes was entitled to, he stated that Holmes needed the money at that time to service his investments and believed that while Starlight "was prepaying [Holmes] profit that was more profit than he was due ... [Holmes and Brand] would settle up the profit that he made at the end." 4 Tr. 21-22, 27.
However, Brand did not always disburse his share, as computed by Holmes, to himself as directed by Holmes in his email instructions. At times, he did not disburse anything to himself. However, overall, he disbursed more to himself than Holmes instructed. Brand paid himself on an as-needed basis. 4 Tr. 20-21. He disbursed funds to himself or on his behalf three ways. He wrote checks to himself, paid his personal expenses, and wrote checks to his wife.
Brand offered another reason for Starlight's declining profits: Holmes started to buy properties that generated insignificant profits but generated commissions to Holmes. He believed that Holmes entered into transactions solely for the commission and without regard to the potential profit which he testified shrank over time. 6 Tr. 127. In fact, the losses on the transactions and the smaller profits principally occurred in the later months of Starlight's existence. There was no evidence that Holmes had stopped studying pricing on a daily basis; that he was no longer better at pricing real estate than anybody else; or that his acumen had otherwise dulled. At the time of the trial, he was still engaged in short sales, although with another company. 2 Tr. 155.
Starlight's collapse came in August 2011. Townsend's note was due on July 29, 2011.
Holmes demanded that Brand turn over Starlight's ledger to him, which Brand did. 6 Tr. 116-117. When he reviewed the ledger, he was "shocked" to learn that instead of there being $2.1 million in outstanding loans to Starlight as he believed to be the case, there was actually $3.5 million in outstanding loans. 6 Tr. 170. When Holmes learned this, he instructed Brand to put the proceeds of sale of the properties into escrow. 6 Tr. 171. The escrow agent — chosen by Holmes — was originally Scott Flanders, but was changed to Don Olinger, a Dorula lender, on August 11, 2011. 5 Tr. 237-238.
Dorula learned of Starlight's losses from Brand at the end of July 2011. 5 Tr. 73-74. Shortly after this, Holmes telephoned Dorula and left messages that they needed to speak but without Brand being present. 5 Tr. 74-76. Dorula began to feel uncomfortable with Holmes at this meeting.
At the time that Brand informed Holmes and Dorula of the losses incurred in the stock market, Starlight owned eight properties purchased as a part of its short-sale venture. 5 Tr. 236.
Holmes sued Starlight on November 15, 2011, to recover on his notes and scheduled a hearing on his motion for a temporary restraining order for November 17, 2011. Ex. 8. Starlight filed a petition in bankruptcy on November 16, 2011.
Holmes had a very close relationship to Brand and Starlight. Brand had been a long-time friend and mentor whom Holmes trusted. The close relationship was reflected in Brand giving Holmes a half interest in the Trinity Square property. They spoke frequently and Holmes turned to Brand for guidance. 1 Tr. 32-33. They attended the same Bible study group. Holmes had been Brand's and Starlight's real estate agent when Starlight was first organized and was looking for properties to purchase and hold for appreciation. 1 Tr. 42; 2 Tr. 179. Holmes was Starlight's real estate agent when the market crashed and successfully sold some of Starlight's original 12 properties at short sales.
The short sale investment scheme was Holmes' creation. He first approached Jeff Palmucci and offered him the opportunity to act as the ostensible short-sale purchaser. When Palmucci declined, he turned to Brand who accepted. 6 Tr. 194. The critical work was performed by Holmes. He selected the properties Starlight bought, negotiated the short sale purchase price with the bank, signed Brand's name as manager of Starlight to the sales contracts, hired and supervised contractors for repairs or renovations that were necessary, advanced his own money to pay for utilities and repairs, negotiated with second trust holders, reached agreements with the owners of the distressed properties to handle second trustholders who would not release the owners from further liability on the second trusts, made monthly payments to second trustholders who did not release the owners, negotiated and signed listing agreements for Starlight when Starlight placed the properties for sale, negotiated sales contracts, signed Brand's name as manager of Starlight on the sales contracts, maintained financial records to determine the profits from each transaction, informed Brand of the profits and directed him how to disburse the profits. 2 Tr. 60-61; 7 Tr. 39; 7 Tr. 40. Holmes testified, "I was making the decisions on price. I mean, that would not be a normal situation with a buyer and a
Holmes provided Starlight with the funds for its first purchases, initially $110,000 and later $200,000 more. He approached Dorula for loans to Starlight; negotiated the first interest rates, the finder's fee, his guarantee, and the structure of the notes; and directed Brand how the promissory notes were to be written. 2 Tr. 197-198. He guaranteed the first series of loans. The terms he originally negotiated with Dorula remained essentially the same throughout Starlight's life. The most significant change was after Holmes first directed Brand to repay the loans when the funds were not immediately available. Dorula and his friends objected and insisted on one-year term notes with a prepayment penalty. As a result of the change in terms, Holmes declined to guarantee further loans and the Dorula lenders believed that their notes were secured by all of the assets of Starlight.
Holmes promised Brand that neither Brand nor Starlight would be responsible for any loss on any transaction, that he would cover all losses.
Holmes, in addition to his real estate commissions, received 90% of the profits from each transaction. Brand received 10%. Holmes was not looking for a partner, but a bookkeeper and a way to avoid having a financial interest in the transactions that would trigger disclosures required under Va.Code (1950) § 54.1-2138, 2139; 18 Va. Admin. Code § 135-20-210 and 220.
Holmes dominated Brand, both personally and financially. Brand testified in reference to the split of the profits:
6 Tr. 89-90.
He testified earlier:
2 Tr. 207-208.
2 Tr. 222-223.
In testifying about closing on a purchase on August 1, 2011, or paying Townsend's note when it became due and about speaking with the Dorula and his lenders about Starlight's losses, Brand testified:
3 Tr. 60-61.
While Brand was certainly seduced by the money, he went along with Holmes and followed his instructions, often against his better judgment.
After Starlight collapsed, Holmes took his "Holmes Model" to Flanders and started a new relationship that pursued the same business with the same business model. Again, the profits were split 90%/10%. This time, however, Holmes had a bank line of credit. 2 Tr. 155-156.
The court finds that Holmes was the de facto manager and owner of Starlight. He effectively controlled Starlight.
Holmes is also an insider as a person in control of Starlight under § 101(31)(B)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code. The test in the Fourth Circuit is that "the alleged insider `must exercise sufficient authority over the debtor so as to unqualifiably dictate corporate policy and the disposition of corporate assets.'" Butler v. David Shaw, Inc., 72 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hunter v. Babcock (In re Babcock Dairy Co.), 70 B.R. 662, 666 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1986)). This he did.
[E]very express executory agreement in writing, whereby the contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some particular property, real or personal, or fund, ... a security for a debt or other obligation, ... creates an equitable lien upon the property so indicated which is enforceable against the property. Hoffman, v. First National Bank of Boston, 205 Va. 232, 236, 135 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1964) (adopting and quoting the definition in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence 5th ed., § 1235); Harper v. Harper, 159 Va. 210, 218, 165 S.E. 490, 493 (1932). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied this definition in Penn Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 26 F.2d 893 (4th Cir.1928) and Stickney v. General Electric Co., 44 F.2d 362 (4th Cir.1930).
There is a difference between the existence of an equitable lien and a bankruptcy trustee's ability to avoid an equitable lien. Beskin v. Bank of New York Mellon (In re Perrow), 498 B.R. 560, 576 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 2013). A bankruptcy trustee has the ability to avoid certain liens. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 547. In Penn Lumber, while the Court of Appeals found that there was no equitable lien, it held that if there had been one, the trustee's strong arm rights would have prevailed over Penn Lumber's equitable lien. The general analysis involves answering two questions. First, is there an equitable lien; and, second, can the trustee in bankruptcy avoid the equitable lien. In this case, the trustee is not involved in the objections or the adversary proceeding. He has not asserted his strong arm rights and they are not a consideration. The contest is between creditors. Only the first question in the analysis needs to be answered.
The equitable remedy of subordination was recognized by the Supreme Court in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 60 S.Ct. 238, 84 L.Ed. 281 (1939) and codified by Congress in 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.
If the creditor against whom equitable subordination is sought is an insider of the debtor, that creditor's dealings with the debtor are subject to closer examination than that of noninsiders. In re Systems Impact, Inc., 229 B.R. 363 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1998). The initial burden is on the moving party to present "material evidence of unfair conduct" by an insider. Id. The insider creditor must then rebut the evidence by proving "the good faith and fairness of its dealings with the debtor." Id. (citing Allied Eastern States Maintenance Corp. v. Miller (Matter of Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 911 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.1990).
The Dorula lenders were promised liens in lieu of Holmes' personal guarantee after Holmes directed Brand to repay the Dorula lenders' loans. They agreed to loan new money only if there was a prepayment penalty and the notes were collateralized. Starlight and the lenders entered into a UCC security agreement that purportedly encumbered all of Starlight's assets, both real and personal property. The security agreements, while intending to grant a lien on Starlight's real estate, were ineffective to do so. That can only be accomplished by a deed of trust.
An equitable lien gives effect to the equitable maxim that equity "regards that as done which ought to be done." Virginia Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States, 22 F.2d 38, 50 (4th Cir.1927). A recurring application of this maxim is the imposition of an equitable lien on property intended to be collateral for a loan. Hoffman, 205 Va. at 236, 135 S.E.2d at 821-822 ("creates an equitable lien upon the property so indicated which is enforceable against the property") (quoting Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th ed., § 1235); Perrow, 498 B.R. at 576 ("The lien created is enforceable against the property.") The party does not necessarily have to promise to convey, assign, or transfer the collateral for the maxim to apply. It will apply even if the "contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some particular property, real or personal, or fund, therein described or identified, a security for a debt or other obligation...." Union Trust Co. of Maryland v. Townshend (In re Smith), 101 F.2d 903, 908 (4th Cir.1939). Here, if the security agreements had been properly drafted as deeds of trusts and recorded, the Dorula lenders would have had priority over all other creditors, including Holmes, as to the real estate.
A second applicable equitable maxim is that he who remains silent when he should have spoken, will not be heard when he should remain silent. Brand and the Dorula lenders thought that they were receiving security for the loans in lieu of Holmes' guarantee. 2 Tr. 200-201; 4 Tr. 194-196; 5 Tr. 68.
An equitable lien is not necessary to create a lien on Starlight's personal property. The security agreements created liens on Starlight's personal property in favor of the Dorula lenders. The liens were effective as between the lenders and Starlight.
Both the equitable lien on Starlight's real property and the unperfected UCC lien on Starlight's personal property are effective against Starlight, a party to the security agreements. Va.Code (1950) § 8.9A-201(a). The question is their effect against Holmes, an unsecured creditor.
An equitable lien is enforceable against the property. Hoffman, 205 Va. at 236, 135 S.E.2d at 821-822; ("creates an equitable lien upon the property so indicated which is enforceable against the property") (quoting Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 5th ed., § 1235); Perrow, 498 B.R. at 576 ("The lien created is enforceable against the property.") In Harper v. Harper, the
An equitable lien may be subject to rights of third parties such as bona fide purchasers for value. Penn Lumber Co. v. Wilson; Perrow, 498 B.R. at 576. The Dorula lenders' equitable liens are not subject to rights of either the chapter 7 trustee or Holmes. The chapter 7 trustee has not asserted his strong arm rights. Holmes is an unsecured creditor, not a bona fide purchaser for value. He never had an interest in the real property, only an unsecured claim against Starlight.
The security interests in the personal property are binding on Holmes. Va.Code (1950) § 8.9A-201(a) expressly provides that a security agreement is effective against creditors — in this case, Holmes — and is enforceable as to him. Va.Code (1950) § 8.9A-203(b). Nor does Holmes have any priority over the Dorula lenders under Va.Code (1950) § 8.9A-317(a) because he never became a lien creditor. Va.Code (1950) § 8.9A-317(a)(2).
While not necessary to finding that Holmes is subject to the Dorula lenders' equitable liens, the equities of this case favor them. Holmes knew of the intended lien on the real property. While he denies that he was aware that the Dorula lenders had a security interest, the assertion is not credible. He testified that his personal guarantee was released because the Holmes Model had proven itself, 7 Tr. 94, and that he was unaware that the Dorula lenders received security interests, Id. at 93-94, 32 S.Ct. 657. However, he set the initial terms of the loans. He personally guaranteed the initial loans. After the prepayment incident, he knew that the terms were modified. He knew that the new loans were for one-year periods. He did not want to guarantee the longer term loans and knew that he was not personally guaranteeing them because he signed no new guarantees.
Holmes also knew that a deed of trust, not a security agreement, was needed to encumber the real estate. He was an experienced real estate agent who had extensive personal real estate experience and negotiated numerous short sales. Each involved a deed of trust. He saw deeds of
Holmes controlled Starlight. The venture was his idea. The business model was his. The initial money to operate the business was his. He found Dorula and his friends and initially obtained their financial support through loans. The Dorula lenders were Starlight's principal lenders. He located and negotiated the purchases of the properties without consulting or seeking the approval of Brand, the ostensible principal of Starlight. He signed Brand's name to the sales contracts. He calculated the profits.
It is not necessary to apply equitable subordination to give effect to the Dorula lenders' property rights — that is, their equitable liens — as to Starlight's real property. Their equitable liens arise independently of equitable subordination. Independent of the Dorula lenders' equitable liens, Holmes' claims would be equitably subordinated to the Dorula lenders' claims. In addition, if necessary, equitable subordination would give effect to the priority of the Dorula lenders' equitable liens.
If there were no equitable liens, the application of equitable subordination would be appropriate and would result in the same priorities. The three elements required for equitable subordination are present. Holmes' knowledge of the intended liens, his knowledge that they were not properly effected, and his control of Starlight are inequitable conduct. The Dorula lenders were injured and Holmes would obtain an unfair advantage — a prorata distribution of estate funds when he should receive a distribution only after the Dorula lenders. Equitable subordination is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, it would achieve the same result as if the matter were resolved by a Virginia court under Virginia law. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir.1977).
This case is before the court on the objections to Holmes' proofs of claims and the complaint to subordinate Holmes' claims. Holmes is the only adverse party in these proceedings. The relief requested will be granted. Equitable subordination would result in the same relief. It may be granted "only to the extent necessary to offset injury or damage suffered by the creditor in whose favor the equitable doctrine may be effective." In re Franklin Equipment Co., 418 B.R. 176 (Bankr. E.D.Va.2009). Holmes' inequitable conduct does not extend to Brooks and Flory who loaned money to Starlight during its first business foray. They never thought that they had a security interest in any of Starlight's assets and Holmes was not involved in the operations of Starlight at that time except as a realtor. Similarly, other unsecured creditors without security agreements are not adversely affected by Holmes' conduct. Holmes' claims should be subordinated only to Dorula's and his friend's claims to the extent of the security agreements. The chapter 7 trustee will first pay all administrative expenses and priority claims. He will then determine the prorata distribution of all creditors and disburse that amount to all of them except Holmes. He will disburse Holmes' portion prorata to the Dorula lenders until their claims are paid in full. If they are paid in
Holmes used the services of members of the "Holmes Team" — other real estate agents in the real estate firm who worked closely with him. He largely determined the split of the commission between the members of the Holmes Team and himself. He testified:
7 Tr. 39-40. See also 2 Tr. 168-169.
1 Tr. 32-33.
3 Tr. 141-143.
4 Tr. 188. Brooks and Flory received about $19,200 over two years. 4 Tr. 189.
Ex 2 at 260-261.
2 Tr. 143-144. Exhibit F is one disclosure statement. There are 20 numbered statements, each initialed by the owner of the distressed property. Number 11 states:
Ex. F, Affidavit of Understanding for Short Sale of Real Estate, ¶¶ 11 and 20. "Buyer" and "Purchaser" refer to Starlight.
Holmes' view of his role with respect to the parties of the transaction is reflected in the following testimony by Holmes:
Ex. 2, Transcript of Hearing on Objection to Proofs of Claim of William Brooks and Charles Flory at 263-264.
5 Tr. 58-59 (emphasis added).
If Dorula and his friends did not expect a lien on the real estate, then they were not harmed when they did not get it. An equitable lien would not attach in nonbankruptcy litigation and equitable subordination on this basis might not be available. The court finds that the Dorula lenders intended to, and thought that they obtained, a lien on the real estate as is expressly stated in the security agreement. See 5 Tr. 66-68. They thought that because Starlight frequently purchased and sold a property at back-to-back settlements or in a matter of days, that the additional paperwork associated with creating a deed of trust and releasing it would be difficult to accomplish in the brief period of time available and could slow down the process. Slowing down the process did not hurt the Dorula investors. Their money was committed, and interest was to be paid on it, for one-year periods whether it was being used in a transaction or was sitting in Starlight's bank account. Slowing down the process did hurt Starlight because it slowed the turn-over of the funds available and could affect transactions that Holmes wanted to do. In light of this, they sought another way to obtain a lien on real estate, as the security agreement expressly states. The mechanism was the security agreement. It was the wrong mechanism and was ineffective to achieve the Dorula investor's objective of a lien on real estate. Brand and Holmes knew this because they were licensed real estate agents and well experienced in real estate transactions. Dorula and his friends did not recognize this. This situation is very similar to the situation described by the Supreme Court in Sexton v. Kessler & Co., Ltd., 225 U.S. 90, 32 S.Ct. 657, 56 L.Ed. 995 (1912). The Supreme Court stated:
Id. at 96-97, 32 S.Ct. 657.
In Sexton, the debtor represented to its lender that certain securities had been set aside as collateral for draws on a line of credit. The debtor had the right to substitute the collateral, at its discretion, with collateral of equal value. Id. at 95, 32 S.Ct. 657. The debtor delivered the collateral to the lender before it filed bankruptcy, but within the preference period. The trustee in bankruptcy unsuccessfully brought a preference action against the lender. Id. at 96, 32 S.Ct. 657. The Supreme Court affirmed because there was an equitable lien in favor of the lender. Id. at 98-99, 32 S.Ct. 657.
The idea that recording a deed of trust and releasing it on every transaction would slow down the process is erroneous. There would have been little extra effort on the part of a settlement agent to complete and record a deed of trust in a standard form acceptable to the Dorula lenders or the release. Releases are not ordinarily delivered at the closing. Releases from banks typically trail the closing by several weeks. Recording deeds of trust required paying the recording tax. The state recording tax was 25¢ per $100 of the loan and the local recording tax was one-third of the state recording tax. Va.Code (1950) §§ 58.1-803A and 58.1-3800. This would have cost Starlight $333 for every $100,000 of a loan secured by a deed of trust, a relatively large expense for using the money for a few days or weeks. For comparison purposes, if a borrower paid $333 in interest on a $100,000 loan outstanding for one year, the interest rate would be .333%. If the loan were outstanding for one month, the interest rate would be 4.00%. If the loan were outstanding for one week, the interest rate would be 17.00%. Starlight intended to, and did in most cases, flip the properties within a matter of days or a few weeks. For examples of the computation of the recording tax on sales by Starlight to third parties, see, inter alia, Ex. PP at 4-5, 8-9 ($1,276.67 on a deed of trust securing $383,000; $1,316.93 on a deed of trust securing $395,000).
2 Tr. 188.
2 Tr. 137-138.
Holmes' decision to reduce reliance on high-interest loans and to retire the loans from the Dorula lenders raised questions in Dorula's mind about Starlight's business. He instructed Brand that he was not to reinvest the loans in new purchases after August 2011. 5 Tr. 228-230. Dorula also testified that he and his friends would have continued lending during a workout at reduced rates. The court questions whether Dorula had made the decision to pull the plug on Starlight, but is satisfied that he was willing to stay in to fund a work-out.
5 Tr. 76-77.
5 Tr. 78-80.
1 Tr. 55:15-22.
1 Tr. 49:18-20.
2 Tr. 200.
2 Tr. 200-201.
Although both the Mellettis and the Dorulas assert a claim of equitable subordination of Holmes' claims to the claims of