KEITH L. PHILLIPS, Baqnkruptcy Judge.
Before the Court is the "Motion for Entry of an Order Approving the Assumption of Certain Real Estate Assets and Granting Related Relief" (the "Motion") filed by the Propco I Debtors (the "Propco I Debtors" or the "Debtors"). The Debtors seek confirmation that the lease that is the subject of the Motion was assumed pursuant to the Court's earlier order authorizing its sale or, alternatively, that the landlord consented to an extension of the Bankruptcy Code's time limitations
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the General Order of Reference entered in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) on August 15, 1984. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (M), (N), and (O). The Court may enter a final order in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.
The Debtors filed their petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on March 20, 2018. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4)(A)(i), the Debtors had until July 18, 2018, to assume nonresidential real property leases. On June 4, 2018, the Debtors filed a motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4)(B)(i), seeking to extend the time to assume nonresidential real property leases for an additional 90 days. The motion was granted by the Court by order entered June 28, 2018,
In June of 2018, the Debtors sought entry of an order approving procedures to reject or assume executory contracts and unexpired leases. An order approving those procedures was entered on July 25, 2018 (the "Lease Procedures Order").
The Debtors and SAICO were parties to a lease for certain real property located in La Mesa, California (the "La Mesa Lease" or "the Lease"). The Debtors have not filed a Notice of Assumption for the La Mesa Lease, and thus, pursuant to the Lease Procedures Order, could only assume the Lease by moving to assume it. In August of 2018, representatives of SAICO and representatives of the Debtors negotiated a purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement") whereby an entity or entities to be created by SAICO would purchase the La Mesa Lease for a price of $11 million.
The Sale Order includes the following language: "All the requirements of sections 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code have been met with respect to the sale of the Ground Lease" and "The Propco I Debtors have met all requirements of sections 365(b) and 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code in connection with the sale of the Ground Lease to the Buyer."
The Purchase Agreement expressly provides that the La Mesa Lease will be transferred pursuant to assumption and assignment:
The Purchase Agreement further states that if the sale is not completed, the Propco I Debtors will be responsible for future rent:
The parties agreed to extend the closing date of the transaction, initially scheduled for November 12, to November 20 and then again to November 30, 2018. On November 27, counsel to the Buyer sought a further extension of the closing date. The Buyer failed to close the sale by the November 30 closing date and, pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, forfeited the deposit it had made to the Debtors. On November 29, the Debtors filed the Motion "out of an abundance of caution and in order to leave no doubt as to whether the lease was assumed."
SAICO filed its opposition to the Motion on January 3, 2019. The Court held a hearing on January 24, at which time it received the following documents into evidence: the Declaration of Michael J. Maher,
The Debtors argue that the Sale Order served as the assumption of the La Mesa Lease. They assert that the sale transaction was structured as it was expressly for the purpose of avoiding a lease rejection or termination. They request that if the Court finds a separate assumption order is necessary, it also find that the assumption is a sound exercise of the Debtors' business judgment. They propose to cure any default under the Lease by paying the cure amount set forth in the proposed order approving the proposed assumption. They further state that they "have been performing their monetary obligations under the La Mesa Lease" since the Propco I cases were filed and that they will be able to continue doing so until the Lease is assigned to another party, at which time they will provide adequate assurance of future performance from that future assignee. Finally, the Debtors argue that SAICO is estopped from now asserting that the Lease was rejected as of October 16, 2018, as its course of action in continuing to negotiate the terms of the transaction for months after that date "reflects an understanding that the La Mesa Lease was not rejected." Dkt. 1025, p.11.
SAICO argues that the October 16, 2018, Assumption Deadline expired prior to the filing of the Motion. It further points to the language in the Sale Motion that:
Dkt.479, ¶ 27 (emphasis added). SAICO asserts that the Lease must be deemed rejected because it was not timely assumed and the deadline within which to do so was not extended. It further argues that the Motion is procedurally incorrect, since if the Sale Order serves as an assumption of the Lease, the Motion is superfluous, and if the Sale Order did not serve as an assumption of the Lease, the Motion is untimely and must be denied.
Assumptions and assignments of leases are governed by § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365.
The Court finds that the September 13, 2018, Sale Order, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, necessarily functioned as an assumption of the La Mesa Lease. First, the Court notes that SAICO's reliance on the provision of the Sale Motion that nothing in the motion should be interpreted as "a request or authorization to assume, adopt, or reject any agreement, contract, or lease pursuant to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code" is unavailing, as the Sale Order itself provides that "[t]o the extent this Order is inconsistent with any prior order or pleading with respect to the Motion in these cases, the terms of this Order shall govern." Therefore, the Court's focus is properly on the Sale Order and not the Sale Motion.
Even if the Court were to consider the terms of the Sale Motion, the proposed sale order, which was attached to the Sale Motion and thus incorporated therein, specifically recites that "[a]ll the requirements of sections 363
In the "Relief Requested" portion of the Sale Motion, the Debtors requested:
The heart of SAICO's objection is that the actual words "assume and assign" are not used in the section of the Sale Motion titled "Relief Requested" or in the Sale Order. However, the section of the Sale Motion titled "The Proposed Sale" summarizes the Purchase Agreement, including its closing requirements, which include the "recordation of the Sale Order, the Assignment and Assumption of Lease and the Quitclaim Deed (in that order), in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Purchase Agreement." This comports with the actual terms of the Purchase Agreement, which is attached to the Sale Motion. Section 13 of the Purchase Agreement, which was executed by both the Debtors and Buyer Wing Avenue Investment, LLC, reflects the closing requirements recited in the Sale Motion. In addition, there are multiple references to assignment and assumption in the Purchase Agreement.
Inspection of the Purchase Agreement reveals that the transaction consisted of two parts, (1) the assumption and assignment of the Lease and (2) the separate sale of the building and other improvements on the premises:
Dkt. 479, § 2(e). The Purchase Agreement reflects that the parties structured the transaction to include both the assumption and assignment of the Lease and the sale of a building and other improvement to the subject real estate.
Other evidence supporting the Debtors' assertion that the Sale Order was an approval of the assumption and assignment of the Lease includes Exhibits A through F attached to the Propco I Debtors' reply brief. Those exhibits illustrate the involvement of SAICO in the formulation of the Purchase Agreement, including the revision of § 2(e) and the revision of § 10, which provides that "[t]ransfer of the Premises shall be made pursuant to (a) an assignment and assumption of lease . . . ."
The Court also notes its previous decision in In re Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R. 154 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2012). While the issue in that case concerned the rights of a sublessee, the dispute arose because the sale contract between the chapter 7 trustee and the purchaser included the assumption and assignment of leases. The purchaser argued that the transfer of the assets at issue was free and clear of any claims, pursuant to § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that a trustee may sell property of a debtor "free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate." The Court was faced with determining whether the sublessee protections of § 365(h) had been extinguished by the unitary nature of the sale contract:
Id. at 158-59. The Court then examined those cases addressing the tension between the two statutory provisions, determining that:
Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
The Court reaches the same conclusion in this case. While the Purchase Agreement was not specifically titled a "Sale and Assumption," it was similar to the Zota contract in all other aspects. It proposed cure amounts, it included references to § 365, it provided for the recording of assignments, and all parties knew of the dual nature of the transaction. In addition to the factors listed in Zota, the Court in this case has evidence of SAICO's involvement in the creation of the Purchase Agreement containing the assignment provisions. Further, in November 2018, the Debtors paid $100,000 to extend the closing deadline, and parties later discussed the Debtors' offer to pay an additional $50,000 deposit in exchange for a further extension of the sale closing date, neither of which would have been necessary if the Lease had been rejected as of the October 16 Assumption Deadline. Dkt. 1025, Ex. F. This is consistent with the provision of the Purchase Agreement that the Debtors' obligation to pay rent would recommence if the sale were not consummated.
The Court notes that at least one court, in approving the sale of a debtor's executory contract, has found that a separate assumption motion is unnecessary. See In re Specialty Foods of Pittsburgh, Inc., 91 B.R. 364, 376-77 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) ("When, as in this case a motion to sell and a motion to assume and sell would have the identical effect and when the procedural safeguards are the same, the motion to sell is sufficient and a motion to assume and sell would be superfluous . . . . It would be counterproductive to require the Trustee and an overburdened Bankruptcy Court to duplicate the effort, time and expense involved in filing two separate motions, providing notice twice, and conducting two separate adjudications to dispose of one estate asset simply because the asset may be characterized as an executory contract. It would be equally nonsensical to require the Trustee to use the technical term `assume' in a motion to sell in order to have the sale before the court in a confirmable posture. . . . [T]his court holds that the sale of executory contracts under the facts at bar is confirmable notwithstanding the fact that the Trustee did not file a separate motion to assume or use the word `assume' in his motion to sell."). The factors guiding the Court's decision in Specialty Foods are present in this case.
The Debtors have argued that SAICO should be estopped from arguing that the Lease has been rejected. Because the Court has found that the Sale Order approved the assumption and assignment of the Lease, it is unnecessary for the Court to address the estoppel argument, and it is also needless for the Court to address the larger legal issue of whether an order allowing the sale of an estate asset necessarily approves the assumption and assignment of that asset. For the same reason, the issue of whether SAICO tacitly consented to an extension of the time within which to assume or reject the Lease is moot.
Finally, the Court is not persuaded by the notice arguments set forth by SAICO. The evidence is clear that SAICO was a participant in every aspect of the transactions at issue herein. Among other things, the same attorney represented both SAICO and the Buyer in the transaction at issue and participated extensively in its structuring.
Based upon the record and its analysis of the law, the Court finds that the Sale Order approved the assumption and assignment of the La Mesa Lease. As pointed out by SAICO, the separate Motion for approval is unnecessary. However, in order to provide clarity, the Court will grant the Motion. A separate order will be entered concurrent with the issuance of this opinion.
11 U.S.C. § 365(f).