PAUL M. BLACK, Bankruptcy Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a modified plan dated April 12, 2016 filed by the Debtor, Ema Dan Wilburn, III (the "Debtor"), and the Chapter 13 Trustee's Objection thereto. The facts in this case are not in dispute. The Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., on January 8, 2014. After proposing several Chapter 13 plans, the Debtor filed a Third Modified Plan on May 16, 2014 and confirmation of that plan (the "Confirmed Plan") was obtained on August 14, 2014. The Debtor was an above median debtor, and the "applicable commitment period" for the Confirmed Plan was five years. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(A)(ii). The Confirmed Plan provided, among other things, that the Debtor would pay to the Trustee the following payments: "Regular monthly payments of $700.00 per month for 60 months. Other payments to the Trustee are as follows: Any tax refunds received. The total amount to be paid into the Plan is estimated to be $42,000.00." Confirmed Plan, Docket No. 35. Paragraph 4 of the Confirmed Plan projected an estimated dividend to unsecured creditors of 15%.
On April 13, 2016, the Debtor filed a Fourth Amended Plan (the "Amended Plan") "due to an unexpected reduction in his income as financial advisor." Debtor's Brief, at P.1. The Amended Plan proposes to pay as follows: "Regular monthly payments of $700.00 per month for 29 months, then beginning in May 2016, 10 payments of $400.00 per month. Other payments to the Trustee are as follows: Any tax refunds received." Amended Plan, Docket No. 82. Paragraph 4 of the Amended Plan proposes a dividend to unsecured creditors of 35-50%.
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter by virtue of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and 157(a) and the delegation made to this Court by Order from the District Court on December 6, 1994, and Rule 3 of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. This Court further concludes that this matter is a "core" bankruptcy proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (L), and (O).
The question of whether 11 U.S.C. 1325(b) applies to post confirmation plan modifications has divided some courts, but this Court finds the reasoning and analysis set forth in In re Davis, 439 B.R. 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) (Wedoff, J.), which finds that Section 1325(b) is not applicable to plan modification under Section 1329(a), to be most persuasive and its thorough analysis of the issue need not be repeated here. However, the Chapter 13 Trustee's objection in the circumstances of this case is more nuanced. Here, the Chapter 13 Trustee concedes that 11 U.S.C. §1329(a)(1) provides that a plan may be modified to "increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class . . . ." The Trustee also concedes that a plan may be modified to "extend or reduce the time for such payments . . . ." See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(2). However, the Trustee contends that because the wording of 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) is in the disjunctive as opposed to the conjunctive, a debtor cannot do both. The Debtor in this case proposes exactly that—to reduce both the amount of payments and the time for such payments. Specifically, the Trustee argues as follows:
Trustee's Brief, at P. 5.
The Court believes the proper reading of the statute is not so limited, and that a debtor may propose such a modification within the bounds of good faith. Section 1329 of the Bankruptcy Code permits modification of a Chapter 13 Plan after confirmation, and that section exists for a reason—sometimes debtor's circumstances can and do change. The wording of the statute read in conjunction with the Bankruptcy Code's rules of construction code section supports the conclusion that the modification options set forth in Section 1329(a) are not mutually exclusive, and are available either separately or in combination, provided the applicable elements of Section 1329(b)(1) are met.
As in all statutory interpretation cases, the Court "necessarily begins with an analysis of the language of the statute. And, in analyzing the meaning of a statute, we must first determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning. If it does, we look no further but simply enforce the [statute] according to its terms." Pliler v. Stearns, 747 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir, 2014) (citing Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 1999)). The Court believes its interpretation is consistent with the guidance set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 102, dealing with statutory construction in Title 11. Section 102(5) provides that "In this title— . . . (5) `or' is not exclusive." 11 U.S.C. § 102(5). The statutory note to Section 102(5) provides "[p]aragraph (5) specifies that `or' is not exclusive. Thus, if a party `may do (a) or (b),' then the party may do either or both. The party is not limited to a mutually exclusive choice between the two alternatives." House Report No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 316 (1977); Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1978). Here, Section 1329(a) provides that "[a]t any time after confirmation of the plan but before completion of payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of the debtor . . . to—" among other things, (1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the plan; or (2) extend or reduce the time for such payments. 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1), (2). The proposed modification may do either or both. In this case, as there is no contention or evidence that any other requirements for modification approval are unsatisfied, the Chapter 13 Trustee's objection will be overruled, and the Amended Plan will be approved.
A separate order will issue.