OPINION

JAMES P. JONES, District Judge.

The defendant, Kenneth Wayne Fannon, proceeding pro se, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2012), alleging that his sentence is no longer valid in light of United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) and Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010). After review of the record, I will grant the United States' Motion to Dismiss Fannon's § 2255 motion as untimely filed and without merit.

I

A grand jury of this court returned a two-count Indictment on April 6, 2004, charging Fannon with possession of nine firearms and ammunition as a felon and as an unlawful drug user, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1), 922(g)(3), and 924(e) (West 2006) (Count One), and possession of an explosive as a felon and unlawful drug user, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 842(i)(1) and 842(i)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012) (Count Two). In July 2004, Fannon pleaded guilty to Count One pursuant to a written plea agreement, in exchange for dismissal of Count Two. Fannon also waived his right to appeal and to bring a § 2255 motion.

At sentencing on October 4, 2004, I found that because Fannon had three prior violent felony and/or drug convictions, he was subject to a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e). I sentenced Fannon to the mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence under the ACCA by Judgment entered on October 6, 2004. Fannon did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

Fannon signed and dated his § 2255 motion on September 12, 2011. He alleges that his sentence as enhanced under § 924(e) is invalid in light of Simmons and Carachuri-Rosendo. The court filed the § 2255 motion conditionally, notified Fannon that it appeared to be untimely under § 2255(f), and granted him an opportunity to submit any additional evidence and/or argument on the issue of timeliness, which he has done. The United States then filed its Motion to Dismiss, to which Fannon has responded. After review of the record, I find that Fannon's § 2255 motion is both untimely and without merit.

II

A person convicted of a federal offense has one year to file a § 2255 motion, starting from the latest of the following:

28 U.S.C.A. § 2255(f). If the defendant does not appeal, his conviction becomes final when his opportunity to appeal expires. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 524-25, 532 (2003).

Fannon did not appeal the judgment entered against him on October 6, 2004. Therefore, his conviction became final on October 20, 2004, when his opportunity to appeal expired.1 Fannon then had one year-until October 20, 2005-in which to file a timely § 2255 motion. Because Fannon filed his § 2255 motion, at the earliest, on September 12, 2011,2 his motion is untimely under § 2255(f)(1).

Fannon argues that the court should calculate his one-year filing period under § 2255(f)(3), because he filed his § 2255 motion within one year of the decision in Simmons, which held that hypothetical aggravating factors cannot be considered when calculating whether prior state conviction was punishable by more than one year. The decision in Simmons cannot trigger § 2255(f)(3), since this section by its own terms applies only to claims based on a right newly recognized by a Supreme Court decision. In Simmons, the Fourth Circuit applied a Supreme Court ruling in Carachuri-Rosendo. Fannon cannot rely on the Carachuri-Rosendo decision to render his motion timely under § 2255(f)(3), however, because he did not file the motion within one year of that decision.3 Fannon fails to demonstrate that his § 2255 motion is timely under any subsection of § 2255(f).4

The statutory limitations period under § 2255(f), may be tolled for equitable reasons. See, e.g., United States v. Prescott, 221 F.3d 686, 688 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying equitable tolling to § 2255 motion); Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (finding same as to similar limitation period in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d) for habeas petitions challenging state convictions). To warrant equitable tolling, the defendant must show two elements: "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way." Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To satisfy the second prong of this analysis, the defendant must present "(1) extraordinary circumstances, (2) beyond his control or external to his own conduct, (3) that prevented him from filing on time." Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d.238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The defendant has the burden to show entitlement to equitable tolling. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562.

Fannon fails to make either of the factual showings necessary to apply equitable tolling here. Waiting more than seven years after the judgment to challenge his sentence does not support a finding of due diligence. Fannon asserts that his pro se status hampered his ability to research the complex legal issues later clarified in the Simmons decision. Fannon's limited legal knowledge is neither extraordinary nor a circumstance external to his control. See United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[I]gnorance of the law is not a basis for equitable tolling").

Even if Fannon could state facts warranting equitable tolling, his Simmons claim is without merit. Section 924(e) mandates a fifteen-year ACCA mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of violating § 922(g) who has been convicted three times or more for a violent felony or a serious drug offense or both. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1). Generally, for purposes of the ACCA enhancement, a `"serious drug offense'" is a drug trafficking crime punishable by a maximum term of ten years or more, while a `"violent felony'" is one "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." § 924(e)(2)(B).

United States v. Pulliam, 474 F. App'x 134, 135 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

For each of the three convictions used to qualify Fannon for the ACCA enhancement, the state court sentenced him to no more than one year imprisonment or probation.5 Fannon, however, does not dispute that he was eligible for a sentence exceeding one year for each of these offenses under Virginia's discretionary sentencing guidelines. He accordingly fails to raise a successful challenge under Simmons.

III

For the stated reasons, Fannon's § 2255 motion is untimely under § 2255(f). He fails to demonstrate grounds for equitable tolling, and his Simmons claim is without merit. Therefore, I grant the Motion to Dismiss.

A separate Final Order will be entered herewith.