GLEN E. CONRAD, District Judge.
This diversity action, filed by plaintiff Brandon Lester ("Lester") against defendants SMC Transport, LLC ("SMC"), Israel Martinez, Jr. ("Martinez"), and Salinas Express, LLC ("Salinas Express"), arises out of a motor vehicle accident on Interstate 81 ("I-81"). The case is now before the court on SMC's motion for summary judgment and Martinez's motion for partial summary judgment. For the following reasons, the court will grant Martinez's motion and deny SMC's motion.
The court previously discussed the facts of this case in its earlier memorandum opinion,
This case arises out of a tractor-trailer accident occurring on southbound I-81 in the early morning hours of October 26, 2015. Roy Salinas ("Roy"), an agent of defendant Salinas Express, was delivering goods from Maryland to Texas when his tractor broke down near a rest stop at exit 158 in Botetourt County, Virginia. Edward Lozano ("Lozano"), another driver for Salinas Express, was several miles behind Roy, and picked up Roy while en route back to Texas. The two left the tractor Roy was driving at the rest stop (the "Salinas Tractor"). Upon arriving in Texas, Rudy Salinas, the owner of Salinas Express, instructed Lozano to return to Virginia to pick up the disabled Salinas Tractor. Roy joined Lozano, as did defendant Martinez and Art Gutierrez ("Gutierrez").
In order to tow the Salinas Tractor back to Texas, Lozano, Roy, Gutierrez, and Martinez borrowed a tractor owned by defendant SMC. Sergio Cuellar, the owner of SMC, had purchased this particular tractor in July of 2015 and had made several mechanical repairs. The October ride to Virginia was the SMC Tractor's first long-haul drive.
Before Martinez, Roy, Lozano, and Gutierrez left for Virginia, Cuellar met with them and showed them how to operate the towing equipment on the SMC Tractor. Prior to this interaction, Cuellar had not met Martinez. However, Cuellar was aware that Martinez, along with a number of other individuals, was interested in purchasing the SMC Tractor. During the entire trip, the SMC Tractor had SMC placards on it.
Upon arriving at the Botetourt rest stop, the Salinas Tractor was hooked up to the SMC Tractor. Just before 6:00 a.m. on October 26, 2015, Martinez attempted to exit the rest stop by driving the SMC Tractor, which was towing the Salinas Tractor, north up the entrance ramp. This maneuver would have allowed Martinez to make a U-turn onto southbound I-81.
Prior to attempting to make a U-turn onto southbound I-81, Martinez turned on the hazard lights for at least one of the two trucks and turned on the headlights for both trucks. Martinez had not attempted to place flares on the road, nor was he aware of whether the vehicle had flares that he could have utilized. Because of a hill just before the entrance ramp, Martinez could not see any oncoming traffic. While undertaking this maneuver, Martinez caused the SMC Tractor, towing the Salinas Tractor, to block at least the right lane of traffic. At this time, Lester was cresting the hill immediately before the entrance ramp. Lester was unable to stop or maneuver his vehicle in time to avoid striking the SMC Tractor. Subsequently, a second vehicle struck Lester's vehicle. After the accident, Martinez again attempted to exit onto southbound I-81 by making the same illegal U-turn. Several hours later, phone records indicate that Cuellar called Martinez.
Lester filed his amended complaint against Salinas Express, SMC, and Martinez on June 6, 2016, alleging nine claims of negligence, willful and wanton negligence giving rise to punitive damages, common-law vicarious liability, negligence per se, negligent entrustment and hiring, placard liability, and constructive fraud. On June 24, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment and defendant SMC filed a motion to dismiss several of Lester's claims. On June 27, 2016, Salinas also filed a motion to dismiss. The court granted in part and denied in part each motion, finding that Salinas Express was, as a matter of law, vicariously liable for the ordinary negligence of both Roy and Martinez and that Lester did not establish as a matter of law that SMC was vicariously liable for the ordinary negligence of Roy and Martinez. Additionally, the court dismissed Lester's claims of negligence per se, negligent entrustment and hiring, placard liability, constructive fraud, and vicarious liability against Salinas Express and SMC for the willful and wanton negligence of Roy and Martinez.
In early November, defendant Martinez filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss Lester's claims of punitive damages against him. Defendant SMC also filed a motion for summary judgment, urging the court to find that SMC cannot, as a matter of law, be held vicariously liable for Roy and Martinez's actions. The motions have been fully briefed and argued, and they are ripe for decision.
An award of summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the court must "view the facts and all justifiable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
Defendant Martinez asks the court to grant partial summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims for punitive damages against him, resulting in the dismissal of Count II for willful and wanton negligence. "Willful and wanton negligence is one of three levels of negligence."
"Virginia courts generally allow punitive damages only in limited circumstances and require truly egregious conduct in order to qualify."
It is undisputed that Martinez drove the wrong way up the entrance ramp in efforts to make an illegal U-turn onto southbound I-81. Trooper Atkins Dep. 29:6-10, Docket No. 143-6. Martinez and others testified that they had intended to use the exit ramp, but could not position the SMC Tractor, as it was pulling the Salinas Tractor, in a manner allowing them access to the exit ramp due to the number of other trucks at the rest stop. The uncontroverted evidence indicates that Martinez activated the emergency flashers for the SMC Tractor and the headlights for both the SMC and Salinas Tractor. Martinez Dep., 72:5-13, Docket No. 143-3; Roy Salinas Dep., 45:5-22, Docket No. 143-4.
Seeking to avoid summary judgment against him on this issue, plaintiff argues that he has forecast sufficient evidence to require jury consideration. First, plaintiff points out that Martinez admitted that he did not set out any emergency triangles or flares, nor was he aware that either truck had such equipment. Martinez Dep. 102:9-15, Docket No. 143-3. Second, Martinez testified that he could not see oncoming traffic because of the limited light available and the hill just north of the entrance ramp.
The court finds
While it is clear that Martinez violated a traffic law by using an entrance ramp to exit a rest stop, Lester has offered no evidence indicating that Martinez was aware of any federal regulation specifically targeting interstate truckers, such as the one involved in
SMC seeks summary judgment on the remaining claims against it, arising from Lester's assertion of vicarious liability for the negligence of Martinez and Roy. SMC argues that no reasonable jury could find that either Martinez or Roy was an employee of SMC. Conversely, plaintiff contends that he has established a record upon which a reasonable jury could find differently.
In making the determination of whether a person is an independent contractor or employee of another, exposing the employer to vicarious liability, the court examines the following factors: (1) selection and engagement; (2) payment of compensation; (3) power of dismissal; and (4) power of control.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, SMC contends that it has presented the following evidence that supports a finding, as a matter of law, that Martinez and Roy were not employees of SMC. First, Roy testified that he drove exclusively for Salinas Express at the time of the accident, despite having previously worked for SMC. Roy Salinas Dep. 74:5-21, Docket 141-1. Second, Martinez was a driver for Salinas Express and stated that he was driving exclusively for Salinas Express in the months prior to the accident. Martinez Dep. at 10:14-16; 19:9-15; 20:3-7; 22:22-24, Docket 141-2. He had never worked for SMC.
In response to SMC's motion, plaintiff points to the following evidence, arguing that the issue of SMC's vicarious liability is a question for the jury. First, Lester contends that SMC benefitted from the use of the SMC Tractor. Prior to this trip, Cuellar testified that the SMC Tractor had not been used on a "long haul." Cuellar Dep. 44:2-4, Docket 150-1. Moreover, this trip was the first time Martinez, a potential buyer of the SMC Tractor, was able to drive it.
Second, Lester points to evidence suggesting that Cuellar had the ability to control Roy and Martinez.
To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). All justifiable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party and weight and credibility issues are reserved for the jury.
For the reasons stated, defendant Martinez's motion for partial summary judgment will be granted and defendant SMC's motion for summary judgment will be denied. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this memorandum opinion and the accompanying order to all counsel of record.