WILMA A. LEWIS, Chief District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants Tropical Shipping and Construction Company Limited and VI Cargo Services, LLC's "Motion for Leave to File Exhibits Under Seal." (Dkt. No. 15). In the Motion, Defendants request leave to file under seal certain exhibits that support their joint Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 16).
The common law public right of access to judicial records and proceedings is axiomatic. See Goldstein v. Forbes (In re Cendant Corp.), 260 F.3d 183, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) ("It is well-settled that there exists, in both criminal and civil cases, a common law public right of access to judicial proceedings and records."); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The existence of a common law right of access to judicial proceedings and to inspect judicial records is beyond dispute."). This right of access "extends beyond" the public's "ability to attend open court proceedings; it also encompasses the right of the public to inspect and to copy judicial records," including exhibits. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 192; Littlejohn v. BIC Corporation, 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 683 (3d Cir. 1991).
As the Third Circuit has explained, the right of access to judicial records and proceedings strengthens the public's confidence in the courts:
In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 192 (quoting Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678). Thus, there is a "`strong presumption' of openness [which] does not permit the routine [and perfunctory] closing of judicial records to the public." Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Criden, 648 F.2d at 823).
Notwithstanding that the common law right of access to judicial records and proceedings "is a recognized and venerated principle, courts have also recognized the accompanying principle that `the right is not absolute.'" In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 194 (quoting Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678); see also Nixon v. Warner Comm's, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) ("Every court has supervisory power over its own records and files, and access has been denied where court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes."). Rather, the presumption of access "must be balanced against the factors militating against access. The burden is on the party who seeks to overcome the presumption of access to show that the interest in secrecy outweighs the presumption." Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 165 (quoting Bank of America Nat. Trust v. Hotel Rittenhouse, 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986)).
In order to meet this "heavy burden," the party seeking to file under seal must show that "the material is the kind of information that courts will protect" and that "disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking closure." Miller, 16 F.3d at 551 (citing Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1071) (emphasis added)). Such a showing requires specificity. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d at 194 ("In delineating the injury to be prevented, specificity is essential."). "Broad allegations of harm, bereft of specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient." Id. (citing Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1071).
In the instant case, Defendants state that the exhibits that they seek to file under seal "contain confidential contracts and bills of lading that reveal below-tariff price negotiations, which could lead to competitive pressures from other customers if the information were widely disseminated." (Dkt. No. 15 at 1). The Third Circuit has "expressly recognized that `courts may deny access to judicial records . . . where they are sources of business information that might harm a litigant's competitive standing.'" Westinghouse, 949 F.2d at 662 (quoting Littlejohn, 851 F.2d at 678); see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. Upon review of the exhibits Defendants seek to file under seal and the representation by Defendants that disclosure of the exhibits would result in a specific type of competitive harm—i.e., competitive pressures from other customers—the Court finds that Defendants have made a sufficient showing to warrant sealing the exhibits filed in support of their Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby