ORDER

CURTIS V. GÓMEZ, District Judge.

The Court is in receipt of a letter dated May 11, 2016, (the "recusal letter") from one of plaintiffs' counsel, Lee J. Rohn, Esq.1 The recusal letter, which indicates that it is regarding a case pending before the Court, Chapin, et. al. v. Great Southern Wood Preserving, Inc., et. al., 3:12-cv-77, references facts, cites legal authority, and requests specific relief — recusal of the undersigned. Yet, the letter does not bear any indicia that it was served on opposing counsel in the referenced case.2

Attorney Rohn claims, among other things, that she has a recollection that she sought advice from the undersigned "years ago" about "what an attorney should do if she felt her clients were in jeopardy as a result of an apparent bias by a judge." She also claims that the undersigned advised her, by way of suggestion, that she "should write a letter and bring the issue to the Court's attention to avoid having a public fight."3

Attorney Rohn then shares several of her undertakings.4 She states that she "[s]uccessfully lobbied former Delegate to Congress, Donna Christiansen [sic],5 to remove her letter of recommendation that . . . [the undersigned] be reappointed."6 Rohn also states that she, "with the aid of . . . [her] position in several PACS, successfully lobbied Delegate Stacy [sic]7 Plaskett not to back . . . [the undersigned's] reappointment." Rohn further states that she has "successfully taken the position in lobbying President Obama's office, on . . . [her] own and in political groups . . . [she is] affiliated with," to not reappoint the undersigned.

Essentially, counsel has shared with the undersigned a list of her activities, each of which constitutes an exercise of her rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. From that list of her activities, she concludes there is "disagreement" and "bias" against her such that she expects automatic recusal by the undersigned. As such, she wants the undersigned to "recuse . . . [himself] from all matters . . . [she is] handling."

To begin, the Court appreciates the exercise of the rights enumerated in the First Amendment. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of our form of government is the freedom to speak and associate. The undersigned holds no bias towards, nor disagreement with, any individual who exercises those rights.

Second, Attorney Rohn states that she does not "want to make a public fight about this issue. . . ." The Court does not regard the disposition of disqualification motions as a "fight." Indeed, the Court treats recusal and disqualification requests like it does other petitions for relief. On the record, the Court will address the merits of the petition. It will then render a decision on the record.

Having reviewed the relief sought by Attorney Rohn, the Court finds that the recusal letter is best treated as a motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455, and will address it as such. 28 U.S.C. § 455 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."8 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Because most district judges are appointed to serve during good behavior, there is a dearth of federal caselaw addressing whether the protected First Amendment conduct engaged in by Attorney Rohn requires the disqualification of the undersigned.

Nevertheless, a number of states elect their judges and have addressed similar issues. State courts have held that when an "attorney . . . has campaigned or contributed to . . . [a] judge's opponent," neither bias nor prejudice are established. See, e.g., Pierce v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana, 550 So.2d 211, 214 (La.App.1989); State v. McBride, 187 Wis.2d 409, 418, 523 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Ct. App. 1994)("[W]e conclude that McBride's support of Judge Koehn's opponent, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence to allow this court to conclude that Judge Koehn harbored actual bias against her."). Indeed, even a candidate for judicial office "accepts the risk that, if he loses, he may have to try cases in the court of his successful opponent." Ex parte Grayson, 665 So.2d 986, 987 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). In light of that authority and the attendant circumstances here, the Court holds that Attorney Rohn's protected conduct does not require the undersigned's disqualification.

A holding to the contrary could "unnecessarily preclude[] . . . [the undersigned] from hearing a significant number of cases arising within his . . . jurisdiction." McBride, 187 Wis. 2d at 417. Moreover, such a holding would permit judge shopping.

The Court also notes that when a motion to disqualify is filed only after adverse rulings, it raises concern that the movant is impermissibly seeking a second bite at the apple.

Indeed, the timing of this letter underscores that concern. Since Haynes, the Court has been involved in several matters in which Attorney Rohn was counsel for a party, including Ritter v. Kmart Corporation, 3:13-cv-51. In that case, the undersigned presided over a jury trial at which Attorney Rohn's client was awarded judgment in the amount of $1,719,430. No motion for disqualification was filed in that case, or any other matters involving Attorney Rohn's clients.

Moreover, this matter has proceeded apace since 2012. The docket contains over 1625 entries. The undersigned has issued multiple orders, including several orders that were favorable to Attorney Rohn's clients. See, e.g., ECF No. 901 (denying entry of summary judgment against the plaintiffs). In addition, as recently as March 28, 2016, Attorney Rohn filed objections to orders issued by the Magistrate Judge, seeking review by the undersigned.9 See ECF No. 1087. Yet, no recusal was sought. Indeed, the recusal issue was presented to the Court only after several orders adverse to Rohn's clients were issued. Between April 28, 2016, and May 9, 2016, the undersigned issued several orders unfavorable to Rohn's clients in which the Court: affirmed the Magistrate Judge's orders in this case; denied leave to file various oppositions out of time; and struck from the record various briefs that failed to comply with the Court's rules and the Magistrate Judge's orders.10 After that turn of events, the recusal letter was sent to the undersigned — approximately three weeks before the trial in this matter is due to commence.

The premises considered, it is hereby

ORDERED that the May 11, 2016, letter sent to the undersigned by Attorney Rohn will be construed as a motion for disqualification; it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall docket the May 11, 2016, recusal letter as a motion for disqualification; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion for disqualification is DENIED.