CURTIS V. GÓMEZ, District Judge.
Before the Court is the application of Rammer Andres Guerrero-Morales ("Guerrero-Morales") to waive his speedy trial. Guerrero-Morales also moves to continue the trial in this matter. For the reasons stated herein, the time to try this case is extended up to and including March 9, 2020.
While the Speedy Trial Act requires that defendants be tried within seventy days of indictment, the Court specifically finds that extending this period would be in the best interest of justice. First, an extension of time is necessary to allow Guerrero-Morales time to review the discovery in this matter. Second, without an extension, Guerrero-Morales would be denied reasonable time necessary to explore plea options and prepare for trial. Third, Guerrero-Morales made his request with the advice and consent of counsel.
Consistent with these concerns, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that "whether or not a case is `unusual' or `complex,' an `ends of justice' continuance may in appropriate circumstances be granted." United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 444 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Dota, 33 F.3d 1179(9th Cir. 1994) ("An ends of justice continuance may be justified on grounds that one side needs more time to prepare for trial [even if the] case [i]s not `complex.'"); see also United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 883 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion when it delayed the trial to give counsel . . . opportunity to . . . decid[e] upon and prepar[e] an appropriate defense."); United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 522 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding there was no abuse of discretion where district court found that multiple count, multiple defendant "case was complex and required additional time for adequate preparation."); cf. United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining that, where a defendant had moved to continue his trial due to his counsel's unavailability, the "period of delay" caused by an ends of justice continuance includes the time "reasonably required to schedule a new trial date" in "consideration of the court's calendar").
The premises considered, it is hereby