GREGA v. PETTENGILL, 5:14-cv-00147. (2015)
Court: District Court, D. Vermont
Number: infdco20150819d51
Visitors: 5
Filed: Aug. 18, 2015
Latest Update: Aug. 18, 2015
Summary: FootNotes 1. At the June 16, 2015 hearing, counsel for Grega stated that the Search Detective did not testify at trial. Grega's complaint alleges that he did testify at Grega's trial. On a motion to dismiss, the record before the court does not include the state court trial transcript. The court need not resolve this factual inconsistency because Grega alleges in any case that Davis read the Search Detective's report before Grega's trial and this allegation is plausible whether or not the Sea
Summary: FootNotes 1. At the June 16, 2015 hearing, counsel for Grega stated that the Search Detective did not testify at trial. Grega's complaint alleges that he did testify at Grega's trial. On a motion to dismiss, the record before the court does not include the state court trial transcript. The court need not resolve this factual inconsistency because Grega alleges in any case that Davis read the Search Detective's report before Grega's trial and this allegation is plausible whether or not the Sear..
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FootNotes
1. At the June 16, 2015 hearing, counsel for Grega stated that the Search Detective did not testify at trial. Grega's complaint alleges that he did testify at Grega's trial. On a motion to dismiss, the record before the court does not include the state court trial transcript. The court need not resolve this factual inconsistency because Grega alleges in any case that Davis read the Search Detective's report before Grega's trial and this allegation is plausible whether or not the Search Detective testified.
2. Defendants contended at the June 16, 2015 hearing that Youngblood bars recognizing a failure-to-investigate cause of action and that Grega's reliance on Wilson is misplaced because Wilson is inconsistent with Youngblood. The court does not agree. While Youngblood reaffirmed an ongoing concern with courts imposing hindsight judgment upon police officers' investigatory decisions, it did not foreclose any and all claims stemming from the recklessness of an investigation; it merely required a showing of bad faith to satisfy a due process claim where police failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence. Wilson, which requires a showing of recklessness for due process claims arising from investigatory failures, is not necessarily inconsistent with Youngblood's bad-faith requirement for the destruction of potentially exculpatory material. The court does, however, read Youngblood as counseling against recognizing Grega's proposed failure-to-investigate cause of action.
3. Defendants do not argue that Grega has failed to allege facts sufficient to show Pettengill's personal involvement in the alleged evidence fabrication. However, for purposes of concluding that Grega has stated a plausible claim, the court notes that Grega has alleged facts — specifically, the fact that Pettengill supervised the crime scene investigation — sufficient to support a claim that Pettengill fabricated evidence. Pettengill's awareness that the alleged fabricated evidence had been forwarded to Davis would suffice to establish his personal involvement. See Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 129 (holding that reasonable jury could find defendant officer liable for fabrication of evidence where officer "heard the content of the document in question" and knew that some of its contents were false).
4. The court does not consider "failure to disclose false evidence" as it is alleged in Count 2 a separate claim. The forwarding to prosecutors of fabricated evidence necessarily encompasses a failure to disclose the fact that the evidence was fabricated.
5. The court considers Grega's malicious prosecution claim as one sounding in the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Washington v. Cnty. of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir.2004) ("[T]he Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, determined that only violations of the Fourth Amendment could support § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution.").
6. "In the Rule 12(b)(6) context, a court may take judicial notice of prior pleadings, orders, judgments, and other related documents that appear in the court records of prior litigation and that relate to the case sub judice." Ferrari v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 790 F.Supp.2d 34, 38 n. 4 (E.D.N.Y.2011); see also Manley v. Utzinger, No. 10 Civ. 2210, 2011 WL 2947008, at *1 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2011) ("The Court may take judicial notice of public records in deciding a motion to dismiss."). Although the court could take judicial notice of the facts alleged in Pettengill's affidavit — not for their truth, but to establish the basis of the judge's probable cause finding — the court concludes it is not necessary to do so here. See Global Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir.2006) ("A court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings."); see also LaRocco v. Jackson, No. 10-CV-01651 (NGG)(LB), 2012 WL 947554, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2012) (taking judicial notice of plaintiff's guilty plea in dismissing plaintiff's malicious prosecution and false arrest claims for failure to allege lack of probable cause).
7. The Second Circuit has distinguished probable cause to arrest from probable cause to prosecute. Boyd, 336 F.3d at 75-76. Probable cause to prosecute is essentially continuing probable cause to arrest, where the probable cause has not been nullified by evidence establishing the criminal defendant's innocence by the conclusion of trial. See Kinzer v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 143-44 (2d Cir.2003). Where, as here, probable cause to prosecute is based on the same evidence that gave rise to probable cause to arrest, the existence of the former necessarily indicates existence of the latter.
8. The Supreme Court held in Iqbal that "a plaintiff must plead that each ... defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution," and that "mere knowledge" of a subordinate's discriminatory purpose is insufficient to establish supervisory liability. 556 U.S. at 676-77, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Some courts have concluded that Iqbal "narrowed the grounds upon which supervisors are liable." Erdogan v. Nassau Cnty., No. 10-CV-05837 (AKT), 2014 WL 1236679, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2014) (citing cases). This court follows the "majority" of courts in this circuit — and District precedent — in continuing to apply all five Colon factors to non-discrimination claims under § 1983 absent a Second Circuit pronouncement otherwise. Thompson v. Pallito, 949 F.Supp.2d 558, 574-75 (D.Vt.2013).
9. Defendants concede that the Police Chief is a policymaking public official for purposes of this motion. (Doc. 59-1 at 15-16.)
Source: Leagle
