ROSE, J.P.
In a race to beat the impending effective date of regulations recently issued by the Adirondack Park Agency, defendant William H. Grimditch Jr. (hereinafter Grimditch) began construction of a boathouse in the waters of Lake Placid adjacent to his lakefront property without applying to plaintiff Town of North Elba for a building permit. As a consequence, plaintiff James E. Morganson, the Code Enforcement Officer for the Town of North Elba/Village of Lake Placid, issued a stop work order and the Town and Morganson (hereinafter collectively referred to as the Town) then moved for a preliminary injunction preventing further construction. After making the motion, the Town learned that Grimditch's children, defendants Wayne H. Grimditch and Carol Lynn Grimditch Roda (hereinafter collectively referred to as the children), had commenced construction of a second unpermitted boathouse adjacent to their nearby, separate parcel of lakefront property, and the parties agreed that both boathouses would be considered as part of the pending motion.
Supreme Court allowed construction of both boathouses to continue to the extent of installing piers and decking, but issued a limited preliminary injunction that required defendants to apply for building permits pursuant to the New York State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code Act (hereinafter SBC) and to comply with the applicable Village of Lake Placid/Town of North Elba Land Use Code (hereinafter LUC).
While the cross motions for summary judgment were pending in action No. 1, plaintiffs John M. McMillin III, Ellen M. McMillin, Richard Moccia and Leslie Moccia (hereinafter collectively referred to as the neighbors) moved to intervene in that action on the ground that, as owners of property adjoining the children's parcel, they would be harmed by the allegedly illegal boathouse being constructed there. Supreme Court denied the motion to intervene,
Ultimately, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to defendants dismissing both actions. Based on our decisions in Higgins and Mohawk Val. Ski Club v Town of Duanesburg (304 A.D.2d 881 [2003]), the court reasoned that Lake Placid meets the definition of "[n]avigable waters of the state" as set forth in Navigation Law § 2 (4), which, in pertinent part, defines that phrase as "all lakes, rivers, streams and waters within the boundaries of the state and not privately owned, which are navigable in fact." Based on the lack of any dispute as to whether Lake Placid is navigable in fact (see Navigation Law § 2 [5]), Supreme Court focused its analysis on whether the lake is privately owned. In doing so, it rejected the Town's argument that the State gave up ownership of the lake as part of the Macomb Patent and concluded that, despite the private ownership of almost 300 homes or camps on its shores, it need not determine whether title to the lake bed is in the riparian owners.
We agree with Supreme Court that Lake Placid was not part of the Macomb Patent and that the Navigation Law is applicable to the lake. We also agree that defendants' boathouses are structures subject to the SBC. Nevertheless, we cannot agree that the Navigation Law preempts the power of local municipalities to administer and enforce local land use laws by conferring upon the State exclusive jurisdiction over structures in the navigable waters of the state. Only when the State owns title to the land under the water in its sovereign capacity does it have exclusive jurisdiction preempting local land use laws. Based on development of English common-law principles regarding the ownership of submerged land in New York, we conclude that Lake Placid is not owned by the State in its sovereign capacity. In the absence of any such exclusive authority conferred by either the Navigation Law or sovereign title to Lake Placid, we now hold that the LUC is applicable to the construction of defendants' boathouses. Our conclusions require us to revisit our decisions in Higgins and Mohawk Val. Ski Club and, to the extent that they hold that the Navigation Law provides the State with exclusive jurisdiction over structures located in its navigable waters, no longer follow them.
We begin with the rule that where the State holds title to the land under navigable water in its sovereign capacity, its paramount authority "is not limited to regulation in the interest of navigation but extends to every form of regulation in the public interest" (People v System Props., Inc., 281 App Div 433, 440 [1953], mod on other grounds 2 N.Y.2d 330 [1957]; see Langdon v Mayor of City of N.Y., 93 N.Y. 129, 155-156 [1883]; Erbsland v Vecchiolla, 35 A.D.2d 564, 565 [1970], affd sub nom. Erbsland v Rubin, 33 N.Y.2d 787 [1973]). The State's sovereign ownership of land under water has its origins in English common law, pursuant to which tidal waters were considered "navigable," with the land under such waters owned by the Crown (see PPL Montana, LLC v Montana, 565 US ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 1215, 1226-1227 [2012]; Langdon v Mayor of City of N.Y., 93 NY at 155-156). Under this framework, nontidal waters were considered "nonnavigable," with title to the land under them being held by the adjacent riparian owners (see PPL Montana, LLC v Montana, 565 US at ___, 132 S Ct at 1227; Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v State of New York, 200 N.Y. 400, 412 [1911]). This distinction between tidal and nontidal waters was determined to be impractical in New York given the abundance of inland lakes and streams and, as a result, our common law has developed such that the State owns, in its sovereign capacity, the land under tidal waters, boundary waters, the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers and certain major inland lakes, based on their size, character and history (see Illinois Central R. Co. v Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 [1892]; Hardin v Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382-384, 393-394 [1891]; Macrum v Hawkins, 261 N.Y. 193, 203 [1933]; Granger v City of Canandaigua, 257 N.Y. 126, 131-132 [1931]; Fulton Light, Heat & Power Co. v State of New York, 200 NY at 412-414; Saunders v New York Cent. & Hudson Riv. R.R. Co., 144 N.Y. 75, 85-86 [1894]; 1 Rasch, New York Law and Practice of Real Property §§ 20:34, 20:35 [2d ed 1991]; 107 NY Jur 2d, Water § 15).
Accordingly, the State's sovereign ownership includes the land under the "marginal sea" to a line three miles from the coast, the Great Lakes within the State's territorial jurisdiction, Lake Champlain and the St. Lawrence and Niagara Rivers (see State Law § 7-a; Public Authorities Law § 1001; Matter of Long Sault Dev. Co. v Kennedy, 212 N.Y. 1, 9-10 [1914]; Matter of Haher's Sodus Point Bait Shop v Wigle, 139 A.D.2d 950, 950 [1988], lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 701 [1988]; Moore v Day, 199 App
We must make this determination regarding Lake Placid because, as a general principle, local zoning codes do not apply to the lands of the State (see 2 Salkin, New York Zoning Law and Practice § 11:06 [4th ed 2011]). This includes "navigable waters" when the phrase is used in the common-law sense that the State holds "title to the land thereunder" (Erbsland v Vecchiolla, 35 AD2d at 565 [Milton Harbor, part of Long Island Sound]; see Town of Alexandria v MacKnight, 281 A.D.2d 945, 945 [2001] [St. Lawrence River]; Britt v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Grand Is., 124 A.D.2d 987, 987 [1986] [Niagara River]; see also 1 Salkin, New York Zoning Law and Practice § 7:07 [4th ed 2011]). This common-law meaning of "navigable waters" reflects the State's sovereign ownership of the land under water, as opposed to its proprietary ownership as a riparian owner. When the land under water is owned by the riparian owners, an inland river is "nonnavigable at common law" even though it may be considered "navigable in fact" in terms of its ability to support transportation (Douglaston Manor v Bahrakis, 89 N.Y.2d 472, 480 [1997] [emphasis omitted]). In Douglaston Manor, the Court of Appeals specifically declined to abandon these common-law distinctions regarding navigability (id. at 481-482), and the State's sovereign ownership of land under tidal waters, the
Although Supreme Court construed Erbsland, Britt and MacKnight as holding that municipalities have no authority over navigable waters as defined in the Navigation Law, these cases do not support that conclusion. Instead, each involves an attempt by a municipality to enforce zoning restrictions on waters owned by the State in its sovereign capacity. Erbsland held that the zoning power of the City of Rye did not extend into the "navigable waters of Milton Harbor" because those waters are within the sole jurisdiction of the State (Erbsland v Vecchiolla, 35 AD2d at 565). The decision made no reference to the Navigation Law. Instead, it pointed out that the State had title to the land under the body of water known as Milton Harbor, which, we note, is tidal water owned by the State in its sovereign capacity. In Britt, the Court noted that the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Grand Island had no authority over construction on navigable waters of the state (see Britt v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Grand Is., 124 AD2d at 987). While Britt uses the phrase "navigable waters of the [s]tate," it does so without reference to the Navigation Law and, as is clear from the location of Grand Island and the underlying litigation documents included in the record, the navigable water of the state at issue was the Niagara River, a boundary river owned by the State in its sovereign capacity (see id.). MacKnight, relying on Erbsland and Britt, likewise held that the Town of Alexandria had no authority to regulate construction of a dock system in navigable waters of the state (see Town of Alexandria v MacKnight, 281 AD2d at 945). As made clear, however, by the location of Alexandria and the underlying litigation documents included in the record, the navigable water at issue was the St. Lawrence River, a boundary river owned by the State in its sovereign capacity. In our view, neither Erbsland, Britt nor MacKnight stand for the proposition that the Navigation Law preempts local zoning regulations. Instead, we read them to more accurately reflect that preemption occurs when the State owns the land under navigable water in its sovereign capacity.
Nevertheless, we must agree with the Town that the State does not own Lake Placid in its sovereign capacity. The application to Lake Placid of our common-law principles governing ownership of inland lakes and rivers requires the conclusion that title to the bed of the lake is held by the riparian owners. As a general rule, nontidal waters, with the exception of those
This conclusion finds further support in the Guide to Underwater Lands published by OGS and included by the Town as an appendix to its brief. The Guide lists "coastal waters, major lakes and rivers" that OGS considers to be owned by the State in its sovereign capacity so as to require — subject to certain exemptions — an easement, license or lease in order for upland owners to construct a dock, bulkhead, pier, jetty, boathouse or other improvement (see Public Lands Law § 75 [7] [b]). Lake Placid is not on the list of underwater lands that OGS considers to be subject to its jurisdiction.
In light of our conclusion that the State does not own Lake Placid in it sovereign capacity so as to give it exclusive jurisdiction over "every form of regulation [of the lake] in the public interest" (People v System Props., Inc., 281 App Div at 440), we turn to examine Supreme Court's holding that the Navigation Law is the source of exclusive jurisdiction preempting local authority. Supreme Court concluded that Lake Placid qualifies as "[n]avigable waters of the state" as defined in Navigation Law § 2 (4) and that, as a result, Navigation Law
By its terms, the Navigation Law applies "to navigation and the use of navigable waters of the state" (Navigation Law § 1). In contrast, as we have said, when the State owns the land under a body of water in its sovereign capacity, "[t]he sovereign power of the State is not limited to regulation in the interest of navigation but extends to every form of regulation in the public interest" (People v System Props., Inc., 281 App Div at 440). A review of Navigation Law §§ 30 and 32 reveals no express provision conferring exclusive jurisdiction over every form of regulation to the State. Rather, these sections are directed to maintaining the ability of the public to navigate or pass over the navigable waters of the state as defined by the Navigation Law. While Navigation Law § 2 (2) and § 30 give the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation jurisdiction "over navigation on the navigable waters of the state" in the region where Lake Placid is located, section 30 explicitly provides that "nothing authorized hereunder shall be construed to ... authorize ... any infringement of ... local laws or regulations" (Navigation Law § 30). Thus, by its plain language, Navigation Law § 30 applies only to navigation and does not infringe upon the application of the LUC to structures built upon the waters of Lake Placid.
Nor does Navigation Law § 46 or § 46-a compel a different conclusion. Navigation Law § 46 allows local municipalities to regulate the use of a lake or other body of water within the municipality by setting speed limits for vessels or prohibiting personal watercraft within a designated "vessel regulation zone" (Navigation Law § 46 [1], [3]; see Town Law § 130 [17]). Navigation Law § 46-a, entitled "Regulation of vessels," authorizes a city or village to adopt regulations concerning the speed, anchoring and removal of garbage from vessels on waters within or bordering the city or village to a distance of 1,500 feet from shore (see Navigation Law § 46-a [1]). The remaining subdivisions allow local legislative bodies in certain specified municipalities to regulate the manner of construction and location of boathouses, moorings and docks (see Navigation Law § 46-a [2], [4], [5], [6]; see also Navigation Law § 32-e). Our review of the record and case law reveals that these subdivisions are delegations of authority to municipalities that border waters owned by the State in its sovereign capacity, such as tidal waters, boundary waters, the Hudson River and the major inland lakes that we have previously discussed (see Navigation Law § 46-a [2], [4], [5], [6]). Accordingly, Navigation Law §§ 46 and 46-a are merely examples of the State's delegation of its authority over its land under water held in its sovereign capacity and the regulation of vessels as provided in the Navigation Law (see e.g. Matter of S.D. Off. Equip. Co. v Philbrick, 247 A.D.2d 838, 840 [1998]; Matter of Haher's Sodus Point Bait Shop v Wigle, 139 AD2d at 951).
We readily acknowledge that Supreme Court's conclusion regarding the exclusivity of the Navigation Law was based in part on our decisions in Mohawk Val. Ski Club v Town of Duanesburg (304 A.D.2d 881 [2003], supra) and Higgins v Douglas (304 A.D.2d 1051 [2003], supra). To the extent that those decisions may suggest that the Navigation Law displaces local land use laws on navigable waters that are not owned by the State in its sovereign capacity, those cases should no longer be followed.
Based on the foregoing, the Town and neighbors correctly assert that Supreme Court erred in declaring that defendants' boathouses are not subject to the LUC, and defendants' cross motions for summary judgment dismissing action Nos. 1 and 2
Our conclusion also renders the order for a hearing on sanctions against the Town in action No. 1 inappropriate. Supreme Court ordered the hearing to determine whether the Town's arguments were completely without merit, whether it engaged in actions primarily to delay and prolong the litigation and whether it asserted material factual statements in the verified complaint against Grimditch that were false. Clearly, the Town's arguments regarding the application of the LUC had merit and their actions were designed to enforce the LUC, not delay the action. With respect to the false statements, the Town alleged in the complaint that Grimditch had not applied for a building permit. While he had applied by the time the summons and complaint were filed, the allegations in the complaint were limited to the specific time frame prior to the applications and were true as of that date, notwithstanding later developments. Accordingly, we find no basis for sanctions against the Town.
Ordered that the order and judgment entered August 24, 2011 in action No. 1 is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted defendants' cross motion for summary judgment and as ordered a hearing on sanctions against plaintiffs; cross motion denied and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.
Ordered that the order entered August 24, 2011 in action No. 2 is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted defendants' cross motion for summary judgment; cross motion denied and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.