While defendants argue that plaintiff's motion was not timely, they do not indicate that they suffered "prejudice or surprise" as a result (360 W. 11th LLC v ACG Credit Co. II, LLC, 90 A.D.3d 552, 553 [1st Dept 2011]). In any event, the record supports a finding that plaintiff moved to amend the complaint shortly after the judgment became final.

Plaintiff is entitled to amend the complaint to assert a claim for aiding and abetting fraud, since her allegations are not "palpably insufficient or clearly devoid of merit" (MBIA Ins. Corp. v Greystone & Co., Inc., 74 A.D.3d 499, 500 [1st Dept 2010]). Moreover, the proposed allegations are sufficient under CPLR 3016 (b), since they support an inference of defendants' actual intent to defraud (cf. Wildman & Bernhardt Constr. v BPM Assoc., 273 A.D.2d 38, 38-39 [1st Dept 2000]; Rabouin v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 307 A.D.2d 843, 844 [1st Dept 2003]; National Westminster Bank v Weksel, 124 A.D.2d 144, 147 [1st Dept 1987], lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 604 [1987]).

Under New York law, there exists a common law cause of action for tortious interference with enforcement of a judgment (Quinby v Strauss, 90 N.Y. 664 [1882]; James v Powell, 25 A.D.2d 1, 2 [1st Dept 1966], revd on other grounds 19 N.Y.2d 249 [1967]; Strachman v Palestinian Auth., 73 A.D.3d 124 [1st Dept 2010], appeal withdrawn 16 N.Y.3d 796 [2011]). We find further that, because plaintiff possessed a valid judgment at the time of the fraudulent conveyance, she was not required to also have a lien on the property to enforce this claim (James at 2). Nor is the tortious interference claim preempted by the Debtor and Creditor Law, since the allegations extend beyond the defendants' fraudulent conveyance of the security interest, and plaintiff seeks affirmative relief for defendants' fraudulent conduct, not merely the setting aside of the conveyance.