Assuming, arguendo, that Post v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (48 N.Y.2d 84 [1979]) mandates the invalidation of all restrictive covenants in an employment agreement upon the termination of the employee without cause (compare e.g. Grassi & Co., CPAs, P.C. v Janover Rubinroit, LLC, 82 A.D.3d 700 [2d Dept 2011], with Wise v Transco, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 1039 [4th Dept 1980]), the record before us still does not demonstrate conclusively that defendant Ephraim Kutner was terminated without cause. In a prior appeal in this case, in which we reversed an order granting defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 on the ground of "the uncertainty of the record as presently developed," we observed that "[i]t is possible that the dispute may be amenable to resolution on a more developed record and exploratory motion for summary judgment" (121 A.D.3d 581, 583-584 [1st Dept 2014]). Defendants moved for summary judgment shortly after our order was issued. However, their argument that Ephraim was terminated without cause was based on the same letters and emails as were submitted on the motion to dismiss. Thus, defendants failed to meet their burden on the motion for summary judgment of "tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853 [1985]).

Similarly, issues of fact still exist as to the reasonableness and enforceability of the restrictive covenants (see Brown & Brown, Inc. v Johnson, 25 N.Y.3d 364, 372 [2015]).

As we are reinstating the claim for breach of the noncompetition and nonsolicitation covenants in Ephraim's employment agreement, the tortious interference claim, which was dismissed on the ground that the restrictive covenants were invalid, must also be reinstated.