Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when he fell from a scaffold while he was working at a construction site. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 240 (1). The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to, inter alia, CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that the action was barred by a general release. The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved, in effect, to preclude the defendants from asserting an affirmative defense based on the general release. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion and the plaintiff's cross motion. The plaintiff appeals, and the defendants cross-appeal.
"A release is a contract, and its construction is governed by contract law" (Kaminsky v Gamache, 298 A.D.2d 361, 361 [2002]; see Rivera v Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 113 A.D.3d 667, 670 [2014]). In general, "a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release" (Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "A release may be invalidated, however, for any of `the traditional bases for setting aside written agreements, namely, duress, illegality, fraud, or mutual mistake'" (id. at 276, quoting Mangini v McClurg, 24 N.Y.2d 556, 563 [1969]; see Shklovskiy v Khan, 273 A.D.2d 371, 372 [2000]). Moreover, there is a requirement that a release covering both known and unknown injuries be "`fairly and knowingly made'" (Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d at 566, quoting Farrington v Harlem Sav. Bank, 280 N.Y. 1, 4 [1939]; see Powell v Adler, 128 A.D.3d 1039, 1040 [2015]).
"A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more
Here, in support of their motion to dismiss the complaint, the defendants submitted a general release executed by the plaintiff, which, by its terms, barred the instant action against them (see Davis v Rochdale Vil., Inc., 109 A.D.3d 867, 867 [2013]). However, the plaintiff's allegations were nevertheless sufficient to support a possible finding that the defendants procured the release by means of fraud and that the release was signed by the plaintiff "`under circumstances which indicate unfairness'" (Farber v Breslin, 47 AD3d at 877, quoting Gibli v Kadosh, 279 A.D.2d 35, 41 [2000]; see Farrington v Harlem Sav. Bank, 280 NY at 3-4; Boxberger v New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 237 N.Y. 75, 78 [1923]; Powell v Adler, 128 AD3d at 1040; Fuentes v Aluskewicz, 25 A.D.3d 727, 728 [2006]; Scheer v Long Is. R.R. Co., 282 App Div 724, 724 [1953]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as barred by the release (see Warmhold v Zagarino, 106 AD3d at 995; Storman v Storman, 90 AD3d at 898).
The Supreme Court also properly denied the plaintiff's cross motion, in effect, to preclude the defendants from asserting an affirmative defense based on the general release. The plaintiff's submissions in support of his cross motion were sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the release was unenforceable due to fraud in the procurement of the release and on the ground that it was not fairly and knowingly made (see Powell v Adler, 128 AD3d at 1040; Fuentes v Aluskewicz, 25 AD3d at 728; see also Farrington v Harlem Sav. Bank, 280 NY at 3-4; Boxberger v New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 237 NY at 78; Scheer v Long Is. R.R. Co., 282 App Div at 724). However, in opposition to the plaintiff's prima facie showing, the defendants submitted evidence controverting the plaintiff's account of how the release came to be signed. These submissions raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the release was enforceable.
