Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim of the defendant Seville Electronics Trading Corp. pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (2) to recover the amount of an unsatisfied obtained judgment in the underlying action and declaring that it is not obligated to satisfy the judgment obtained in the underlying action is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for the entry of a judgment declaring that the plaintiff has no obligation to Seville Electronics Trading Corp. in connection with the judgment obtained in the underlying action.
On September 15, 2005, a fire occurred at a building owned by the defendant D.P. Holding Corp. (hereinafter D.P. Holding) and occupied by the defendant Seville Electronics Trading Corp. (hereinafter Seville). On that date, D.P. Holding was a named insured under a policy of insurance issued by the plaintiff.
In 2006, Seville commenced an action against D.P. Holding entitled Seville Elec. Trading Corp. v D.P. Holding Corp. in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, under index No. 1042/06 (hereinafter the underlying action), inter alia, to recover damages allegedly sustained by it as a result of the fire. Seville and D.P. Holding agreed to a settlement in the underlying action. As part of the settlement, Seville obtained a judgment by confession in its favor and against D.P. Holding in the amount of $819,574.35, and an assignment of D.P. Holding's rights under its insurance contract with the plaintiff.
Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, for a judgment declaring that it is not obligated to defend or indemnify either D.P. Holding or Seville in the underlying action
"Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (2) expressly permits an injured party to recover any unsatisfied judgment against an insured, directly from the insurer" (Becker v Colonial Coop. Ins. Co., 24 A.D.3d 702, 704 [2005]). Insurance Law § 3420 (a) (3) requires the injured party to demonstrate that he or she acted diligently in attempting to ascertain the identity of the insurer, and thereafter expeditiously notified the insurer (see Steinberg v Hermitage Ins. Co., 26 A.D.3d 426, 428 [2006]). "In determining the reasonableness of an injured party's notice, the notice required is measured less rigidly than that required of the insured[ ]" (Malik v Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 60 A.D.3d 1013, 1016 [2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Spentrev Realty Corp. v United Natl. Specialty Ins. Co., 90 A.D.3d 636, 637 [2011]). "The injured person's rights must be judged by the prospects for giving notice that were afforded him, not by those available to the insured" (Lauritano v American Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 3 A.D.2d 564, 568 [1957], affd 4 N.Y.2d 1028 [1958]). "What is reasonably possible for the insured may not be reasonably possible for the person he has injured. The passage of time does not of itself make delay unreasonable" (id. at 568).
Here, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that Seville failed to act diligently in attempting to ascertain the plaintiff's identity and in expeditiously notifying it. In opposition, Seville failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Spentrev Realty Corp. v United Natl. Specialty Ins. Co., 90 AD3d at 637; Seneca Ins. Co. v W.S. Distrib., Inc., 40 A.D.3d 1068, 1070 [2007]; Steinberg v Hermitage Ins. Co., 26 AD3d at 428; Ringel v Blue Ridge Ins. Co., 293 A.D.2d 460, 461-462 [2002]; cf. Malik v Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 60 AD3d at 1015-1016). Accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment dismissing Seville's counterclaim and declaring that it is not obligated to satisfy the judgment obtained in the underlying action.
Since this is a declaratory judgment action, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for the entry of a judgment declaring that the plaintiff has no obligation to Seville Electronics Trading Corp. in connection with the judgment
