UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PER CURIAM

John James filed a CrR 7.8 motion to vacate and modify his 1995 sentence for first degree rape, first degree robbery, and first degree burglary. The superior court denied the motion as untimely, and James appealed. The parties agree, and we concur, that the superior court lacked authority under CrR 7.8 to rule on the timeliness of the motion. See State v. Smith, 144 Wn.App. 860, 863, 184 P.3d 666 (2008). The parties disagree, however, on the appropriate remedy.

The State maintains that CrR 7.8 required the superior court to transfer the motion to this court as a personal restraint petition (PRP),1 and that "the most expeditious relief would be for this Court to convert this appeal to a personal restraint petition and dismiss it" as untimely. Resp't's Br. at 3. James contends the appeal should not be converted to a PRP "at this stage" because doing so "could infringe [his] right to choose whether he wants to pursue a future PRP in the Supreme Court." Appellant's Br. at 4. James correctly points out that, under the abuse of the writ doctrine, review in the Supreme Court is foreclosed "if the petitioner was represented by counsel throughout postconviction proceedings." In re Jeffries, 114 Wn.2d 485, 492, 789 P.2d 731 (1990). Because he has appointed counsel in this appeal, James contends converting the appeal to a personal restraint petition would foreclose future review in the Supreme Court.

But James has not been represented by counsel "throughout" his prior and current postconviction proceedings. James was not represented by counsel in several previous personal restraint petitions. Nor was he represented by counsel below. Accordingly, converting this appeal to a personal restraint petition will not jeopardize his ability to bring future personal restraint petitions before the State Supreme Court. See In re Stoudmire, 141 Wn.2d 342, 352, 5 P.3d 1240 (2000) (no abuse of the writ where petitioner, though represented by counsel in his first PRP, was not represented by counsel in his second PRP); In re Perkins, 143 Wn.2d 261, 265 n.5, 19 P.3d 1027 (2001).2

Treating the appeal as a PRP, we conclude it is time barred. A petition filed more than one year after a final judgment and sentence is time barred so long as the judgment and sentence is valid on its face. RCW 10.73.090(1). Contrary to James's assertions, the face of the judgment and sentence correctly lists his offender score as 11. The judgment recites a criminal history of four prior nonviolent adult convictions (which count one point each), three prior nonviolent juvenile adjudications (one half point each), one prior violent juvenile adjudication (two points), and two violent current offenses (two points each), for a total of 11 and one half points. See Former RCW 9.94A.360 (1992). James's petition is therefore time barred.

The petition must also be dismissed because it is successive and James has not shown good cause why his offender score argument was not raised in his prior petitions. RCW 10.73.140; In re Turay, 150 Wn.2d 71, 87, 74 P.3d 1194 (2003).

For the reasons set forth above, we convert the appeal to a personal restraint petition and dismiss the petition as untimely and successive.

BECKER ELLINGTON, JJ., concur.