UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Dwyer, C.J.

A criminal defendant's constitutional right to present a defense does not extend to irrelevant or inadmissible evidence. Because evidence of the victim's prior drug use in this rape and robbery prosecution was inadmissible, marginally relevant, and highly prejudicial, we conclude that its exclusion did not violate the defendant's right to present a defense. We further conclude that the court's instructions regarding consent were consistent with established case law and that the prosecutor's questions regarding the defendant's postarrest statements were proper. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

Based on allegations that Mohamed Hassan Mohamed forcibly raped D.T., took her car keys, and drove away in her car, the State charged him with first degree rape and first degree robbery. Prior to trial, the parties agreed that if, as anticipated, the defense put on evidence that D.T. engaged in consensual sex in exchange for drugs, D.T. could be examined regarding her alleged drug use on the evening in question. The court ruled, however, that the defense could not inquire into D.T.'s prior drug use or drug history.

At trial, D.T. testified that around 11:00 p.m. on July 15, 2008, she was sitting in her white Honda at a stop sign when Mohamed suddenly reached through an open window and entered her car. He then pulled her hair, placed something sharp against her neck, and gave her directions to a cul-de-sac adjacent to Crystal Springs Park. Once there, he walked her into the park and raped her. He then took her keys and drove away in her car. D.T. later identified Mohamed in a lineup.

During cross-examination, the defense requested a sidebar. Defense counsel sought permission to ask D.T. if she was either an addict or a recovering addict on the evening in question. Counsel pointed out that there was evidence that D.T. had previously had problems with heroin and cocaine. The prosecutor conceded that "D.T. is a recovering addict for drugs." He argued, however, that evidence of D.T.'s drug history was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. The court adhered to its pretrial ruling. D.T. subsequently denied using or attempting to buy drugs on the evening in question.

Patty Reed corroborated parts of D.T.'s testimony. She testified that on July 15, 2008, she saw a white Honda parked outside her home, which is located next to Crystal Springs Park. She watched as a woman wearing a dress walked into the park with a man. Half an hour later, she noticed the white Honda was gone. A woman wearing a dress then walked up to Reed's house crying, "Please, help me, I've been raped." Reed called the police.

When police arrived, D.T. was hysterical. Her face was covered in blood and her dress was disheveled. She said she had been beaten and raped in the park and that the rapist had stolen her white Honda. D.T. had a fractured tooth, swelling and bruising around her right eye, an orbital fracture, abrasions on her elbows, knees, chest and back, and superficial scratches on her neck. A tampon had been forced so deep into her vagina that it had to be removed with forceps.

Around 2:00 a.m. the next morning, a King County Sheriff's officer spotted and stopped D.T.'s car. Mohamed ran from the car but was apprehended and arrested. Mohamed told police that a friend gave him the car at the Silver Dollar Casino and told him that it was stolen. Surveillance video from the Silver Dollar Casino showed Mohamed driving up to the casino entrance in D.T.'s car at 12:54 a.m. He entered the casino and then drove away at 1:19 a.m. with another male in the car.

A Tukwila Police Department detective interviewed Mohamed around 6:00 a.m. Mohamed said he had been with a friend the night before. His friend's car was towed, so he took a bus to the Silver Dollar Casino and asked another friend for a ride home. That friend said he had a stolen car that Mohamed could take home. Mohamed took the stolen car and was eventually stopped by police. He denied having a woman in the car and denied having sex with anyone that night.

Mohamed testified that D.T. drove up to him on the evening in question and asked where she could buy drugs. He got into the car and directed D.T. to an apartment complex where he obtained crack cocaine. D.T. said she had no money but had friends at a nearby park who could pay him. They then drove to Crystal Springs Park. D.T. smoked some cocaine and eventually offered to give Mohamed sex instead of money. Mohamed agreed and had sex with D.T. in the car.

When Mohamed asked D.T. to take him home, she said she first needed more cocaine. Mohamed gave her some, but D.T. said the amount was too small and began punching him. Mohamed admitted hitting her back, but said he only hit her once. He eventually got back in the car, saw the keys, and decided to take the car because D.T. had lied to him and reneged on her promise to take him home.

Mohamed denied forcing D.T. to have sex. He claimed D.T.'s injuries must have occurred when she tried to stop the car as he drove away. He denied running from the police and denied making various statements attributed to him by police.

Three other witnesses testified for the defense. Mustafa Abshir, who admitted having convictions for crimes of dishonesty, testified that he was with Mohamed when a woman pulled up and asked him where she could get drugs. According to Abshir, Mohamed told the woman he knew where she could get some drugs and got into her car.

On cross-examination, Abshir admitted that Mohamed had recently called him from jail. In that conversation, which was recorded and translated by a Somali translator,1Mohamed indicated he needed to find Jamaal Mohamed to testify at trial. When Abshir said he had been unable to find Jamaal, Mohamed said he needed a witness who was there that night. According to the translator,2 Abshir said, "Why didn't you call on me, man?" Mohamed responded, "Okay. Why don't you yourself come for me and then say that you were there that night. You were there. I saw you." Abshir said, "Yes, I was there, I was there" but then asked, "What happened there? I don't remember." Mohamed told him, "It was a woman picked me up. She asked me for [cocaine.]" Mohamed proceeded to describe D.T.'s version of the events. He then coached Abshir as to what was "needed" from his witness:

Kulmiye Kulmiye testified that on July 15, 2008, he saw Mohamed talking to a friend and moments later saw him inside a white car. He admitted visiting Mohamed in jail but denied that they talked about the case.

Jamaal Mohamed testified that he also saw Mohamed riding in a white car that night. A "white lady" was driving the car. According to Jamaal, Mohamed was yelling to him and waving as he went by. Jamaal admitted on cross-examination that he was a friend of Mohamed's, that they often played basketball together at Crystal Springs Park, and that they both knew the park well.

The jury convicted Mohamed as charged. He appeals.

II

Mohamed first contends the court violated his right to present a defense when it precluded his counsel from questioning D.T. about her prior drug use . A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense, but the right does not extend to irrelevant or inadmissible evidence. State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010) (irrelevant evidence); State v. Aguirre, 168 Wn.2d 350, 362-63, 229 P.3d 669 (2010) (inadmissible evidence); State v. Mee Hui Kim, 134 Wn.App. 27, 41, 139 P.3d 354 (2006) (defendant has a right to present a defense "`consisting of relevant evidence that is not otherwise inadmissible'" (quoting State v. Rehak, 67 Wn.App. 157, 162, 834 P.2d 651 (1992))). If the defendant's evidence is relevant and admissible, then it is the State's burden to demonstrate that "the evidence is so prejudicial as to disrupt the fairness of the fact-finding process at trial." State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 622, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002). We review an alleged denial of the right to present a defense de novo. State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 719, 230 P.3d 576 (2010).

Citing State v. Jones, Mohamed contends evidence of D.T.'s prior drug use should have been admitted because it went to the heart of his defense on the rape charge—i.e., that D.T. consented to sex in exchange for drugs. He argues that, like the evidence at issue in Jones, the evidence of D.T.'s prior drug use was not only relevant, "it was [his] `entire defense.'" Appellant's Reply Br. at 1 (quoting State v. Jones). We disagree.

In Jones, the trial court excluded evidence that the victim in a rape prosecution consented to sex during a drug-induced sex party. In holding that this ruling violated Jones's right to present a defense, the court noted that the evidence was "not marginally relevant evidence that a court should balance against the State's interest in excluding the evidence." Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 721. Rather, it was "evidence of extremely high probative value" concerning the night in question, and excluding it would have precluded Jones from presenting his version of the incident. Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 721. The court concluded there was no State interest compelling enough to preclude introduction of such evidence and that excluding it violated Jones's right to present a defense. Jones, 168 Wn.2d at 721.

By contrast, D.T.'s past drug use, the recency of which was unknown, was at best only marginally relevant to whether she used or sought drugs on July 15, 2008. Moreover, it was not part of Mohamed's version of the incident, was inadmissible for its only relevant purpose—i.e., to argue that D.T. had acted in conformity with her prior behavior—and was highly prejudicial. ER 404(b); State v. Renneberg, 83 Wn.2d 735, 737, 522 P.2d 835 (1974) (evidence of drug use on other occasions, or of drug addiction, is generally inadmissible due to its prejudicial nature); State v. Tigano, 63 Wn.App. 336, 344-45, 818 P.2d 1369 (1991) (citing Renneberg, 83 Wn.2d at 737); State v. LeFever, 102 Wn.2d 777, 783, 690 P.2d 574 1984) (noting that evidence of narcotics addiction can have a significant impact on a jury of laymen). Finally, the State has strong interests in preventing inadmissible evidence of little probative worth from distracting and inflaming a jury, see Darden, 145 Wn.2d at 620-23, and in assuring that witnesses who come forward will not be discouraged from testifying because prior misconduct may be revealed. State v. Barnes, 54 Wn.App. 536, 539, 774 P.2d 547 (1989). In these circumstances, the court's ruling did not violate Mohamed's right to present a defense. See State v. Sublett, 156 Wn.App. 160, 197-99, 231 P.3d 231 (2010) (because evidence was neither relevant nor admissible, trial court properly excluded it and did not violate defendant's right to present a defense); State v. Thomas, 123 Wn.App. 771, 778-81, 98 P.3d 1258 (2004) (exclusion of inadmissible expert testimony did not violate right to present a defense); State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 18, 659 P.2d 514 (1983) (exclusion of evidence of past general promiscuity of rape victim did not deny defendant his right to present a defense because it was minimally relevant, had little or no probative value, was not part of the defendant's version of the incident, and was highly prejudicial).3

Mohamed next contends the court's instructions on the rape count shifted the burden of proof because they required the State to prove forcible compulsion, but required him to prove consent. He concedes this contention is at odds with State v. Camara, 113 Wn.2d 631, 781 P.2d 483 (1989), but argues that Camara rests on a flawed reading of United States Supreme Court precedent and is contrary to principles of due process. Our Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge to Camara in State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 801-04, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). Therefore, Mohamed's challenge to the instructions in this case fails.

Finally, Mohamed contends that the prosecutor commented on his postarrest silence and denied him a fair trial when he asked a detective witness whether Mohamed mentioned D.T.'s drug use on the evening in question. The State correctly points out, however, that Mohamed did not remain silent. Rather, he made two statements to police following Miranda4 warnings. When a defendant waives his right to remain silent and chooses to speak with police, "the state may comment on what he does not say." State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 765, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001). In particular, the prosecutor may draw attention "to the fact that a story told at trial was omitted from that statement." State v. Silva, 119 Wn.App. 422, 429, 81 P.3d 889 (2003).

Here, defense counsel questioned D.T. about her drug use on the evening in question and elicited testimony that emergency room personnel did not request toxicology tests on D.T.'s urine sample.5 The prosecutor subsequently asked the detective whether D.T.'s or Mohamed's statements referenced any drug use by D.T. on the evening in question. The detective testified that he had heard no mention of D.T.'s drug use until several days before trial. Given Mohamed's postarrest statements and defense counsel's pursuit of the drug use theory, the prosecutor's questions concerning Mohamed's statements were not an impermissible comment on postarrest silence.

Affirmed.

SPEARMAN, and GROSSE, JJ., concur.