Sweeney, J.
An employer has an affirmative obligation to accommodate an employee's disabilities. But the employee must show that any disability interferes with his ability to do his job. That showing is missing here, so we conclude that the employee's complaint should have been dismissed on the employer's motion for summary judgment.
Wellpinit School District No. 49 (School District) hired John Hale as an instructional assistant in February 2002 to help with the computer system at Wellpinit High School. In May 2002, Mr. Hale transferred to the district's satellite school (Alliance School) in White Swan, Washington. He resigned in February 2003 because some relationships at work aggravated his pre-existing anxiety and depression disorders. His supervisor at Wellpinit High School was Magne Kristiansen. Mr. Hale claimed that Mr. Kristiansen aggravated his depression and anxiety when he refused to share administrator passwords or information about the district's computer operating system and made statements and acted in ways that implied Mr. Hale was ignorant.
On August 25, 2002, Mr. Hale notified the school district superintendent, Reid Riedlinger, that working with Mr. Kristiansen made him nauseas, gave him stomachaches, and caused him to lose sleep. He told Superintendent Riedlinger that he was going to see a doctor "to get something for the nausea and pain." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 117. He asked to discuss the problem with Superintendent Riedlinger and said he believed that "a respectful meeting could be set up to resolve the issues." CP at 117.
Phyllis Magden was Mr. Hale's supervisor at the Alliance School. By November 2002, Mr. Hale believed Ms. Magden had become abusive and hostile because she made him do menial administrative tasks rather than allow him to teach. On January 3, 2003, Mr. Hale wrote to the Wellpinit school board "because Mr. Riedlinger ha[d] not responded to [his] previous efforts to discuss what [he] thinks is abusive treatment by Wellpinit staff and working conditions that have resulted in severe medical problems for [him]." CP at 119. Mr. Hale asked that the board "send someone with the authority necessary to investigate and assess" the mistreatment and other problems. CP at 119. He attached a note from his doctor, Robert Wigert, MD. That note confirmed that Mr. Hale's relationships with his supervisors were aggravating his depression and anxiety:
CP at 121. Mr. Hale sent a copy of this letter and the doctor's note to Superintendent Riedlinger.
Superintendent Riedlinger talked to Mr. Hale about his letter. Mr. Hale told the superintendent that Ms. Magden had treated him badly and that the poor treatment aggravated his anxiety disorder. The superintendent believed he told Ms. Magden and Mr. Kristiansen about Mr. Hale's health issues. But he could not recall doing anything else to address Mr. Hale's concern.
On February 23, Mr. Hale sent Superintendent Riedlinger a letter of resignation. The letter states that "Ms. Magden continues to slander me" and that "the working conditions at Wellpinit Alliance High School have become so unprofessional and unfair to me and the students, that I am forced to resign in order to protect myself from further disability." CP at 123. Mr. Hale attached another note from Dr. Wigert to his resignation letter:
CP at 276.
In 2006, Mr. Hale sued the School District for discrimination for failing to accommodate a disability. He also asserted but later voluntarily dismissed causes of action for breach of contract and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The School District moved for summary judgment. The court concluded that Mr. Hale was not disabled and dismissed his suit. Mr. Hale moved for reconsideration based on a new (April 2007) statutory definition of "disability" in Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW. He argued that the new definition of "disability" superseded the earlier common law definition and applied retroactively, controlling the outcome here.
The trial court concluded that the legislature's action violated the separation of powers doctrine because it reversed the judicial definition of the term "disability," and the court denied Mr. Hale's motion for reconsideration. Mr. Hale petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review. The Supreme Court accepted review, concluded there was no violation of the separation of powers doctrine, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Hale v. Wellpinit Sch. Dist. No. 49, 165 Wn.2d 494, 510, 198 P.3d 1021 (2009).
On remand, the School District again moved for summary dismissal of Mr. Hale's disability discrimination claim. This time the School District argued that Mr. Hale did not have a "disability" as the legislature defined it in the WLAD. It argued that he had a personality conflict, which was not a disability. Alternatively, the School District argued that it did not have a duty to accommodate Mr. Hale in the event that he did have a "disability." Mr. Hale moved for summary judgment on the disability issue.
Mr. Hale also moved to strike evidence of statements he had made to government agencies when applying for disability and unemployment benefits. Mr. Hale had told the Employment Security Department that he quit his job because of "unreasonable and unhealthy working conditions" and that he was able to do any type of work "with reasonable management." CP at 144-45. Mr. Hale had informed the Division of Disability Determination Services that he could follow instructions and finish what he starts but that "authority figure[s] make [him] sick very quickly" and that he had lost his job because of problems with his superiors. CP at 151. He had also suggested that, because of his illness, he could no longer work under normal workplace conditions.
The trial court entered one order denying all the motions. Both parties moved for and this court granted discretionary review. No one moved to modify that ruling.
Discretionary review is an extraordinary procedure that should be granted in only extraordinary cases. See Right-Price Recreation LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 146 Wn.2d 370, 380, 46 P.3d 789 (2002). The parties here petitioned for discretionary review pursuant to RAP 2.3(b)(4), which provides that "discretionary review may be accepted . . . [if] all the parties to the litigation have stipulated[] that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that immediate review of the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." The operative word here is "may." We have discretion whether to review a case piecemeal.
Discretionary review might not have been proper here. Ultimately, we are a court that reviews primarily finished litigation proceedings to which at least one of the parties assigns error. This case involves an incomplete, not a finished, proceeding. The court of appeals generally avoids periodically checking in to confirm that a case in the trial court is error free so far. That is because any number of things, aside from this court's opinion, could resolve a case like this. The trial judge here, for example, could have revisited his summary judgment rulings after opening statements, or after the plaintiff rested, or at the end of the case. The lawyers and their clients could have decided to settle the case at any stage of the proceedings, including now. That process did not play out here because we granted discretionary review. That said, this case has now been pending in this court for over a year. So we have concluded that we should exercise our discretion and address the substantive issues raised. RAP 12.2.
Mr. Hale first contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to strike statements he made to two government agencies after he quit his job. He argued that the statements were irrelevant and prejudicial. We review de novo the court's rulings on evidence when those rulings are part of a summary judgment proceeding. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998).
Evidence is relevant if it makes the existence of any material fact more or less likely. ER 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible but may be excluded if it is more prejudicial than probative. ER 402; ER 403.
Mr. Hale's statements to the government agencies were relevant to whether Mr. Hale qualified for accommodation (i.e., whether the School District had a duty to accommodate him). To qualify for reasonable accommodation, Mr. Hale had to show, among other things, that his impairment substantially limited or was likely to substantially limit his ability to perform his job. RCW 49.60.040(7)(d). His statements to the government agencies concern whether and to what extent his health problems affected his ability to work. They amount to admissions that Mr. Hale's illnesses did not affect his ability to work. So, of course, they do not help him. But those statements are relevant to factual issues before the court and are, therefore, admissible. ER 801(d)(2). The trial court, then, appropriately considered this evidence.
We review an order denying a motion for summary judgment de novo. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 860, 93 P.3d 108 (2004). "Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hisle, 151 Wn.2d at 861 (citing CR 56(c)). It is proper where the evidence leads to only one conclusion. Townsend v. Walla Walla Sch. Dist., 147 Wn.App. 620, 624, 196 P.3d 748 (2008). To avoid summary dismissal, the nonmoving party must offer specific, detailed evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. Sanders v. Woods, 121 Wn.App. 593, 600, 89 P.3d 312 (2004). Argumentative assertions and unsupported conclusory allegations will not defeat summary judgment. Id.
Mr. Hale contends that evidence of his depression and anxiety disorder show he has a disability — as a matter of law. The School District responds that the disability Mr. Hale claims is not a disability; it is, instead, a personality conflict. Alternatively, the School District argues that it had no duty to accommodate any disability that Mr. Hale might have had because the only possible accommodation was changing supervisors or perhaps telling those supervisors to do things differently and the District is legally obligated to do neither.
An employer may not discriminate based on an employee's sensory, mental, or physical disability. RCW 49.60.180(3). The employer has a duty to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability unless the accommodation causes the employer undue hardship. Hines v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 127 Wn.App. 356, 373, 112 P.3d 522 (2005). Under WLAD, a disabled employee has a cause of action against an employer who fails to reasonably accommodate that disability. Id. at 370.
Accommodation claims present two essential questions. Wilson v. Wenatchee Sch. Dist., 110 Wn.App. 265, 269-70, 40 P.3d 686 (2002). The first is whether the employee has a disability under the WLAD. Id. at 269. And the second is whether the employer has a duty to reasonably accommodate the disability and, if so, whether it has satisfied its duty. Id. at 269-70.
The School District claims that Mr. Hale does not have a disability because he has neither shown that his problems substantially limited his job performance, nor is it reasonably likely that any impairment had a substantially limiting effect and would be aggravated by continuing to work without accommodation. But this is not the test for disability. Final Bill Rep. on S.S.B. 5340, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007). WLAD spells out the definition of disability.
A "disability" is an abnormal sensory, mental, or physical impairment that (1) is medically recognized or diagnosable, (2) exists as a record or history, or (3) is perceived by the employer to exist, whether or not it exists in fact. RCW 49.60.040(7)(a). An impairment includes any mental disorder or emotional or mental illness. RCW 49.60.040(7)(c)(i)-(ii). "A disability exists . . . whether or not it limits the ability to work generally or work at a particular job." RCW 49.60.040(7)(b).
The School District insists, nonetheless, that Mr. Hale's complaints amount to a personality conflict, which the District says is not a disability under the WLAD. It relies on Snyder v. Medical Service Corp. of Eastern Washington for support. 145 Wn.2d 233, 241, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001), aff'g, 98 Wn.App. 315, 988 P.2d 1023 (1999). The issue in Snyder, however, was not whether the employee there had a disability. It was whether the employer had a duty to accommodate the employee's disability. Indeed, the Supreme Court said, "[I]f Snyder can perform the job, then she has no disability requiring accommodation simply because she has a personality conflict with her supervisor." Snyder, 145 Wn.2d at 241; accord Snyder, 98 Wn. App. at 326. The Court of Appeals' decision in Snyder (which the Supreme Court affirmed) did question whether Ms. Snyder's post traumatic stress disorder was a disability and cited several cases that suggested it was not. Snyder, 98 Wn. App. at 326 n.1 (citing Christiano v. Spokane County Health Dist., 93 Wn.App. 90, 93-94, 969 P.2d 1078 (1998); Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998); Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1997); Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1996)). But Snyder and all the cases it cited predate the applicable statutory definition of disability. And, unlike federal law, under Washington law, "[a] disability exists . . . whether or not it limits the ability to work generally or work at a particular job." RCW 49.60.040(7)(b).
Mr. Hale has been diagnosed with mental impairments — depression and an anxiety disorder. Those impairments are medically recognized, they have been diagnosed, and, according to Dr. Wigert's first note, they exist as a record or history. As a matter of law, then, Mr. Hale has a disability regardless of whether the disability limited his job performance.
The presence of a disability alone does not qualify an employee for accommodation. An employer's duty to accommodate is not triggered until the employer is aware of the employee's disability and physical limitations. Goodman v. Boeing Co., 127 Wn.2d 401, 408, 899 P.2d 1265 (1995). Once the duty arises, the employer must take "those steps reasonably necessary to enable the employee to perform his . . . job." Snyder, 98 Wn. App. at 326. So, to qualify for reasonable accommodation, the employee's impairment must be known to the employer or shown to exist in fact and (1) the impairment must substantially limit the employee's ability to perform his job; or (2) "medical documentation must establish a reasonable likelihood that engaging in job functions without an accommodation would aggravate the impairment to the extent that it would create a substantially limiting effect." RCW 49.60.040(7)(d)(i)-(ii).
Here, the School District knew that Mr. Hale had depression and anxiety as early as Mr. Hale's hire date. And Dr. Wigert's first note, attached to Mr. Hale's January 2003 letter to the school board, notified the School District that Mr. Hale was impaired. The next question, then, is whether Mr. Hale's impairments substantially limited his ability to do his job.
Mr. Hale argues that his August 2002 letter to Superintendent Riedlinger and his doctor's notes show his impairments substantially limited his ability to work. We disagree. The evidence shows only that his job affected his health. The August letter describes how his relationship with his supervisor made him physically ill. The doctor's first note explains Mr. Hale "suffers from anxiety disorder and depression" and explains that these conditions had gotten worse and required more medication because of difficulties with his supervisor. CP at 121. The other note states that Mr. Hale was quitting his job because "the job situation is worsening his health." CP at 276.
These letters do not show that Mr. Hale's anxiety and depression substantially limited his ability to perform job functions, like teach classes, assist with computer software issues, or perform administrative tasks. Again, they show only that the problems he had with supervisors aggravated his disabilities. In fact, Mr. Hale said, "My symptoms weren't intolerable[;] the hostility that Mr. Kristiansen approached me with was what was intolerable." CP at 133. He added that the way Superintendent Riedlinger and Ms. Magden treated him was also intolerable. And, although he suggested, in conclusory fashion, in his application for disability benefits that he could no longer work under normal workplace conditions, he unequivocally stated in his application for unemployment that his problems did not limit his ability to work. In short, there is no showing that Mr. Hale's impairments substantially limited his ability to perform any specific job function.
Moreover, no medical documentation establishes a reasonable likelihood that engaging in job functions without an accommodation would aggravate Mr. Hale's disabilities to the extent that it would create a substantially limiting effect. Dr. Wigert's two notes are the only medical documents in this record. Neither indicates how, to what extent, or whether Mr. Hale's impairments limited his ability to perform his job functions. Nor do the notes suggest that accommodation was necessary or warn that, without accommodation, continued work likely would aggravate the impairments and thereby substantially limit Mr. Hale's ability to do his job in some way. Dr. Wigert's notes say only that Mr. Hale's problems with supervisors aggravated his disabilities, which led him to quit his job.
Mr. Hale's accommodation claim, then, fails because there is no evidence that his depression and anxiety disorder substantially limited, or was likely to substantially limit, his ability to do his job. Therefore, the School District's duty to provide reasonable accommodation never arose. And the trial court should have dismissed Mr. Hale's discrimination claim on summary judgment.
We reverse the denial of the School District's motion for summary judgment.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
KULIK, C.J., and KORSMO, J., concur.
