SCHINDLER, J.

¶ 1 Bruce Pleasant sued Regence BlueShield alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW, for denying coverage for nonrehabilitative services and medications he received during inpatient rehabilitation and for a mechanical embolectomy procedure. On cross motions for summary judgment, the court dismissed the lawsuit against Regence. We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Bruce Pleasant had an individual health care plan with Regence BlueShield in 2010. The health care plan was approved by the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner.1

¶ 3 On March 18, 2010, 50-year-old Pleasant suffered a stroke while undergoing knee surgery at Stevens Hospital. Pleasant was transported to Swedish Medical Center and admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU). The doctors performed a number of medical procedures including a mechanical embolectomy.2

¶ 4 On March 22, Pleasant's relative, Bob Quigley, called Regence to ask about rehabilitation coverage. Regence informed Quigley that the health care plan had a "$4,000 per calendar year maximum" for inpatient rehabilitation. The transcript of the phone call between Quigley and Regence customer service representative Shannon Grim states, in pertinent part:

¶ 5 On March 24, the family met with a care manager at Swedish Medical Center. The family told the care manager they were interested in the Acute Rehabilitation Unit (ARU) at Swedish where an inpatient receives "three hours of therapy a day, seven days a week." The care manager reiterated that the health care plan had a $4,000 limit for inpatient rehabilitation and discussed other options. But the family told the care manager they were "only interested in ARU at this time" and "may be willing to pay privately for ARU." The care manager suggested the family meet with ARU admission coordinator Meghan Trigg. The March 24 medical records state, in pertinent part:

¶ 6 When Trigg met with the family to discuss inpatient rehabilitation, she also reiterated the Regence health care plan had a $4,000 limit and gave the family a benefits form. The benefits form states for "stay on the inpatient rehabilitation unit are: Covered at 80%. Limit $4000 per 12 months." Trigg discussed a number of other options with the family including using the benefit for a 30-day stay at a skilled nursing facility.3 The March 24 medical records state, in pertinent part:

¶ 7 On March 25, one of the treating doctors, Dr. David Clawson, met with Pleasant and his family to discuss rehabilitation. Dr. Clawson recommended Pleasant use skilled nursing care and "reevaluate his progress in a month" before considering "bring[ing] him onto an acute rehabilitation service." The medical records state, in pertinent part:

¶ 8 Pleasant decided to use the skilled nursing benefit before using the limited rehabilitation benefit and "then pay privately at ARU when ARU benefit has been exhausted." The medical records for March 30 state, in pertinent part:

¶ 9 On April 5, Swedish discharged Pleasant to an inpatient skilled nursing facility, The Springs at Pacific Regent. Thirty days later, on May 5, the ARU admitted Pleasant as an inpatient for "rehabilitation." The ARU provides intensive rehabilitation therapy only to patients who are medically stable.

¶ 10 The medical records for May 5 state the inpatient ARU admission for Pleasant is "Physician Referral (Non-health Care Facility Point of Origin)," and the "Reason for Admission" is "for rehabilitation." The "Admission Type" is "Elective," the "Primary Service" is identified as "Rehab," and the "Secondary Service" is listed as "None." Pleasant left the ARU on May 31.

¶ 11 Regence paid approximately $250,000 for the inpatient hospital care Pleasant received at Swedish from March 18 until his discharge on April 5. Regence also paid for the one month of inpatient skilled nursing care at The Springs at Pacific Regent.

¶ 12 Under the terms of the health care plan, Regence paid only $4,000 for the rehabilitation expenses incurred while Pleasant was an inpatient at the ARU. Pleasant incurred approximately $138,000 in medical expenses while a rehabilitative inpatient at the ARU — approximately $95,000 for rehabilitation and physical, occupational, and speech therapy, $25,600 for medications, and the remaining $17,400 for medical and surgical supplies and devices and laboratory tests.

¶ 13 Regence did not pay $415 for the mechanical embolectomy procedure. On July 8, 2010, Regence sent Pleasant a letter concerning denial of coverage for the mechanical embolectomy. Regence explained that under the "`Regence Medical Policy Mechanical Embolectomy for Treatment of Acute Stroke" (Medical Policy), the procedure was excluded as "investigational" and provided a link to the Medical Policy posted on its website. The Medical Policy states, in pertinent part:

¶ 14 On February 9, 2011, Pleasant filed a lawsuit against Regence alleging breach of contract, bad faith, and violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW, for refusing to pay for services and drugs he received while an inpatient at the ARU.

¶ 15 Pleasant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing he was entitled to payment for the medically necessary services and medications he received while a rehabilitative inpatient at the ARU. Pleasant relied on the provision of his health care plan that states when confined as an inpatient at a hospital, "[b]enefits will be provided for services and supplies ... determined to be Medically Necessary." Pleasant also submitted the declaration of Dr. Clawson. Dr. Clawson states that Pleasant received "medically necessary" care while at the ARU. The declaration states, in pertinent part:

¶ 16 Regence filed a cross motion for summary judgment. Regence argued there was no dispute Pleasant was admitted to the ARU as an inpatient for rehabilitation and the health care plan expressly limited coverage for inpatient rehabilitation to $4,000.

¶ 17 In opposition, Pleasant argued there was a material issue of fact about whether Regence properly informed him of all of the benefit options under the plan. Pleasant also argued that Regence never produced evidence supporting denial of coverage for the mechanical embolectomy as an experimental or investigational procedure.

¶ 18 Regence moved to strike the claim that it improperly denied coverage for the mechanical embolectomy. Regence pointed out Pleasant raised the argument that the insurance policy covered the mechanical embolectomy procedure for the first time in opposition to summary judgment.

¶ 19 The court granted Regence's motion for summary judgment in part. The court ruled that under the terms of the health care plan, Pleasant was entitled to reimbursement of only $4,000 for inpatient rehabilitation at the ARU. The court also dismissed the claim that Regence did not fully inform Pleasant of his benefits and options under the health care contract. However, the court denied summary judgment on whether Regence properly denied coverage for the mechanical embolectomy. The "Order Granting In Part Regence's Motion for Summary Judgment" states, in pertinent part:

¶ 20 Approximately two months later, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on whether Pleasant was entitled to payment of $415 for the mechanical embolectomy procedure. Pleasant argued the exclusion for an experimental or investigational procedure did not apply to the mechanical embolectomy. Regence argued the mechanical embolectomy procedure was investigational. In support, Regence submitted the declaration of Regence Medical Director Dr. Richard Rainey, the Medical Policy, and the medical studies and literature it relied on in determining the procedure was investigational. Dr. Rainey states that Regence periodically reviews and updates the Medical Policy on mechanical embolectomy "based on research, studies, medical literature, peer review publications, or other events occurring since the last review and update."

¶ 21 Pleasant moved to strike the Medical Policy, the medical studies and literature, and the declaration of Dr. Rainey. Pleasant argued Regence had not previously produced the Medical Policy and the medical literature or identified Dr. Rainey as a witness. In response, Regence asserted the Medical Policy was provided to Pleasant before he filed the lawsuit, and the medical studies and literature were produced in compliance with the court order extending the date to respond to discovery. Regence also asserted that the disclosure of possible primary witnesses reserved the right to include Dr. Rainey as a witness.

¶ 22 At the beginning of the hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment, the court denied Pleasant's request to exclude the Medical Policy, the medical studies and literature, and Dr. Rainey's declaration. The court granted Regence's motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim that Regence improperly denied coverage for the mechanical embolectomy procedure as well as "all remaining claims in this case ... with prejudice."

ANALYSIS

¶ 23 Pleasant contends the court erred in ruling the health care plan excludes coverage for medically necessary services and the medications he received while an inpatient at the ARU and the mechanical embolectomy procedure.5

¶ 24 We review summary judgment de novo. Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co., 150 Wn.2d 478, 483, 78 P.3d 1274 (2003). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). By filing cross motions for summary judgment, the parties concede there were no material issues of fact. Tiger Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Licensing, 88 Wn.App. 925, 930, 946 P.2d 1235 (1997).

¶ 25 Interpretation of an insurance contract is also a question of law that we review de novo. Overton v. Consol. Ins. Co., 145 Wn.2d 417, 424, 38 P.3d 322 (2002); Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 154 Wn.2d 165, 171, 110 P.3d 733 (2005). Because insurance policies are contracts, the principles of contract interpretation apply. Quadrant, 154 Wash.2d at 171, 110 P.3d 733. If the language in an insurance contract is not ambiguous, the court must enforce it as written and may not modify the contract or create an ambiguity where none exists. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, 134 Wn.2d 713, 721, 952 P.2d 157 (1998). A provision is ambiguous if, on its face, it is fairly susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Quadrant, 154 Wash.2d at 171, 110 P.3d 733.

¶ 26 The party seeking to establish coverage bears the initial burden of proving coverage under the policy has been triggered. Diamaco, Inc. v. Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co., 97 Wn.App. 335, 337, 983 P.2d 707 (1999). The insurer bears the burden of establishing an exclusion to coverage. Diamaco, 97 Wash.App. at 337, 983 P.2d 707. We construe any ambiguity in an exclusion against the insurer. McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 119 Wn.2d 724, 733, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992).

Inpatient Rehabilitation

¶ 27 Pleasant contends the policy covers all medically necessary nonrehabilitative expenses he incurred while an inpatient at the ARU at Swedish, including x-rays, blood draws, laboratory work, and medications. Regence argues the health care contract expressly limits the benefit Pleasant is entitled to receive as an inpatient admitted for rehabilitation. We agree.

¶ 28 The Regence individual health care plan provides benefits subject to specific limitations and exclusions. Article 8 defines benefits the insured is entitled to receive. Section 8.2 states Regence agrees to provide benefits for medically necessary services "subject to all limitations, exclusions, and provisions of this Contract."6

¶ 29 The "Limitations and Exclusions" section excludes treatment for rehabilitative care "including speech therapy, physical therapy, or occupational therapy, except as specified in the ... Rehabilitative Benefits of Article 8." Article 6 provides, in pertinent part:

¶ 30 Pleasant relies on Section 8.7, "Hospital... Inpatient Benefits," to argue he is entitled to coverage for all the medical expenses he incurred while at the ARU at Swedish. Section 8.7 states, in pertinent part:

¶ 31 Regence relies on Section 8.29, "Inpatient Rehabilitation," to argue that under the terms of the policy, benefits are limited to $4,000 for the expense incurred while an inpatient at the ARU. Section 8.29 states, in pertinent part:

¶ 32 The unambiguous terms of the health care plan and the undisputed record do not support Pleasant's argument that he was entitled to coverage for nonrehabilitative expenses he incurred while an inpatient at the ARU at Swedish.8 Contrary to Pleasant's argument, coverage under the terms of the Regence health care plan turns on his admission to the ARU for "Inpatient Rehabilitation."

¶ 33 The provision Pleasant relies on, Section 8.7.1, applies only when the Member is "confined" in the hospital as an "Inpatient."9 Section 1.13 defines "Inpatient" as "[a] person confined overnight in a Hospital or other facility as a regularly admitted bed patient to whom a charge for room and board is made in accordance with the Hospital's or facility's standard practice."10 By contrast, Section 1.14 defines an "Inpatient Rehabilitation Admission" as "[a]n inpatient admission to a Company approved facility specifically for the purpose of receiving speech, physical, or occupational therapy in an inpatient setting."

¶ 34 There is no dispute that Pleasant's admission was an inpatient rehabilitation admission. After suffering a stroke on March 18, Pleasant was discharged from Swedish on April 5 to a skilled nursing care facility. On May 5, Pleasant was admitted to the ARU for elective rehabilitation for physical, occupational, and speech therapy, not as a "regularly admitted" hospital inpatient. Neither the medical records nor the declaration of Dr. Clawson suggest that the inpatient admission at the ARU was for any purpose other than rehabilitation. The elective inpatient admission to the ARU was "specifically for the purpose of receiving speech, physical, or occupational therapy in an inpatient setting."11

¶ 35 The two cases Pleasant relies on, Dobias v. Service Life Insurance Co. of Omaha, 238 Neb. 87, 469 N.W.2d 143 (1991), and National Family Care Life Insurance Co. v. Kuykandall, 705 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.App.1986), are distinguishable.

¶ 36 In Dobias, the insured's 18-year-old daughter fractured a vertebra when she was thrown from a truck. The spinal cord injury resulted in paralysis from the waist down and a number of serious complications. Dobias, 469 N.W.2d at 144. The daughter remained at Methodist Hospital in Omaha foils days following surgery. The doctors then transferred her to the rehabilitation center at Immanuel Medical Center to receive "24-hour acute nursing care and treatment for the complications from the spinal cord injury and paralysis." Dobias, 469 N.W.2d at 144.

¶ 37 The health insurance company paid for treatment at Methodist but denied the claim for care at Immanuel on the grounds that the policy did not provide coverage for rehabilitative care. Dobias, 469 N.W.2d at 144. The policy defined "hospital" to mean "`a place which: ... (b) is primarily engaged in providing medical, diagnostic, and major surgical facilities on its own premises ...; (c) has continuous 24-hour nursing services...; [and] (d) has a staff of one or more doctors available at all times.'" Dobias, 469 N.W.2d at 144-45. The health insurance policy also expressly states that "hospital" does not mean "convalescent, nursing, rest, custodial, self-care, educational, or rehabilitative homes or units of hospitals used for such care." Dobias, 469 N.W.2d at 145.

¶ 38 The insureds sued the health insurance company arguing the policy did not unambiguously exclude coverage for the care their daughter received at Immanuel. Dobias, 469 N.W.2d at 145. Following a trial, the court found that the definition of "hospital" excluded coverage for the care the daughter received at Immanuel. Dobias, 469 N.W.2d at 145.

¶ 39 On appeal, the court reversed. The court held that the evidence established the care the daughter received at Immanuel met the criteria for the definition of "hospital." Dobias, 469 N.W.2d at 146. The court concluded, in pertinent part:

Dobias, 469 N.W.2d at 146.

¶ 40 In Kuykandall, the insured was diagnosed with a pulmonary embolus and hospitalized in the ICU. Kuykandall, 705 S.W.2d at 269. After three days, the doctor transferred the insured from the ICU to a community hospital to continue to receive intensive care "in a like environment." Kuykandall, 705 S.W.2d at 269-70. The insurance company denied coverage for medical care the insured received at the community hospital in the coronary care unit (CCU). The health care policy excluded coverage for confinement in a CCU. Unlike an ICU, the policy did not define a CCU. Kuykandall, 705 S.W.2d at 269-70. A jury found the policy covered the expenses incurred at the CCU. Kuykandall, 705 S.W.2d at 269.

¶ 41 On appeal, the court noted the ambiguity in the policy and held that overwhelming evidence supported the jury verdict. Kuykandall, 705 S.W.2d at 270-71. The evidence showed the exclusion for care in a CCU applied only if it did not meet the standards for an ICU; that the intensive care the insured received at the CCU was "`interchangeable'" with the care at the ICU; and based on the diagnosis, the hospital changed the billing to reflect ICU care. Kuykandall, 705 S.W.2d at 270.

¶ 42 Here, unlike in Dobias and Kuykandall, the health care plan is not ambiguous. The health care plan makes a clear distinction between benefits for a hospital inpatient and inpatient rehabilitation. Further, the record establishes that Pleasant was admitted to the ARU after his release from Swedish for treatment of his stroke and 30 days of care at a skilled nursing facility. Patients are admitted to the ARU for rehabilitation only if they are medically stable. The medical records establish his admission to the ARU was a "Physician Referral (Non-health care Facility Point of Origin)" and was "Elective." The "Primary Service" is identified as "Rehab" and the "Secondary Service" as "None."

¶ 43 Pleasant also argues Regence improperly denied coverage for the medications he received while at the ARU. Pleasant relies on Section 6.1.11 to argue he is entitled to coverage for the drugs he received as an inpatient at the ARU. The unambiguous terms of the health care plan do not support his argument. Section 6.1.11 states that the plan covers the cost of drugs "for the Inpatient who is receiving the Benefits ... for that confinement, unless otherwise excluded under this Contract."12

¶ 44 We conclude the court did not err in concluding the health care plan limited the amount Pleasant was entitled to receive for inpatient rehabilitation at the ARU.

Mechanical Embolectomy

¶ 45 Pleasant also claims he is entitled to coverage for the mechanical embolectomy procedure. Pleasant argues Regence failed to meet its burden to show the mechanical embolectomy was an investigational procedure.

¶ 46 Consistent with the Washington Administrative Code (WAC), the individual health care plan addresses whether a procedure is investigational. See WAC 284-44-043(1) ("[e]very health care service contract... must include ... a definition of experimental or investigational" services excluded under contract).13 The WAC also requires the insurer to "establish a reasonable procedure under which denials of benefits or refusals to preauthorize services because of an experimental or investigational exclusion or limitation may be appealed." WAC 284-44-043(4)(a).14

¶ 47 Here, the health care plan excludes coverage for "investigational services or supplies." The health care plan defines "Investigational Service or Supply" and the criteria to determine whether a procedure is "investigational." Section 1.15 states:

¶ 48 Pleasant ignores both the WAC and the language of his individual health care plan. The health care plan complies with WAC 284-44-043 by setting forth the criteria Regence uses to determine whether a procedure is investigational. The Medical Policy describes the studies Regence relied on to determine a mechanical embolectomy used to treat acute stroke is investigational.15 Regence also produced as evidence the medical studies it relied on in making that determination.

¶ 49 In the alternative, Pleasant claims Regence violated the CPA and acted in bad faith by failing to provide any reasonable explanation supporting the basis for denial of the mechanical embolectomy procedure. "[A] reasonable basis for denial of an insured's claim constitutes a complete defense to any claim that the insurer acted in bad faith or in violation of the Consumer Protection Act." Dombrosky v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 84 Wn.App. 245, 260, 928 P.2d 1127 (1996).

¶ 50 Here, Regence sent Pleasant an "Explanation of Benefits" and a follow-up letter explaining why it considered the mechanical embolectomy to be investigational. The July 8, 2010 letter explaining its denial of coverage for the mechanical embolectomy states, in pertinent part:

¶ 51 We conclude Regence complied with the requirements of WAC 284-44-043 and provided a reasonable basis for denial of the claim for the mechanical embolectomy. Reasonable minds could not differ that its denial of coverage was based upon reasonable grounds. Smith, 150 Wash.2d at 486, 78 P.3d 1274.

¶ 52 We affirm summary judgment dismissal of the lawsuit against Regence.

WE CONCUR: SPEARMAN, A.C.J., and DWYER, J.