SCHINDLER, J.

¶ 1 Chad Bruce Olson appeals his conviction of residential burglary in violation of RCW 9A.52.025. Olson claims his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a jury instruction on the defense of abandonment. Because abandonment is not a defense to the crime of residential burglary, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Jane Roberts and her husband lived together in the house they owned in Auburn at 38003 43rd Avenue South for nearly 37 years. Approximately six years after her husband died in "the late '80s," Roberts went to live near her sister in Puyallup. Roberts continued to own the Auburn house and for many years, Roberts hired a yard service to maintain the yard. Roberts kept many of her belongings at the house, as well as in a workshop area inside the carport and in a freestanding, padlocked shed adjacent to the carport. Roberts also kept her black BMW convertible in the carport.

¶ 3 In 2011, Roberts' neighbors Karen Everett and Harvey McClung notified Roberts and called the police to report "kids had been breaking into the house" and a female and a male leaving the house. In late August or early September, McClung called 911 to report seeing a man and a woman drive away in Roberts' BMW.

¶ 4 King County Sheriff Deputy Denny Gulla testified that he responded to the reports of "people breaking into the house, taking property and a car from that house," and "tracked down the owner of the home." In September, Deputy Gulla began to routinely check on Robert's house at least once, if not twice, a day. Deputy Gulla testified, in pertinent part:

¶ 5 On October 11, Deputy Gulla walked around the entire property. Deputy Gulla testified the sliding glass door to the house was closed and locked, the doors to the workshop area were closed and locked, and the doors of the shed were "closed and padlocked."

¶ 6 At around 9:00 a.m. the following morning, next-door neighbor Karen Everett "saw a little silver pickup pulled — or, backed all the way into [Roberts'] roadway. And I saw a gentleman there getting things out and putting things in his truck, and I said, okay, that doesn't look right." Everett called 911.

¶ 7 Shortly after her 911 call, neighbor Harvey McClung called 911 to report someone "unloading stuff out of a shed" and putting it "in a pickup truck [that was] full, from the best [he] could tell." McClung testified that the "backside of our property has a dog pen. And along that dog pen at the backside of the property there was four-foot high pieces of plywood. And you could see the top of a loaded pickup back there. And that's when I figured something's wrong."

¶ 8 Deputy Gulla arrived at the house approximately 10 minutes after the first 911 call. Deputy David Jeffries arrived shortly thereafter. Deputy Gulla and Deputy Jeffries saw a silver pickup truck backed up to the front of the storage shed and a tarp strung up to block the view from the street.

¶ 9 Deputy Gulla and Deputy Jeffries approached a man, later identified as Chad Bruce Olson, while he was "walking from the storage shed, carrying some items" to the pickup truck. The shed doors were open and there was property on the ground near the shed that had not been there the day before. Deputy Gulla said that "[t]here were a lot of things in the truck. The cab of the truck was filled full of various property, and the bed of the truck was nearly overflowing with property." Deputy Jeffries said there was a brass bedframe in the back of the truck. Deputy Gulla testified the brass bedframe had not been outside the day before.

¶ 10 Deputy Gulla testified that the rear sliding door to the house was "open about a foot, and there were some footprints on the inside of the entryway," and the "doorframe to the workshop area — the door had been forced open, and the frame was split and broken." Inside the house, there were "fresh" footprints on the floor in "some type of sticky liquid." Deputy Gulla testified that the sole of the sneakers Olson wore matched the pattern of the footprints on the floor.

¶ 11 Olson said he told Deputy Gulla that he had permission from the owner to remove the property and showed the deputies a handwritten note. The note reads:

¶ 12 According to Deputy Gulla, Olson said that he "met [Roberts] at Dave's bar, which is in [the] Edgewood area, and she asked him to clean up her property, that she wrote him the note, and that she had moved to Mexico." Olson described Roberts "as about 67 years old ... with blonde hair."

¶ 13 After Deputy Gulla contacted Roberts, he arrested Olson. Deputy Gulla said that while he was in the patrol car writing his report, Olson "looked over my shoulder and was reading the [computer] screen. And he... said, oh, she actually lives in Puyallup." Olson also said that "it wasn't a burglary because he never went in the house."

¶ 14 The State charged Olson with residential burglary. At the beginning of trial, the defense attorney stated Olson planned to request jury instructions on the lesser included crimes of burglary in the second degree and criminal trespass.

¶ 15 During the three-day jury trial, the State presented the testimony of Deputy Gulla, Deputy Jeffries, Deputy Neil Woodruff, Roberts, and her neighbors McClung and Everett. The court admitted into evidence the sneakers Olson wore and photographs of the footprints found in the house.

¶ 16 Roberts testified she owns the Auburn house and she kept her belongings in the house and the locked shed. Roberts described going to her house on October 12 with Deputy Woodruff. Roberts said, "Everything was scattered around, and things broken and things missing," and she felt "[d]egraded[,] like my identity had been taken and part of my life gone." Roberts testified that the items in the pickup truck were taken from the shed and her house. Roberts said that she did not give Olson permission to go onto her property or go into the house or shed, or to take any property from the house or shed.

¶ 17 Deputy Woodruff testified when he took Roberts to her house on October 12, she was in "shock" and "had a hard time even standing. She needed me to help her stand. So, I braced her with my arm. She was almost throwing up. She was crying. She was distraught about what she had seen. It was pretty ... moving for her." Deputy Woodruff said that Roberts told him "the brass bedframe had been in the house prior to her last visit."

¶ 18 Olson testified he owns a yard cleanup and recycling business called "Iron House Boys." Olson testified he has a business account with Tacoma Metals for recycling aluminum, copper, brass, nickel, titanium, platinum, and zinc. Olson said that he posted his business card and a flyer at Dave's Restaurant in Milton, Washington.

¶ 19 Olson said that he had permission to remove items from Roberts' property. Olson testified that on September 30, a woman and two other men approached him while he was at Dave's Restaurant and asked him if he was the owner of Iron House Boys. Olson said that "the woman asked me if I could do some yard cleanup for her." Olson said that he asked the woman to write a note authorizing him to clean up the property and take "things I no longer want." Olson testified, in pertinent part:

¶ 20 Olson testified that he asked the woman if there were "any appliances or any metal products and she said, yes, it just needs to be cleaned up, and I said, okay, I'll do it." The court admitted into evidence a copy of the note Olson said that he gave to the officers before his arrest. Olson testified that the woman was "kind of heavyset[,] about 62 years old[,] well-dressed [with] dark hair, kind of curly." But Olson admitted the woman he talked to at Dave's Restaurant was not the Jane Roberts who testified in court.

¶ 21 Olson said that he did a "thorough inspection of the whole property" before starting in the shed "because the doors were open." Olson also testified that the sliding door of the house was open and he did not go into the house, but that he planned to go into the house because "I had permission."

¶ 22 On cross-examination, Olson admitted that he was convicted of forgery in 2004, theft in 2005, and trafficking in stolen property in 2006. Olson also admitted that in 2006, he did not have permission from the owner to remove and sell the metal siding of a mobile home.

¶ 23 In rebuttal, Deputy Joseph Eshom testified about the 2006 investigation of Olson for trafficking in stolen property. Deputy Eshom said that by the time he arrived at the property owned by Melvin Couture, Olson had stripped most of the metal siding off Couture's mobile home and loaded the metal into his pickup truck. Deputy Eshom testified that Olson told him "the owner of the property gave him permission to clean the property up," and "the owner had given him permission to be on the property and to take the items." Deputy Eshom said Couture told him that he did not give Olson "permission to clean up or take anything off the property."

¶ 24 The court instructed the jury that to convict Olson of the crime of residential burglary, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he "entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling" with the intent to commit a crime against "a person or property therein." The jury instructions defined "a dwelling" as "any building or structure which is used or ordinarily used by a person for lodging." The court also instructed the jury that "[a] person enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises when he or she is not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain."

¶ 25 At the request of the defense, the court also instructed the jury on the lesser included crimes of burglary in the second degree, criminal trespass in the first degree, and criminal trespass in the second degree, as well as the statutory defenses to criminal trespass in the first degree and criminal trespass in the second degree. Jury instruction 20 states:

¶ 26 Jury instruction 24 states:

¶ 27 During closing, the State argued the evidence established Olson committed the crime of residential burglary. The prosecutor pointed to the testimony that established the sliding glass door was locked the day before and the distinctive footprints Deputy Gulla found in the house that matched the shoes Olson wore. The prosecutor argued, in pertinent part:

¶ 28 The prosecutor also pointed to the testimony that the brass bedframe in the pickup truck had been in the house. The prosecutor argued, in pertinent part:

¶ 29 The prosecutor asserted Olson's testimony that he had permission to remove Roberts' belongings was not credible.

¶ 30 The defense argued that Olson believed he had permission from the owner to remove the property he loaded into his pickup truck. The defense claimed there was no evidence Olson ever entered the residence because Olson testified all the items in the truck except for the brass bedframe came from the shed, and there was no evidence that established when the bedframe was last in the house. The defense also argued that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the shoeprints found in the house matched the soles of the shoes Olson wore.

¶ 31 As to the lesser included crimes of criminal trespass, defense counsel argued that not only did Olson have permission, but the house was abandoned. Defense counsel argued, in pertinent part:

¶ 32 In rebuttal, the prosecutor asserted that while abandonment is a defense to criminal trespass, it is not a defense to residential burglary.

¶ 33 The jury found Olson guilty of residential burglary. The court imposed a standard-range sentence of 75 months. Olson appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶ 34 Olson claims his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a jury instruction on abandonment of a building as a defense to the crime of residential burglary.3 To establish ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to request a jury instruction, the defendant must show that he was entitled to the instruction. State v. Cienfuegos, 144 Wn.2d 222, 227, 25 P.3d 1011 (2001); State v. Johnston, 143 Wn.App. 1, 21, 177 P.3d 1127 (2007). Whether abandonment is a defense to residential burglary is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Gonzalez. 168 Wn.2d 256, 263, 226 P.3d 131 (2010).

¶ 35 The authority to define the elements of a crime "rests firmly with the legislature." State v. Torres Ramos, 149 Wn.App. 266, 271, 202 P.3d 383 (2009); State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 447 n. 2, 114 P.3d 627 (2005). Our goal in interpreting a statute is to carry out the legislature's intent. Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d at 263, 226 P.3d 131. The court must give effect to the plain language of an unambiguous statute. See State v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571, 577-78, 238 P.3d 487 (2010); Gonzalez, 168 Wash.2d at 263, 226 P.3d 131; State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600-01, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, this court's inquiry is at an end and we enforce the statute "in accordance with its plain meaning." State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007).

¶ 36 The legislature divided the crime of burglary into three felonies: (1) RCW 9A.52.020, burglary in the first degree, a class A felony; (2) RCW 9A.52.025, residential burglary, a class B felony; and (3) RCW 9A.52.030, burglary in the second degree, a class B felony.

¶ 37 A person commits the crime of burglary in the first degree if the person, with the intent to commit a crime against a person or property, enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and while in the building or in flight therefrom, is armed with a deadly weapon or assaults a person. RCW 9A.52.020(1). A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building "other than ... a dwelling" with intent to commit a crime therein. RCW 9A.52.030(1).

¶ 38 A person is guilty of residential burglary if, "with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein," he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a "dwelling." RCW 9A.52.025(1). A person "enters or remains unlawfully" when he or she is not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to enter or remain. RCW 9A.52.010(5).

¶ 39 Criminal trespass in the first degree is a lesser included offense of burglary in the second degree. State v. Soto, 45 Wn.App. 839, 840-41, 727 P.2d 999 (1986) (holding burglary in the second degree includes criminal trespass in the first degree). A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree if he or she knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building. RCW 9A.52.070(1). Criminal trespass in the first degree is a gross misdemeanor. RCW 9A.52.070(2). Criminal trespass in the second degree is a lesser included crime of criminal trespass in the first degree. A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree if he or she knowingly enters or remains "unlawfully in or upon premises of another under circumstances not constituting criminal trespass in the first degree." RCW 9A.52.080(1). Criminal trespass in the second degree is a misdemeanor. RCW 9A.52.080(2).

¶ 40 The legislature enacted statutory defenses for the crimes of criminal trespass in the first degree and criminal trespass in the second degree. RCW 9A.52.090. RCW 9A.52.090 provides, in pertinent part:

¶ 41 In City of Bremerton v. Widell, 146 Wn.2d 561, 51 P.3d 733 (2002), our supreme court held that because the statutory defenses to criminal trespass negate the unlawful presence element of the crime of criminal trespass, the statutory defenses are not affirmative defenses. Widell, 146 Wash.2d at 570, 51 P.3d 733. The court also held that when the defendant asserts he had permission, the State must prove the absence of that defense. Widell, 146 Wash.2d at 570, 51 P.3d 733. In Widell, the court held, in pertinent part:

Widell, 146 Wash.2d at 570, 51 P.3d 733.

¶ 42 Olson relies on the Division Three decision in State v. J.P., 130 Wn.App. 887, 125 P.3d 215 (2005), to argue that abandonment is a defense to residential burglary. In J.P., J.P. was apprehended after he crawled out the window of a vacant home being prepared for sale. The juvenile court found J.P. guilty of residential burglary. J.P., 130 Wash.App. at 890-91, 125 P.3d 215. On appeal, J.P. argued that the statutory defense of abandonment was a defense to residential burglary. J.P., 130 Wash.App. at 894, 125 P.3d 215. Relying on Widell, the court held that J.P. could assert abandonment as a defense to residential burglary. J.P., 130 Wash.App. at 895, 125 P.3d 215. The court concluded that because residential burglary required proof of unlawful entry or presence, the defense of abandonment could negate the unlawful entry or presence element of the crime. J.P., 130 Wash.App. at 895, 125 P.3d 215. Nonetheless, because sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that the vacant house was not abandoned, the court affirmed. J.P., 130 Wash.App. at 896, 125 P.3d 215.

¶ 43 In State v. Jensen, 149 Wn.App. 393, 203 P.3d 393 (2009), Division Two disagreed with the analysis and conclusion in J.P. that abandonment is a defense to the crime of residential burglary. Jensen, 149 Wash. App. at 400-01, 203 P.3d 393. In Jensen, a jury found Jensen guilty of burglary in the second degree. Jensen, 149 Wash.App. at 397, 203 P.3d 393. On appeal, Jensen argued he was entitled to a jury instruction on abandonment as a defense to the crime of burglary in the second degree. Jensen, 149 Wash. App. at 397-98, 203 P.3d 393. The court held that under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, the defense of abandonment applies "only to prosecutions for first degree criminal trespass" and abandonment is not a defense to burglary in the second degree. Jensen, 149 Wash.App. at 400-01, 203 P.3d 393.

Jensen, 149 Wash.App. at 401, 203 P.3d 393. The court expressly rejected the reliance of the court in J.P. on Widell;

Jensen, 149 Wash.App. at 401, 203 P.3d 393.

¶ 44 We agree with the analysis in Jensen. Under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, the defense of abandonment applies only to the crime of criminal trespass. The legislature did not provide the statutory defense of abandonment as a defense to residential burglary, and the supreme court in Widell did not hold otherwise. See State v. Frampton, 95 Wn.2d 469, 477-78, 627 P.2d 922 (1981) (presumption that legislature was aware of the state of the law); Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wn.2d 268, 274, 693 P.2d 71 (1984) (stating courts presume legislature is aware of its prior enactments).

¶ 45 The legislature enacted the new offense of residential burglary in 1989. Laws of 1989, ch. 412, § 1. Legislative history shows that consistent with the common law, the crime of residential burglary was enacted in order to punish burglaries occurring in dwellings more harshly "[i]n light of the steady increase in residential burglaries and the potential for personal injury inherent in such crimes." FINAL B. REP. on S.B. 5233, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.1989).

¶ 46 Under the common law, "[b]urglary has always been regarded as a serious crime because of the ancient notion that a man's home is his castle. When he closes his door, he should be able to feel secure in his castle." 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 325, at 253 (15th ed.1995). See also RCW 9A.04.060 (common law supplements criminal statutes to the extent not inconsistent); State v. Byrd, 125 Wn.2d 707, 712-13, 887 P.2d 396 (1995) (examining common law to construe undefined term in criminal statute); State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 356, 68 P.3d 282 (2003) (Madsen, J., concurring) (common law burglary considered a "`heinous offense'" because it invaded the "`right of habitation'") (quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.13(c) at 469 (1986 & Supp. 2003)).5

¶ 47 In addition, the record establishes a strategic reason not to request an instruction on abandonment as a defense to residential burglary. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Olson must demonstrate (1) deficient performance, that his attorney's representation fell below the standard of reasonableness; and (2) resulting prejudice, that but for the deficient performance, the result would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bowerman, 115 Wn.2d 794, 808, 802 P.2d 116 (1990) (adopting the standards in Strickland). If a defendant fails to establish either prong, we need not inquire further. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996).

¶ 48 There is a strong presumption of effective representation of counsel, and the defendant has the burden to show that based on the record, there are no legitimate strategic or tactical reasons for the challenged conduct. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335-36, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). As the Supreme Court explained in Strickland:

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

¶ 49 Here, Olson told the deputies he had permission from the owner to remove the property he had loaded into his pickup truck. Olson then gave the deputies a note from "Jane A. Roberts" dated September 30, 2011 authorizing him to clean up and remove "my things I no longer want." Olson also told Deputy Gulla that he did not commit residential burglary because he never entered the house. At trial, Olson continued to insist that he had permission to remove property. Olson also testified that he did not enter the house on October 12, but was "going to ... [b]ecause I had permission." Because the record establishes a clear, strategic reason to not request an abandonment instruction as a defense to residential burglary, Olson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.6

¶ 50 We affirm.

WE CONCUR: VERELLEN, A.C.J. and DWYER, J.