LEE, J.
In January 2013, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) revoked Mark Lee Miller's parole and returned him to prison. Miller filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) alleging that he is under unlawful restraint due to the ISRB's order revoking his parole. Miller alleges that the legislation repealing the sunset provision that would have abolished the ISRB violated Wash. Const. art. II, § 19. We reject Miller's argument and hold that the legislation is constitutional. Miller also raises several issues related to the ISRB's order rescinding his 2010 Conditional Discharge from Supervision (CDFS), but Miller waived these challenges by failing to file a PRP challenging the order rescinding his CDFS at the time the ISRB entered it. Finally, Miller argues that his parole revocation was improper because (1) the ISRB failed to hold a parole revocation within 30 days of serving him with notice of the violations, (2) the Department of Corrections (DOC) did not have the authority to perform an on-site drug test, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the ISRB's findings that he violated the conditions of his parole. We disagree and deny Miller's petition.
On November 9, 1979, Miller pleaded guilty to one count of first degree robbery and was granted a five year deferred sentence. After Miller committed a series of robberies in Oregon, the Clark County Superior Court revoked his deferred sentence and sentenced him to a maximum term of 40 years incarceration. The ISRB set a minimum term of 33 months. In November 1993, the ISRB released Miller on parole. Between 1993 and 2008, Miller violated the conditions of his parole on several occasions. In 2009, the ISRB again granted Miller parole and released him to a CDFS. In November 2010, Miller's Community Corrections Officer (CCO) filed a notice of violation, alleging that Miller violated the conditions of his CDFS by stabbing one person and threatening to kill another person. However, the victims and witnesses did not cooperate with law enforcement, and the case was dismissed. On December 9, 2010, the ISRB returned Miller to CDFS.
On December 20, 2011, Miller's CCO, Ronda Nielsen, filed a report with the ISRB requesting that Miller's CDFS be rescinded and that he be returned to active supervision. Nielsen stated that, since being released on the CDFS, Miller had been arrested seven times:
ISRB Ex. 27 at 1. Nielsen stated that after Miller's arrest in December 2011, the local police department reported Miller's arrests and requested that the ISRB take action. Nielsen recommended that the ISRB rescind Miller's CDFS and place him back on active supervision. The ISRB rescinded Miller's CDFS and placed him back on active supervision with the following conditions:
Pet'r's. Ex. 2.
On July 5, 2012, CCO Nielsen submitted a notice of parole violation based on Miller using illegal drugs. The ISRB ordered Miller's parole reinstated with the additional condition that he obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with all recommendations. On July 25, Nielsen submitted another notice of violation based on Miller possessing alcohol and failing to report as directed. The ISRB again reinstated Miller's parole with the conditions that Miller obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation within 15 days and report weekly.
On November, 9, 2012, CCO Nielsen submitted another notice of violation, alleging that Miller failed to report as directed, failed to report a change of residence, and failed to obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation as ordered. Nielsen also noted that Miller had recently been arrested for resisting arrest and second degree possession of stolen property. On December 31, Nielsen submitted a notice of two additional violations: using methamphetamines and using opiates.
On January 8, 2013, the ISRB held a parole revocation hearing to address all five alleged parole violations. Miller was represented by an attorney at the revocation hearing. Miller pleaded guilty to the alleged violations that he failed to report and failed to obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation. The ISRB found Miller not guilty of the alleged violation that he failed to report a change of address. Miller's attorney objected to the ISRB considering the allegations regarding illegal drug use because the only evidence supporting the allegations was inadmissible hearsay. The ISRB ruled that the allegations would be considered based on the testimony of the CCOs and any finding would not be based on inadmissible hearsay. The CCOs testified as follows:
Pet'r's Ex. 7 at 3. The ISRB found that the CCOs' testimony was not hearsay because they testified to "first-hand observations." Pet'r's Ex. 7 at 4. The ISRB found Miller guilty of using illegal substances and, per agreement, combined the two alleged violations into one violation. The ISRB revoked Miller's parole stating:
Pet'r's Ex. 7, at 5. Miller now files this PRP alleging that his current restraint is unlawful.
Miller argues that the legislation repealing the sunset provision that would have abolished the ISRB violates Wash. Const. art. II, § 19. Essentially, Miller argues that because the legislation was unconstitutional, the ISRB ceased to exist, at least as to its authority to supervise offenders sentenced prior to 1984, in 2008. Miller is mistaken. The legislation repealing the sunset provision abolishing the ISRB does not violate Wash. Const. art. II, § 19.
Former RCW 9.95.0011(1) (1997) stated that the ISRB would "cease to exist on June 30, 2008." In 2001, the legislature passed Third Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill (S.B.) 6151,: "AN ACT Relating to the management of sex offenders in the civil commitment and criminal justice systems." S.B. 6151, LAWS OF 2001, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 12, at 2196. Among other things, the act repealed former RCW 9.95.0011. LAWS OF 2001, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 12, § 501.
Wash. Const. art. II, § 19 states, "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title." Wash. Const. art. II, § 19 established two specific rules: (1) the single subject rule, and (2) the subject-in-title rule.
To determine whether legislation violates the single subject rule, this court must first determine whether the title is general or restrictive. Stannard, 134 Wn. App. at 835. Miller argues that ESSB 6151 has a restrictive title because it specifically references sex offenders. But, to be considered a general title, the title "need not contain a general statement of the subject of an act; rather, `a few well-chosen words, suggestive of the general subject stated, is all that is necessary.'" Stannard, 134 Wn. App. at 836 (quoting Amalgamated, 142 Wn.2d at 209) (internal quotations omitted). Here, the title of ESSB 6151 broadly references both the civil commitment system and the criminal justice system. Therefore, the title should be considered general. See Amalgamated, 142 Wn.2d at 193, 216 (holding title "[s]hall voter approval be required for any tax increase, license tab fees be $30 per year for motor vehicles, and existing vehicle taxes be repealed" was general because, read as a whole, the title embraced the general topic of vehicle taxes); City of Burien v. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d 819, 825, 31 P.3d 659 (2001) (holding title "[s]hall certain 199 tax and fee increases be nullified, vehicles exempted from property taxes, and property tax increases (except new construction) limited to 2% annually?" was general because the entirety of the title encompassed the general subject of tax relief); Citizens, 149 Wn.2d at 632, 636 (holding title "[s]hall it be a gross misdemeanor to capture an animal with certain body-gripping traps, or to poison an animal with sodium fluoroacetate or sodium cyanide?" was general because the specific topics referenced in the title were "merely incidental to the general topic reflected in the title—a ban on methods of trapping and killing animals").
If the legislation has a general title, it does not violate the single subject rule provided that "a rational unity" exists among the subjects addressed in the legislation. Stannard, 134 Wn. App. at 839 (citing Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 825-26). Here, there is a rational unity between the section of the S.B. 6151 repealing former RCW 9.95.0011 and its title. The legislature determined that it would use the ISRB as the vehicle for managing sex offenders in the criminal justice system. Repealing former RCW 9.95.0011 was necessary to accomplish this purpose. Accordingly, S.B. 6151 did not violate Wash. Const. art. II, § 19 because it included a section repealing former RCW 9.95.0011.
Miller also provides this court with a list of suggested ways in which the legislature could have crafted the legislation in a way which he believes effectively complies with Wash. Const. art. II, § 19. However, we do not evaluate what the legislature may have done; rather we determine whether Miller has met his burden to prove what the legislature did do was unconstitutional. Miller has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ESSB 6151 violated Wash. Const. art. II, § 19. Accordingly, his argument must fail.
Miller challenges the ISRB's administrative order rescinding his CDFS arguing that the DOC did not have the authority to request that the ISRB rescind his CDFS and that he was entitled to minimum due process protections (notice and an opportunity to be heard) prior to the ISRB rescinding his CDFS and placing him back on active supervision. However, Miller's challenges to the order rescinding his CDFS are not properly before this court. Currently, Miller is under restraint due to the ISRB's order revoking his parole, he is not under restraint from the order rescinding his CDFS. Accordingly, his petition is a challenge to the order revoking his parole not the order rescinding his CDFS. Moreover, Miller waived his challenges to the order rescinding his CDFS by failing to file a PRP challenging the order when the ISRB rescinded his CDFS. Because Miller failed to challenge the order rescinding his CDFS in a timely manner, when this court could have effectively provided relief, he is not allowed to challenge an order that is no longer the cause of his restraint.
Miller argues that the ISRB improperly considered the first three alleged violations (failure to report, failure to notify change of address, and failure to obtain drug and alcohol evaluation) because the ISRB did not hold a hearing on the alleged violations within 30 days as required by RCW 9.95.120. But, under In re Personal Restraint of Knoke, 17 Wn.App. 874, 876, 565 P.2d 1187 (1977), failure to comply with the 30-day timeline does not deprive the ISRB of jurisdiction over the alleged violations and a hearing does not violate due process unless the delay is unreasonable.
RCW 9.95.120 provides, in relevant part:
In Knoke, the petitioner argued that the State's failure to hold his parole revocation within the 30-day timeline of RCW 9.95.120 required dismissal of the parole revocation proceedings. 17 Wn. App. at 876. Division Three of this court rejected his argument stating:
17 Wn. App. at 876. Further, failure to hold a parole revocation within 30 days does not violate the petitioner's right to due process if the delay is reasonable. Knoke, 17 Wn. App. at 876 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972); Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wn.2d 922, 530 P.3d 334 (1975)). Here, the delay in holding the parole revocation on the alleged violations was not unreasonable. Miller was not in custody during the entire period leading up to the parole revocation hearing; rather the ISRB granted him conditional release pending the parole revocation hearing. Further, Miller had pending criminal charges that may have been relevant to the parole revocation hearing. Therefore, any delay in the parole revocation hearing should not be considered unreasonable and Miller is not entitled to relief based on the ISRB's failure to hold a hearing on the first three alleged parole violations within 30 days of Miller being provided notice of the alleged violations.
Miller asserts that, under the terms of his parole, the DOC did not have authority to administer his UA. One of the conditions imposed after Miller was returned to active supervision stated:
Pet'r's Ex. 2. Miller relies on principles of civil contract law to argue that the stated condition establishes a third party agency as the exclusive method of obtaining a UA and that, as a result, the DOC was divested of legal authority to conduct a UA. But, orders imposing conditions of parole are not civil contracts. Nothing in the stated section prohibits the DOC from performing a UA. Moreover, by December 27, 2012, when Miller's CCOs obtained the UA, Miller had repeatedly failed to contact a third party agency to obtain monitoring or a drug and alcohol evaluation as previously ordered. Accordingly, we reject Miller's assertion that the DOC could not perform a UA as part of random drug and alcohol monitoring.
Miller argues that the ISRB violated WAC 381-70-400 when it found him guilty of using illegal drugs based exclusively on inadmissible hearsay. Miller is incorrect. The ISRB did not rely on any inadmissible hearsay when finding him guilty. Thus, there was no violation of WAC 381-70-400.
WAC 381-70-400 provides that "[i]f the sole evidence to support the allegation is hearsay that would be inadmissible in a superior court proceeding and is not substantiated or corroborated, the board shall not enter a finding of guilt." Hearsay is a "statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." ER 801(c). Here, CCOs Nielson and Conrad testified about their own actions and first-hand observations, which are not hearsay. The sole "hearsay" contained in Nielsen's and Conrad's testimony was Miller's statements. And, Miller's statements are not hearsay in an action in which he is a party. ER 801(d)(2)(i) (admission by party-opponent is not hearsay). Because Nielson's and Conrad's testimony did not contain inadmissible hearsay, the ISRB did not violate WAC 381-70-400.
Finally, Miller states that there was insufficient evidence to support the ISRB's finding that he used illegal drugs. At a parole revocation hearing, an alleged violation must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 9.95.125; WAC 381-70-160(6). "Preponderance of the evidence means evidence that is more probably true than not true." In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 739 n.2, 513 P.2d 831 (1973) (citing Presnell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 60 Wn.2d 671, 374 P.2d 939 (1962)). Here, both CCO Nielson and CCO Conrad testified that they observed Miller's urine sample test positive for methamphetamines and opiates. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the ISRB's finding that the allegations Miller used illegal drugs was proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
We deny Miller's petition.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public records in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HUNT and BJORGEN, A.C.J., concurs.
LAWS OF 2001, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 12, at 2196 (emphasis added). The subject at issue (repeal of former RCW 9.95.0011) is clearly expressed in the title of S.B. 6151.
