COX, J.
¶ 1 In a civil rights case that provides for attorney fees, a court may award a prevailing plaintiff reasonable attorney fees on multiple claims where there is a "common core of facts"
¶ 2 Bright formerly worked for Frank Russell Investments in its human resources department. During her employment, Frank Russell investigated several employees, including her, for allegedly violating its code of conduct and code of ethics.
¶ 3 In September 2012, while the investigation was ongoing, Bright took a medical leave of absence. In November 2012, Bright commenced this action, claiming violations of the WLAD. Specifically, she alleged racial discrimination and unlawful retaliation arising from the ethics investigation. She alleged that Frank Russell was treating her more
¶ 4 Later that month, Bright requested disability accommodations. She supported this request with information from her psychologist, who recommended certain accommodations. On December 13, 2012, Frank Russell informed Bright that it denied her request for accommodations and terminated her employment. The company informed her that it terminated her employment due to her "serious misconduct."
¶ 5 In March 2013, Bright amended her complaint to add a failure to accommodate claim to this action.
¶ 6 On summary judgment, the court dismissed Bright's racial disparate treatment claim. It concluded that because she was on medical leave at the relevant time, she was unable to prove that she was performing satisfactory work at the time of the allegedly adverse employment action. The court also dismissed Bright's racial discrimination claim against one of Frank Russell's senior executives.
¶ 7 The retaliation claim and the failure to accommodate claim went to trial. At the conclusion of a lengthy trial, the jury found that Frank Russell had failed to accommodate Bright's disability and awarded her $475,000 in damages. But the jury did not find Frank Russell liable on her unlawful retaliation claim.
¶ 8 Bright sought an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to RCW 49.60.030(2). Frank Russell opposed her request, arguing that Bright failed to segregate time spent on unsuccessful racial discrimination claims.
¶ 9 After a hearing, the trial court gave its oral ruling, explaining its conclusion that Bright demonstrated that there was both a "common core of facts" and "related legal theories" in this case. Accordingly, there was no requirement to segregate attorney fees based on successful and unsuccessful claims, as Frank Russell argued. Thereafter, the court prepared and entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered a judgment regarding the award of fees and costs.
¶ 10 Frank Russell appeals.
¶ 11 Frank Russell argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to require segregation of time spent on Bright's successful failure to accommodate claim from her unsuccessful race-based claim. We hold that segregation of time on this basis was not required in this case.
¶ 12 The WLAD entitles prevailing plaintiffs to "reasonable attorneys' fees."
¶ 13 Under Bowers v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., the first step of deciding what is reasonable is to determine the lodestar amount.
¶ 14 We review for abuse of discretion whether the amount of an attorney fee award is proper.
¶ 15 Here, the awardability of reasonable attorney fees is not at issue. RCW 49.60.030(2) clearly authorizes this award to Bright, the successful plaintiff in this case.
¶ 16 Rather, Frank Russell challenges the amount of fees awarded. In doing so, it does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact
¶ 17 When interpreting the WLAD, Washington courts frequently look to federal authority on the question of fees.
¶ 18 "The amount of the fee, of course, must be determined on the facts of each case."
¶ 19 Here, the focus of our inquiry is whether the reasonably expended hours component of the lodestar calculation is proper. Hensley contains useful analysis on this issue.
¶ 20 There, the petitioners argued that "`an award of attorney's fees must be proportioned to be consistent with the extent to which a plaintiff has prevailed, and only time reasonably expended in support of successful claims should be compensated.'"
¶ 21 The Court stated:
¶ 22 The Supreme Court went on to state:
¶ 23 Notably, the Supreme Court made the following observation while rejecting an argument very similar to the one Frank Russell now makes:
¶ 24 Similarly, in this case Frank Russell argues that "Ms. Bright's attorneys recorded work in progress with a stated value of $1 million towards recovery of a judgment of less than half that amount."
¶ 25 Instead, because "there is no precise rule or formula," the trial court has discretion in determining the plaintiff's degree of success.
¶ 26 In this case, the court determined that the trial was "a win" for Bright, rejecting the notion that it was a partial success. The substantial jury verdict supports the trial court's determination. The court noted that Bright received considerably more in damages than the severance packages of her colleagues who were also terminated for allegedly violating ethical rules. The jury's verdict also substantially exceeded Frank Russell's settlement offers.
¶ 27 The trial court also explained in its oral ruling why segregation of time was not required under the circumstances of this case:
¶ 28 Thus, there was a common core of facts in both her discrimination claims, challenging Frank Russell's decision to terminate.
¶ 29 We also note that Bright raised two legal theories for why her discharge was discriminatory and prevailed on only one. But "[l]itigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome."
¶ 30 The trial court prepared and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent
¶ 31 Frank Russell makes several additional arguments. None is persuasive.
¶ 32 First, it argues that the trial court abused its discretion under Hensley because Bright's claims could have been filed as separate lawsuits. Not so.
¶ 33 As Hensley noted, courts should treat claims as separate lawsuits when they "are based on different facts
¶ 34 Here, Bright's claims shared a factual core. Additionally, while Bright brought her claims under two distinct legal theories, they were related. Both claims alleged unlawful discrimination under the WLAD. Thus, the court was not required to treat her claims as separate lawsuits.
¶ 35 Second, Frank Russell relies on Chuong Van Pham v. Seattle City Light,
¶ 36 In that case, the trial court reduced the fee award by some hours, concluding that they were "unnecessarily expended, unproductive, or not sufficiently related to the successful claim."
¶ 37 Here, the trial court did not conclude that the hours Bright spent on her racial discrimination claims were unnecessary. Rather, the trial court determined that the failure to accommodate claim "necessarily" involved evidence of Frank Russell's motive for terminating her employment. There simply is no support for the argument that Chuong Van Pham is analogous to this case.
¶ 38 Third, Frank Russell argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Bright fees for all her claims merely because they all arose under the WLAD. This mischaracterizes the trial court's decision.
¶ 39 As explained earlier in our quotation of the trial court's oral decision, the court relied on the fact that Bright's claims shared a common factual core. It did not, as Frank Russell argues, rely simply on the fact that the claims arose under the WLAD.
¶ 40 Similarly, Frank Russell argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it determined that Frank Russell's litigation strategy created a common core of facts. This also mischaracterizes the trial court's decision.
¶ 41 Frank Russell's litigation strategy for both claims was similar. In essence, it argued that Bright "had committed dischargeable acts that justified denying her accommodation and terminating her [employment]."
¶ 42 Fourth, Frank Russell argues that Bright "needlessly increased the cost of adjudicating this case by up to 80%" by bringing her racial discrimination claims.
¶ 43 As we previously noted in discussing Hensley, mathematical formulae are not dispositive in determining what fee is reasonable. Thus, reliance on this mathematical measure is not helpful.
¶ 45 Fifth, Frank Russell argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to take into account Bright's degree of success. The company argues that the court should have considered the fact that the jury awarded Bright considerably less in damages than she requested.
¶ 46 This argument is unpersuasive. As noted earlier, the trial court explicitly took Bright's degree of success into account. The court called the result a "win" for Bright. It determined that Bright had been successful and rejected the notion that Frank Russell had partially succeeded.
¶ 47 While Frank Russell disagrees with the trial court's assessment of Bright's success, the court has discretion in determining the degree of success.
¶ 48 Here, the court determined that in light of Frank Russell's proposed settlement, and the amount of damages that Bright received compared to the amount of her colleagues' severance packages, Bright had succeeded. This was not an abuse of discretion. And Frank Russell fails to cite any authority indicating that the court must reduce an award of attorney fees merely because a plaintiff is awarded less in damages than requested.
¶ 49 Finally, Frank Russell argues that Bright should not have received fees for her claim against one of Frank Russell's senior executives. But while her claim against this executive as an individual was dismissed, his actions as Frank Russell's representative formed part of her claims' common factual core.
¶ 50 In reply, Frank Russell contends counsel's billing rates were excessive. We disagree.
¶ 51 The trial court entered unchallenged findings of fact 9 and 10, which note the high quality of counsel's representation and the reasonability of the hourly rates of those who worked on the case. While Frank Russell disagrees with this result, it fails to show that the finding is unsupported by substantial evidence.
¶ 52 Bright also argues that Brand v. Department of Labor & Industries
¶ 53 Frank Russell finally argues that the court should not have awarded Bright costs for her racial discrimination claims. But Frank Russell presents no meaningful analysis of this claim. Accordingly, we reject the argument.
¶ 54 Bright requests an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. We hold that she is entitled to both.
¶ 55 Under RCW 49.60.030(2), a successful plaintiff who also prevails on appeal is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal.
¶ 56 Here, because Bright prevails on appeal, she is entitled to an award of attorney fees, subject to compliance with RAP 18.1. Likewise, she is also entitled to an award of costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: LAU and APPELWICK, JJ.