RICARDO S. MARTINEZ, District Judge.
This matter was initiated by the filing of a Request for Determination by the Makah Indian Tribe, asking for a determination of the Usual and Accustomed Fishing Grounds ("U&A") in the Pacific Ocean of the Quinault Indian Nation ("Quinault") and the Quileute Indian Tribe ("Quileute"). Dkt. # 1. It is now before the Court for consideration of a motion by the Makah for partial summary judgment. Dkt. # 125. The motion was opposed by the Quinault and the Quileute, as well as the Hoh Indian Tribe as an Interested Party. The State of Washington, also an Interested party under the procedures established in this case, also filed a response to the motion. The Court heard oral argument on May 22, — and has fully considered the parties memoranda and exhibits, together with prior Orders in this case. For the reasons set forth below, the Makah motion shall be substantially granted.
The Makah filed this Request for Determination on December 4, 2009, invoking the continuing jurisdiction of the Court under two specified provisions of Paragraph 25 of the Permanent Injunction, as modified by the Court's Order Modifying Paragraph 25 (C70-9213, Dkt. # 13599) dated August 23, 1993). Dkt. # 1. The Makah requested a determination of the U&A's of the Quinault and Quileute in the Pacific Ocean, to the extent they were not specifically determined in Final Decision # 1, U.S. v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D.Wash.1974) ("Final Decision # 1"). The Makah themselves have an adjudicated U&A in the Pacific Ocean extending forty miles offshore, specifically determined and described in proceedings subsequent to Final Decision # 1. U.S. v. Washington, 626 F.Supp. 1405, 1467 (1985).
The sections of Paragraph 25 invoked by the Makah in the Request for Determination are Paragraph (a)(1) and Paragraph (a)(6). As set forth in Paragraph 25,
(a) The parties or any of them may invoke the continuing jurisdiction of this court in order to determine:
U.S. v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. at 419.
The U&A of the Quinault with the U.S. v. Washington case area was determined by Judge George Boldt in Final Decision # 1, and is described as encompassing
U.S. v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 374. In the same Order, Judge Boldt described the U&A of the Quileute, determining that
Id. at 372.
The Request for Determination ("RFD") asserts that the Quinault and Quileute have been fishing (along with Makah and other Tribes) for salmon, halibut, groundfish, and highly migratory species of fish in the Pacific Ocean under regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"). RFD ¶ 3(b)(i).
The Quinault and Quileute initially responded to the Request for Determination with motions to dismiss. Dkt. ##51, 53. They argued that the RFD should be dismissed on various grounds including sovereign immunity, lack of standing, failure to state a claim, lack of ripeness, and laches. In addressing the sovereign immunity claim, the Court cited to previous rulings as well as to the Tribes' objections to the Court's proposed entry of a "Sunset Order" closing this case. Order on Motions to Dismiss, Dkt. # 86, pp. 3-4. The Court then stated,
Id., p. 4.
With respect to standing of the Makah to request a determination of another Tribe's U&A, the Court pointed to the language of Paragraph 25 stating that "any party" may invoke the Court's continuing jurisdiction for the purposes specifically enumerated in the paragraph. Thus the Makah had standing to request definition of the Quinault and Quileute U&A's under Paragraph 25(a)(1) and 25(a)(6) as set froth in the RFD. Id. As for ripeness and laches, the Court dispensed with these arguments on grounds that need not be repeated here. Id. The Court concluded that its jurisdiction had been properly invoked under paragraph 25(a)(6), "because the western boundary of the Quinault and Quileute U&A's were not `specifically determined' in Final Decision I." Id., p. 5. This language was subsequently modified upon motion for clarification filed by several other Tribes who appeared as Interested parties under the custom and procedure of this case. The conclusion was amended to read, "This Court's jurisdiction has been properly invoked by the Makah under sections (a) and (6) of Paragraph 25 of the Permanent Injunction." Order on Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. # 104, p. 2. The balance of the sentence, regarding the "western boundary" of the Quinault and Quileute U&A's was stricken. Id. The Court then stated that "it views this subproceeding as addressing the meaning of the term `adjacent' as used by Judge Boldt in describing the Quinault and Quileute U&A's. Therefore it shall proceed under Paragraph 25(a)(1), and evidence shall be limited to the record that was before Judge Boldt." Id.
Following the Court's denial of the motions to dismiss, the parties filed their Joint Status Report and Discovery Plan ("JSR"). Dkt. # 114. The JSR described, under the heading "Nature and Complexity of the Case," several issues that the parties consider unresolved by the Court's Order on the motions to dismiss. The third and fourth of these issues have led to this motion for summary judgment by the Makah. As the parties set forth in the JSR,
Joint Status Report, Dkt. # 114, pp. 5-6.
After the parties' JSR was filed, the Hoh Indian Tribe moved for leave to intervene, asserting that "it is likely that any determination of Quileute ocean fishing usual and accustomed fishing grounds will also affect and define Hoh ocean fishing usual and accustomed fishing grounds." Dkt. # 115, p. 2. The Court denied the motion to intervene, noting that "[t]o the extent that factual and legal determinations in this subproceeding have implication[s] for the scope of the usual and accustomed fishing grounds of the Hoh, that Tribe may argue their position in memoranda filed in their status as [a] participant under Paragraph 25." Order on Motion for Leave to Intervene, Dkt. # 128, p. 2. The Hoh did in fact file a response to the Makah motion for summary judgment, and as set forth below, it was considered along with the responses filed by the Quinault and Quileute. Dkt. # 152.
The motion for partial summary judgment brings before the Court the two issues identified by the parties in the JSR, set forth above. The Makah request a ruling that,
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Dkt. # 125, p. 1.
In opposing the motion, the Quileute assert that it is essentially an improper motion for reconsideration of the Court's prior Orders regarding the scope of this subproceeding, and should be stricken. Quileute Response, Dkt. # 157, p. 5. However, the positions taken by the Quinault, Quileute and Hoh could equally well be viewed as constituting a motion for reconsideration on the Court's prior ruling on standing and jurisdiction. The Court will therefore reiterate and, where necessary, clarify the prior rulings with the expectation that the ruling will guide the parties in open meaningful negotiations to resolve this issue by agreement.
The Quileute point to the Court's language in the earlier Order on Motion for Reconsideration, stating that this subproceeding "shall proceed under Paragraph 25(a)(1), and evidence shall be limited to the record that was before Judge Boldt." Dkt. # 104, p. 1. According to the Quileute, this forecloses the Makah from requesting a ruling that the U&A's of the two coastal tribes were not "specifically determined" in Final Decision #1, and limits the subproceeding to an interpretation of Judge Boldt's meaning under Paragraph 25(a)(1). However, the Court's language was not intended to be so limiting. As the Court has noted, the Makah properly invoked the Court's jurisdiction under both Paragraph 25(a)(1) and (a)(6). Therefore the statement should be read, "this subproceeding shall proceed initially under Paragraph 25(a)(1) . . ." However, in the event that the issues cannot be resolved through a Paragraph 25(a)(1) proceeding, the Court could find that the Quinault and Quileute U&A's were not specifically determined by Judge Boldt, and turn to Paragraph 25(a)(6) for further proceedings. While the Quinault at oral argument raised the specter of "pre-emptive" Requests for Determination under Paragraph 25 (a)(6) by all the Tribes, the Court does not view that as a serious threat.
The Makah motion shall accordingly be granted, to the extent that it asks for a ruling that they may be allowed to proceed under Paragraph 25(a)(6). However, the Court cannot find within the context of this motion that the Quinault and Quileute U&A's were not "specifically determined" by Judge Boldt. While the parties are in agreement that his ruling was limited to the State of Washington coastal waters (within the three-mile limit), that does not answer the question of what he meant by the term "adjacent." If the Court should find, in proceedings under Paragraph 25(a)(1), that "adjacent" meant only one or two miles offshore, then the U&A's would have been "specifically determined." If, on the other hand, there was evidence before Judge Boldt that the treaty-time Quinault and/or Quileute fishermen went more than three miles out to sea in their quest for fish, then the extent of their U&A's in the ocean would not have been specifically determined by him. Only in the latter case would the Paragraph 25(a)(6) proceedings go forward.
The Quileute and Quinault stated in the JSR that they intend to continue to challenge Makah's standing to seek an adjudication of their ocean U&A's. The Hoh join in that challenge, although their U&A is not in dispute in this subproceeding. In their responses to the Makah motion, the Hoh and Quinault have also questioned the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, and the Hoh once again raised the banner of sovereign immunity. Hoh Response, Dkt. # 152. The sovereign immunity issue was decided in the Court's Order on Motion to Dismiss, a portion of which is quoted above. Dkt. # 86. The Court will not revisit or reconsider that ruling.
The Hoh and Quinault both argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because they only waived sovereign immunity for the purpose of determining their treaty fishing rights vis-a-vis the State of Washington. Hoh Response, Dkt. # 152, p. 1-2; Quinault Response, Dkt. # 153, p. 14. They contend that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the waters outside the original case area, which extended only to the three-mile limit. This is incorrect. The Court's subject matter jurisdiction in this case arises from the treaties under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. That jurisdiction extends to all treaty-based fishing and is not limited to State of Washington waters.
In 1975, in the "Herring Fisheries" proceedings, the court found,
U.S. v. Washington, 459 F.Supp. 1020, 1048 (W.D.Wash. 1978) (citations omitted). The fact that the Court's jurisdiction extended to all treaty fishing rights, whether within or outside the waters of the State of Washington, was again recognized in the Makah's own determination of their ocean fishing rights. There, the Court noted that the Treaty of Neah Bay,
U.S. v. Washington, 626 F.Supp. 1405, 1468 (W.D.Wash. 1985). Finding of Fact 346 described the Makah U&A as including offshore waters well outside the State of Washington territorial limits. Id. at 1467. As the Ninth Circuit stated more recently, "Nothing in the plain language of the treaty provides a geographic limitation, and longstanding case law establishes that U&A fishing grounds properly extend into waters under United States jurisdiction." Mid-WinterTrawlers Cooperative v. Department of commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 718 (9th Cir. 2002).
These and other rulings clearly establish that the Court's subject matter jurisdiction extends to all treaty-based fishing, whether within or outside the boundaries of the State of Washington. Nevertheless, the Quinault stated at the oral argument that,
Transcript of Hearing, pp. 27-28. The argument is that NMFS has issued regulations allowing them to fish for halibut, black cod and other species in the open ocean, so therefore their fishing is "legal." There is no merit to this argument. NMFS does not determine tribal U&A's; they can only be established by this Court. The Quileute tacitly acknowledged this when they referred to "Judge Boldt's mandate that we each get 50 percent of what is in our U&As." Transcript of Hearing, p. 37. If there is no adjudicated U&A, there is no right to take 50 percent. And as counsel for the Port Gamble and Jamestown S'Klallam pointed out in summary, U&A's cannot be established by federal regulators or agencies; that would deny due process to other tribes and upset the very foundation of this case.
Long-established rulings in this case mandate that any Tribe wishing to exercise a treaty right to take fish must do so within the confines of this case, by following the principles established by Judge Boldt and others, and the procedures set forth in Paragraph 25. The Tribes came to Court in 1970 asking the Court to determine and enforce their treaty rights, and they subjected themselves to the Court's jurisdiction for all purposes relating to the exercise of their treaty rights. The Quinault and Quileute objections to the Makah motion for partial summary judgment on jurisdiction are thus without merit.
As for standing, the Court earlier ruled that the Makah have standing to seek a determination of the boundaries of the Quinault and Quileute U&A's. Order on Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. # 86. Their assertion of a continued challenge to Makah's standing amounts to an improper motion for reconsideration of that ruling. The Court noted that Paragraph 25 allows "any party" to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to determine, among other things, the location of any tribe's U&A where it was not specifically determined in Final Decision # 1. The Court further found that the Makah have alleged injury sufficient to meet the standing requirements, in that fishing by other tribes has an impact on the Makah share of the treaty allocation. The Court finds no basis for reconsideration.
The Makah motion for partial summary judgment is accordingly GRANTED, except as set forth above regarding whether Judge Boldt "specifically determined" the extent of the Quinault and Quileute U&A's in Final Decision # 1. The Court now directs the parties to again confer and provide a revised JSR so the Court can issue a scheduling order for further proceedings.