ROBERT S. LASNIK, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on "Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" (Dkt. #41) and "Defendant Draper Valley's Motion for Summary Judgment" (Dkt. #49). Having reviewed the memoranda, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court finds as follows:
This case was brought by a non-profit environmental and human health organization, Waste Action Project, against Draper Valley Holdings, LLC, for alleged violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("Clean Water Act" or "Act"), 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Plaintiff alleges that defendant exceeded the limitations imposed by its state waste discharge permit and failed to apply all known, available, and reasonable methods of treatment and control ("AKART") to its effluent in violation of the Act. Defendant does not deny that it violated certain numeric effluent limitations throughout the limitations period, but argues that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue this citizen's suit and denies that it violated the permit's AKART requirement. Defendant also challenges the adequacy of the pre-suit notice provided pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
Section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters unless in compliance with the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 537 F.3d 1006, 1020 (9th Cir.2008) ("[T]he Act categorically prohibits any discharge of pollutant from a point source without a permit."). Congress directed the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to promulgate regulations setting limits on the pollutant discharges from three sources, including (1) point sources discharging directly into navigable waters ("direct dischargers"); (2) publicly owned treatment works ("POTWs") treating and discharging municipal sewage or industrial wastewater; and (3) point sources discharging pollutants into POTWs rather than directly into navigable waters ("indirect dischargers"). See Nat'l Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 719 F.2d 624, 633 (3d Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds, Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985). Direct dischargers and POTWs are regulated through National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits issued to the discharger under 33 U.S.C. § 1342. The effluent from indirect dischargers, such as defendant here, is subject to separate pretreatment standards designed to "prevent the discharge of any pollutant through [the POTW], which pollutant interferes with, passes through or otherwise is incompatible with such works." 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1).
Pretreatment standards may be imposed by the EPA or an authorized state or POTW: where multiple standards exist for the same pollutant, the most stringent applies. 40 C.F.R. § 403.4. In Washington, the applicable pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers, including numerical limitations and treatment requirements, are set forth in a permit. Because the state waste discharge permit establishes the governing "pretreatment standard" for purposes of the Clean Water Act, a violation
Defendant's waste discharge permit authorizes discharges from defendant's slaughterhouse to the Mount Vernon sanitary sewer and POTW under certain conditions. In particular, defendant's effluent is limited to a maximum consecutive three-day average of 1430 pounds of biochemical oxygen demand ("BOD") per day, a maximum consecutive three-day average of 825 pounds of total suspended solids ("TSS") per day, and a pH between 6.0 and 11.0 standard units. It is undisputed that defendant exceeded one or more of these limitations at various times throughout the limitations period.
The Mount Vernon POTW has its own wastewater discharge limitations. The POTW has not had any permit excursions during the relevant time frame.
In order to satisfy Article III's standing requirements, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). The "personal injury" element requires a showing that plaintiff suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, as well as actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Its purpose is to ensure that the named plaintiff was actually injured and is entitled to an adjudication of the claim asserted, not merely abstractly distressed by unfounded fears or a wrong suffered by the public at large. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 154, 156 (4th Cir.2000). The alleged injury need not be large: an actual and genuine loss, even if a trifle, will suffice for standing purposes. See, e.g., U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n. 14, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 710 F.3d 71, 85 (2nd Cir.2013).
An organization like Waste Action Project "has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).
In this case, Doris Brevoort is a member of Waste Action Project who lives within sight of the Skagit River and utilizes the river for spiritual renewal, recreation, bird-watching, and aesthetic enjoyment. Ms. Brevoort is, however, aware that the waters of the Skagit River in and downstream of Mount Vernon are not as clean as other bodies of water in the area or even as clean as the upstream reaches of the river. While she would like to get in the water, watch birds, and enjoy the aesthetic and spiritual attributes of nature close to home, she expends time and money traveling elsewhere to engage in these activities. She also believes that, if the Skagit River were healthier near the estuary, the local fisherman from whom she buys salmon would have better catches and more to sell. Ms. Brevoort believes there is a correlation between the amount of pollutants going into the Mount Vernon POTW and the amount being discharged into the Skagit River. Thus, when defendant exceeds its permit limitations and sends additional pollutants to the POTW, Ms. Brevoort fears that the violations result in additional pollutants being discharged from the POTW over and above what would have been discharged had defendant stayed within its permitted limits. Ms. Brevoort states that her concerns regarding the kind and amount of pollutants discharged from the POTW and their effects on the environment inhibit her use of the river and have diminished her enjoyment and appreciation of the resource.
Defendant argues that the alleged injuries to Ms. Brevoort's aesthetic, recreational, and spiritual interests do not satisfy the standing requirement because they are either unfounded or not fairly traceable to defendant's unlawful discharges. Defendant argues that any fears or concerns Ms. Brevoort has about utilizing the river are unreasonable because the POTW did not exceed its permit limitations at any point during the relevant period. "The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing, however, is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff." Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181, 120 S.Ct. 693. Ms. Brevoort states, and defendant does not dispute, that she would like to utilize the river near Mount Vernon more often and for a wider range of activities, but does not do so because of the presence of pollutants. Her enjoyment of the river is diminished as a result of the existence of pollution in the water even in the absence of proof that any particular contaminant has reached a level at which the water is unsafe. The same situation was presented in Laidlaw, where the trial court found that there was "no demonstrated proof of harm to the environment" from Laidlaw's discharge of mercury in excess of its permit limitations. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court determined that "environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the challenged activity," notwithstanding the lack of injury to the environment. Id. at 183, 120 S.Ct. 693.
Defendant's primary argument appears to be that Ms. Brevoort's injuries are not fairly traceable to defendant's permit violations. Defendant argues that the expert opinions of David LaLiberte and Joseph Leyda are inadmissible, leaving no
Plaintiff must also satisfy the statutory standing requirements for bringing a citizen's suit under the Clean Water Act. The Clean Water Act authorizes any citizen to commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person who is alleged to have violated an effluent standard or limitation. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). A "citizen" is defined as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). The Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of the Clean Water Act and concluded that the statutory grant of standing is at least as broad as Article III. Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16-17, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). Thus, because plaintiff is able to prove an injury that satisfies Article III, it has "an interest which is or may be adversely affected" by the alleged discharge.
Defendant does not dispute the underlying records on which plaintiff bases its allegations of permit violations or plaintiff's calculations regarding the number and extent of violations. The Court therefore finds that defendant is liable under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317, for violating numeric effluent limitations for BOD, TSS, and pH contained in condition S1 of state waste discharge permit ST0003861 as follows:
Violations of Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) Limit Limit: 1430 lbs/day, 3-day rolling average Components of 3-day average BOD
Date average BOD lbs/day 03/04/08 2274 03/05/08 1592 03/06/08 1251 3-day average 1706 08/18/09 1931 08/19/09 1551 08/20/09 1678 3-day average 1720 08/21/09 1112 3-day average 1447 08/26/09 1024 08/27/09 2001 08/28/09 1690 3-day average 1572 12/07/10 1729 12/08/10 1592 12/09/10 4329 3-day average 2550 12/10/10 1000 3-day average 2307 12/11/10 799 3-day average 2043 12/14/10 1655 12/15/10 2058 12/16/10 1841 3-day average 1851 12/17/10 794 3-day average 1564 01/25/11 1033 01/26/11 2383 01/27/11 1102 3-day average 1506 01/28/11 892 3-day average 1459 02/01/11 1140 02/02/11 1879 02/03/11 1685 3-day average 1568 02/04/11 1180 3-day average 1581 02/08/11 1475
02/09/11 1501 02/10/11 1549 3-day average 1508 02/11/11 1497 3-day average 1516 05/26/11 1248 05/27/11 1560 05/28/11 2159 3-day average 1656 05/29/11 1540 3-day average 1753 06/14/11 1620 06/15/11 1647 06/16/11 1036 3-day average 1434 07/19/11 1520 07/20/11 1889 07/21/11 1037 3-day average 1482 07/22/11 1696 3-day average 1541 01/18/12 853 01/19/12 1652 01/20/12 1935 3-day average 1480 01/21/12 824 3-day average 1470 12/11/12 1629 12/12/12 1306 12/13/12 1371 3-day average 1435 07/16/13 1390 07/17/13 1533 07/18/13 1618 3-day average 1514 11/13/13 1655 11/14/13 1513 11/15/13 1286 3-day average 1485 12/11/13 1232 12/12/13 1327
3-day average 1450 Total Violation Days = 58
Violations of Total Suspended Solids (TSS) Limit Limit: 825 lbs/day, 3-day rolling average Components of 3-day average Date TSS lbs/day 03/03/08 62 03/04/08 1674 03/05/08 930 3-day average 889 03/06/08 671 3-day average 1092 04/28/08 42 04/29/08 1070 04/30/08 1409 3-day average 840 05/01/08 704 3-day average 1061 05/02/08 476 3-day average 863 06/19/08 430 06/20/08 1035 06/21/08 1517 3-day average 994 06/22/08 379 3-day average 977 07/15/08 987 07/16/08 1193 07/17/08 507 3-day average 896 01/02/09 97 01/03/09 1253 01/04/09 1165 03/11/09 487 03/12/09 892 03/13/09 1402 3-day average 927 03/14/09 597 3-day average 964 05/27/09 740 05/28/09 1211
05/29/09 714 3-day average 888 06/09/09 665 06/10/09 1109 06/11/09 754 3-day average 843 08/17/10 414 08/18/10 1130 08/19/10 1092 3-day average 879 08/20/10 460 3-day average 894 10/12/10 1165 10/13/10 1018 10/14/10 523 3-day average 902 11/30/10 756 12/01/10 885 12/02/10 1024 3-day average 888 12/03/10 610 3-day average 840 12/07/10 851 12/08/10 1479 12/09/10 1977 3-day average 1436 12/10/10 628 3-day average 1361 12/11/10 488 3-day average 1031 01/01/11 715 01/03/11 424 01/04/11 1363 3-day average 834 02/01/11 654 02/02/11 1310 02/03/11 767 3-day average 910 02/04/11 595 3-day average 891 05/03/11 1058
05/04/11 1036 05/05/11 776 3-day average 957 05/26/11 549 05/27/11 786 05/28/11 1570 3-day average 968 05/29/11 1298 3-day average 1218 05/31/11 447 3-day average 1105 06/01/11 788 3-day average 844 05/21/12 157 05/22/12 1553 05/23/12 1108 3-day average 939 05/24/12 673 3-day average 1111 05/25/12 793 3-day average 858 05/26/12 769 05/27/12 1080 3-day average 881 05/30/12 810 05/31/12 1148 06/01/12 1154 3-day average 1037 06/02/12 621 3-day average 974 07/16/13 780 07/17/13 964 07/18/13 1166 3-day average 970 07/19/13 533 3-day average 888 Total Violation Days = 76
Violations of pH Limit: Not outside the range of 6.0 to 11.0 Standard Units (S.U.) Date Minimum pH (S.U.) Maximum pH (S.U.) 3/5/2008 3.4 3/20/2008 4.6 12/15/2008 3.4 12/16/2008 5.1 1/1/2009 2.8
6/2009 5.6 6/25/2012 5.5 10/8/2012 5.2 10/9/2012 5.6 10/19/2012 4.7 10/24/2012 4.6 12/4/2012 4.95 12.0 12/5/2012 3.6 12/7/2012 5.5 12/13/2012 5.0 12/14/2012 3.7 12/17/2012 5.0 1/5/2013 4.9 1/15/2013 4.8 1/21/2013 4.6 1/24/2013 4.1 1/26/2013 3.9 12.7 2/1/2013 4.3 12.8 2/2/2013 4.4 2/3/2013 11.5 2/5/2013 4.7 12.6 2/7/2013 3.9 2/8/2013 4.75 2/10/2013 5.1 12.9 2/11/2013 4.5 2/12/2013 3.7 2/14/2013 3.6 2/15/2013 4.05 12.3 2/19/2013 4.95 12.55 2/22/2013 4.0 12.0 2/23/2013 13.4 2/26/2013 4.6 2/27/2013 4.2 3/6/2013 4.1 12.6 3/11/2012 4.9 3/15/2013 4.8 3/16/2013 4.4 4/1/2013 11.6 4/15/2013 4.82 4/16/2013 5.4 4/17/2013 5.6 4/19/2013 3.58 4/20/2013 5.56 5/1/2013 4.8 5/2/2013 5.6 5/9/2013 4.0 5/10/2013 4.6 5/11/2013 5.6 5/13/2013 2.7
5/14/2013 4.8 5/15/2013 5.2 11.5 5/16/2013 11.4 5/18/2013 12.6 5/19/2013 4.0 5/26/2013 4.2 11.1 5/28/2013 11.2 5/31/2013 12.4 6/1/2013 12.0 6/2/2013 11.2 6/8/2013 5.8 6/10/2013 5.3 12.2 6/11/2013 5.5 11.2 6/12/2013 5.8 6/13/2013 5.4 6/14/2013 5.9 6/19/2013 5.8 6/27/2013 5.0 7/1/2013 2.6 12.2 7/2/2013 5.2 12.0 7/5/2013 4.0 11.6 7/6/2013 4.0 11.6 7/7/2013 2.4 7/9/2013 5.7 7/10/2013 4.7 7/11/2013 4.8 7/12/2013 5.4 7/13/2013 5.4 7/15/2013 5.5 7/19/2013 5.6 7/20/2013 5.7 12.2 7/21/2013 4.6 7/22/2013 4.4 12.0 7/27/2013 5.7 7/30/2013 5.0 7/31/2013 5.8 11.8 8/3/2013 4.2 8/4/2013 5.4 8/6/2013 5.9 8/8/2013 12.0 8/11/2013 5.6 8/28/2013 4.6 11/13/2013 4.8 11/26/2013 4.2 12/9/2013 5.0 12.1 12/10/2013 5.6 12/11/2013 5.7 11.2 12/12/2013 11.3 12/17/2013 5.7
12/19/2013 12.0 12/21/2013 12.3 12/24/2013 11.9 12/25/2013 2.4 12.4 12/26/2013 5.5 11.9 12/28/2013 11.2 12/29/2013 11.8 12/30/2013 12/31/2013 11.5 1/3/2014 12.4 1/4/2014 11.1 1/5/2015 11.2 1/6/2014 11.9 1/11/2014 4.7 12.3 1/12/2014 12.2 1/22/2014 4.1 1/30/2014 5.9 Total Violation Days = 143
Defendant's state waste discharge permit requires it to "treat all industrial wastes containing pollutants by using all known, available, and reasonable methods for treatment prior to discharge to the sanitary sewer." Dkt. #44-1, § S4.C.5. Plaintiff seeks a determination that, as of October 23, 2012 (the date on which the complaint in this case was filed), defendant was in violation of this permit requirement. Plaintiff's evidence consists of (1) the undisputed fact that defendant's then-existing dissolved air flotation ("DAF") system had failed to prevent numerous discharges in excess of the numeric permit limitations; (2) other poultry processing facilities, including nine out of ten facilities owned by defendant's grandparent company that discharged to POTWs, utilized equalization tanks as part of their pretreatment systems; (3) one food processing facility and a number of chemical facilities utilized flocculation chambers in their pretreatment systems; and (4) defendant installed both an equalization tank and a flocculation chamber in December 2013. Defendant argues that Washington's Department of Ecology ("DOE") found that its DAF system satisfied the AKART requirement when it reissued the permit on September 30, 2010, and that plaintiffs cannot challenge that determination in the context of this suit.
RCW 90.48.520 requires DOE to review a permit applicant's "operations and incorporate permit conditions which require all known, available, and reasonable methods to control toxicants in the applicant's wastewater." DOE incorporated just such a requirement in defendant's 2010 permit. In an accompanying "Fact Sheet," DOE provided an explanation of its permit decisions. With regards to the AKART provision, DOE stated that it would not impose any "specific limitations based on AKART criteria," but that it "considers the performance of [defendant's] DAF system to be consistent with AKART requirements." Dkt. #53-7 at 3. Defendant argues that this statement conclusively establishes its compliance with the permit's AKART requirement. Plaintiff argues that the quoted statements are inadmissible as undisclosed
The AKART requirement is "clearly meant to foster the use of new emission control technology" in the hopes of someday "extinguish[ing] sources of water quality degradation." Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 102 Wn.App. 783, 789, 792, 9 P.3d 892 (2000). Defendant's argument that a statement in the "Fact Sheet" should trump the express permit requirement that defendant use "all known, available, and reasonable" treatment methods is factually and legally unsupported. There is no indication that DOE intended that defendant use the "Fact Sheet" as a shield against any technological upgrades that became available during the permit's five year term. Nor is it clear that DOE would have the power to do so: a preemptive declaration of AKART compliance, notwithstanding changes in the permitee's operations or the availability of new technologies, would thwart the legislature's express command in RCW 90.48.520 and, in fact, the express requirements of the permit.
The "Fact Sheet" is not meaningless, however. One could argue that, at least as of September 30, 2010, DOE believed that defendant's DAF system satisfied the AKART requirement. While such a finding would not bind plaintiff or the fact finder in this litigation (Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res., 299 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[N]either the text of the Act nor its legislative history expressly grants to the EPA or [an authorized] state agency the exclusive authority to decide whether the release of a substance into the waters of the United States violates the Clean Water Act."); Sierra Club v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 663 F.Supp.2d 983, 997 (D.Or.2009) ("The citizen suit provisions in both [the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act] are nearly identical, and grant citizens the right to challenge the actions of companies alleged to be in violation of the law, regardless of whether the government believes them to be in violation of the law.")), it is evidence that weighs in favor of defendant on the AKART claim. Plaintiff's objections to the admissibility of the "Fact Sheet" are overruled. The "Fact Sheet" is not subject to the disclosure requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2): it is not an expert witness, nor was the person(s) who created it "retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case." With regards to the hearsay objection, the "Fact Sheet" is a "record or statement of a public office" which sets out factual findings following a legally authorized application and review process under Fed. R. Ev. 803(8). Plaintiff is free to argue that the investigation and review of defendant's wastewater treatment system was cursory, that the statement is ambiguous, and/or other factors that might reduce the weight given the statement (see Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir.2010)), but the Court finds that the source of the "Fact Sheet" and the context in which it was created are sufficient indications of trustworthiness to warrant its admission into evidence.
The question, then, is whether either party has shown that it is entitled to summary adjudication on the AKART claim. Determining whether defendant utilized "all known, available, and reasonable methods" to treat its wastewater throughout the limitations period will require consideration of available technologies, their application in the food processing industry, and the financial and operational burdens of adoption. The state legislature has made clear that the goal of ensuring the purity of the waters of the state must be pursued in a way that is consistent with not only public health and wildlife protection,
On August 13, 2012, plaintiff sent a Notice of Intent to Sue, as required by 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). The notice advised "Draper Valley Holdings LLC dba Draper Valley Farms" that plaintiff intended to file a citizen's suit against "Draper Valley Farms, Inc.," under the Clean Water Act. Dkt. #47-1. Suit was subsequently filed against Draper Valley Holdings LLC dba Draper Valley Farms. Defendant argues that the insertion of "Inc." in the notice made it impossible for the recipient to identify "the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation." 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. This argument is not well-taken. Taken in the context of the remainder of the notice, defendant could not possibly have been confused about the identity of the alleged polluter: plaintiff clearly identified the relevant permit number (which identified Draper Valley Farms, Inc, as the permitee), the location of the slaughterhouse facility, and the dates on which violations were alleged to occur. Although the record shows that defendant used at least three names while operating the Mount Vernon facility, there is no indication that, upon receipt of the Notice of Intent to Sue, it was in any way confused regarding the identity of the entity responsible for the alleged violations. The notice provided on August 13, 2012, was sufficient.
For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #41) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #49) is DENIED.
