KAREN L. STROMBOM, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff has brought this matter for judicial review of the defendant Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental security income ("SSI"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the parties' briefs and the remaining record, the Court hereby orders that for the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits is affirmed.
On September 8, 2011, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI, alleging disability as of January 1, 2011, due to heart problems, migraine headaches, asthma, depression, and hypertension.
On March 19, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ's decision should be reversed and remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings, because the ALJ erred in (1) failing to develop the record as to Plaintiff's prior finding of disability, (2) failing to call a medical expert in rendering stepthree findings, and (3) failing to explain why the credited opinions of State agency medical consultants were not fully adopted. For the reasons set forth below, the Court disagrees that the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff to be not disabled, and therefore affirms the Commissioner's decision.
The determination of the Commissioner that a claimant is not disabled must be upheld by the Court, if the "proper legal standards" have been applied and the "substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports" that determination.
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Plaintiff testified at the administrative hearing that the Commissioner had previously found him disabled, but discontinued his benefits for non-medical reasons. AR 57. The administrative record in this case indicates that Plaintiff was previously found disabled at the initial level in April 1999, and that his benefits were terminated in July 2003. AR 178. Plaintiff subsequently applied for benefits, and that application was denied at the initial level in June 2006.
Plaintiff cites no Ninth Circuit authority finding that a prior determination terminated for non-medical reasons is relevant to a subsequent application, although he cites a Second Circuit case for that proposition. Dkt. 13 at 3 (citing
In this case, the connection between Plaintiff's prior determination and his current application is exceedingly more tenuous. Plaintiff's benefits were terminated nearly ten years before the administrative hearing, and an intervening application for benefits was denied and not appealed. Plaintiff is not now arguing that the 2003 benefits termination was inappropriate, or that the 1999 finding of disability should have given rise to a presumption of continuing disability. Plaintiff is narrowly arguing that the 1999 finding of disability is relevant to the current application because it was allegedly based on the same theory of disability, namely his heart condition. ECF # 13 at 6.
Plaintiff's current application, however, alleges that his disability began on January 2011. AR 164-70. The basis for the 1999 determination is therefore not relevant to determining whether Plaintiff was disabled during the relevant period under the ALJ's consideration. In the absence of a plausible theory as to how the prior determination could be relevant to his current application, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record regarding his prior award of benefits.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to obtain expert testimony as to whether his heart condition met or medically equaled a listing.
At step three of the sequential evaluation of disability, the ALJ considers whether one or more of a claimant's impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations. The Listing of Impairments (the "listings") describes specific impairments of each of the major body systems "which are considered severe enough to prevent a person from doing any gainful activity."
Each listing sets forth the "symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings" that must be established in order for claimant's impairment to meet the listing.
Plaintiff acknowledges that he bears the burden to show that he meets or equals a listing, yet also argues that the ALJ should have queried a medical expert on this issue. ECF # 13 at 7. In his opening brief, Plaintiff does not acknowledge that the State agency medical consultants considered whether his heart condition met a listing, and found that it did not.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in affording significant weight to the opinions of the State agency medical consultants, yet failing to explain why she did not credit their opinion that Plaintiff is limited to sedentary work.
Plaintiff's argument rests on a mischaracterization of the record. The State agency medical consultant opined at the initial level of review that Plaintiff was limited to sitting for six hours per workday and standing or walking for two hours, with the ability to lift/carry ten pounds frequently or occasionally. AR 71. Such restrictions would be consistent with sedentary work. But on reconsideration, the State agency medical consultant opined that Plaintiff could sit for six hours per workday and stand or walk for four hours, and could lift/carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, and these restrictions are consistent with light work. AR 86-87. The ALJ's residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment is consistent with the State agency medical consultant's opinion rendered upon reconsideration. AR 20-21.
Furthermore, the ALJ's hypothetical posed to the VE assumed a sedentary RFC, and the VE identified a significant number of jobs consistent with the hypothetical. AR 59-61. The ALJ's step-five findings describe sedentary work that exists in significant numbers. AR 27. Thus, even if the ALJ should have explained why she relied upon one State agency opinion over the other, any error was harmless because the ALJ identified sedentary work that Plaintiff could perform.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court hereby finds the ALJ properly concluded Plaintiff was not disabled. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits is AFFIRMED.