ROBERT H. WHALEY, Senior District Judge.
Before the Court is (1) Defendant/Petitioner's Motion to Vacate Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ECF No. 43, and (2) a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, ECF No. 50. These motions were decided without oral argument.
On March 3, 2004, Petitioner pled guilty to being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(a)(6). ECF No. 13. This Court eventually sentenced him to 200 months incarceration, five years of supervised release, and a special penalty assessment of $100.00. ECF No. 29.
On June 27, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence. ECF No. 43. The main substantive issue in Petitioner's motion is whether the Supreme Court's decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013) is retroactively applicable. As a case on this precise issue was making its way through the Ninth Circuit at the time, the Court entered an order staying this action until the case was decided. ECF No. 49. The case, Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2015), has been decided and accordingly, the Court lifts the stay in this case. For the reasons set forth below, the Court also denies Petitioner's motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), a one year period of limitations applies to petitions filed under § 2255. The relevant provision states that the one-year limitations period shall run from the latest of:
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The only timeliness issue before the Court is in regards to sub-paragraph three. It is agreed that sub-paragraphs one, two, and four of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) do not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. See ECF Nos. 43 at 5 and 50 at 3. The Court stayed this matter to see if sub-paragraph three could potentially be applicable. More specifically, if Descamps announced a new right and that right was made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, Defendant's petition would be timely. The retroactive applicability of the Descamps decision was an issue in the Ezell case.
While the opinion issued in Ezell did not specifically resolve the retroactivity issue
Other circuit courts who have squarely addressed the question of the timeliness of using the date of the Descamps decision as the one-year triggering event under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) have all found that Descamps decision is not considered to be retroactive. See Groves v. United States, 755 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2014); Wilson v. Warden, FCC Coleman, 581 Fed. Appx. 750 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curium); Whittaker v. Chandler, 574 Fed. Appx. 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curium); United States v. Tenderholt, 587 Fed.Appx. 505 (10th Cir. 2014).
Other district courts within the Ninth Circuit have similarly held that the Supreme Court has not made Descamps retroactive. See Knight v. United States, 2015 WL 731443 (D. Idaho Feb. 19, 2015); Lai v. Copenhaver, 2014 WL 4211110 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2014); United States v. Lawrence, 2014 WL 4264800 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2014) ("Because Descamps did not create a newly recognized right, [petitioner] cannot rely on that decision's date (June 20, 2013) as permitting a timely Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).").
The Court finds that Defendant's Petition is not timely because the one-year limitations period found in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) has elapsed. There is no precedent enabling the Court to conclude that Descamps has been made retroactively applicable, so Defendant's Petition cannot be timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).
Additionally, with good cause having been shown, the Court grants counsel's motion to withdraw.
Accordingly,
1. The Court lifts the stay in this matter.
2. Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
3. Counsel's Motion to Withdraw,