Filed: Sep. 16, 2015
Latest Update: Sep. 16, 2015
Summary: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT MARSHA J. PECHMAN , Chief District Judge . THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 30.) Having considered the Parties' briefing and the related record, the Court DENIES the motion. The Court first notes that because Plaintiffs' motion asks the Court to revisit its conclusion that attorney Douglas Anderson was not covered as an appointed official under the insurance policy
Summary: ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT MARSHA J. PECHMAN , Chief District Judge . THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 30.) Having considered the Parties' briefing and the related record, the Court DENIES the motion. The Court first notes that because Plaintiffs' motion asks the Court to revisit its conclusion that attorney Douglas Anderson was not covered as an appointed official under the insurance policy a..
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARSHA J. PECHMAN, Chief District Judge.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 30.) Having considered the Parties' briefing and the related record, the Court DENIES the motion.
The Court first notes that because Plaintiffs' motion asks the Court to revisit its conclusion that attorney Douglas Anderson was not covered as an appointed official under the insurance policy at issue—the conclusion that formed the basis for the Court's fraudulent joinder finding—Plaintiffs' motion is perhaps more accurately considered an untimely motion for reconsideration. (See Dkt. No. 27.) Nevertheless, the Court addresses Plaintiffs' motion on the merits.
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment that attorney Douglas Anderson was an appointed official of Grant County and thus was covered under the insurance policy at issue in this case. (Dkt. No. 30 at 1.) Plaintiffs argue that the phrase "appointed official" is not defined in the policy and that under the ordinary meaning of the phrase, Mr. Anderson should be considered an appointed official. (Id. at 2-4, 8-15.) In support of their position, Plaintiffs cite to various county documents and provisions of Washington law that refer generally to the public defense. (Id.)
The insurance policy covers "amounts any protected person is legally required to pay as damages," and defines "protected person" to include, among others, WRCIP and its member counties, the "elected or appointed officials" of WRCIP and its member counties, and the "employees" of WRCIP and its member counties. (Dkt. No. 16-6 at 2, 5.) The policy defines "employee" to exclude independent contractors, but does not define "elected or appointed official." (Id. at 5.) Under the "volunteer worker" subsection of the "Who is Protected Under This Agreement" section, the policy differentiates between independent contractors and appointed officials, stating "`volunteer worker' means any person who performs duties related to the conduct of your operations, other than an employee, any of your elected or appointed officials . . . or any independent contractors." (Dkt. No. 16-6 at 6.)
As this Court has already determined, (Dkt. No. 27), Mr. Anderson was an independent contractor and not an appointed official, and therefore was not covered under the policy:
The policy excludes independent contractors from coverage and differentiates between independent contractors and appointed officials, and Plaintiffs fail to explain why Mr. Anderson should otherwise be considered an "appointed official." Furthermore, there is good reason to conclude that Grant County (and, by extension, WRCIP) specifically did not insure Mr. Anderson: Mr. Anderson's contract with Grant County required him to maintain private malpractice insurance, to name the county as a co-insured, and to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless Grant County (as well as Grant County's "appointed officers") against negligence liability and other costs. (Dkt. No. 16-4 at 15-16.)
(Dkt. No. 27 at 4-5.)
The Court again concludes that Mr. Anderson was not an appointed official, and thus was not covered under the policy. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 30) is DENIED.
The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.
