RICHARD A. JONES, District Judge.
The court rules on the defendant's motions in limine (Dkt. #364) as follows:
The court references United States v. Laurensen, 2000 WL 1693538 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000) as a basis for the ground rules on this motion. Absent a good faith basis, defense counsel is not permitted to present evidence or arguments on defendant's behalf that directly contradicts specific factual assertions summarized in the government's summary of the proffer.
It does not appear the defense disputes the contents of the government's summary. That being the case, the only issue on the ineffective assistance issue is how far defense counsel is permitted to go in their questions and arguments.
Much of that answer depends upon how counsel frames their questions in light of the general categories outlined on pages 3 and 4 of the defendant's motions in limine. The court will not rule in a vacuum on the questions defense counsel will be permitted to ask. Consequently, the court will reserve ruling on the specifics of this motion due to the uncertainty of the precise questions to be asked. This determination will be made in trial.
The court does agree, however, with the categorical limitations on what the defense may challenge in the presentation of the defense: The sufficiency of evidence, calling into question the credibility of government witnesses, questioning witnesses about their knowledge, qualifications and motive to testify, and challenging inconsistencies in the evidence.
In addition, defense counsel is permitted to ask questions outside the bounds of factual admissions made by Mr. Seleznev during the interview. In order for the court to rule upon any specific objection to a question by the defense that the government believes was covered during the interview, the court expects the government to precisely indicate where in the proffer the restriction should be applied.
The defense challenges the government's FRE 1006 offering of a variety of exhibits on grounds that the offering is not voluminous, that the data is easily readable and contains information that is easily accessible to the jury, easily explained by the source document, or that it does not condense information from voluminous records. Based upon these challenges, the defense argues the exhibits should not be allowed as substantive evidence.
Rule 1006 has three conditions that must be satisfied to support admissibility:
1. The writings must be voluminous;
2. There must be a proper foundation for introduction of summary i.e., the originals must be admissible;
3. Originals must be made available for examination or copying.
The defense appears to primarily contest only the first of the conditions, i.e., are the documents voluminous.
In the order raised by the defense, the court rules as follows:
The defendant's challenge could properly be denied for the sole reason that it is an untimely new motion raised for the first time in a reply brief. But in the interest of resolving all of the issues before trial, it will be considered.
The government has responded via proffer that the evidence at trial will establish that the underlying records maintained by the card brands are regularly-conducted activity. The government has also detailed in their response to defendant's motion (Dkt. #391) the manner in which they will establish that these records were maintained in the regular course of business. The court will hold the government to this representation. If it fails to establish the same, the summary exhibit will not be admitted, but it would be improper to exclude the summary at this juncture.
In addition, the record appears to indicate the government has produced all of the underlying evidence to the defense to support their summary. The defense will certainly have the opportunity to cross-examine or voir dire Ms. Wood as to any discrepancies they believe exist.
For all of these reasons the motion is denied.
Accordingly, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The court reserves ruling on this motion in the event this witness attends the trial.
However, the government will be permitted to offer evidence of common hacker methodology so long as they are not offering evidence of personal attributes or personal characteristics of the defendant.
Modus operandi testimony is traditionally allowed testimony in the Ninth Circuit. It is common practice to allow this type of testimony to help the jury understand the significance of certain pieces of evidence. The examples provided by the government (gangs, drug dealers, street terminology) certainly fit within this practice. Most recently this court in a sex trafficking case allowed modus operandi testimony to explain the relationship between pimps and prostitutes (United States v. Powell, CR15-244RAJ). The modus operandi type evidence proposed by the government is not objectionable and such testimony upon proper foundation will be permitted. To this extent the defendant's motion is denied.
It is also understood that any witness testifying as an expert must have the proper foundation established to allow their testimony as an expert.
First, no combination lay/expert witness will be permitted to state an opinion as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition to constitute an element of the crime or a defense thereto. Nor will any such testimony be permitted regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
The court will not require the bifurcation of testimony as proposed by the defense.
The court will, however, direct the government to clarify to the extent possible when the witness is testifying as an expert. This can be done simply by prefacing a question with: "Is it your professional opinion that. . . ."
It would also be helpful for the defense to submit a proposed instruction on the receipt of dualized testimony that could be read to the jury in advance of any witness fitting into this category.
Accordingly, this motion is granted in part and denied in part.
The government is not intending to offer or elicit such testimony so this issue is moot.
See response to Section (E) above.
This motion is granted. No evidence of any pending charges in Nevada or Georgia will be permitted.
This motion is granted. The government is, however, permitted to have Special Agent David Mills present at counsel table as the case agent pursuant to Rule 615 (b).
This motion is granted.
The court orders that the government shall advise counsel of the expected order of witnesses for the following day of trial. This has been the customary practice of this court.
To the extent possible, the government should strive to provide as much notice as possible of the expected order witnesses, even as far out as 48 hours.