THOMAS O. RICE, Chief District Judge.
BEFORE THE COURT are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 14, 16. This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the administrative record and the parties' completed briefing, and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion and grants Defendant's motion.
The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
A district court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under §405(g) is limited: the Commissioner's decision will be disturbed "only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error." Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). "Substantial evidence" means relevant evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 1159 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence equates to "more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). In determining whether this standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation. Id.
In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. If the evidence in the record "is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, a district court "may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is harmless." Id. An error is harmless "where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ's] ultimate nondisability determination." Id. at 1115 (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ's decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).
A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant's impairment must be "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v); 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant's work activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i); 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity," the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b); 416.920(b).
If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the analysis proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant's impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities," the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); 416.920(c). If the claimant's impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id.
At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant's impairment to several impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe or more severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d); 416.920(d).
If the severity of the claimant's impairment does meet or exceed the severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant's "residual functional capacity." Residual functional capacity ("RFC"), defined generally as the claimant's ability to perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1)), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis.
At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past ("past relevant work"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f); 416.920(f). If the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five.
At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant's RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant's age, education and work experience. Id. If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1); 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, the analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits. Id.
The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such work "exists in significant numbers in the national economy." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c); 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, dated March 9, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2012. Tr. 184-90. Plaintiff's claims were denied initially, and upon reconsideration. Tr. 79-98, 101-24. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, Tr. 150, which was held on April 22, 2014. Tr. 46-75. On April 29, 2014, the ALJ rendered a decision denying Plaintiff's claims. Tr. 21-33.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2012, the alleged onset date. Tr. 23. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: cervical and lumbar spondylosis; mild cervicalgia and lumbago; depressive disorder; and mild anxiety. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a listed impairment. Tr. 24. The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
Tr. 26. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff is able to perform past relevant work. Tr. 31. At step five, the ALJ found that, in the alternative, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and residual functioning capacity, there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can also perform, such as housekeeper, cleaner, production assembler, document preparer, or cashier. Tr. 32-33. On that basis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. Tr. 33.
On August 12, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, TR. 1-4, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1481, 422.210.
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision denying her disability benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. ECF No. 14. Plaintiff raises the following two issues for review:
ECF No. 14. The Court evaluates each issue in turn.
First, Plaintiff contends the ALJ improperly conducted an adverse credibility analysis. ECF 14 at 11. In support Plaintiff asserts that (1) her physical and mental symptoms were not inconsistent with objective medical evidence; (2) the ALJ finding that Plaintiff's mental symptoms were well-managed with medication is not supported by the record; and (3) the ALJ finding that Plaintiff's mental symptoms were situational rather than related to her functioning is not supported by the record. Id. at 12.
An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. "First, the ALJ must determine whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged." Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The claimant is not required to show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom." Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, "[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives `specific, clear and convincing reasons' for the rejection." Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). "General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints." Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant's testimony."). "The clear and convincing [evidence] standard is the most demanding required in Social Security cases." Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the [Plaintiff's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision." Tr. 27. Because there is no evidence of malingering in this case, the Court must determine whether the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons not to credit Plaintiff's testimony regarding the limiting effect of her symptoms. Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012).
This Court finds the ALJ provided specific, clear, and convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff's statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms not entirely credible—specifically, the medical evidence did not support the degree of physical and mental limitation alleged by Plaintiff. Tr. 27.
As for her physical limitations, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred as evidenced by the single notation in an April 8, 2013 medical record showing "SLR 80 degrees bilateral." ECF No. 14 at 12 (citing Tr. 363). Concerning this record, the ALJ found
Tr. 29. The ALJ found the medical evidence did not support the degree of physical limitation alleged by Plaintiff. The ALJ set out, in detail, the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff's physical impairments, see Tr. 24-29, and ultimately concluded that the medical record did not support Plaintiff's allegedly debilitating impairments and associated limitations. Tr. 27. The one positive straight leg raising test, in context with the entire report, does not show the ALJ erred in his finding.
Next, Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred because "Dr. Comrie found mental impairments, which the VE testified were preclusive of gainful employment." ECF No. 14 at 12. The ALJ set out, in detail, the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff's impairments, see Tr. 24-29, and ultimately concluded that her allegations were inconsistent with the medical evidence. Specifically with regards to Dr. Comrie, the ALJ found:
Tr. 30-31. Moreover, the ALJ found that State Agency Medical Consultant Dr. Alex Fisher's (PhD) opinion was consistent with the record including the opinions of other medical experts such as Drs. Everhart and Comrie. The ALJ also observed that Dr. Fisher found:
Tr. 31. Thus, the ALJ set forth Plaintiff's limitations in his RFC finding which were supported by the experts, but not those which were exaggerated by the Plaintiff. No error has been shown.
Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by finding that her mental symptoms were well-managed with medication when Dr. Comrie found that even with medication Plaintiff continued to have symptoms that resulted in mental impairments. ECF No. 14 at 12 (citing to Tr. 97). Dr. Comrie made no such finding. See Tr. 89-98. Furthermore, the ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff's mental health symptoms were well-managed with medication since the alleged onset date, and, additionally, that her symptoms did not persist to a significant degree despite her cessation of treatment and her prescribed medication. Tr. 28. No error has been shown.
Next, Plaintiff contends the ALJ's finding that her mental symptoms were situational rather than related to her functioning is not supported by the record. ECF No. 14 at 12. Treatment notes reflected familial stressors and problems unrelated to Plaintiff's actual functioning. Tr. 28. Moreover, Plaintiff reported that on February 21, 2013, she "had not been taking any prescribed medication, and endorsed feeling well." Tr. 28. While "it is error to reject a claimant's testimony merely because symptoms wax and wane in the course of treatment," an ALJ may rely on examples of "broader development" of improvement when finding a claimant's testimony not credible. Garrison, 759 F.3d 1017-18 ("While ALJs obviously must rely on examples to show why they do not believe that a claimant is credible, the data points they choose must in fact constitute examples of a broader development to satisfy the applicable `clear and convincing' standard.").
Plaintiff makes no argument that the ALJ's chosen examples from the record evidencing improvement with treatment do not demonstrate broader improvement. Further, while the failure to seek mental health treatment may not be a legitimate basis to reject a claimant's symptom claims, see Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996), the lack of credible evidence in the record corroborating the extent of mental health limitations can be, see Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113-14.
Plaintiff has not shown the challenged and all the unchallenged inconsistencies between the Plaintiff's alleged physical and mental limitations and the medical evidence do not provide a valid reason for discounting Plaintiff's credibility. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958; see also Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) ("While subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in determining the severity of the claimant's pain and its disabling effects."). Accordingly, this Court finds no error.
Plaintiff faults the ALJ for improperly considering the medical opinion evidence in determining Plaintiff's residual functioning capacity. ECF No. 14 at 14-15. Specifically, Plaintiff asks this Court to consider the ALJ's evaluation of the opinions of Dr. Salina and fully accept the opinions of Dr. Comrie. Id.
There are three types of physicians: "(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant but who review the claimant's file (nonexamining or reviewing physicians)." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001) (brackets omitted). "Generally, a treating physician's opinion carries more weight than an examining physician's, and an examining physician's opinion carries more weight than a reviewing physician's." Id. "In addition, the regulations give more weight to opinions that are explained than to those that are not, and to the opinions of specialists concerning matters relating to their specialty over that of nonspecialists." Id. (citations omitted).
If a treating or examining physician's opinion is uncontradicted, an ALJ may reject it only by offering "clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence." Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). "However, the ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory and inadequately supported by clinical findings." Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). "If a treating or examining doctor's opinion is contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence." Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31).
Although the contrary opinion of a non-examining medical expert does not alone constitute a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting a treating or examining physician's opinion, it may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1989)).
This Court finds the ALJ properly considered the opinion of Dr. Salina in determining the residual functional capacity assessment. As Plaintiff concedes, ECF No. 14 at 15, if contradicted by another doctor's opinion, the ALJ need only have provided "specific and legitimate" reasoning for rejecting Dr. Salina's opinion regarding Plaintiff's physical functioning. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216.
The ALJ correctly notes the record does not indicate that Dr. Salina himself examined or treated Plaintiff. Tr. 30; 347-57. The only statement rendered by Dr. Salina is "Without doing an impairment evaluation, it is my opinion that [Plaintiff] would be more suited for sedentary work." Tr. 389. This statement fits the very definition of "brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings," and the ALJ need not accept Dr. Salina's opinion. Bray, 554 F.3d at 1228. Accordingly, this Court finds the ALJ provided a specific and legitimate reason for affording Dr. Salina's opinion only limited weight.
This Court finds the ALJ properly considered Dr. Comrie's opinion in creating the residual functional capacity assessment. Although Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly incorporate Dr. Comrie's opinion, this assertion is belied by the ALJ's opinion. The ALJ afforded "significant weight" to the opinion of Dr. Comrie, a fact that Plaintiff did not contest. ECF No. 18 at 4. Interestingly, Dr. Comrie noted:
Tr. 97. Moreover, the ALJ found Dr. Comrie's opinion regarding Plaintiff's mental impairments remained consistent with those of Dr. Everhart, an examining physician. Tr. 31. The ALJ properly accounted for this opinion by limiting Plaintiff's RFC to "simple routine tasks, and well-learned complex tasks," see Tr. 26, as well as tasks where Plaintiff "can maintain concentration and pace for twohour segments, but should only have superficial interactions with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public." Tr. 26.
Plaintiff further contends that, through Dr. Comrie's opinion, the VE "determined that [Plaintiff] was incapable of sustaining gainful employment." ECF No. 18 at 4. This Court disagrees. The VE made such determination after Plaintiff's counsel added additional restrictions to the hypotheticals posed by the ALJ. Tr. 74-75. On cross-examination by Plaintiff, the vocational expert admitted that under such restrictions the Plaintiff would not be able to work in any capacity. Tr. 74. Specifically, if Plaintiff was moderately limited in carrying out detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, working with others without being distracted by them, and getting along with coworkers and peers. Tr. 73. Plaintiff's counsel added a further restriction on the term "moderate," quantifying it as "up to one-third of an eight hour workday." Tr. 74. Indeed, Plaintiff only cites to Dr. Comrie as supporting this determination. See ECF No. 14 at 15-16. But, the ALJ incorporated the findings of Dr. Comrie, among other doctors, in determining Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. ECF No. 16 at 14-15.
An ALJ may exclude restrictions in a hypothetical that are unsupported by the record or discredited as unreliable. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the ALJ properly considered Dr. Comrie's opinion along with all the other evidence in the record.
The District Court Executive is hereby directed to file this Order, enter Judgment for Defendant, provide copies to counsel, and
