JUSTIN L. QUACKENBUSH, Senior District Judge.
This long-delayed case began upon Plaintiff's paying of the filing fee on August 21, 201
On March 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion seeking to reopen the case and allow him to serve the summons and complaint. (ECF No. 11). On April 6, 2016, the court granted the Motion, reopened this matter, and gave Plaintiff 30 days to serve the summons and complaint. (ECF No. 12). On May 6, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Declaration of Service from a process server stating the summons and complaint were served on Defendant's registered agent. (ECF No. 13).
On July 8, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss which alternatively requested Plaintiff be ordered to file a more definite statement of his claims. (ECF No. 24). On July 29, 2016, Plaintiff moved for an extension of time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 28). The court granted the motion and extended Plaintiff's deadline to August
On August 31, 2016, the court denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and granted Plaintiff 30 days to file his Amended Complaint. See (ECF No. 42). At Plaintiff's request, the court extended the deadline to October
As the above procedural history establishes, Plaintiff failed throughout this litigation to timely prosecute his case. The court warned Plaintiff on eight occasions the failure to timely prosecute his case or comply with deadlines is grounds for dismissal. See (ECF No. 6 at 2); (ECF No. 8 at 2); (ECF No. 12 at 2); (ECF No. 31 at 3); (ECF No. 38 at 2); (ECF No. 42 at 4); (ECF No. 44 at 2); (ECF No. 47 at 2).
District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and "in the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal of a case." Thompson v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.3d 829, 831 (9
In determining whether to dismiss an action for failure to obey a court order or lack of prosecution, the court must consider several factors: (1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendant; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. Thompson, 782 F.2d at 831.
A presumption of injury arises from the unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9
The court has considered each of the five factors and finds dismissal is an appropriate sanction. First, this case has been unreasonably delayed by Plaintiff, resulting in the dismissal of this case for failure to serve the Summons and Complaint. Although this court chose to re-open this matter at Plaintiff's request, Plaintiff continued to delay and miss deadlines. Second, the fact this case is over a year old and has not proceeded beyond initial pleadings weighs in favor of dismissal. Third, Defendant has been prejudiced by the unreasonable delay in this matter, through both the presumption of injury and also through the fact the passage of time affects the availability of evidence and memory of witnesses. Lastly, while public policy favors disposition on the merits, there is no other less drastic alternative available to adequately address the problems described herein. The court has granted numerous extensions and accepted late filed requests for extensions. Plaintiff has not heeded the explicit warnings to meet deadlines and timely prosecute his case. The court has already dismissed this case once, but that has not stopped the pattern of delay. For all of the above reasons, the court finds the failure to prosecute and unreasonable delay of this matter in violation of the court's Orders requires dismissal of this matter with prejudice.
Based on Plaintiff's failure to prosecute and failure to comply with Orders of the court, the Clerk is directed to enter Judgment dismissing the Complaint (ECF No. 4) and the claims therein