ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

ROBERT S. LASNIK, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on "Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint." Dkt. # 107. Plaintiff, an osteopathic physician, applied for a congenital cardiac surgery clinical fellowship sponsored by the University of Washington in 2015, 2016, and 2017. His application was rejected each time. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against various entities involved in or associated with the University of Washington School of Medicine alleging that the fellowship program discriminated against him based on the fact that he is board certified by the American Osteopathic Board of Surgery rather than the American Board of Thoracic Surgeons. Defendants filed motions to dismiss which have been fully briefed and are now pending. Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to respond to some of the criticisms leveled by defendants, to supplement his factual allegations, to clarify some of his claims, and to drop his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

Courts "should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). There is a "strong policy in favor of allowing amendment" (Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1370 (9th Cir. 1994)), and "[c]ourts may decline to grant leave to amend only if there is strong evidence of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, or futility of amendment, etc." Sonoma County Ass'n of Retired Employees v. Sonoma County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The underlying purpose of Rule 15 is "to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

The provider defendants eschew any of the normal grounds for denying leave to amend, instead arguing that it would be inefficient to consider the proposed amendment before ruling on the pending motions to dismiss. To the extent plaintiff has withdrawn defective claims and/or added factual allegations in an effort to remedy defects identified by defendants, there does not seem to be any benefit in ignoring the proposed alterations. Otherwise the Court would have to rule on claims that are no longer being asserted and/or evaluate the sufficiency of claims based on only some of the facts on which plaintiff intends to rely.

The non-provider defendants argue that the proposed amendments would be futile as to the claims asserted against them. If a proposed amendment would be immediately subject to dismissal when challenged under Rule 12(b)(6)), there is no reason to put defendants through the unnecessary expense and delay of responding to the amendment. Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 787 n.12 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court finds that at least some of the proposed alterations, such as the withdrawal of claims, are not futile and declines to conduct a full merits analysis of plaintiff's antitrust claim in the context of this motion to amend. The Court will evaluate defendants' challenges to plaintiff's antitrust claim and the adequacy of plaintiff's other claims in light of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion to amend (Dkt. # 107) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to accept and file Dkt. # 107-1 as the operative pleading in this matter.