ROBERT S. LASNIK, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on "Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint." Dkt. # 16. Mr. Martin alleges that his application for appointment to the City of Mill Creek City Council was rejected in February 2018 because of his race and/or because he engaged in protected activities in 2015, 2017, and 2018. In his complaint, Mr. Martin cites to statutes and common law causes of action related to discrimination, retaliation, defamation, and intentional interference with business expectancy. Defendants are the City of Mill Creek, the six City Council members who selected another applicant for appointment to the open Council position, and the City Manager who developed the process for interviewing, nominating, and voting on the applicants. They seek dismissal of all of Mr. Martin's claims on the grounds of absolute legislative immunity, lack of evidence of unlawful activity, and the separation of powers doctrine. They argue that some of the claims asserted are subject to dismissal because there is no employer-employee relationship between Council members and any of the defendants, plaintiff failed to file a tort claim before pursing his state law causes of action, and the statutory limitations periods have run.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the entry of judgment as a matter of law. The party seeking summary dismissal of the case "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion" (
Having reviewed the memoranda, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the parties
Defendants argue that they are entitled to absolute legislative immunity from suit (
"[N]ot all governmental acts by a local legislator, or even a local legislature, are necessarily legislative in nature."
Defendants identify the relevant acts as interviewing applicants, voting until a single candidate obtained majority support, and appointing the successful applicant to the City Council. Dkt. # 16 at 6. Personnel decisions are generally administrative in nature unless they are made in the context of budget legislation which has the impact of creating, eliminating, or redefining municipal positions.
Local elected officials and appointees on the policy making level are not "employees" under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). Plaintiff cannot, therefore, assert discrimination or retaliation claims under those statutes.
Defendants argue that, although the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") does not expressly exclude elected officials or policy-making appointees from its reach, the Court should look to common law to determine whether a City Council member is "employed" by the City and therefore an "employee." As the Seventh Circuit has noted, the ADA's definition of "employee" as one who is employed by an employer "is vague and circular," necessitating resort to the common law test for determining who is and is not an employee.
Defendants assert that "[t]he undisputed evidence demonstrates Plaintiff was afforded a fair and equal opportunity to seek appointment to the vacant seat on the Mill Creek City Council through a legislative process mandated by State law." Dkt. # 16 at 11. Plaintiff alleges, however, that he is African American, that he was qualified for the Council position, and that the Council members, acting in their official capacities, chose a white applicant instead. These allegations are uncontested and, as in the Title VII context, are sufficient to raise a prima facie inference of racial discrimination.
With regards to Rebecca Polizzotto, however, there is no indication that she had any role in the decision-making that plaintiff alleges was discriminatory. As the then-City Manager, Ms. Polizzotto made recommendations regarding the process to be used in selecting an applicant for the open City Council position. Because plaintiff has not challenged the process or otherwise presented facts that could support a claim of discrimination against Ms. Polizzotto, his claims against her will be dismissed.
Based on the existing record, it appears that plaintiff failed to file a tort claim with the City of Mill Creek before filing this lawsuit. His failure to comply with the condition precedent set forth in RCW 4.96.020 requires dismissal of the state tort claims.
Defendants, relying on a reference to an event that occurred in 2015, argue that one or more unspecified claims are barred by a three-year statute of limitations. This argument is not well-taken. The complaint unambiguously alleges and is based on unlawful conduct occurring in 2018. The reference to a 2015 complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is part of plaintiff's retaliation claim: it is one of the protected activities that he believes prompted the 2018 retaliatory failure to hire. There is no limitations problem where plaintiff filed suit within months of the allegedly discriminatory appointment decision.
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 16) and plaintiff's motion opposing dismissal (Dkt. # 22) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and state tort law are DISMISSED, as is his Section 1983 claim against defendant Rebecca Polizzotto. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim against the other defendants may proceed.