ORDER

JOHN C. COUGHENOUR, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's motion to compel, for sanctions, and to modify case schedule (Dkt. No. 46). Having thoroughly considered the parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion for the reasons explained herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this citizen suit pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. § 1365, alleging, among other things, that Defendant failed to adequately inspect and maintain eight Atlantic salmon farms it operated across the Puget Sound, in violation of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6-7.) On December 13, 2018, Plaintiff served Defendant with a deposition notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 46-1 at 5.) Plaintiff identified 33 topics for which it sought testimony from Defendant. (Id. at 8-16.) As relevant to the present motion, topic 8 sought information regarding inspections Defendant conducted on the anchoring components at each of its facilities.1 (Id. at 11.) Topic 10 sought information regarding any maintenance Defendant had undertaken at its facilities since 2012. (Id. at 12.) As part of its notice, Plaintiff also instructed Defendant to produce any documents related to inspections conducted during the relevant period. (Id. at 16-17) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34).

After conferring, the parties agreed that Defendant would be deposed for two days on February 28 and March 1, 2019. (Id. at 186.) Defendant designated its General Manager, Jim Parsons, to testify on its behalf. (Id. at 25.) In the days leading up to the deposition, Defendant produced more than 30,000 pages of documents, which were purportedly responsive to Plaintiff's Rule 34 request as well as to topics 8 and 10.2 (Id. at 209-13.) These documents included, for example, dive logs that appear to show the removal of dead fish from Defendant's facilities. (Id. at 289-313.)

Plaintiff asserts that Parsons was "unable and/or unwilling to testify on issues 8 and 10 identified in the deposition notice." (Dkt. No. 46 at 8.) Plaintiff states that Parsons was unable to identify, with any specificity, who conducted the anchor inspections at Defendant's facilities or when the inspections occurred. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff further asserts that Parsons was unable to testify about whether Defendant's anchor inspections revealed a need for maintenance or repair. (Id.) Instead, Parsons repeatedly stated that the relevant information could be found in the records Defendant produced to Plaintiff prior to the deposition. (Id.; see, e.g., Dkt. No. 46-1 at 126-27.)

Plaintiff asks the Court to re-open Defendant's deposition so that it can fully respond to questions regarding topics 8 and 10. (Dkt. No. 46 at 2.) In addition, Plaintiff asks for an award of fees for bringing this motion and for its expenses incurred in having to conduct an additional deposition. (Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff also asks for a 45-day trial continuance based on Defendant's delay in providing timely discovery responses. (Id. at 12-13.) Defendant argues that Parsons was adequately prepared for his deposition, that an award of fees is not warranted, and that the Court should keep the current trial schedule. (See Dkt. No. 49.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Compel Additional Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6):

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). As one court has noted, a corporation has "a duty to make a conscientious, good-faith effort to designate knowledgeable persons for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions and to prepare them to fully and unevasively answer questions about the designated subject matter." Starlight Int'l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 638 (D. Kan. 1999); see also Flowers v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr., Case No. C17-0989-JCC, Dkt. No. 75 at 7 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (holding that defendant failed to prepare a corporate designee who could not answer questions regarding one out of thirty topics). A party may move for an order compelling discovery where a Rule 30 deponent fails to answer questions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i). Rule 37 instructs courts to treat a deponent's "evasive or incomplete" answer as a failure to answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

The Court has read the relevant deposition transcript and concludes that Parsons was not adequately prepared to testify about the matters included in topics 8 and 10 of Plaintiff's deposition notice. (See Dkt. No. 46-1 at 64-150.) The following excerpt is characteristic of Parsons' answers to Plaintiff's questions concerning the inspection of anchoring components as described in topic 8:

(Id. at 126-27.)3 The following excerpt is characteristic of Parsons' answers to Plaintiff's questions concerning the need for repair of anchoring components as described in topic 10:

(Id. at 133) (see also id. at 144).

Parsons' answers to the above questions were evasive because they failed to provide a responsive answer and instead vaguely referred Plaintiff to various documents "in the record." (See id. at 60-148.) As an initial matter, a Rule 30(b)(6) deponent does not meet his or her duty to testify to a corporation's knowledge simply by pointing opposing counsel to other discovery documents that have been produced. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Vegas Const. Co., 251 F.R.D. 534, 539 (D. Nev. 2008) ("[A] corporation may not take the position that its documents state the company's position.").

Parsons' repeated references to documents in the record were particularly evasive in light of the way in which Defendant produced those documents to Plaintiff. Just days before the deposition, Defendant inundated Plaintiff with over 30,000 documents that it suggested were relevant to topics 8 and 10. (Dkt. Nos. 46 at 6, 46-1 at 209-13.)4 Having reviewed dozens of the documents that Defendant and Parsons suggested were responsive to the topics of anchor inspections and maintenance, the Court finds that it is not facially clear how the documents address those topics. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 46-1 at 290-313, 315-27.) The Court would be more understanding of Defendant's position that Plaintiff's counsel should have presented Parsons with the responsive documents during the deposition had Defendant not engaged in eleventh hour disclosure and been clearer about how the documents related to Plaintiff's deposition topics.

The combination of Defendant's last-minute disclosure of documents and Parsons' references to documents in "the record" frustrated Plaintiff's ability to develop testimony regarding topics 8 and 10. With regard to those topics, Defendant did not meet its duty under Rule 30(b)(6) to prepare Parsons to fully and unevasively answer questions. Pursuant to Rule 37, Plaintiff shall be allowed to depose Defendant for one additional day not to exceed seven hours.

B. Motion for Fees

When a court grants a Rule 37 motion to compel it must "require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). However, such sanctions are not warranted if:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii). The Court may also require a corporate defendant to pay for the costs of reconvening a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. See Lains v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., Case No. C14-1982-JCC, Dkt. No. 172 at 3 (W.D. Wash. 2016).

While the Court has found that Defendant failed to adequately prepare Parsons to answer questions regarding topics 8 and 10, the Court does not believe that Parsons was so ill-prepared that an award of expenses or other monetary sanctions is appropriate. Plaintiff provided Defendant with 33 deposition topics, most of which had numerous subtopics. (See Dkt. No. 46-1 at 8-16.) Plaintiff has only demonstrated that over the course of two days, Parsons provided evasive answers regarding 2 out of 33 topics. Additionally, Defendant states that Parsons spent approximately 100 hours preparing for the deposition. (Dkt. No. 50 at 2.) Under the circumstances, the Court finds that an award of expenses or other monetary sanctions would be unjust. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(iii). Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and expenses is DENIED.

C. Motion to Continue Trial

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), a court's scheduling order can be modified "only for good cause and with the judge's consent." The good cause standard "primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial schedule if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension." Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause to continue the current case schedule. All expert disclosures are currently due by April 26, 2019, discovery closes on May 24, 2019, and trial is scheduled for September 23, 2019. (See Dkt. No. 20.) Defendant's delay in producing discovery has prevented Plaintiff from adequately preparing its expert witness within the current case deadlines. (See Dkt. No. 46 at 12-13.) The need for an additional Rule 30(b)(6) deposition provides another justification for a continuance. The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot meet the current case deadlines notwithstanding its diligence. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to modify case schedule is GRANTED.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to compel, for sanctions, and to modify case schedule (Dkt. No. 46) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. In accordance with the Court's order: