N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 1 This is a review of a published court of appeals decision
¶ 2 Beauchamp argues that the circuit court erred in admitting into evidence the statements made by Somerville prior to his death because there was no opportunity for Beauchamp to cross-examine Somerville about his statements, and Beauchamp was therefore deprived of his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.
¶ 3 Beauchamp further argues that even if a hearsay exception for dying declarations was recognized and implicitly incorporated by the framers of the United States Constitution in the Confrontation Clause,
¶ 4 Beauchamp also claims that the admission of the two witnesses' prior inconsistent statements violated his right to due process.
¶ 5 We hold that the admission of the dying declaration statement violates neither Beauchamp's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses nor his corresponding right under the Wisconsin Constitution.
¶ 6 We are likewise unpersuaded by Beauchamp's argument that the failure to exclude the prior inconsistent statements of recanting witnesses here violated due process rights and, as he argued before the court of appeals, constituted either plain error by the circuit court or prejudicial error by counsel necessitating remand for a Machner hearing, when the grounds for the claim is that a test different from Wisconsin's should have been applied and that, if applied, the test would have barred the statements from evidence. The statements in question were admitted without objection and consistent with controlling Wisconsin law. Beauchamp was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to urge the court to apply the law of another jurisdiction, nor can the circuit court be said to have committed plain error when it applied what was then the controlling law in Wisconsin. There was no violation of Beauchamp's right to due process here.
¶ 7 We therefore affirm the court of appeals.
¶ 8 According to statements by witnesses and testimony at the trial, the conflict that ultimately led to the shooting was a couple's fight over rumored infidelity, though the shooting itself was by a person whose interest in the argument seems impossible to discern from the evidence in the record. On the morning of June 16, 2007, Somerville was angrily going from one residence to another trying to find his girlfriend, Dalynn Brookshire, and a flurry of phone calls were being made to and from Somerville, Brookshire, and her friends and relatives. One of those calls came to Marvin Beauchamp as he was driving home with his girlfriend from an appointment, and his girlfriend testified that after he took that call, they quickly headed toward the Sherman Avenue address where Somerville had said he was going next. They parked a block away,
¶ 9 Witnesses testified to seeing Somerville walk out of the house and hearing Somerville briefly exchange words with someone outside the house. Just before the gunshots, witnesses told police, they heard Somerville say, "Oh, you got a gun. Oh, you're going to shoot me. Shoot me then." In a statement to police that she later said was untrue, Beauchamp's girlfriend said she then saw Beauchamp point a gun at Somerville and shoot him in the stomach from a distance of about five feet. A boy who was selling bottled water at the intersection nearby testified that he saw a man come up from behind the house, saw Somerville walk out of the house, heard the two exchange words, and saw the man shoot Somerville, though when shown a group of photographs that included Beauchamp, he was unable to identify him as the shooter. He then saw the wounded man walk toward his vehicle and open the door before falling to the ground.
¶ 10 When police and fire department units responded to the call reporting the shooting, that is where they found Somerville, conscious but gravely injured with five gunshot wounds. The EMT who arrived on the scene, Marvin Coleman, testified that he asked Somerville, "Who did this?" Somerville responded, "Marvin." When Coleman, who was an acquaintance of the victim and had recognized his vehicle at the scene, asked, "Who, me?" Somerville responded, "No, big head Marvin."
¶ 11 Police officer Wayne Young rode in the ambulance with Somerville. In the ambulance, Somerville stated that "Marvin" shot him. An emergency room doctor told Young shortly before Somerville died that his time for asking questions was short. In response to Young's questions, Somerville described "Marvin" as dark-skinned, bald, and having a big forehead. People who had known Beauchamp prior to his arrest in this case described his physical appearance in trial testimony in ways that were consistent with the description Somerville provided of the man who shot him. Somerville's girlfriend described Beauchamp as having a bald head and dark skin. An acquaintance who grew up with Beauchamp and was housed in the same county jail with him for three days described him as having "a big head," and "particularly a large forehead."
¶ 12 The two women, Brown and Brookshire, were at the house where the shooting occurred, and it is their "prior inconsistent statements" whose admissibility Beauchamp challenges. Both gave multiple statements to the police. First, each gave initial statements that did not implicate Beauchamp. Second, when re-interviewed by police after other witnesses told the police that the two women had actually been in the front yard quite close to where the shooting occurred, each signed statements that put Beauchamp at the scene with a gun and identified him as the shooter.
¶ 13 At a pre-trial motion hearing, over defense counsel's objection, the circuit court ruled that the evidence of Somerville's statements to the EMT and police officer, as well as the evidence of Somerville's grave wounds, supported a finding that the statements were made while Somerville thought he was dying and that the statements were therefore admissible under Wis. Stat. 908.045(3) as exceptions to the hearsay rule.
¶ 14 The standard of review for the second issue Beauchamp presents is determined by the fact that the recanting witnesses' prior inconsistent statements were read into the record at trial without objection. Because the claimed error was not preserved by an objection at trial, the court of appeals reviewed the claim as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant to State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, ¶ 47, 274 Wis.2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31 (noting that in the absence of an objection an appellate court addresses issues "within the rubric of the ineffective assistance of counsel"). The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment and order denying Beauchamp's motion for post-conviction relief seeking a new trial, or in the alternative a Machner hearing to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For the same reason, the court of appeals reviewed for plain error the circuit court's failure to exclude the statements on the basis of a Vogel analysis.
¶ 15 We likewise review the claimed error involving the admission of the prior inconsistent statements recognizing that these are unobjected-to matters. We therefore determine whether Beauchamp is entitled to the Machner hearing he sought in his post-conviction motion and on appeal to pursue a claim of a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. That claim is premised on the argument that Beauchamp was prejudiced by his counsel's error in failing to object to the admission of the statements and also failing to advocate for the statements to be excluded on due process grounds based on an allegedly more restrictive standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. We also must determine whether it was plain error for the court not to apply the Seventh Circuit's standard sua sponte.
¶ 16 Beauchamp argues that the admission of unconfronted hearsay statements made by Somerville to the medical and law enforcement personnel who arrived at the scene violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution. He contends that a proper reading of Crawford v. Washington, in which the United States Supreme Court abrogated a previous rule
¶ 17 The State also argues that Somerville's statement to the emergency medical technician (EMT) was not testimonial and therefore is exempted by Crawford from the confrontation requirement that applies to testimonial statements. After this case was briefed and argued, the United States Supreme Court decided Bryant, which examined the parameters of the "ongoing emergency" rule established by the holding in Davis v. Washington that statements to police are non-testimonial when the "primary purpose of the interrogation" that produced them "is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). Though the underlying facts and the statements at issue in this case and Bryant are similar, the legal questions presented are different. In Bryant, the statements at issue had been admitted under a different hearsay exception, and no factual foundation was established for a finding that they qualified as dying declarations. The Court stated, "Because of the State's failure to preserve its argument with regard to dying declarations, we . . . need not decide that question here." Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1151, n. 1. It thus proceeded with its analysis of whether the Davis "ongoing emergency" rule rendered statements made to police by a shooting victim nontestimonial. The Court concluded that the statements were made in the context of an ongoing emergency and deemed them nontestimonial, ruling that the admission of the unconfronted statements did not violate the defendant's constitutional confrontation right. Id. at 1167. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg recapped the brief mentions of the dying declaration hearsay exception in Crawford and Giles and acknowledged that the Court has yet to address its continued viability:
¶ 18 The State argues that Somerville's statements to the EMT were nontestimonial,
¶ 19 "[W]hether the admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to confrontation is a question of law subject to independent appellate review." State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶ 12, 299 Wis.2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518.
¶ 20 We begin by acknowledging the circuit court's determination that the statements Somerville made to the EMT and to the officer in the ambulance and in the operating room were dying declarations. Beauchamp's counsel conceded that a motion to exclude the statements was unlikely to succeed:
¶ 21 The circuit court then noted that upon the evidence provided, it would permit the statements to come in under Wis. Stat. § 908.045(3). We agree with the circuit
¶ 22 There is a dual framework for our analysis, as Professor Daniel Blinka has explained: "In effect, the government's use of hearsay is regulated by both the rules of evidence and the confrontation clause. Put differently, there are two distinct hearsay rules, one rooted in constitutional law and the other found in evidence law. While there is overlap and even some interrelationship, the two doctrines are nonetheless fundamentally different."
¶ 23 If we were to accept that the Confrontation Clause, as set forth in Crawford's seemingly unbending declaration, requires that all testimonial statements be subject to confrontation to test their reliability, we would exclude dying declarations as, by definition, unconfrontable, and therefore, statements whose reliability cannot be tested. In fact, where the admissibility of a statement is governed by the Crawford analysis, one never reaches the issue of reliability
¶ 24 But such a seemingly rigid approach cannot prevail here. As noted above, the Crawford Court deliberately avoided the question of how such a rule would apply in a dying declaration case. In addition, in Giles, the Court made clear that notwithstanding the categorical language employed in Crawford, there remain situations in which a defendant may not successfully invoke the Confrontation Clause to exclude testimonial hearsay statements. In Giles, the court rejected a California hearsay exception that was a broader version of the exception than the one that was accepted at common law at the time of the Sixth's Amendment's ratification. Giles involved a murder case in which the California courts had ruled that statements of the murder victim had been properly admitted under a theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing. As applied in Giles, the theory had permitted the judge to determine, without a specific showing of the defendant's intent to keep the person from testifying, that the defendant had forfeited by his wrongdoing the right to confront the witness. The Giles Court's analysis of the Confrontation Clause issue turned on a determination of the contours of the common law forfeiture rule in existence at the time of the Constitution's drafting, and it made clear that the flaw in the application of the California forfeiture rule was that it permitted evidence that the common law rule in existence in 1791 would have excluded. The Court made two statements in that regard that are of significance to our analysis.
¶ 25 First, in answering the question of whether a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing comports with the guarantees of the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court found that it does so only where there has
¶ 26 It considered the following fact "conclusive" to the question:
Giles, 554 U.S. at 368, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (emphasis added). Notably, the Court did not say that the Confrontation Clause barred all testimony admitted pursuant to a forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. It merely described what kind of forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine would comport with constitutional guarantees. After all, the Court remanded the case to the California court with the observation that "the court is free to consider evidence of the defendant's intent on remand." Id. at 377, 128 S.Ct. 2678. In other words, Giles stands for the proposition that the permissible contours of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, and the point beyond which it becomes a violation of Confrontation Clause guarantees, are co-extensive with the contours of that exception at the time of the founding of our nation and specifically the Sixth Amendment's ratification.
¶ 27 The second statement the Giles Court made that is relevant to this case was its specific reference to the dying declaration exception:
Giles, 554 U.S. at 358, 128 S.Ct. 2678.
¶ 28 Given the Court's recent acknowledgement of the dying declaration hearsay exception under the common law at the time of the founding and specifically the ratification of the Sixth Amendment, as well as the assertion of treatise writers such as Wigmore that the exception was not merely in existence but was centuries old by that point,
Jackson v. State, 81 Wis. 127, 131, 51 N.W. 89 (1892).
¶ 29 While acknowledging the deep historical roots of the dying declaration hearsay exception, Beauchamp argues that such statements were previously presumed to be reliable and considered to be necessary evidence but that those rationales are no longer tenable. Further, he argues that courts have ignored factors that would tend to show that such statements are likely to be especially unreliable and should therefore be subject to exclusion under Crawford just as other unconfronted testimonial statements are. He argues that there is no reason to presume that all dying declarations are reliable given possible motives to accuse falsely and the likelihood that a mortally wounded victim is too cognitively impaired by his injuries to give an accurate account of the crime. He discounts the necessity of such evidence given the advances of forensic science. The State counters that Beauchamp had the opportunity at trial to impeach Somerville's statements pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 908.06 by introducing evidence of any fact that would have called into question the reliability of Somerville's statements on grounds of malice or mental status, and that he did not do so. As to the presumed reliability of dying declarations, the State points to legal precedent that affirms such a presumption on other than religious grounds.
1 Greenleaf, Evidence § 156, editorial note (1860) (cited in Wigmore on Evidence, § 1431).
¶ 31 We do not disagree with Beauchamp's contention that we live in "a society more secular than the one in which the exception originated."
People v. Monterroso, 34 Cal.4th 743, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (2004).
¶ 32 We further agree with that court's observation that to exclude such evidence as violative of the right to confrontation "would not only be contrary to all the precedents in England and here, acquiesced in long since the adoption of these constitutional provisions, but it would be abhorrent to that sense of justice and regard for individual security and public safety which its exclusion in some cases would inevitably set at naught." Id. (internal citations omitted).
¶ 33 This case is an example of that possibility. Notwithstanding advances in forensic science, there was in this case, as in many cases, no fingerprint evidence, no DNA evidence, and no definitive ballistics evidence that would tie the defendant directly to the crime. In any event, of course, such evidence, as valuable as it may be, does not necessarily prove a defendant's guilt any more than its absence necessitates his acquittal.
¶ 34 We therefore, like every state court that has considered the dying declaration exception since Crawford, take a position consistent with the language of Crawford and Giles and decline to hold that the constitutional right to confront witnesses is violated by the admission of statements under the dying declaration hearsay exception. As the State notes, no published decision of any state court in the country has eliminated the dying declaration hearsay exception based on the reading of selected language of Crawford. We concur with the courts
¶ 35 We therefore affirm the court of appeals' holding that the statements made by Somerville to the EMT and the officer were properly admitted and did not violate Beauchamp's confrontation rights under the state and federal constitutions.
¶ 36 Beauchamp argues that the court erred when it allowed admission of the prior inconsistent statements of the two women, Brown and Brookshire. As described above, each woman gave initial statements to the police that did not implicate Beauchamp, and then each woman gave a statement detailing that she had seen and heard Beauchamp commit the murder. Each later recanted the portions of the statements implicating Beauchamp. Beauchamp contends that the admission of the inculpatory statements as substantive evidence was error because they are insufficiently reliable and thus their admission constituted a violation of his constitutional right to due process.
¶ 37 The State argues that the statements were properly admitted under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a) because the women's statements at the preliminary hearing and at trial recanted the portions that implicated Beauchamp. The State argues that the declarants were available for cross-examination at trial, and therefore the admission of the prior statements satisfied the due process test set forth in Robinson. The State also notes that any appellate review of unobjected-to matters is governed by the analysis appropriate for claims of plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. The State's brief also notes that "an appellate court may not conclude that counsel was ineffective without a Machner hearing," a proposition stated in State v. Curtis, 218 Wis.2d 550, 554, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct.App.1998).
¶ 38 We review the unobjected-to admission of the prior inconsistent statements to determine whether Beauchamp is entitled to a new trial due to plain error by the circuit court. Though failure to object ordinarily constitutes waiver of an issue, a defendant is entitled to a new trial where unobjected-to error is "plain error."
¶ 39 Additionally, we review whether Beauchamp was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the admission of the statements and whether Beauchamp is, as a result, entitled to a remand for a Machner hearing to pursue a new trial via an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
¶ 40 The law governing the admissibility of such statements is well settled in Wisconsin, and, given the standard of review that governs here, that is dispositive in either analysis. As noted above, this court has stated that due process requirements are satisfied in such a situation so long as the declarant is "present and subject to cross-examination."
¶ 41 Beauchamp urges a different standard for determining whether due process considerations are satisfied by the admission of a prior inconsistent statement: a test in which the availability of the declarant for cross-examination is only one of five factors to consider. That test, as noted above, is taken from Vogel v. Percy, 691 F.2d 843, 846-47 (7th Cir.1982). That court cited a Fifth Circuit case establishing the following "guidelines" for determining whether "substantive use of a prior inconsistent statement would comport with due process":
Id.
¶ 42 In Vogel, which concerned the prior inconsistent statement of a co-defendant against the defendant in a case arising from a Beloit armed robbery, the co-defendant had given a prior statement to police implicating the defendant, but in trial testimony
¶ 43 We are unpersuaded that our simple, straightforward and workable requirement for the admission of prior inconsistent statements—that the declarant be present and available for cross-examination—needs any revision, and we decline the invitation to reformulate Wisconsin's standard on this question.
¶ 44 Even if we favored the test set forth in Vogel, we could not determine that the circuit court had erred such that Beauchamp was entitled to a new trial. Nor can we determine that counsel's failure to object prejudiced Beauchamp and that he is consequently entitled to a remand for a Machner hearing to pursue a new trial via an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We note that the standard of review governing this issue in this case sets the bar high. We are satisfied that Beauchamp was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to seek to bar the admission of the statements on the basis of a standard not employed in Wisconsin law. Counsel was not required to urge the circuit court to apply the law of another jurisdiction when Wisconsin had its own test. In light of this standard of review, we agree with the court of appeals that Beauchamp's claims regarding the prior inconsistent statements' admission are without merit. Where a legal standard has been set forth in another jurisdiction, counsel is free to make an argument setting forth the other jurisdiction's practice as persuasive authority, but it simply cannot be said here either that Beauchamp was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object or that the circuit court erred in permitting the admission of the evidence.
¶ 45 We hold that the admission of the dying declaration statement violates neither Beauchamp's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses nor his corresponding right under the Wisconsin Constitution. As the court of appeals noted, "the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the confrontation right does not apply `where an exception to the confrontation right was
¶ 46 We are likewise unpersuaded by Beauchamp's argument that the failure to exclude the prior inconsistent statements of recanting witnesses here violated due process rights and, as he argued before the court of appeals, constituted either plain error by the circuit court or prejudicial error by counsel necessitating remand for a Machner hearing, when the grounds for the claim is that a test different from Wisconsin's should have been applied and, if applied, would have barred the statements from evidence. The statements in question were admitted without objection and consistent with controlling Wisconsin law. Beauchamp was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to urge the court to apply the law of another jurisdiction, nor can the circuit court be said to have committed plain error when it applied what was then the controlling law in Wisconsin. There was no violation of Beauchamp's right to due process here.
¶ 47 We therefore affirm the court of appeals.
Affirmed.
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. (concurring).
¶ 48 The majority opinion unnecessarily creates an exception to an accused's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation—an exception not yet recognized by the United
¶ 49 I conclude that the victim's comments to the emergency medical technician were not testimonial. The technician's testimony relating to the victim's comments is therefore not barred by the Confrontation Clause and is admissible under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule.
¶ 50 I need not determine whether the victim's comments to the police officer were testimonial, a closer call. As I see it, if admitting the police officer's testimony was an error, it was harmless.
¶ 51 For the reasons set forth, I concur.
¶ 52 I first address the issue of testimonial and non-testimonial statements raised in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).
¶ 53 The majority opinion suggests that the "fairest way" to resolve the tension between the State's interests in presenting unconfronted testimonial dying declarations and a defendant's concern about unreliability is to "continue to freely permit. . . the aggressive impeachment of a dying declaration. . . ." Majority op., ¶ 5. Yet Crawford v. Washington is rather explicit in stating that for testimonial evidence the Sixth Amendment "commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).
¶ 54 The Court in Crawford elucidated two inferences from its historical review of the Sixth Amendment. First, not all hearsay implicates the core concerns of the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. Instead, the confrontation clause focuses on "testimonial statements." Second, "the `right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him,' is most naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the founding."
¶ 55 Crawford held that for testimonial evidence to be admissible absent confrontation, the Sixth Amendment "demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination."
¶ 56 The Supreme Court has not subsequently determined whether a historical exception to the right of confrontation for testimonial dying declarations "must be accepted." Instead the focus of the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has been on developing the law surrounding the first inference of Crawford, differentiating between testimonial and non-testimonial statements.
¶ 57 I now turn to Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011), which was decided after oral argument in the instant case. Both the State and the defendant submitted letter briefs to the court discussing the effect of Bryant on the present case.
¶ 58 In Bryant, to the dismay of Justice Scalia (the author of Crawford),
¶ 59 Because I conclude that the victim's statements to Coleman were not testimonial under Bryant, I do not join the majority opinion in creating an exception to the Confrontation Clause for testimonial dying declarations. Under the facts of the instant case, it is unnecessary to create a historical exception for testimonial dying declarations, as the majority does today. Under the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the statements of the victim to Coleman in the present case are admissible because they are non-testimonial statements and are admissible under Wisconsin's hearsay rules.
¶ 60 In Bryant, the Supreme Court determined whether statements of a mortally wounded victim made to responding police officers were admissible hearsay statements at trial.
¶ 61 In Bryant, police officers responded to an emergency: a man had been shot and was lying on the ground, bleeding, next to his car in a gas station parking lot. A number of police officers arrived on the scene, and asked the victim "what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred."
¶ 62 Based on the information police obtained from the victim, they left the gas station, called for backup, and traveled to Bryant's house. When they arrived at the house, Bryant was not there; however, the officers found blood, a bullet on the back porch, a hole in the back door, and the victim's wallet and identification outside the house. Bryant was eventually arrested nearly a year later.
¶ 63 At trial the police officers who responded to the scene testified about the statements the victim made regarding "what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred."
¶ 64 The Supreme Court concluded that the analysis in determining whether a hearsay statement is testimonial or non-testimonial is an objective analysis of the "primary purpose" of the questioning and the answering.
¶ 65 When an encounter is between an individual and the police, the existence of an "ongoing emergency" is among the most important circumstances informing the primary purpose of the encounter.
¶ 66 The existence of an "ongoing emergency" is, however, not the only factor that informs the determination of the primary purpose of an encounter.
¶ 67 The severity of the victim's medical condition also plays an objective role in evaluating the primary purpose, as it "sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at all in responding to police questions...."
¶ 68 Another factor is the formality (or lack thereof) of the encounter. While informality
¶ 69 The Supreme Court examined the encounter presented by the facts in Bryant objectively, analyzing the circumstances of the encounter and the statements and actions of the declarant and the interrogator, to determine the primary purpose and to determine whether the victim's statements were testimonial or non-testimonial.
¶ 70 The Bryant Court determined that the police officers were responding to an ongoing emergency. The police did not know whether the threat was limited to the victim, whether the threat to the victim was over, or whether a threat to the public existed because a gun was used. "At bottom, there was an ongoing emergency here where an armed shooter, whose motive for and location after the shooting were unknown, had mortally wounded [the victim] within a few blocks and a few minutes of the location where the police found [the victim]."
¶ 71 The Supreme Court then went on to consider how the victim's condition affected the analysis of the "primary purpose" of the statements that he made. Based upon the victim's condition, lying on the ground of a gas station bleeding from a mortal gunshot wound, and upon the victim's short, truncated responses due in part to difficulty breathing, the Supreme Court determined that a person in the victim's condition cannot be said to have a "primary purpose" of establishing or proving past events potentially relevant to a later prosecution.
¶ 72 Similarly, the Supreme Court evaluated the statements and actions of the police officers. The officers were responding to an emergency call. "[T]hey did not know why, where, or when the shooting had occurred."
¶ 73 Lastly, the Supreme Court examined the informality of the encounter in determining the "primary purpose" of the statements. The Court evaluated the statements in the case within a spectrum of informality bounded by a harried 911 call and a formal station-house interview.
¶ 74 The statements in Bryant fell nearer to the harried 911 call in Davis v. Washington
¶ 75 Based on an objective evaluation of the circumstances in which the encounter occurred and the statements and actions of both of the parties, the Supreme Court concluded that the "primary purpose" of the victim's statements in Bryant was to enable police to respond to an ongoing emergency. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the statements in Bryant were non-testimonial and were properly admitted at trial.
¶ 76 Bryant is informative for the present case. In the present case, emergency medical services and the police responded to a call reporting a shooting. Upon arriving on the scene, they found a man who had been shot numerous times, lying next to his car and bleeding.
¶ 77 Marvin Coleman, a heavy equipment operator and trained emergency medical technician with the Milwaukee Fire Department, responded to the scene. Coleman testified that upon arriving at the scene he recognized the car near where the victim lay as belonging to an acquaintance. When he approached the victim he recognized him as that acquaintance. According to Coleman's testimony, the victim recognized him and implored, "Please don't let me die, please don't let me down." Coleman testified that in response he stated, "We're not going to let you go, we'll do our best," and that he asked the victim, "Who did this?"
¶ 78 Coleman testified that the following brief exchange occurred in response to that question. The victim responded, "Marvin." Marvin Coleman responded, "Who, me?" and the victim responded, "No, Big Headed Marvin."
¶ 79 Coleman then asked the victim what had happened. Coleman testified that the victim responded he "was in the house arguing with some woman and he felt like he was lured outside and that's where [the shooting] happened."
¶ 80 Applying the analysis used by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Bryant, I conclude that the victim's statements made to Coleman were non-testimonial.
¶ 81 The circumstances in which the encounter between the victim and Coleman took place are substantially similar to the circumstances in Bryant. The victim was lying next to his car, bleeding from a mortal gunshot wound. The distinctions in the circumstances of this case are that Coleman is an EMT, not a police officer, and Coleman was acquainted with the victim.
¶ 82 These distinctions further support the conclusion that under an objective analysis, the primary purpose of the statements to Coleman was not to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later prosecution.
¶ 83 That Coleman was an emergency medical technician, not a police officer, and was acquainted with the victim objectively increases the informality of the situation.
¶ 84 Emergency medical technicians play a distinct role from police officers in responding to an ongoing emergency. However, these emergency service people (similar to police officers upon arriving at the scene of an emergency) must ensure that the scene is secure for the victim, for themselves, and for the public. While emergency medical service people may not play the primary role in ensuring public safety in an ongoing emergency in which the situation is fluid and somewhat confused, emergency responders play a role in ensuring the safety of all those involved.
¶ 86 Coleman's questions were similar to the initial inquires in Bryant, and under an objective evaluation of the "primary purpose" of the statements made by the victim, similarly result in a conclusion that they are non-testimonial statements.
¶ 87 I conclude that the admission of Coleman's testimony in the present case did not violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause; the victim's statements were non-testimonial and fall within the hearsay exception.
¶ 88 I turn now to the testimony of police officer Wayne Young. Officer Young testified that he and his partner responded to the scene of the shooting. When they arrived, Officer Young's primary responsibility was to get observers out of the street, clearing the area around the emergency. At the scene Officer Young did not approach the victim while he was lying on the ground.
¶ 89 Officer Young was instructed to ride along with the victim to the hospital with the emergency medical unit. Officer Young accompanied the victim into the hospital emergency department.
¶ 90 Officer Young testified that while he was standing by in the emergency department, a doctor notified him that if he had any questions for the victim he should ask them now because the doctor's opinion was that the victim was not going to survive the gunshot injuries.
¶ 91 Officer Young testified that he spoke with the victim, asking him if he had "any information about who may have shot him." Officer Young testified that the victim responded "Marvin" and gave a brief description of "dark complected, bald headed guy with a big forehead."
¶ 92 Officer Young testified that the victim then lost consciousness and was taken to surgery, where he ultimately succumbed to the gunshot injuries.
¶ 93 The statements and actions of Officer Young and the victim did not go beyond the initial inquiry of who may have shot the victim.
¶ 94 The informalities of the situation suggest that the primary purpose of the interrogator was not focused on possible future prosecutorial use of the statements. The questions and answers were given in a harried, informal way. There was no structure to the questions asked. Officer Young asked an open-ended initial inquiry question and the statements in response gave little detail or information. These informalities suggest a purpose of meeting the ongoing emergency, that is, a shooter at large, potentially not satisfied that the victim was not yet dead, and potentially a danger to the public or hospital staff. The informalities of the encounter suggest the primary purpose was not prosecutorial.
¶ 95 An emergency response to a potentially mortal shooting is a fluid environment of competing priorities. Objectively, prosecution of the killer may also have been an ancillary factor to Officer Young's questioning. The encounter between the victim and Officer Young occurred at the hospital and not at the scene of the shooting, after significant time had lapsed. Officer Young asked questions knowing that the victim was likely to die. An objective analysis might lead one to conclude that the primary purpose of the questions and answers in the hospital just prior to the
¶ 96 The distinctions between the circumstances surrounding the encounter between Officer Young and the victim in this case and the encounter analyzed in Bryant are that Officer Young's encounter with the victim did not occur upon arrival at the scene of an ongoing emergency, but rather after significant time had passed, and that the encounter occurred within a hospital emergency department removed from the crime scene.
¶ 97 In Bryant, the Supreme Court did not have to determine when the "ongoing emergency" ended; statements made within the first few minutes of the arrival of emergency services, near the location of the shooting, and well before the scene of the shooting was secure fell well within the bounds of an "ongoing emergency."
¶ 98 I refrain, however, from determining whether the victim's statements to Officer Young were testimonial or non-testimonial, a closer call. And I refrain from determining whether testimonial dying declarations are a historical exception to the guarantee of the Confrontation Clause. These determinations are not necessary to decide the present case. Officer Young's testimony was repetitive of Coleman's testimony. Even if the victim's statements to Officer Young were testimonial hearsay and even if the dying declaration exception is not recognized, the admission of Young's testimony was harmless error.
¶ 99 For these reasons, I do not join the majority in creating an exception to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of confrontation, an exception not yet recognized by the United States Supreme Court, and I concur.
The Bryant Court acknowledged that it was reviewing "a record that was not developed to ascertain the `primary purpose of the interrogation.'" Id. at 1163. However, the first step in the Court's analysis, id. at 1163-65, focused on "the available evidence, which suggests that [the victim] perceived an ongoing threat." Id. at 1164 n. 16. Nothing in the Court's analysis indicated that every incident in which a shooting victim is treated by emergency responders constitutes an "ongoing emergency" such that the victim's statements are rendered non-testimonial. Having granted the petition for review in this case and having the benefit of a properly developed record, we see no need to leave this important question to be answered another day.
Wis. Stat. § 908.02 provides, "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the supreme court or by statute."
Miguel A. Méndez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 Stan. L.Rev. 569, 571 (2004)(footnotes omitted).
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56, n. 6, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citations omitted).
Id. at 105-06.
Similarly, the Supreme Court acknowledged this possibility in Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008) ("We have previously acknowledged that two forms of testimonial statements were admitted at common law even though they were unconfronted. The first of these were declarations made by a speaker who was both on the brink of death and aware that he was dying" (internal citations omitted).).
In the present case, the circuit court concluded that the challenged statements were testimonial under Crawford and fell within the dying declaration exception to Crawford and the hearsay rule, Wis. Stat. § 908.045(3).