ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 1 The petitioners, Thomas H. Schmitt and MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC (collectively, MBS), seek review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming a circuit court order dismissing their claims for monetary relief.
¶ 2 The defendant telecommunications companies assert that Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Southeastern Wisconsin, 2002 WI 108, 255 Wis.2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626, is squarely on point and forecloses the argument advanced by MBS. Additionally, they contend that under the rule of Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, 244 Wis.2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833, the legislature was required to make explicit reference to the voluntary payment doctrine in the text of Wis. Stat. § 100.207 if it intended the doctrine to be inapplicable to claims under that statute.
¶ 3 We conclude that no Wisconsin court has addressed whether the legislature intended the voluntary payment doctrine to be a viable defense against any cause of action created by a statute. In Putnam, the question of whether the voluntary payment doctrine was a viable defense to a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) may have lurked in the record, but it was neither brought to the attention of the court nor was it specifically addressed. Accordingly, it was not decided by this court.
¶ 4 We further determine that the defendants misinterpret Fuchsgruber. Application of the common law voluntary payment doctrine would undermine the manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.207. Under these circumstances, the conflict between the statute's manifest purpose and the common law defense leaves no doubt that the legislature intended that the common law defense should not be applied to bar claims under the statute.
¶ 5 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals to address ILD's cross-appeal and, if appropriate, any previously unresolved appellate issues regarding Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act.
¶ 6 The allegations at issue in this case relate to an illegal telecommunications practice called "cramming." According to MBS, cramming is a deceptive billing scheme in which telecommunications companies insert relatively small, unauthorized charges into customers' telephone bills with the expectation that the customers will unwittingly pay the unauthorized charges.
¶ 7 The facts set forth below are taken primarily from MBS's complaint. Because we are reviewing the circuit court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we must assume that these facts are true.
¶ 8 Thomas Schmitt is an accountant who owns and operates MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC (MBS). Wisconsin Bell is the local exchange carrier that provides MBS's telephone service.
¶ 9 According to the allegations in the complaint, the unauthorized charges, which ranged from $2 to $40 per month, were
¶ 10 According to MBS, the unauthorized charges were forwarded to ILD Communications (ILD), a billing clearinghouse. ILD aggregated the unauthorized charges and then forwarded them on to Wisconsin Bell, where they were incorporated into MBS's telephone bills under the heading "Miscellaneous Charges and Credits." The complaint alleges that Schmitt did not notice the unauthorized charges and unwittingly paid them.
¶ 11 The defendants named in MBS's complaint fall into three categories: service providers (Local Biz USA, U.S. Connect, and AmericaTel); billing clearinghouses (ILD); and local exchange carriers (Wisconsin Bell). At this point, however, only two defendants, ILD and Wisconsin Bell, remain as parties to this appeal.
¶ 12 In relevant part, the complaint alleged violations of Wis. Stat. § 100.207(2) and (3)(a), violations of Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), and violations of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act, Wis. Stat. § 946.80, et seq. (hereinafter, the Crime Control Act).
¶ 13 At a hearing on the defendants' motions, the circuit court dismissed all claims for monetary relief against ILD and Wisconsin Bell with one exception.
¶ 14 Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, the court concluded that each of the defendants made false statements with regard to the provision of telecommunications service in violation of § 100.207(2).
¶ 15 The court also concluded that all of the defendants except ILD violated § 100.207(3)(a).
¶ 16 Nevertheless, the court went on to conclude that "the complaint also establishes a possible defense to the damage claim." Relying on MBS's allegation that Schmitt "did not notice the charges and unwittingly paid them," it asserted: "[T]he complaint implies that the plaintiffs voluntarily paid the unlawful charges."
¶ 17 The court concluded that the voluntary payment doctrine was a viable defense to MBS's claims for damages under Wis. Stat. § 100.207 because the legislature did not insert any language in the statute that expressly abrogated the common law doctrine:
The court asserted that it was required to "presume the Legislature knew about the doctrine and knew this would be raised as a defense, [and] if they didn't want it raised as a defense, they would have said so."
¶ 18 Additionally, the circuit court found support in Putnam: "I'm also influenced by the fact that the Putnam court upheld the application of the common law voluntary payment doctrine against not only common law damage claims, but also a statutory claim."
¶ 19 Wisconsin case law recognizes three exceptions to the voluntary payment doctrine: fraud, duress, and mistake of fact. See Putnam, 255 Wis.2d 447, ¶ 13, 649 N.W.2d 626. Turning to those exceptions, the circuit court determined that MBS had alleged fraud but had failed to "satisfy the court" that the charges were sufficiently deceptive to fulfill the elements of common law fraud: "[T]he charges were stated with sufficient particularity that a reasonable
¶ 20 As explained above, the circuit court's analysis was focused on the language of Wis. Stat. § 100.207. It did not specifically examine Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) or the Crime Control Act to determine whether the voluntary payment doctrine was applicable to claims under those statutes. Nevertheless, by dismissing all of MBS's claims for monetary relief, it appears that the court implicitly concluded that the doctrine was a viable defense to claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and the Crime Control Act as well.
¶ 21 Additionally, the court provided an alternative rationale for dismissing the claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). It concluded that that statute applied to representations that are made in advertisements and sales promotions, and that the telephone bills did not constitute advertisements or sales promotions.
¶ 22 MBS appealed the dismissal of its claims for relief under Wis. Stat. § 100.207, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), and the Crime Control Act. The primary focus of its brief to the court of appeals was the applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine. In addition, MBS appealed the circuit court's alternative rationale for dismissing the § 100.18(1) claims and the court's determination that MBS failed to state a § 100.207(3)(a) claim against ILD because ILD did not "bill" MBS.
¶ 23 ILD cross-appealed. It argued that in addition to the voluntary payment doctrine, the dismissal of the Wis. Stat. § 100.207 claims against it should be affirmed on other grounds.
¶ 24 Relying primarily on Fuchsgruber and Putnam, the court of appeals concluded
¶ 25 Upon review, we must determine whether the circuit court properly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. We review a grant or denial of a motion to dismiss independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals. Pool v. City of Sheboygan, 2007 WI 38, ¶9, 300 Wis.2d 74, 729 N.W.2d 415. Like the circuit court and the court of appeals, we must assume that the allegations in the complaint are true. Putnam, 255 Wis.2d 447, ¶ 11, 649 N.W.2d 626.
¶ 26 This case presents the issue of whether the voluntary payment doctrine is a viable defense to claims under several statutes. Ultimately, this is a matter of statutory interpretation. It must be decided whether the legislature intended the common law defense to be applied to bar monetary relief under these statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we also review independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of appeals. Pool, 300 Wis.2d 74, ¶ 9, 729 N.W.2d 415.
¶ 27 We begin by addressing the defendants' contention that the issue in this case was already decided in Putnam, 255 Wis.2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626, a recent decision of this court. Then, we turn to interpreting the statute and addressing the defendants' argument that Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis.2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833, resolves the matter of statutory interpretation that is presented by this case.
¶ 28 MBS asserts that the voluntary payment doctrine is not a viable defense to its statutory claims for damages because the doctrine conflicts with the purposes of the statutes. The defendant telecommunications companies counter that we need look no further than a recent decision of this court to resolve the issue. They contend that Putnam demonstrates that the voluntary payment doctrine is a viable defense to all statutory claims. Therefore, they argue that Putnam forecloses the argument advanced by MBS.
¶ 29 In Putnam, the dispute revolved around the enforceability of a clause in Time Warner's standard cable contract. The clause imposed a late-payment fee on customers who failed to timely pay their bills. 255 Wis.2d 447, ¶ 4, 649 N.W.2d 626. A class of customers who paid the fees subsequently filed suit to recover their payments, alleging that the fees were not reasonably related to Time Warner's actual costs. Id. The customers averred that the fees constituted unlawful liquidated damages. Id., ¶ 10.
¶ 30 The complaint set forth eight separate causes of action for monetary damages, including a claim for damages under "Wisconsin's Trade Practices Act."
¶ 31 We described the nature and purpose of the voluntary payment doctrine as follows: "[M]oney paid voluntarily, with knowledge of all the facts, and without fraud or duress, cannot be recovered merely on account of ignorance or mistake of the law." Id., ¶ 13. The voluntary payment doctrine "allows entities that receive payment for services to rely upon these funds and to use them unfettered in future activities" and "operates as a means to settle disputes without litigation by requiring the party contesting the payment to notify the payee of its concerns." Id., ¶ 16.
¶ 32 Ultimately, we determined that the voluntary payment doctrine barred the customers "from recovering monetary damages for their payment of allegedly unlawful fees without objection or protest." Id., ¶ 3. We concluded that the customers had paid the fees without objection or protest, and that their payments were not made as a result of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact. Id., ¶ 3.
¶ 33 We neither cited to nor individually addressed the customers' claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). Rather, we grouped together all of the remaining claims and collectively disposed of them in a footnote: "[B]ecause the customers are precluded under the voluntary payment doctrine from seeking repayment of allegedly unlawful liquidated damages, the additional claims [for money damages] are encapsulated in the overall [unlawful liquidated damages] theory and are properly subject to the voluntary payment doctrine." Id., ¶ 36 n. 12.
¶ 34 The Putnam court's application of the voluntary payment doctrine lends superficial support to the defendants' contention that the doctrine is a defense to all statutory claims and can likewise be applied to the statutes implicated in this case. Nevertheless, "questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents." Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925).
¶ 35 The Putnam court did not interpret Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), and it did not rule upon whether the legislature intended the common law doctrine to be a viable defense to that statutory claim. Further, a review of the briefs filed in this court in Putnam reveals that the customers never advanced that the statutory claim should be treated any differently than the common law unlawful liquidated damages
¶ 36 In fact, the customers did not make any such argument in any court. During the hearing before the circuit court on Time Warner's motion to dismiss, the customers' attorney did not discuss or even mention Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). Similarly, the circuit court did not mention the statutory claim when the court dismissed "all counts in this complaint."
¶ 37 Likewise, the customers did not make any such argument in the court of appeals. The opinion of the court of appeals listed the claims made, including one for "violation of Wisconsin's trade practice statutes." Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wisconsin, 2001 WI App 196, ¶ 3 n. 1, 247 Wis.2d 41, 633 N.W.2d 254. However, it noted that the customers made no separate argument regarding any statutory claim: "The customers present separate arguments challenging the circuit court's dismissal of both the claim for unlawful liquidated damages and the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. However, they present a unified argument challenging the dismissal of all their other claims." Id.
¶ 38 The customers' opening brief to this court did not cite to Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) or any other trade practices statutes. The only statute cited was the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04. In their reply brief, the customers did not cite any statutes at all.
¶ 39 Rather, the customers' briefs focus on only one claim for damages—the common law unlawful liquidated damages claim. Under these circumstances, where no distinction between the common law and statutory claims was brought to any court's attention, it is unsurprising that this court grouped the claims for damages together and collectively affirmed their dismissal.
¶ 40 In Putnam, the question of whether the voluntary payment doctrine was a viable defense to a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) may have lurked in the record, but it was neither brought to the attention of the court nor did the court specifically rule upon it. Accordingly, it has not been previously decided.
¶ 41 Having determined that no Wisconsin case squarely addresses the question before us, we turn to the relevant statutes. In its petition for review, MBS argued that the circuit court erroneously dismissed its claims for monetary relief under three statutes: Wis. Stat. § 100.207, Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), and the Crime Control Act. However, the primary focus of the parties' arguments is on just one of these statutes, Wis. Stat. § 100.207. Accordingly, we likewise focus our discussion on that statute.
¶ 42 When interpreting a statute, this court strives to give effect to the language chosen by the legislature. In so doing, we consider the statute's scope, context, and purpose. State ex. rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶48, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("[S]cope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute itself[.]"). "We begin by looking to the language of the statute because we assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language." Bosco v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 2004 WI 77, ¶23, 272 Wis.2d 586, 681 N.W.2d 157.
¶ 43 As always, a court should avoid adopting an interpretation that is contrary to a "textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose." Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 49, 681 N.W.2d 110. "[W]e will liberally construe remedial statutes to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy that the legislature intended to afford." Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 2004 WI 93, ¶8, 273 Wis.2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365.
¶ 44 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.207 is entitled "telecommunications services." It prohibits false, misleading, or deceptive statements "with respect to the provision of telecommunications service," and it prohibits "bill[ing] a customer for any telecommunications service that the customer did not affirmatively order." Wis. Stat. §§ 100.207(2); 100.207(3)(a).
¶ 45 Subsection (2) provides:
Wis. Stat. § 100.207(2).
¶ 46 Subsection (3)(a) provides:
Wis. Stat. § 100.207(3)(a) (emphasis added).
¶ 48 The State of Wisconsin, which filed an amicus brief in this case, explained that cramming is one of a number of deceptive billing practices to emerge in the 1990s. See United States General Accounting Office, Overview of the Cramming Problem: Statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski (1999). The State asserts that by enacting Wis. Stat. § 100.207 in 1994, the Wisconsin legislature specifically acted with the intent to provide the means to seek relief in the courts for deceptive and unauthorized billing.
¶ 49 The telecommunications company defendants imply that the real purpose and import of the statute is found in sub. (6)(b) and sub. (6)(c), the portions of the statute that permit the State to file actions and seek forfeitures against crammers. They indicate that the legislative intent was to give the State a "very heavy hammer," and that the private right of action in sub. (6)(a) is largely inconsequential because it is duplicative of preexisting common law claims.
¶ 50 The defendants' assertion of legislative purpose fails to square with the statute's plain language. Wisconsin Stat. § 100.207 is a remedial statute that provides two remedial paths, not one. In addition to the enforcement mechanisms provided to the State in subs. (6)(b) and (6)(c), "any person or class of persons adversely affected by the failure to comply" with the statute may bring an independent cause of action.
¶ 51 In another context involving remedial statutes with a dual enforcement mechanism, we have explained that "private tenants actions provide a necessary backup to the state's enforcement powers." Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis.2d 352, 358-59, 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983). Because "the sheer number of violations prevent
¶ 52 Courts interpret statutes to avoid surplusage. Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. If the legislature had intended nothing more in sub. (6)(a) than to duplicate preexisting common law claims, there would have been no need to enact sub. (6)(a) at all.
¶ 53 We must construe this statute "with a view towards the social problem which the legislature was addressing when enacting the law." Garcia, 273 Wis.2d 612, ¶ 8, 682 N.W.2d 365. Based on the plain language of the statute, the manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.207 are to provide remedies for those who are adversely affected by cramming, and to deter that practice.
¶ 54 If the voluntary payment doctrine were a viable defense to a person's cause of action under sub. (6)(a), however, both of these legislative purposes would be severely undermined. The application of the voluntary payment doctrine would significantly limit the circumstances under which a person would be entitled to a remedy under Wis. Stat. § 100.207. A person could maintain a claim under only two circumstances: if the person noticed the charges and protested before paying; or if the person could satisfy one of the common law exceptions to the voluntary payment doctrine.
¶ 55 The plain text of Wis. Stat. § 100.207 sets forth a broad remedy available to persons who are adversely affected by cramming. Under the statute, a plaintiff need not protest an unauthorized charge to seek a remedy. Nevertheless, if the voluntary payment doctrine were a viable defense, then plaintiffs would either have to protest or satisfy all of the elements
¶ 56 Application of the voluntary payment doctrine would likewise undermine the legislature's purpose to deter cramming by limiting the circumstances under which a customer would be entitled to relief. The defendant telecommunications companies explain that whenever a customer notices an unauthorized charge and complains, the unauthorized charges are cancelled. As a result of the customer's protest, no claim for damages would arise. If the voluntary payment doctrine were a viable defense, one could conceive of very few situations in which a private action would produce an actionable claim for damages.
¶ 57 The statute is meant to deter the practice of cramming by holding crammers responsible for the illegal practice in court. However, application of the common law defense would reduce the likelihood that crammers would face any consequence at all for violating the statute. Rather than being deterred by the statute's remedial scheme, telecommunications companies might be encouraged to produce more unauthorized charges, knowing that customers who do not initially notice deceptive charges will face high hurdles to recovering those payments in a court action. Applying the voluntary payment doctrine to bar many private rights of action could encourage cramming, the mischief the legislature sought to suppress, by eliminating "a necessary backup to the state's enforcement powers." See Shands, 115 Wis.2d at 358-59, 340 N.W.2d 506.
¶ 58 A court's interpretation of a statute should not "contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose." Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 49, 681 N.W.2d 110. Remedial statutes should be liberally construed to "suppress the mischief and advance the remedy that the legislature intended to afford." Garcia, 273 Wis.2d 612, ¶ 8, 682 N.W.2d 365. Here, application of the common law voluntary payment doctrine would encourage the mischief identified by the legislature and circumscribe the remedy it provided. That is, application of the common law defense would undermine both textually manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.207.
¶ 59 Despite the damage that application of the voluntary payment doctrine would do the manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.207, the defendants assert that such a result is compelled by Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis.2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833. They contend that under the rule of Fuchsgruber, the common law voluntary payment doctrine applies to all new causes of action created by the legislature unless the legislature uses express language to the contrary. If the legislature intended to make the voluntary payment doctrine inapplicable to claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.207, the defendants assert that it was required to make explicit reference to the doctrine in the text of that statute. They contend that the absence of such a reference forecloses MBS's argument that the common law defense is inapplicable because it is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute.
¶ 60 At this point, we pause to make an observation regarding the scope and consequences of the defendants' argument. The defendants' interpretation of Fuchsgruber would appear to apply equally to all common law doctrines and rules. Thus, if the defendants correctly interpret Fuchsgruber, the legislature would be required to identify and evaluate each and every potentially relevant common law doctrine and rule, whether well known or obscure, and enumerate every one that is inapplicable whenever it creates a new statutory cause of action.
¶ 62 In Fuchsgruber, after being injured by a product, the plaintiff filed a strict product liability claim against the product's distributor. 244 Wis.2d 758, ¶¶ 4-5, 628 N.W.2d 833. In a strict product liability claim, the defendant's liability is based not upon fault, but rather, upon the defective condition of the product. Id., ¶ 22.
¶ 63 Around the same time that the plaintiff was injured, the legislature amended the comparative negligence statute. Under the amended statute, a plaintiff's negligence would be compared against the negligence of each individual defendant for purposes of determining liability in an action for negligence. Id., ¶ 13. The amended statute also modified the rules for joint and several liability, so that only those defendants found to be at least 51 percent negligent could be jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff's damages. Id.
¶ 64 Relying on the new statutory language that expressly modified the rules for negligence actions, the distributor argued that the legislature intended to modify the rules for strict product liability actions as well. It argued that the statute, as applied to strict product liability claims, "operates to protect from liability a defendant who is merely an innocent member of the chain of distribution, who did nothing to cause or contribute to the defective condition of the product." Id., ¶ 11.
¶ 65 This court disagreed. We explained that "strict product liability is not negligence," that negligence and strict product liability were separate torts with distinct common law rules, and that "[t]he comparative negligence statute has never fully applied to strict product liability actions in the first place[.]" Id., ¶ 27. We examined the text of the amended comparative negligence statute and concluded that it did not "explicitly or even implicitly suggest a legislative purpose to change the common law of strict product liability." Id., ¶ 26.
¶ 66 As illustrated by this explanation, the focus of our analysis was discerning the legislature's intent. We explained further: "While the 1995 amendment clearly ushered in a significant development in negligence law, there is nothing in the language of the new statute that even hints at a legislative purpose to accomplish such a sweeping change in the common law of strict product liability in this state." Id., ¶ 29. Accordingly, we concluded that the amendment to the comparative negligence statute, "which is silent on the subject, does not abrogate or alter the common law of strict product liability." Id., ¶ 27.
¶ 67 It is in this context that we made the following statements, upon which the defendants rely:
Id., ¶ 25.
¶ 68 The defendants' argument takes this language out of context. Fuchsgruber does not stand for the proposition that every time the legislature creates a new cause of action, it must enumerate each and every potentially relevant common law doctrine or rule that is inapplicable to that cause of action. Such a proposition would place a weighty and unrealistic burden on the legislature when drafting new statutes.
¶ 69 In addition to burdening the legislature, the defendants' interpretation of Fuchsgruber would needlessly tie the court's hands. In Fuchsgruber, there was no inconsistency between the legislature's purpose to modify the rules applicable to negligence actions and the common law rules that pertain to strict liability claims. Here, by contrast, the voluntary payment doctrine is incompatible with the manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.207. In a case like this, the defendant's interpretation of Fuchsgruber would force the court to interpret a statute contrary to the clear legislative intent. Such a proposition would turn on its head the established canon of construction that a statute should not be interpreted to contravene its manifest purpose. Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 49, 681 N.W.2d 110.
¶ 70 The reasoning underlying Fuchsgruber remains sound. If the legislature wanted to abrogate the voluntary payment doctrine, certainly it would be required to do so using express language.
¶ 71 Whenever the application of a common law doctrine or rule would undermine the manifest purposes of a statutory cause of action, the conflict between the statute's manifest purpose and the common law defense "leaves no doubt of the legislature's intent." Fuchsgruber, 244 Wis.2d 758, ¶ 25, 628 N.W.2d 833. In a case of such apparent incompatibility, the legislature necessarily intended that the common law defense would not be applied to bar claims under the statute.
¶ 72 We find support in a case that postdates both Fuchsgruber and the circuit court's grant of the motion to dismiss in this case. In Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, 2008 WI 22, 308 Wis.2d 103, 746 N.W.2d 762, we concluded that the legislature did not intend the common law economic loss doctrine to be a viable defense against the Home Improvement Protection Act (HIPA)
¶ 73 We also find support in case law from other jurisdictions. Other courts have concluded that the voluntary payment doctrine was not a viable defense to claims for damages caused by illegal cramming.
¶ 74 Given the conflict between the manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.207 and the voluntary payment doctrine, we conclude that the doctrine is inapplicable to a claim under that statute.
¶ 75 As ILD notes, however, its cross-appeal asserted various alternative reasons to affirm the circuit court's dismissal of MBS's Wis. Stat. § 100.207 claims. See supra, ¶ 23 n. 13. The court of appeals declined to address these alternative arguments because it concluded that the voluntary payment doctrine was dispositive. Given our decision that the voluntarily payment doctrine is inapplicable, we remand to the court of appeals to address these alternative arguments.
¶ 76 As explained above, we have focused our analysis on Wis. Stat. § 100.207 because the parties primarily focused on that statute. Before concluding, however, we pause to briefly address MBS's claims under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and the Crime Control Act.
¶ 77 We emphasize that the voluntary payment doctrine remains alive and well in Wisconsin. The determination of whether the doctrine bars a cause of action is a statute-specific inquiry.
¶ 78 At this point, we do not decide whether the voluntary payment doctrine is a viable defense to a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). The circuit court provided an alternative rationale for dismissing MBS's § 100.18(1) claims. See supra, ¶ 21. Although MBS appealed the alternative rationale in its brief to the court of appeals, it did not include this argument in its petition for review in this court. Under these circumstances, we need not now interpret Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1). Rather, we remand to the court of appeals to address the alternative rationale that the claim presented herein does not come within Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and, if appropriate, whether the voluntary payment doctrine applies to claims made under that statute. See State v. Achterberg, 201 Wis.2d 291, 300 n. 5, 548 N.W.2d 515 (1996).
¶ 80 However, nothing set forth in this opinion should be construed to restrict the court of appeals from taking up these arguments on remand, if it determines that they were sufficiently preserved. If the court of appeals concludes that MBS stated a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1), then it will need to address whether the voluntary payment doctrine is a viable defense to a claim under that statute. Further, the court of appeals may be required to determine whether the common law doctrine is a viable defense to a claim under the Crime Control Act.
¶ 81 In sum, we conclude that no Wisconsin court has addressed whether the legislature intended the voluntary payment doctrine to be a viable defense against any cause of action created by a statute. In Putnam, the question of whether the voluntary payment doctrine was a viable defense to a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) may have lurked in the record, but it was neither brought to the attention of the court nor was it specifically addressed. Accordingly, it was not decided by this court.
¶ 82 We further determine that the defendants misinterpret Fuchsgruber. Application of the common law voluntary payment doctrine would undermine the manifest purposes of Wis. Stat. § 100.207. Under these circumstances, the conflict between the statute's purpose and the common law defense leaves no doubt that the legislature intended that the common law defense should not be applied to bar claims under the statute.
¶ 83 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals to address ILD's cross-appeal and, if appropriate, any previously unresolved appellate issues regarding Wis. Stat. § 100.18(1) and the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act.
The decision of the court of appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals.
¶ 84 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate.
DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
¶ 85 The voluntary payment of money by one person to another upon a demand of payment, with knowledge of the facts and without fraud or duress, generally bars the payor from recovering the money from the payee in subsequent litigation. This is the essence of the voluntary payment doctrine. See Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., 2002 WI 108, ¶¶ 13-15, 255 Wis.2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626.
¶ 86 The voluntary payment doctrine is described in 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 92 (2011) as follows:
(Footnotes omitted.)
¶ 87 The voluntary payment doctrine,
¶ 88 The voluntary payment doctrine is neither unique to Wisconsin nor something new. To illustrate, in 1836 the United States Supreme Court discussed the application of the doctrine to an overcharge of a duty by a collector at the Port of New York. The Court determined that when a voluntary payment has been made, "no action will lie to recover back the money." Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. 137, 153, 10
¶ 89 In reaching this decision, the Court relied on several English cases—dating back two centuries. One case, Brisbane v. Dacres, (1813) 128 Eng. Rep. 641 (C.P.) 645; 5 Taunt. 143, 152-53 (opinion of Gibbs, J.), describes the doctrine as follows:
¶ 90 Thus, in 1813, an English court eloquently described the rationale underlying the doctrine of voluntary payment: to promote finality in commercial transactions and to protect payees who in good faith spend the money they receive.
¶ 91 Any suggestion that the voluntary payment doctrine is so old that it is now a dead letter is belied by a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 2010. Spivey v. Adaptive Marketing LLC, 622 F.3d 816 (7th Cir.2010). In that decision the court, in an opinion written by Retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, sitting by designation, explained that "[t]he voluntary payment doctrine has long been recognized in common law" and cited Illinois cases as recent as 2005, to determine that the voluntary payment doctrine barred the plaintiff's claims. Id. at 822-24.
¶ 92 Having established both the lineage and vitality of the voluntary payment doctrine, I freely concede that this common law doctrine may be abrogated by legislation. As far back as 1929, Corpus Juris explained that:
48 C.J. § 280 (1929) (footnotes omitted). Notably, the only statute cited to support
¶ 93 Nonetheless, the common law may be abrogated. This fundamental principle is reflected in Article XIV, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution which reads: "Such parts of the common law as are now in force in the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall be and continue part of the law of this state until altered or suspended by the legislature." Wis. Const. art. XIV, § 13 (emphasis added).
¶ 94 The question inevitably arises when we interpret this section: How do we know when the legislature has "altered or suspended" some feature of the common law? This question was addressed in Kranzush v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 74, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981). The court said:
Id.; see also Meek v. Pierce, 19 Wis. 318 (*300), 322 (*303) (1865) ("[T]he rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication. To give such effect to the statute, the language must be clear, unambiguous and peremptory."); NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 185 Wis.2d 827, 836, 520 N.W.2d 93 (Ct.App.1994) ("A statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed so as to have minimal effect on the common law rule.").
¶ 95 Ten years ago this court applied these principles in the context of a comparative negligence statute and strict product liability. Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, 244 Wis.2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833. The court determined that an amendment to that statute did not apply to strict product liability claims. Id., ¶ 30. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
Id., ¶ 25 (citations omitted).
¶ 96 I am satisfied that Wis. Stat. § 100.207(3)(a) is so clearly designed to protect telecommunications consumers from particular unfair practices in billing that it would be unreasonable to permit the voluntary payment doctrine to nullify the effect of the statute. Subsection (3)(a) reads as follows:
Wis. Stat. § 100.207(3)(a). The evils prohibited by subsection (3)(a) are not ambiguous, and the private remedies created to attack these evils are plainly identified in subsection (6)(a) of the section. Among the evils prohibited is cramming, an attempt to get customers to "unwittingly pay the unauthorized charges" that appear on their telecommunications bills. Majority op., ¶ 6. Even if these payments are not obtained by fraud, their voluntariness is certainly questionable. Cramming charges are prohibited under subsection (3)(a) and the legislature provided a specific remedy in subsection (6)(a) of a right to recover these payments when the payments have been made. In sum, subsection (3)(a) targets demands for unauthorized charges and subsection (6)(a) provides for recovery of those charges when paid. Quasi-voluntary payment of the charges does not bar recovery.
¶ 97 The application of Wis. Stat. § 100.207(2) to the alleged facts is not so clear because subsection (2), which is labeled "ADVERTISING AND SALES REPRESENTATIONS," is different from subsection (3), which is labeled "SALES PRACTICES." Applying the sales language of subsection (2) to the billing practices of "cramming" and "slamming"
¶ 98 The bottom line, however, is that the voluntary payment doctrine does not require the dismissal at this time of the claims in this case under this anti-cramming/anti-slamming statute. We need not answer whether the voluntary payment doctrine could ever apply to a claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.207.
¶ 99 Wisconsin Stat. § 100.18 requires a different analysis. This sweeping statute can be traced back to Chapter 510, Laws of 1913, which created section 1747k of the statutes. Section 1747k read:
§ 1747k, ch. 510, Laws of 1913. This one-paragraph provision has been amended at least 45 times over the past century and has evolved into a lengthy (nearly 2600 words), very complex statute that is difficult to cabin and difficult to analyze.
¶ 100 To suggest in the majority opinion that the legislature abrogated the voluntary payment doctrine when it adopted Wis. Stat. § 100.18 is both unnecessary and unfounded.
¶ 101 Because the majority opinion cannot support such a proposition either analytically or historically, it simply concludes that:
Majority op., ¶ 71. With this conclusion, the majority opinion apparently abandons this court's longstanding methodology in evaluating when the legislature has abrogated the common law. The methodology that the majority applies—that is, to search for some conflict with a statutory purpose—weakens all common law doctrines. This methodology leaves the viability of all common law defenses in doubt.
¶ 102 The majority opinion casts a cloud of uncertainty over commercial transactions in this state. Its assurance that "the voluntary payment doctrine remains alive and well in Wisconsin," majority op., ¶ 77, will prove hollow if its discussion of the doctrine in relation to Wis. Stat. § 100.18 is maintained.
¶ 103 The majority opinion invites consideration of the proposition that Wis. Stat. § 100.18 abrogated the voluntary payment doctrine by asserting that the relationship between the voluntary payment doctrine and § 100.18 was never "brought to the attention of the [Putnam] court [in 2002] nor did the court specifically rule upon it. Accordingly, it [w]as not. . . decided" by the court in Putnam. Majority op., ¶ 40. I disagree.
¶ 104 Putnam discussed the first amended complaint that was dismissed with prejudice by the circuit court. Putnam, 255 Wis.2d 447, ¶¶ 1, 4 n. 2, 649 N.W.2d 626. The opinion cites the multiple theories in the amended complaint, including unlawful liquidated damages, unjust enrichment, restitution, and violation of Wisconsin's Trade Practices Act. Id., ¶ 4 n. 2. All are affected by the voluntary payment doctrine. The Wisconsin Trade Practices Act is identified as Wis. Stat. § 100.18 in Count VII of the amended complaint cited in Putnam's brief. It was discussed by the circuit court, and it was referred to in the published court of appeals decision, Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., 2001 WI App 196, ¶ 3 n. 1, 247 Wis.2d 41, 633 N.W.2d 254, which affirmed the circuit court. The Putnam majority, in turn, affirmed the circuit court and the court of appeals in relation to the voluntary payment doctrine.
¶ 105 In doing so, the Putnam court said: "In analyzing this case, we . . . take as true all allegations made in the customers' amended complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the customers." Putnam, 255 Wis.2d 447, ¶ 11, 649 N.W.2d 626 (emphasis added). The
¶ 106 In the present case the majority opinion takes the fact that the Putnam court "collectively disposed of" the stated claims, majority op., ¶ 33, as support for the proposition that there ought to be a difference between statutory and common law claims. Curiously, the majority opinion takes our past identical treatment of statutory and common law claims as support for the proposition that the claims ought to be treated differently. Likewise, the opinion's analysis ignores that we determined that the voluntary payment doctrine applied to all claims in Putnam—statutory and common law alike. Putnam, 255 Wis.2d 447, ¶ 36 n. 12, 649 N.W.2d 626.
¶ 107 The Putnam court addressed the possibility that the legislature could act to supersede the voluntary payment doctrine in a paragraph strongly affirming the doctrine:
Putnam, 255 Wis.2d 447, ¶ 35, 649 N.W.2d 626 (emphasis added).
¶ 108 It is unlikely that the court would have acknowledged the legislature's power "to create additional exceptions to the voluntary payment doctrine" if the court thought that the legislature had already done so in adopting Wis. Stat. § 100.18.
¶ 109 I believe this case may go forward under Wis. Stat. § 100.207(3)(a) because the statute prohibits specific billing practices in telecommunications and actually addresses a person's "failure to refuse" an unauthorized charge. This alters the voluntary payment doctrine so that claims under the statute are not required to be dismissed in this case at this stage in the proceedings. The legislature provided a clear remedy for overpayment of certain charges. The legislature was clear, unambiguous, and peremptory in this paragraph; the court need not go further and alter the law of abrogation of the common law.
¶ 110 I concur with the court's decision that the dismissal of the claim under Wis. Stat. § 100.207 must be reversed. However, I disagree with the court's statement of the law and its decision regarding the other claims. Therefore, I cannot join the court's opinion.
¶ 111 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
¶ 112 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN joins this concurrence/dissent.
In Butcher, it was alleged that Ameritech had collected taxes for services that were not properly subject to taxation. Id., ¶ 1. Wisconsin's tax code provides a statutory procedure for recovering payments. In certain circumstances, taxpayers can file a claim for a refund with the Department of Revenue (DOR) under Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a). The remedial scheme in Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a) does not require taxpayers to protest the payment of unlawful taxes prior to seeking a remedy from the DOR.
The Butcher plaintiffs did not seek the remedy from the DOR as provided in Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a). Rather, they filed suit in the circuit court directly against Ameritech.
The plaintiffs argued that application of the voluntary payment doctrine to bar their claims would violate the public policy as expressed in Wis. Stat. § 77.59. The Butcher court disagreed, holding that the voluntary payment doctrine was a viable defense against the claims filed against Ameritech in circuit court, even if the doctrine would not apply to claims made under Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a). The court of appeals explained: "Section 77.59(4)(a) expresses the legislature's intent that a taxpayer need not protest the tax when paying it in order to recover a refund [from the DOR] under the procedure established in § 77.59(4)(a). The statute expresses no intent and no policy judgment on whether the common law voluntary payment doctrine should apply in a court action outside the statutory scheme." Id., ¶ 31 (emphasis added).
Because there was no Wis. Stat. § 77.59(4)(a) claim at issue in Butcher, the Butcher court had no occasion to evaluate the applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine to a cause of action created by statute.
While the voluntary payment doctrine is often discussed in the context of payments to governments, the same rules do not necessarily apply in the context of payments from government agents. See Joshua E. Dodge, How To Sue the Government, 8 Marq. L.Rev. 267, 285 (1924) ("When . . . a public officer . . . pays out to an individual money which the law did not authorize . . . the Government may recover [it] back, unhampered by any of the rules of voluntary payment . . . applicable as between individuals."); but see Frederick, 96 Wis. at 423, 71 N.W. 798 (Winslow, J. concurring) (suggesting that the opinion of the court applied the doctrine of voluntary payment to payments made by public officials). Joshua Dodge was a member of this court from 1898-1910. Portraits of Justice 28 (Trina E. Gray et al. eds., 2d ed.2003).