N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.

¶ 1 The question we address in this case is whether Robert Luethi, who hired an independent contractor to spray herbicide on his property, may be held liable to his neighbors, the Brandenburgs, for the extensive, permanent damage they claim the spraying caused to 79 trees on adjoining property. Bruce Brandenburg, who owned property at the top of a steep slope above Luethi's pasture, claimed damage to all eight trees on his land; Kelli Brandenburg, who also owned property at the top of the slope, claimed damage to 71 of 115 trees on her land.

¶ 2 More specifically, we must determine whether this case falls into one of the exceptions to the well-settled independent contractor rule that states that, in general, "one who contracts for the services of an independent contractor is not liable to others for the acts of the independent contractor."1

¶ 3 Under one of those exceptions, the "inherently dangerous activity" exception, an employer of an independent contractor may be liable for the torts of an independent contractor if the activity of the independent contractor is inherently dangerous. This exception is what the parties disagree about. Plaintiffs say the exception is good law and it applies here because this activity is inherently dangerous. Luethi says that it is not good law and does not apply here. Further, he argues that the exception is unworkable and should be altered or abandoned altogether.

¶ 4 The "inherently dangerous" exception has long been recognized in treatises, in our case law and in case law from other jurisdictions. The test for whether an activity is inherently dangerous has two parts. An activity is inherently dangerous 1) if the activity poses a naturally expected risk of harm and 2) if it is possible to reduce the risk of the activity to a reasonable level by taking precautions.2

¶ 5 For the reasons explained below, we see no reason to abandon our precedent concerning the "inherently dangerous" exception. It is a widely accepted and long-established rule of negligence law that is rooted in good policy. The rule imposes liability on the parties who are in the best position to take precautions to avoid harm to third parties where the activity to be done is inherently dangerous.

¶ 6 We therefore turn to the exception's application. In some negligence cases, including somewhat unusual negligence claims such as the one against Luethi, "[w]e require a plaintiff to plead facts, which if proved true, would establish the following four elements: (1) the existence of a duty of care on the part of the defendant, (2) a breach of that duty of care, (3) a causal connection between the defendant's breach of the duty of care and the plaintiff's injury, and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the [breach]."3

¶ 7 Under Wisconsin law, "every person is subject to a duty to exercise ordinary care in all of his or her activities" and, therefore, "the elements of duty and breach are usually presented to the trier of fact in a question asking whether the defendant was negligent, and then the elements of causation and damages are addressed."4 Thus, generally, a trier of fact in a usual negligence case is presented with three questions: was the defendant negligent?, was that negligence the cause of the harm?, and what are the damages?5 As noted above, this case is somewhat different.

¶ 8 The threshold question is whether Luethi may be liable for the negligence of the independent contractor he hired to spray herbicides. To answer that, we have to examine the nature of the activity itself because if spraying is an inherently dangerous activity, then it gives rise to a duty of ordinary care for Luethi for the acts of the independent contractor. If, on the other hand, the activity is not inherently dangerous (and if no other exceptions apply), the duty of ordinary care is that of the independent contractor, and Luethi cannot be liable for the acts of the other person.

¶ 9 In many cases, this determination of whether a given activity is inherently dangerous will be one of fact, but in the unusual case where the facts are undisputed and no reasonable jury could find otherwise,6 it is appropriate to decide it as a question of law. As the relevant suggested verdict form in Wisconsin Jury Instruction — Civil 1022.6 notes, "There are times when the [question about inherent dangerousness] will not be necessary."

¶ 10 The record contains uncontroverted evidence that the chemical used here is capable of killing 56 "woody plant" species, including oak, birch, poplar and maple trees. It therefore poses a "naturally expected risk of harm" to trees on neighboring properties. The record also contains undisputed testimony and exhibits showing that it is possible to reduce that risk by taking precautions. Therefore, both parts of the inherently dangerous test are satisfied, and we agree with the court of appeals that under Wisconsin law, under these circumstances, "spraying the herbicides was an inherently dangerous activity, and, as a result, the general rule of nonliability for an independent contractor's torts did not apply."7

¶ 11 The threshold question in the negligence determination is resolved here in favor of a determination that Luethi may be liable for the acts of the independent contractor on the grounds that the spraying here was an inherently dangerous activity — it posed a risk of naturally expected harm, and it was possible to reduce the risk. With that question resolved, the negligence claim may now proceed, with the plaintiffs having the opportunity to show that Luethi failed to use ordinary care with regard to the activity and that such failure was the cause of the damage claimed,8 followed by an appropriate damage question.

¶ 12 This is consistent with the approach applied in Wisconsin Jury Instruction — Civil 1022.6 and the Suggested Verdict Form 1 (Inherently dangerous activity). It is also consistent with the Restatement sections on which we have relied in the prior cases addressing this question.

¶ 13 The Restatement sections describe a framework that imposes liability on an employer for the acts of the independent contractor where three facts are established: that there exists a naturally expected risk of harm, that there exists an opportunity to take precautions against the harm, and that the employer "knows or has reason to know" that it poses a risk and requires precautions. The concurrence/dissent rightly points out that Wisconsin case law clearly adopts the "inherently dangerous exception" as described in the Restatement sections discussed herein. However, it is equally clear that Wisconsin courts have rejected a strict liability approach in "inherently dangerous" cases. Adopting such an approach would erase the distinction between "inherently dangerous" and "extrahazardous activity," which we explicitly declined to do in Wagner. Wagner v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 143 Wis.2d 379, 392-93, 421 N.W.2d 835 (1988).

¶ 14 At this point in the case, there has been no determination by a trier of fact of what Luethi knew or had reason to know about the danger inherent in the work. To impose strict liability would therefore contravene the applicable section of the Restatement and change the law by erasing one requirement — making an employer liable for activities even where it is not established that the employer knew or had reason to know of the danger inherent in the work. The lack of clarity on the analysis in prior cases is partly due to the fact that this particular question has not been squarely addressed because the application of the "inherently dangerous" exception has been mentioned in other contexts rather than being subjected to full analysis. Nevertheless, imposing strict liability without any resolution of the knowledge requirement, within the framework of the duty of ordinary care, is unsupported by the Restatement sections. This "knows or has reason to know" factor seems to come into play on the question of whether Luethi failed to use ordinary care with regard to the activity. No resolution of that question has been made at this point in the record; therefore, the court of appeals correctly stated that the case should be remanded for the relevant further determinations to be made, specifically whether Luethi exercised ordinary care to prevent damage to the Brandenburgs' property.

¶ 15 We therefore affirm the court of appeals and remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 16 Luethi hired an independent contractor who sprayed a potent herbicide — one capable of killing oak, birch, poplar and maple trees and 52 other woody species, according to its label — on part of his property to rid it of a plant called prickly ash, which had grown thickly on the property, with some plants reaching a height of seven feet. There was no written contract between Luethi and the contractor, and Luethi placed no time restrictions on the spraying company.

¶ 17 A few days after the herbicide was applied, Luethi's neighbors, the Brandenburgs, noticed that leaves were falling off of the birch trees and other plants on their property. Based on an investigation that identified the herbicide as the cause of the damage,9 they sued Luethi as well as the independent contractor, Briarwood Forestry, and its employee and its insurer.10 The only basis in the complaint for the claim was that the independent contractor was negligent for failing to take precautions to prevent the damage to their trees — specifically, to keep the chemicals from drifting onto adjoining property.

¶ 18 The circuit court for Trempealeau County, the Honorable John A. Damon presiding, looked to a six-factor test discussed in a case from a Kansas district court that bore some factual resemblance to this case in that it also involved a claim concerning damage caused to plants by a neighbor's herbicide spraying. See Desaire v. Solomon Valley Co-op, Inc., No. 94-1271-PFK, 1995 WL 580064 (D.Kan., Sept. 14, 1995). The circuit court, applying the factors cited in that case, held that spraying herbicides was not "abnormally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous." Therefore, it held that Luethi had no duty to the Brandenburgs and that only the independent contractor could be liable for any damage the spraying caused. The circuit court therefore granted Luethi's summary judgment motion.

¶ 19 In making its ruling, the circuit court stated, "I can't find that [under] the language used in Desaire this was abnormally dangerous and I can't find this reaches the level of ultrahazardous activity[.]"

¶ 20 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed that ruling on the grounds that the circuit court had relied on an improper standard. The relevant question was, the court of appeals said, whether the activity was inherently dangerous — not whether it was abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous. Brandenburg v. Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip op., ¶¶ 1, 16, 2013 WL 1729480 (Wis.Ct.App. Apr. 23, 2013).

¶ 21 Applying the test for inherently dangerous activities that we clarified in Wagner, 143 Wis.2d at 392-93, 421 N.W.2d 835, the court of appeals concluded that "the risk of harm" posed by spraying herbicides "is one that could be naturally expected to arise in the absence of precautions." Brandenburg v. Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip op., ¶ 22, 2013 WL 1729480 (Wis.Ct.App. Apr. 23, 2013). It also concluded, "Undisputed evidence also showed that the risk of harm could be reduced to a reasonable level by taking certain precautions." Id., ¶ 23. "Consequently, spraying the herbicides was an inherently dangerous activity...." Id., ¶ 24. Its holding was essentially that no reasonable jury could find otherwise on the facts in the record and that the circuit court had erred when it used a test derived from Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 520. (We note that Section 520 had also been the basis for the Desaire court's holding.) As the court of appeals noted, that Restatement section falls under "Strict Liability" and defines those circumstances where there can be liability "without the need of a finding of negligence." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 cmt. f (1977). It therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 22 We granted review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 23 "Whether the circuit court has applied the correct legal standard is a question of law reviewed de novo." Landwehr v. Landwehr, 2006 WI 64, ¶ 8, 291 Wis.2d 49, 715 N.W.2d 180. As noted above, the circuit court applied the standard employed in Desaire, which, in the course of answering a different question presented, contained discussion about what factors courts consider in determining "whether a given action is abnormally dangerous." Desaire v. Solomon Valley Co-op, Inc., No. 94-1271-PFK, 1995 WL 580064, at *4 (D.Kan., Sept. 14, 1995).

¶ 24 The circuit court granted Luethi's summary judgment motion. "There is a standard methodology which a trial court follows when faced with a motion for summary judgment." Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis.2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). "The first step of that methodology requires the court to examine the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has been stated." Id.

Id. "When this court is called upon to review the grant of a summary judgment motion ... we are governed by the standard articulated in section 802.08(2), and we are thus required to apply the standards set forth in the statute just as the trial court applied those standards." Id. at 315, 401 N.W.2d 816.

III. DISCUSSION

¶ 25 The claims in this case are simple negligence claims. The only twist is the fact that it involves an independent contractor. The legal principles for negligence cases involving independent contractors are discussed in the treatise Prosser and Keeton on Torts. In the section concerning negligence and independent contractors, the treatise writers describe how the courts moved from a general rule of liability for one hiring an independent contractor to the present general rule of non-liability. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 71, at 509 (5th ed.1984). The independent contractor exception to that general rule appears in its current form in cases as early as 1851. Id. at 509, n. 4. The treatise authors state that courts "continue[] to repeat the general rule of nonliability with exceptions" and state that the exceptions "overlap and shade into one another." Id. at 510.

¶ 26 The treatise explains the origins of the inherently dangerous activities exception, in an 1876 case,11 which held the employer could be found liable for the negligence of the contractor, and it notes that "`[i]nherent danger' converges not only with `special precautions' but also with `non-delegable duty.'" Id. at 512 n. 44.

¶ 27 By 1895, we had recognized as "well-established" both the independent contractor rule and the "inherently dangerous" exception. In a case involving extensive flood damage to property allegedly caused by someone opening a dam in order to drive logs down a river, we stated that we had "repeatedly held"

Carlson v. Stocking, 91 Wis. 432, 436, 65 N.W. 58 (1895) (emphasis added) (quotations omitted) (citing earlier cases). The rule was stated in that case in the context of a dispute about whether the person whose acts had allegedly caused the damage was an independent contractor. Id. at 432, 65 N.W. 58. As detailed below, later cases continued the practice of repeatedly citing the rule of non-liability with an exception for activities that could be characterized as inherently dangerous.12

¶ 28 Nevertheless, Luethi argues that the law does not impose liability on him for the acts of the independent contractor in this instance, and if it does, it should not. He advances two types of arguments. First, he makes a series of arguments about why the inherently dangerous exception is not or should not be recognized in Wisconsin law, especially where homeowners are concerned. Second, he argues that even if the exception is recognized by Wisconsin law, it does not apply in this case because herbicide spraying is not an inherently dangerous activity. The Brandenburgs contend that the "inherently dangerous" exception is clearly expressed in the law, is straightforward to apply, and is consistent with good policy. They argue that it applies on the facts of this case.13 We address the arguments in turn.

¶ 29 Luethi argues first that the inherently dangerous exception does not control because it "has been a confusing and evolving doctrine in Wisconsin, which has been described but not applied." He contends that "no precedent has applied the rule the Brandenburgs now seek to resurrect in more than 25 years," that "no applicable precedent subsequent to Lofy14 ... has actually applied the rule in either direction," and that in the cases cited, the rule, though stated, has never operated to allow recovery for a plaintiff.

¶ 30 Even though there may not be a Wisconsin case on all fours with the specific facts in this case, we see no reason that the accepted rule needs to be revisited.15 The law is well-founded in the Restatement, very familiar to treatise writers, and often repeated in Wisconsin cases dating to the early nineteenth century. See Carlson, 91 Wis. 432, 65 N.W. 58 (citing earlier cases). In Finkelstein v. Majestic Realty Corp., 198 Wis. 527, 224 N.W. 743 (1929), which involved contractors apparently knocking loose a piece of terra cotta that fell from a balcony and killed a child below, the court observed,

Id. at 536-37, 224 N.W. 743.

¶ 31 We mentioned the exception again, in 1931, in Medley v. Trenton Investment Company, 205 Wis. 30, 236 N.W. 713 (1931), a case in which a landlord was sued for the wrongful death of a tenant after a contractor fumigated a neighboring apartment and the victim died from exposure to the fumes:

Id. at 35-36, 236 N.W. 713.

¶ 32 The principle was invoked in Lofy by plaintiffs who sought to hold a school district liable for the alleged negligence of a bus driver who was an independent contractor. Lofy v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 42 Wis.2d 253, 263, 166 N.W.2d 809 (1969). There we noted the rule and the "inherently dangerous" exception and then rejected the argument that it applied in that case:

Id. at 263, 166 N.W.2d 809.

¶ 33 We have also looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts in prior cases and have examined the principles set forth in sections 413, 416 and 427 in resolving questions arising in negligence claims involving independent contractors.16

Wagner, 143 Wis.2d at 391, 421 N.W.2d 835 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, Introductory Note to secs. 416-429). We cited to both Prosser and Keeton's treatise and the Restatement for these principles in Snider v. Northern States Power Co., 81 Wis.2d 224, 233, 260 N.W.2d 260 (1977):

¶ 34 As Snider recognized, these sections overlap in certain respects.17

¶ 35 Section 416 is entitled "Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions" and it falls in Chapter 15, Liability of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, under the heading, "Topic 2: Harm Caused by Negligence of a Carefully Selected Independent Contractor." It states:

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 (1965).

¶ 36 A comment to Section 416 states in part:

Id., § 416, cmt. a.

¶ 37 Section 427 is entitled "Negligence as to Danger Inherent in the Work" and it falls under the same chapter and topic heading. It states:

Id., § 427. A comment to this section clarifies that, like the rule stated in Section 416, "the rule here stated applies only where the harm results from the negligence of the contractor in failing to take precautions against the danger involved in the work itself, which the employer should contemplate at the time of his contract." Id. § 427 cmt. d. Further, "the rule stated here has no application ... as to negligence in the operative details of the work which involve no peculiar risk, which the employer may reasonably assume will be carried out with proper care." Id.

¶ 38 The court of appeals concisely summarized the applicable principles derived from our case law, which has consistently referenced the Restatement sections above:

Brandenburg v. Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip op., ¶¶ 16, 20, 21, 2013 WL 1729480 (Wis.Ct.App. Apr. 23, 2013) (citations omitted). We agree.

¶ 39 While it is true that in some earlier cases the distinction between the categories of "extrahazardous" and "inherently dangerous" activities appears unclear, we dispelled any confusion on that point in Wagner, when we specifically explained the difference between the two: "We do not regard an activity which is inherently dangerous because of the absence of special precautions to be synonymous with an activity that is extrahazardous. A person engaged in an activity of the first type, i.e., one that is inherently dangerous without special precautions, can take steps to minimize the risk of injury." Wagner, 143 Wis.2d at 392, 421 N.W.2d 835.

¶ 40 In short, we have consistently acknowledged the rule and the exception that applies here. The lack of cases in which the exception has applied in precisely the way it applies here does not persuade us that the rule does not exist.18

¶ 41 Luethi also argues that, if the "inherently dangerous" exception is good law, homeowners and landowners should be exempt from its application because no Wisconsin cases dealing with this exception have applied it to an individual homeowner. For the reason already given — that absence of factually identical cases does not persuade us of the invalidity of the rule — we disagree. Nor has Luethi pointed us to precedent as a legal basis supporting a contrary rule if an individual homeowner is involved.

¶ 42 In a similar vein, he argues that if liability exists as to a homeowner, public policy factors19 should preclude liability under these circumstances. Specifically, he argues that the injury is too remote from the negligence, that the injury is wildly out of proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability, that allowing recovery would place an unreasonable burden on the tortfeasor, and that allowing recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. In support of his public policy arguments, he relies on our holdings in Casper v. American International South Insurance Co., 2011 WI 81, 336 Wis.2d 267, 800 N.W.2d 880, and Hoida, Inc. v. M & I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, 291 Wis.2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17.

¶ 43 In the first case, Casper, we found the that the injury was too remote from the negligence to permit a finding of liability for Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jeffrey Wenham, who had approved a route that was driven by Mark Wearing, a truck driver who, while under the influence of multiple drugs, caused a tragic accident:

Casper, 336 Wis.2d 267, ¶ 96, 800 N.W.2d 880.

¶ 44 In Hoida, the plaintiff sought recovery from a disbursing agent of money that was disbursed to a subcontractor who took $650,000 in construction loan proceeds without doing the work. Hoida, 291 Wis.2d 283, ¶ 43, 717 N.W.2d 17. We declined on public policy grounds to assign liability to a disbursing agent for a construction loan, where that agent "acted solely at the direction" of the bank. We did so on the grounds that permitting recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on such agents to verify details of the progress of construction projects. Id.

¶ 45 Luethi analogizes his position to that of the CEO in Casper, for whom the ultimate harm was not reasonably foreseeable, and to the disbursing agent in Hoida, who would have been unreasonably burdened by the responsibility of checking on the progress of the work. The plaintiffs disagree that such analogies are valid.

¶ 46 We do not see the situation of a person hiring an independent contractor doing inherently dangerous work as raising the types of concerns that precluded liability in the cases Luethi cites. He cannot be compared to the CEO who did not hire or even meet the truck driver who caused the harm and whose only connection to the accident was the fact that he had approved the route the driver was on. Nor is a person who hires an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work on his own property fairly compared to a disbursing agent for a construction loan. This is true for many reasons, including that the property where the work was done was Luethi's own. Also, the construction project was of a magnitude much larger than a one-time application of herbicide.

¶ 47 Further, the public policy factors have in fact already been balanced in favor of potential liability in these cases. Public policy reasons underlie the "inherently dangerous activity" exception in the first place, as the Restatement sections discussed note. As one court observed, the "inherently dangerous" exception "accords with basic intuitions of fairness, and it is also consistent with what is often efficient economically." Huddleston by Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. Ass'n, 841 P.2d 282, 287 (Colo.1992). The reason for its existence is that the employer is in a better position than third parties to take precautions against harm to unwitting third parties, and should not be permitted to shift liability to a contractor where inherently dangerous activities are involved.20 We do not agree that the injury is so remote from the negligence that public policy precludes liability — indeed it follows directly from it. Also, we do not agree that holding Luethi liable imposes an unreasonable burden under these circumstances.

¶ 48 Alternatively, Luethi asks that we adopt a rule that liability may exist for a homeowner only where an activity is "extrahazardous," using the test employed by the Kansas district court in Desaire, which applied the six factors from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520. Section 520, which falls in the division concerning strict liability, defines "abnormally dangerous" activities using the following standard:

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977).

¶ 49 The Desaire decision relied on Section 520. From the cases to which the Desaire court cites, it can be inferred that the claim involved in the case may have been a claim for strict liability rather than a negligence claim though that is not clearly stated.21 What is clear is that application of the factors from Section 520 is appropriate where a claim for strict liability is made. To apply such a standard to negligence claims such as this one would be a departure from Wisconsin law, as the court of appeals correctly noted.22 To import strict liability from a products liability context to a negligence claim would mean "reliev[ing] [a plaintiff] of proving specific acts of negligence and protect[ing] him from [applicable] defenses...." Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).

¶ 50 Having established what the law in Wisconsin is, we turn to Luethi's final argument, which is that even if the "inherently dangerous" exception is the law and the Wagner and Lofy standards govern, herbicide spraying does not qualify as inherently dangerous. The plaintiffs, of course, disagree.

¶ 51 To support his argument that herbicide spraying is not inherently dangerous, Luethi points to Comment f to Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 413. That section states:

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 (1965).

¶ 52 The comment to which Luethi refers provides that "the extent of the employer's knowledge and experience in the field of work to be done is to be taken into account," and Luethi asserts that in light of this comment, he cannot be held liable because he "had no knowledge of the peculiar risks involved, nor special precautions needed to mitigate them, nor any reason to foresee [the contractor] would ignore standard safety precautions such as instructions on the chemicals' labels." Luethi's knowledge or lack thereof are matters to be considered as to whether he exercised ordinary care.

¶ 53 Section 413, the section with the comment to which Luethi cites, falls into the first part of Chapter 15 of the Restatement (Second), "Liability of an Employer of an Independent Contractor." The chapter is divided into two parts: the first, Topic 1, covers "Harm Caused by the Fault of Employers of Independent Contractors," and the second, Topic 2, covers "Harm Caused by the Negligence of a Carefully Selected Independent Contractor." Topic 2, which includes sections 416 and 427, which we discussed above, overlaps with Section 413, as was acknowledged in Snider, in that all three contain language conditioning liability on, among other things, what the employer "should recognize" or "has reason to know" about the nature of the danger involved in the work.

¶ 54 Under sections 416 and 427, an employer's assertions of a lack of knowledge about an activity's dangerousness are not dispositive on the question of its inherent dangerousness because liability may be imposed for activity "which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken" (as Section 416 states), and for activity involving "a special danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract" (as Section 427 states).

¶ 55 The Restatement sections at issue thus explicitly condition liability not on actual knowledge but on the inherent dangers an employer of an independent contractor "should recognize," "has reason to know," or "has reason to contemplate." This "knows or has reason to know" factor seems to come into play on the question of whether Luethi failed to use ordinary care with regard to the activity.

¶ 56 In many cases, the determination of an activity's inherent dangerousness will be a question of fact.23 However, in certain circumstances involving undisputed facts, a court may hold an activity is inherently dangerous as a matter of law. As noted above, Wisconsin Jury Instruction-Civil 1022.6 includes a note referring to the threshold "inherently dangerous" question that says, "There are times when the [first] question will not be necessary."

¶ 57 For example, in Lofy, this court held as a matter of law that "[t]he operation of a bus between Cumberland and Madison over modern highways cannot be considered inherently dangerous." Lofy, 42 Wis.2d at 263, 166 N.W.2d 809. See also Brooks v. Hayes, 133 Wis.2d 228, 395 N.W.2d 167 (1986). Here the court of appeals, citing the extensive and uncontroverted evidence, determined that certain precautions could reduce the risk to a reasonable level:

The undisputed evidence therefore established that Briarwood's application of the herbicides posed a naturally expected risk of harm, and that certain precautions could be taken to reduce the risk to a reasonable level.

Brandenburg v. Luethi, No. 2012AP2085, unpublished slip op., ¶¶ 22-24, 2013 WL 1729480 (Wis.Ct.App. Apr. 23, 2013).

¶ 58 We agree with the court of appeals for the reasons it stated that in this case, under our precedent, the activity is inherently dangerous, because the activity poses a naturally expected risk of harm, and taking certain precautions could reduce the risk to a reasonable level.

¶ 59 That determination resolves the threshold question in this claim as to Luethi. Because the activity involved was inherently dangerous, Luethi may be liable despite hiring an independent contractor. The next questions to answer are 1) whether Luethi failed to use ordinary care with regard to any danger inherent in the herbicide spraying that he knew or had reason to know about, and 2) if so, whether any harm that occurred was caused by the spraying. As the court of appeals noted, "[T]he factual question remains for the jury to determine whether Luethi exercised ordinary care to prevent damage to the Brandenburgs' property." Id., ¶ 24.

IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 60 The record contains uncontroverted evidence that the chemical used here is capable of killing 56 "woody plant" species, including oak, birch, poplar and maple trees. It therefore poses a "naturally expected risk of harm" to trees on neighboring properties. The record also contains undisputed testimony and exhibits showing that it is possible to reduce that risk by taking precautions. Therefore, both parts of the inherently dangerous test are satisfied, and we agree with the court of appeals that under Wisconsin law, under these circumstances, "spraying the herbicides was an inherently dangerous activity, and, as a result, the general rule of nonliability for an independent contractor's torts did not apply."24

¶ 61 The threshold question in the negligence determination is resolved here in favor of a determination that Luethi may be liable on the grounds that the spraying here was an inherently dangerous activity. With that question resolved, the negligence claim may now proceed, with the plaintiffs having the opportunity to show that Luethi failed to use ordinary care with regard to the activity and that such failure was a cause of the damage claimed, followed by an appropriate damages question. This is consistent with the approach applied in Wisconsin Jury Instruction — Civil 1022.6 and the Suggested Verdict Form 1 (Inherently dangerous activity). It is also consistent with the Restatement sections on which we have relied in the prior cases addressing this question.

¶ 62 The Restatement sections describe a framework that imposes liability on an employer for the acts of the independent contractor where three facts are established: that there exists a naturally expected risk of harm, that there exists an opportunity to take precautions against the harm, and that the employer "knows or has reason to know" that it poses a risk and requires precautions. The concurrence rightly points out that Wisconsin case law clearly adopts the "inherently dangerous exception" as described in the Restatement sections discussed herein. However, it is equally clear that Wisconsin courts have rejected a strict liability approach in "inherently dangerous" cases. Adopting such an approach would erase the distinction between "inherently dangerous" and "extrahazardous activity," which we explicitly declined to do in Wagner.

¶ 63 At this point in the case, there has been no determination by a trier of fact of what Luethi knew or had reason to know about the danger inherent in the work. To impose strict liability would therefore contravene the applicable section of the Restatement and change the law by erasing one requirement — making an employer liable for activities even where it is not established that the employer knew or had reason to know of the danger inherent in the work. The lack of clarity on the analysis in prior cases is partly due to the fact that this particular question has not been squarely addressed because the application of the "inherently dangerous" exception has been mentioned in other contexts rather than being subjected to full analysis. Nevertheless, imposing strict liability without any resolution of the knowledge requirement, within the framework of the duty of ordinary care, is unsupported by the Restatement sections. This "knows or has reason to know" factor seems to come into play on the question of whether Luethi failed to use ordinary care with regard to the activity. No resolution of that question has been made at this point in the record; therefore, the court of appeals correctly stated that the case should be remanded for the relevant further determinations to be made, specifically "whether Luethi exercised ordinary care to prevent damage to the Brandenburgs' property."

¶ 64 We therefore affirm the court of appeals and remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed and cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 65 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, Chief Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).

When a landowner employs an independent contractor to perform an activity that this court declares is inherently dangerous as a matter of law, who should bear the cost of the damage to the innocent neighbor's property? Should it be the employer who hires the independent contractor to perform the inherently dangerous activity and reaps the benefits of that activity? Or should it be the innocent neighbor who suffers the damages caused by the independent contractor's negligence?1

¶ 66 Our case law has already answered this question: "[A]n employer of an independent contractor is vicariously liable for the torts of an independent contractor if the activity of the independent contractor is inherently dangerous."2

¶ 67 The majority opinion professes that it "sets forth the proper analysis in applying the inherently dangerous exception to the general rule,"3 but its analysis does not comport with the principles underlying the inherently dangerous exception.4

¶ 68 The general rule, upon which we all agree, is that employers of independent contractors are not generally liable for the torts committed by their independent contractors. An employer may, however, be liable for the torts of an independent contractor in two circumstances:

¶ 69 These two bases of liability of the employer of an independent contractor are analyzed separately in the case law and the literature.

¶ 70 This case addresses only a claim against the employer (Luethi) for the tortious acts committed by his independent contractor. The complaint does not allege that any wrongful acts were committed by Luethi.6 As the majority opinion notes, summary judgment determinations rely solely on allegations in the complaint.7

¶ 71 By confusing the two separate inquiries of an employer's liability, the majority reaches the conclusion that vicarious liability attaches to the employer as a matter of law for his or her independent contractor's torts in performing an inherently dangerous activity, but that such an employer can nonetheless avoid liability if he or she exercised ordinary care.

¶ 72 Because the court has already determined as a matter of law that the herbicide spraying by the independent contractor in the instant case constituted an inherently dangerous activity and nothing in the complaint or record avers Luethi's negligence, no inquiry into Luethi's level of care is necessary.

¶ 73 Accordingly, I agree with the majority opinion that the matter is to be remanded to the circuit court to determine whether the independent contractor was causally negligent in damaging the neighbor's property. I disagree that on remand the circuit court must resolve the question of whether Luethi failed to use ordinary care with regard to the activity. Neither the complaint nor the summary judgment record raises the issue of the negligence of Luethi himself.

¶ 74 I reach my conclusions by reasoning as follows:

I

¶ 75 In order to clarify the nature of the liability in the instant case, I lay out the state of the law regarding instances in which an employer of an independent contractor is liable for the independent contractor's negligence.

¶ 76 The general rule, as I stated above, is that one who contracts for the services of an independent contractor is not liable to others for the acts of the independent contractor.8

¶ 77 An employer may, however, be liable for the torts of an independent contractor under a variety of exceptional circumstances. The Restatement (Second) of Torts organizes the bases for an employer's liability when he or she employs an independent contractor into two distinct categories:

¶ 78 These two categories are described in the Third Restatement as (1) "direct liability in negligence"11 and (2) "vicarious liability."12

¶ 79 In the first category, direct liability, an employer of an independent contractor may be held liable for the injuries caused by the employer's own negligence.13 That is, liability for the employer exists on "occasions where the employer may be liable for his [or her] own negligence, even if the work entrusted to the contractor is such that the employer is not otherwise answerable for the negligence of the contractor...."14

¶ 80 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm acknowledges a variety of potential negligent acts on the part of the employer that would create liability, as listed in the relevant sections of the Restatement (Second):15

Restatement (Third) of Torts § 55 cmt. a (2012) (footnotes added).

¶ 81 In those cases falling in the first category of employer liability, in which the employer's own negligence is at issue, the employer is liable if the employer breached his or her duty of ordinary care.21

¶ 82 Conversely, in cases in the second category, i.e., vicarious liability, the employer's own negligence is not at issue. Once an activity falls into this second category, the liability of an employer of an independent contractor depends on the tortious acts of its independent contractor, not the tortious act of the employer.

¶ 83 The Restatement (Second) of Torts explicitly notes that for this category of liability, the potential negligence of the employer is irrelevant:

Restatement (Second) of Torts ch. 15, topic 2, intro. note, at 394 (1965) (emphasis added).

¶ 84 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm echoes this declaration, stating that the rules it sets forth are "consistent with the Second Restatement of Torts" and asserting that the rules in this second category are "appropriately viewed as rules of vicarious liability."22 The Restatement (Third) goes on to reiterate the irrelevance of the principal employer's own negligence: "These rules subject the hirer, even absent the hirer's own negligence, to liability for harm caused by the tortious conduct of another actor — the independent contractor."23

¶ 85 The Restatements (Second) and (Third) of Torts identify the "inherently dangerous" exception as falling into this second category of vicarious liability.

¶ 86 Section 416 of the Restatement (Second) states that an employer is subject to vicarious liability for the torts of an independent contractor under circumstances with an increased risk that can be reduced through special precautions:

2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 at 395 (1965).

¶ 87 Similarly, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 states that an employer of an independent contractor in a situation involving inherently dangerous activities is subject to vicarious liability for harm caused by the contractor's tortious acts.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427, at 415 (1965).

¶ 88 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm echoes this rule, declaring that an employer may be vicariously liable for the torts of its independent contractor if the activity carries a peculiar risk, i.e., a heightened risk if reasonable care is not taken:

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 59 (2012).24

¶ 89 The view of the Restatements (Second) and (Third) and the law of vicarious liability of an employer of an independent contractor are reflected in the literature. The Prosser and Keeton treatise notes that the "inherently dangerous" exception is one of many exceptions to the general rule that there is no vicarious liability upon an employer for the causal negligence of the independent contractor.25 Specifically, this category of cases goes beyond the reasonable precautions taken by an employer, "hold[ing] the employer liable for the negligence of the contractor, although [the employer] has ... done everything that could reasonably be required of him [or her]. They are thus cases of vicarious liability."26 See also 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts § 432 (2d ed. Practitioner Treatise Series 2011); Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Liability of Employer with Regard to Inherently Dangerous Work for Injuries to Employees of Independent Contractor, 34 A.L.R.4th 914 (1984 & Supp.).

II

¶ 90 Wisconsin case law has followed these tort principles explained above involving inherently dangerous activities.

¶ 91 As the majority opinion correctly notes,27 our case law has cited Sections 416 and 427 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts when assessing whether an employer can be held vicariously liable for the torts of its independent contractor: "Sections 416 and 427 impute the independent contractor's negligence to the principal employer irrespective of whether the employer is himself or herself at fault on the basis that the dangerous activities involved give rise to a nondelegable duty." Wagner v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 143 Wis.2d 379, 391, 421 N.W.2d 835 (1988) (emphasis added) (cited by the majority op., ¶ 33.).

¶ 92 In Hackett v. Western Union Tel. Co., 80 Wis. 187, 49 N.W. 822 (1891), this court recognized that employing an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work renders the employer liable for injuries caused by the sole negligence of the contractor. The Hackett court described the liability as follows:

Hackett, 80 Wis. at 193, 49 N.W. 822.

¶ 93 The court reiterated this principle of vicarious liability of an employer who employs an independent contractor to perform inherently dangerous activity in subsequent cases, notably in Carlson v. Stocking, 91 Wis. 432, 435, 65 N.W. 58 (1895) (cited in majority op., ¶ 27) and Medley v. Trenton Inv. Co., 205 Wis. 30, 36, 236 N.W. 713 (1931) (cited in majority op., ¶ 31).

¶ 94 The majority opinion properly concludes that spraying herbicides is inherently dangerous as a matter of law in the context and facts of the instant case. Majority op., ¶¶ 58-60. If an activity is inherently dangerous and an independent contractor, in performing that activity, negligently causes harm to a third party, then the employer of the independent contractor is liable, irrespective of the employer's own negligence.

¶ 95 Applying the rule to the instant case, Luethi may be liable for the harm caused to the innocent neighbor plaintiff if it is proved that the independent contractor was causally negligent in spraying the herbicides, an inherently dangerous activity. The only remaining question, in my opinion, for the circuit court on remand is whether the independent contractor was causally negligent in damaging the innocent neighbor plaintiff's property. The inquiry should end here.

¶ 96 Yet the majority opinion appends a confusing and unnecessary additional step to the inquiry on remand.

¶ 97 I turn now to the majority opinion's additional step, requiring the innocent neighbor plaintiff to prove on remand that Luethi (the employer of the independent contractor in the present case) knew or had reason to know about the danger inherent in the spraying of the herbicide. See majority op., ¶¶ 13-14, 53-56.28

III

¶ 98 In the present case, this court has declared that as a matter of law the activity of the independent contractor spraying herbicides was inherently dangerous.29 In order to declare an activity "inherently dangerous" as a matter of law, the majority opinion rules that the activity poses a "naturally expected risk of harm." Majority op., ¶¶ 14, 10, 11, 58. Wisconsin Civil Jury Instruction 1022.6 explains that "[i]nherently dangerous work is work from which one can naturally expect harm to arise unless something is done to avoid that harm." If a risk of harm is "naturally expected," then the reasonable person, as a matter of law, knows or has reason to know that an increased risk of harm is "inherent in or normal to the work."30

¶ 99 Once the court has determined as a matter of law that the activity is "inherently dangerous," that is, that the activity poses a naturally expected risk of harm, the court has determined that a reasonable person in the position of Luethi knew or had reason to know the activity was inherently dangerous. Majority op., ¶¶ 8, 55. The end!

¶ 100 Sister state jurisdictions have similarly recognized that the "knows or has reason to know" element is included within the designation of an activity as "inherently dangerous."31

¶ 101 In Huddleston v. Union Rural Electric Association, 841 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1992), the Colorado Supreme Court outlined the link between "inherently dangerous" activities and the "knows or has reason to know" element as follows:

Huddleston, 841 P.2d at 289-90 (emphasis added).

¶ 102 Thus, in order to determine whether an activity is "inherently dangerous," a court must look to the "knows or has reason to know" element before determining an activity "inherently dangerous," not the other way around. Whether the employer "knows or has reason to know" of the inherent danger is part of the objective test for determining whether an activity is inherently dangerous. If a danger is "inherent," it must necessarily be one that an employer of an independent contractor (using the reasonable person objective standard) expects to occur from the particular activity.

¶ 103 Nevertheless, the majority opinion reasons that on remand the factfinder must determine whether a reasonable person knew or had reason to know what the court has already determined to be "the naturally expected risk of harm." I find this reasoning perplexing and contradictory to the majority opinion's holding that, as a matter of law, reasonable people know or have reason to know that the spraying of herbicides in the instant case is inherently dangerous.

¶ 104 The "knew or had reason to know" element is satisfied in the present case as a definitional part of "inherently dangerous," rather than as an additional question of fact to be determined after this court declares the activity inherently dangerous as a matter of law.

IV

¶ 105 The majority opinion declares that in order to determine whether vicarious liability exists for Luethi in the instant case, the fact finder must examine "whether Luethi failed to use ordinary care with regard to any danger inherent in the herbicide spraying that he knew or had reason to know about." Majority op., ¶ 59.

¶ 106 Nevertheless, the majority opinion asserts that "if spraying [herbicides] is an inherently dangerous activity, then it gives rise to a duty of ordinary care for [the employer of the independent contractor] for the acts of the independent contractor." Majority op., ¶ 8. Yet, as our case law adopting the principles of tort law for inherently dangerous activities clearly demonstrates, the employer's behavior does not govern the liability of the employer for the causal tortious conduct of the independent contractor who is engaged in an inherently dangerous activity. The employer in such circumstances is vicariously liable irrespective of his or her own fault.

¶ 107 The majority opinion asserts that the need to address the factual question of the due care of the employer who employs an independent contractor derives from Wisconsin's pattern jury instruction for the liability of an employer for the torts of an independent contractor and from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413.

A

¶ 108 The majority opinion comments on the special verdict form and the pattern jury instructions as follows:

Majority op., ¶ 11 n.8.32

¶ 109 The instant case is a summary judgment case. No jury instruction or special verdict is involved.

¶ 110 The majority opinion confuses whose ordinary care and wrongdoing is at issue in the instant case, which is a vicarious liability case. It is the independent contractor's causal negligence that matters, not Luethi's. Luethi was not spraying any herbicides himself in the instant case. He is vicariously liable for the causal negligence of his independent contractor in applying the herbicides — an inherently dangerous activity.

¶ 111 I am unpersuaded by the jury instruction's references to the employer's failure to use ordinary care. The comments to the jury instruction are not supported by the case law cited.33

¶ 112 The Wagner case, cited by the jury instruction,34 specifically states that the employer's liability for the negligent acts of its independent contractor in performing inherently dangerous activities exists "irrespective of whether the employer is himself or herself at fault."35

¶ 113 The other cases cited in the comments to the jury instruction declare that the employer's own acts and negligence are irrelevant to the determination of the employer's vicarious liability for the causal negligence of an independent contractor performing an inherently dangerous activity:

Wertheimer v. Saunders, 95 Wis. 573, 581, 70 N.W. 824 (1897) (emphasis added). That is, regardless of any wrongdoing on the part of the employer, when the activity is one that is "certain to be attended with injurious consequences," liability attaches to the employer for the causal negligence of the independent contractor.

¶ 114 In Finkelstein v. Majestic Realty Corp., 198 Wis. 527, 224 N.W. 743 (1929) (also cited in the comments to the jury instruction), there were multiple theories of negligence of an independent contractor for a roof tile that fell onto a roadway: First, the employer's failure to inspect; and second, the negligence of the independent contractor in applying the roof tiles. The Finkelstein jury found no negligence on the part of the independent contractors and thus only the employer's own negligence was at issue. Nevertheless, the Finkelstein court stated the general rule for the liability of an employer who employs an independent contractor who negligently performs an inherently dangerous activity as follows:

Finkelstein v. Majestic Realty Corp., 198 Wis. 527, 537, 224 N.W. 743 (1929).

¶ 115 Thus, it is clear, as we have explained previously, that there are two separate inquiries in determining the liability of an employer who employs an independent contractor: (1) whether the employer himself engaged in any wrongdoing; and (2) whether, in the case of an independent contractor performing an inherently dangerous activity, the independent contractor committed causal negligence in performing the activity. If the activity is inherently dangerous, the employer's liability is vicarious: the negligence of the independent contractor attaches to the employer regardless of the principal employer's own actions.

¶ 116 Rather than clarify the jury instruction, the majority opinion simply extends the confusion. I am persuaded that the Wisconsin Jury Instructions Committee should consider clarifying the jury instruction in light of the case law upon which the instruction relies.

B

¶ 117 In an attempt to buttress its conclusion that the employer's personal duty of ordinary care is relevant in the instant case, the majority opinion also relies on Section 413 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a section that it acknowledges is entirely inapplicable to the instant case. Section 413 discusses only the fault of the employer, not the vicarious liability at issue in the instant case.36

¶ 118 Indeed, the majority opinion properly acknowledges that Section 413 is inapplicable to the instant case because the innocent neighbor plaintiff alleges no wrongdoing on the part of Luethi.37 Specifically, the plaintiffs "did not allege in the complaint that any harm was caused by [Luethi]." Majority op., ¶ 33 n.19.

* * * *

¶ 119 By muddling through direct liability and vicarious liability of an employer who employs an independent contractor and failing to state the doctrines clearly, the majority opinion has injected confusion into the law. Furthermore, the majority opinion has shifted the liability for inherently dangerous activities from an employer who employs the independent contractor for an inherently dangerous activity, the person who reaped the benefits of the contracted work, to the innocent neighbor plaintiff, who had no knowledge about or control over the spraying of herbicides.

¶ 120 The majority opinion has subverted the long-standing rationale for the "inherently dangerous exception," and indeed jeopardizes the vitality of the "inherently dangerous" doctrine. If a plaintiff must show that an employer who employs an independent contractor has breached the employer's own duty of ordinary care, in what way does a case of "inherently dangerous" activity differ from any other negligence claim against the employer?

¶ 121 As the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm explains, the "inherently dangerous activity" doctrine imposing vicarious liability on an employer of an independent contractor for the tortious actions of the independent contractor is motivated by public policy concerns.38 That is, once the activity is one that a reasonable person knows or has reason to know would pose a peculiar risk, the liability for creating such a risk falls on the employer for the torts of the independent contractor, not the innocent third parties harmed by such torts.

¶ 122 The majority opinion has apparently converted a longstanding rule that an employer of an independent contractor is vicariously liable for the torts of an independent contractor in performing inherently dangerous activities into one of an employer's liability for the employer's personal negligence and has converted a rule that places the burden of risk for inherently dangerous activities on the person creating those dangers into a rule placing that burden on innocent third parties. This outcome is contrary to the letter and the rationale of our case law, the Restatements of Torts, treatises, and case law from other states.

¶ 123 For the reasons set forth, I write separately.

¶ 124 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and DAVID T. PROSSER join this opinion.