LYNN ADELMAN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Isaac Sawyer, doing business as A-1 Security Locksmiths, brought this putative class action in state court, alleging that defendant Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. ("Atlas") violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227, by faxing it an unsolicited advertisement. On April 14, 2010, Atlas removed the case based on the presence of a federal question. On April 21, 2010, plaintiff filed an action in state court against Atlas and West Bend Mutual Insurance Company ("West Bend"), seeking a declaration that an insurance policy that West Bend issued to Atlas affords coverage for any liability Atlas might incur as a result of plaintiff's TCPA claim. On April 30, 2010, West Bend moved to intervene in the present case, seeking a declaration that its policy does not provide coverage
I first address whether I have subject matter jurisdiction over West Bend's claim. West Bend's request to intervene and for a declaratory judgment presents no independent basis for jurisdiction, such as federal-question or diversity jurisdiction. Rather, West Bend relies on supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, arguing that its claim forms part of the same case or controversy as plaintiff's claim against Atlas. (Prop. Intervenor Compl. ¶ 3.) Assuming that I could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over West Bend's claim pursuant to Section 1367(a), however, I would decline to do so because such claim "raises a novel or complex issue of State law," 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). Specifically, West Bend asks me to resolve whether its general commercial liability policy provides coverage for claims under the TCPA. As far as I can tell, no Wisconsin court has addressed this issue, and thus West Bend's claim involves a novel question of state law. I therefore conclude that this claim should be addressed in the pending state-court litigation rather than here.
Because the parties agree that the merits of this case may be stayed pending resolution of the coverage issue in state court, I will enter such a stay. However, so that the motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations—which has been fully briefed and is ready for decision—does not languish on the docket, I will exempt that motion from the stay and decide it in a separate order.
Therefore,